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1. Introduction 
1.1 Subject and Purpose of the Thesis 
Recently, public discussions on tax policy have mainly centered around profit shift-
ing activities by large, multinational firms.
1
 The majority of businesses, however, is made up 
of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In the European Union, they account for 
99.8% of all businesses and 67% of total employment.
2
 Moreover, SMEs are widely per-
ceived to be the engine of growth and innovation for the economy.
3
 Accordingly, the Europe-
an Commission (EC) regards the “capacity to build on the growth and innovation potential of 
small and medium-sized enterprises” to be incremental for the future prosperity of the Euro-
pean Union (EU).
4 
The creation of a “world-class environment for SMEs” has thus become a 
major goal of the European Commission.
5
 
While the need of an attractive business environment for SMEs is widely agreed up-
on, it is less apparent how to create it. SMEs face disadvantages with regard to financing, 
competition failures and disproportionate regulatory burdens compared to large enterprises. 
An attractive business environment minimizes the impact of these obstacles and aims at 
providing a level playing field for firms of all sizes, industries and legal forms.
6 
Taxation is an 
important component of the regulatory framework in which businesses operate. It constitutes 
a major, inevitable cost factor for all businesses. For policy-makers, taxation is a particularly 
interesting feature of the business environment as it can be directly influenced and controlled 
through legislation.
7
 Occasionally, however, tax legislation is excessively and inappropriately 
utilized to compensate for problems not related to taxation and the creation of a neutral and 
efficient tax system takes a back seat.
8
 
                                                 
1
 See Fuest/Spengel/Finke/Heckemeyer/Nusser (2013) pp. 307 ff.; OECD (2013a) pp. 9 ff. 
2
 See European Commission (2015a) p. 7. 
3
 See Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (2014) p. 2; European Commission (2013) pp. 3 f.; OECD 
(2009a) p. 22. 
4
 See European Commission (2008) p. 2.  
5
 See European Commission (2008) p. 2. SMEs were again prominently featured in the Commission’s 2020 
Strategy as a key driver of smart, sustainable and inclusive economic growth. The special focus of some of the 
EC’s flagship initiatives on SMEs as well the Annual Reports on the Performance of SMEs constitute further 
indicators for SMEs’ perceived significance in the European Union. See European Commission (2010a) pp. 10 
ff.; European Commission (2015a) pp. 7 ff.  
6
 See European Commission (2013) pp. 8 ff.; Lee (2014) pp. 183 ff.; BIS (2015) pp. 74 ff. 
7
 See OECD (2009a) pp. 31 ff.; European Commission (2015b) pp. 75 ff.  
8
 See OECD (2001a) pp. 87 ff. 
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The use of tax incentives specifically targeted at SMEs may be one of these occa-
sions. Preferential treatment for certain groups of taxpayers generally interferes with the neu-
trality and the efficiency of the tax system and the social benefits of any tax incentive have to 
be carefully weighed against the related costs.
9
 The adequacy of SME tax incentives thus 
hinges on the desirable traits of small and medium-sized enterprises and incentives’ effective-
ness in fostering these traits to the benefit of society as a whole.
 
Policy-makers across Europe 
apparently consider these two prerequisites to be given as SME tax incentives have become a 
commonly used policy instrument in Europe as well as the rest of the world. 
The thesis at hand analyzes and evaluates the current use of SME tax incentives in 
the European Union. In this endeavor, three major questions are addressed: 
1) Which countries do currently employ SME tax incentives and how do they imple-
ment them? 
2) What are the effects of SME tax incentives on eligible enterprises as well as on the 
economy as a whole? 
3) Should SME tax incentives be used and if so, how can they be designed adequately? 
The overall goal of the thesis is to provide policy-makers with clear-cut advice on the 
usage of special tax treatments for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. At best, the 
analysis reinforces the role of scientific evidence in the public debate on SME tax incentives 
and helps to base future actions on economic rationale rather than heuristics and public mis-
conceptions. 
1.2 Outline of the Thesis  
The following analysis starts in Chapter 2 by discussing different approaches to de-
fining and identifying the group of small and medium-sized enterprises. An uncomplicated 
and inexpensive identification of SMEs is especially relevant in the context of taxation as 
eligibility needs to be monitored by tax administrations for a large number of taxpayers. Sec-
tion 2.2 continues with a brief description of the main design dimensions along which the 
different forms of SME tax incentives need to be distinguished. This distinction is the founda-
tion of an adequate evaluation of SME tax incentives as the different types vary significantly 
                                                 
9
 See Klemm (2010) p. 324.  
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in their merits and their shortcomings. Closing the second chapter, the most important re-
quirements for well-designed tax incentives are presented. These properties constitute the 
assessment criteria for the following analysis and provide a framework for the systematic 
evaluation of the pros and cons of SME incentives.  
Chapter 3 comprises an overview of currently available tax incentives in the EU as 
well as a quantitative analysis of their impact on effective tax burdens. The qualitative analy-
sis aims in particular at identifying and evaluating common practices with regard to the types 
of available incentives and the ways in which taxpayers are targeted. The quantitative analysis 
builds hereon and provides further insight on the actual size of the reliefs. For this purpose, 
effective tax burdens are calculated with the help of the European Tax Analyzer, a widely 
acknowledged program that permits the detailed simulation of the development of a model 
company and its tax burden.  
In Chapters 4 and 5, the general appropriateness of SME tax incentives as a policy 
tool is assessed by reviewing the arguments presented in their favor and by examining the 
costs of SME-specific regimes. Among the narratives supporting the use of tax incentives, 
two lines of argumentation need to be distinguished: The SME sector is either argued to make 
particularly valuable contributions to the economy that need to be reinforced (mostly due to 
market failure) or tax incentives are considered to be a compensation for disadvantages faced 
by SMEs as a consequence of their size, especially with regard to regulatory requirements.  
The costs of SME tax incentives, on the other hand, arise as eligibility for preferential tax 
treatment is restricted to businesses of a certain size or a certain legal form. These restrictions 
incentivize firms to choose into the respective size classes or legal forms in order to gain ac-
cess to tax benefits. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 empirically test, if and to what extent these distor-
tions really occur before Section 5.3 summarizes the results of the empirical analyses and 
provides a brief overview of other potential costs arising from SME tax incentives.  
Chapter 6 concludes the main part and shifts the focus from tax incentives specifical-
ly targeted at SMEs to the design of an investment-friendly tax system for the entirety of en-
terprises including SMEs. The development of the German tax code is taken as a case study 
that exemplifies how recent trends in business taxation have affected the investment environ-
ment for large as well as for small and medium-sized entities. The case study centers around 
two reforms in 2001 and 2008 whose goals explicitly included improved investment condi-
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tions for the so-called Mittelstand.
10
 The main changes of these reforms are presented and 
their impact is measured with the help of effective tax rates based on the neoclassical model 
by Devereux and Griffith.
11
 Based on the findings, recommendations for the development of a 
neutral, investment friendly tax system are provided. These recommendations focus on the 
specific needs of SMEs but – in contrast to the majority of currently available SME tax incen-
tives – do not pursue a partitioning of taxpayers that inevitably introduces distortions to the 
tax system. 
Lastly, Chapter 7 concludes and summarizes the main findings of the thesis. 
1.3 Co-Authors and Publication Status of Projects 
Parts of this monograph have originally been written for publication in journals and 
other outlets. They are the work of multiple authors. Table 1 informs about the different co-
authors and the publication status for each paper. In addition, the key contributions of the au-
thor of this monograph are highlighted. 
 
                                                 
10
 See Deutscher Bundestag (2000) p. 92; Deutscher Bundestag (2007) pp 1 ff. 
11
 For a detailed description of the model, see Sections 6.3 and 6.4.3.1 as well as Devereux/Griffith (1999) 
pp. 7 ff. and Devereux/Griffith (2003) pp. 109 ff. 
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Table 1: Co-authors and publication status of projects 
Project Section Co-authors Publication status Own key contributions 
Tax Incentives for Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises in the European Union  
1, 3 & 4 Rainer Bräutigam 
Maria Theresia Evers 
Christoph Spengel 
Discussion Paper  introduction and positioning of the paper 
 analysis of effective tax burdens 
 analysis of policy rationale for SME tax 
incentives 
 summarizing assessment of SME tax 
incentives as a policy instrument 
Taxpayer Bunching Around Thresholds for 
SME Tax Incentives 
5.1 Heiko Vay Discussion Paper (in preparation)  introduction and positioning of the paper 
 research and description of institutional 
background 
 empirical analysis including bunching 
estimates and matching analysis 
 analysis and summarizing assessment of 
economic implications of taxpayer 
bunching 
Simplified Tax Accounting and the Choice of 
Legal Form 
5.2 Jost H. Heckemeyer Accepted in  
European Accounting Review 
 introduction and positioning of the paper 
 research and description of institutional 
background 
 empirical analysis including difference-
in-difference analysis, panel analysis and 
robustness checks 
 interpretation of results and derivation of 
economic implications 
Investitionswirkungen der deutschen Unter-
nehmensbesteuerung im internationalen Ver-
gleich: eine Analyse vor dem Hintergrund der 
Steuerreformen 2001 und 2008 unter Berück-
sichtigung grenzüberschreitender Investitio-
nen 
6 Christoph Spengel Published in  
Zukunftsfähigkeit in den Mittel-
punkt – Jahresgutachten 2015/16  
(Sachverständigenrat zur Begut-
achtung der gesamtwirtschaftli-
chen Entwicklung) 
 introduction and positioning of the study 
 research and presentation of institutional 
background 
 description of Devereux/Griffith model 
 analysis and interpretation of effective 
tax rates 
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2. Design of Tax Incentives for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
2.1 Definition of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
As a first step in the design of SME tax incentives as well as in the discussion of 
their appropriateness, it needs to be defined what an SME is. Perceptions of the terms SME or 
small business vary significantly. While some may only consider the very smallest businesses 
with an owner-manager and no or very few employees to be small, others could also view the 
companies listed in the SDAX or even the MDAX as part of this group. Which businesses are 
considered small (or medium-sized) is highly dependent on the specific context and the pur-
pose of the definition.
12
  
With regard to the design of SME tax incentives, precise, clear-cut definition criteria 
for targeted businesses need to be formulated in order to provide taxpayers as well as tax ad-
ministrations with legal certainty.
13
 In this respect, either qualitative or quantitative indicators 
can be referred to in order to distinguish SMEs from their larger counterparts. Given the struc-
tural differences in firm characteristics across industries and countries, quantitative criteria 
bear the risk of introducing substantial arbitrariness to the size classification of enterprises, in 
particular around the respective thresholds on employment, turnover and other measures.
14
 
Moreover, quantitative indicators are susceptible to accounting policies and tax planning.
15
 
Qualitative or “economic” criteria may thus be the more adequate and versatile instrument for 
distinguishing small from large entities.
16
  
The existence of actively managing owners is a qualitative feature of many small 
businesses that is especially important for business taxation. It determines the nature of the 
business owner’s income as well as her opportunities for shifting income between different 
tax bases.
17
 Hence, it may be sensible to refer to active and passive owners when differentiat-
                                                 
12
 See Crawford/Freedman (2010) p. 1029; Gale/Brown (2013) p. 872. 
13
 See Crawford/Freedman (2010) p. 1035. 
14
 An enterprise with a certain turnover, for example, may be considered large in the personal service sector but 
rather small for a manufacturer. For a detailed discussion of the relation between industry characteristics and 
firm size, see Kumar/Rajan/Zingales (2001) pp. 11 ff. 
15
 Several studies have recently shown taxpayers to bunch below thresholds at which eligibility for tax benefits 
expires. See, for example, Saez (2010) pp. 180 ff.; Chetty/Saez (2013) pp. 1 ff.; Kleven/Waseem (2013) pp. 
669 ff. 
16
 See Bolton (1971) p. 1. 
17
 In contrast to passive owners of enterprises, an owner-manager derives business and labor income from the 
business which can have implications for applicable tax rates and allowances. As a consequence, he can design 
contracts in ways that allow him to minimize his personal tax liability. By means of legal form choice, for exam-
ple, business profits can be assigned to either corporate or personal income taxation. Owner-managers can also 
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ing between small and large businesses in taxation. While appealing in theory, this approach 
raises difficulties in practice as tax administrations will have trouble to separate actively man-
aging owners from those owners only pretending to do so.
18
 Moreover, owner-managed firms 
are not necessarily small in terms of employment, market power and other relevant indica-
tors.
19
 Since tax incentives mostly aim at compensating for market failures and disadvantages 
arising from being small,
20
 they would be misdirected in many situations if solely based on 
the distinction of active and passive owners. 
Legal form is another proxy for firm size that is discussed in the literature and re-
ferred to in tax codes. Evidentially, firm size and the propensity to incorporate are positively 
correlated.
21
 Similarly to active ownership, however, legal form is not an accurate indicator to 
target small businesses when designing tax incentives. Despite the proven correlation, there 
are numerous examples of large non-corporate entities as well as small businesses being cor-
porations.
22
 In addition, taxpayers who can hardly be considered business owners regularly 
take the legal form of a sole proprietorship or a partnership.
23
 SME tax incentives building 
exclusively on legal form to restrict eligibility for tax incentives would inadvertently benefit 
these taxpayers, too. 
Apparently, easy-to-track qualitative indicators do not provide the required accuracy 
in identifying small businesses as neither the owner’s involvement in management nor legal 
form are properties that can be exclusively attributed to small businesses. The same problem 
occurs for other indicators such as being listed on a stock exchange or being part of a corpo-
rate group.
24
 On the other hand, qualitative proxies offering a more precise identification (e.g., 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
more easily reclassify business income to be either labor income or capital income in the form of interest pay-
ments, dividends or capital gains. See Jacobs/Scheffler/Spengel (2015) pp. 99 f. 
18
 See Crawford/Freedman (2010) pp. 1035 f. 
19
 Some of Germany’s largest enterprises, for example the Dr. August Oetker KG and the Schwarz Beteiligungs, 
are managed or were managed by their (co-)owners. 
20
 See Holtz-Eakin (1995) pp. 390 ff. 
21
 This pattern is caused by the non-tax benefits connected to incorporation that become increasingly important 
as an enterprise expands, e.g., limited liability, facilitated risk diversification and formalized governance struc-
tures. See Fama/Jensen (1983a) pp. 304 ff.; Fama/Jensen (1985) pp. 109 ff.; MacKie-Mason/Gordon (1997) pp. 
484 ff. 
22
 The largest non-corporate entities in Germany, for example, include the Dr. August Oetker KG, the Tengel-
mann Warenhandelsgesellschaft KG and the Miele & Cie. KG.    
23
 Such taxpayers may be people pursuing their hobbies or certain kinds of consultants not really conducting an 
independent business. See Gale/Brown (2013) p. 873. 
24
 See Bolton (1971) pp. 1 f.; Crawford/Freedman (2010) pp. 1035 f.; Guenther (2009) p. 1 ff. 
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market share
25
 or market power
26
) are not reliably observable and verifiable at reasonable 
costs for taxpayers and tax administrations. There is a trade-off between accuracy and feasi-
bility when identifying small (and medium-sized) businesses. This trade-off cannot be solved 
adequately by qualitative criteria alone. Hence, in terms of legal certainty, it seems inevitable 
to use quantitative indicators when defining and verifying eligibility for size-related tax incen-
tives for a large number of taxpayers. 
The most prominent and widely used SME definition in Europe has been established 
by the European Commission.
27
 It employs three quantitative criteria to distinguish four dif-
ferent size classes. Enterprises are classified as either micro, small, medium-sized or large 
according to their number of employees, annual turnover and balance sheet totals (see Table 
2). According to the SME definition by the European Commission, enterprises need to meet 
the employment threshold and either the turnover threshold or the maximum balance sheet 
total to be assigned to the respective size category.
28
 Tying the classification to turnover or 
balance sheet total accounts – at least partly – for industry-specific characteristics. Retailers, 
for example, can still be classified in the same category as comparable service providers de-
spite having a higher average turnover.
29
 Arbitrariness is introduced by the use of absolute 
thresholds, though. Deeming an enterprise to be large just because turnover amounts to € 50.1 
million instead of € 50 million appears questionable, especially as accounting numbers can be 
managed by businesses. On the other hand, referring to relative thresholds (i.e., defining cer-
tain percentiles of the business population to be small) does not seem to be a feasible option 
either due to restrictions in data availability.
 
In addition, relative thresholds introduce arbitrar-
iness as well as a firm’s size classification would depend on the size and the development of 
the market it operates in. Given these drawbacks, relative measures would also impair the 
transparency of the classification because enterprises can neither estimate their “ranking” ex 
ante nor ex post. 
                                                 
25
 See Bolton (1971) p. 1. 
26
 See 15 U.S.C. § 632 (a) (1). 
27
 The European Commission first published a Commission recommendation on the definition of small and me-
dium-sized enterprises in 1996. Since then the recommendation has been followed by several updates. The fol-
lowing discussion is based on the most recent definition provided by the Commission recommendation of May 
6, 2003. Furthermore, the Commission has issued an updated user guide to the SME definition in 2015 that is 
also drawn upon. See European Commission (1996) pp. 4 ff.; European Commission (2003) pp. 36 ff.; European 
Commission (2015c) pp. 1 f. 
28
 See European Commission (2003) p. 39. 
29
 Retailers usually incur lower profit margins than other sectors such as the service sector and the manufacturing 
sector. Data on average net margins for the U.S. as well as Europe, Japan and emerging markets can be accessed 
through the Damodaran Online database that is provided by Aswath Damodaran: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/ 
~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/margin.html (retrieved on May 8, 2016). 
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Table 2: SME definition by the European Commission 
Category Number of employees Turnover Balance sheet total 
Micro < 10 ≤ € 2 million ≤ € 2 million 
Small < 50 ≤ € 10 million ≤ € 10 million 
Medium < 250 ≤ € 50 million ≤ € 43 million 
 
Besides the abovementioned quantitative criteria, the SME definition by the Europe-
an Commission also includes provisions on related parties. An enterprise must not own 25% 
or more of the capital or the voting rights of potentially related parties to be considered inde-
pendent. Furthermore, no external party must hold 25% or more of the capital or the voting 
rights of the enterprise.
30
 If these requirements are not met, the thresholds for employment, 
turnover and balance sheet total apply for the whole group of enterprises instead of the stand-
alone entity.
31
  
In the United States (U.S.), the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) uses a 
different approach to identify so-called small businesses that are eligible for federal govern-
ment programs. While the standards also refer to annual receipts, the number of employees 
and total assets
32
, only one of the indicators applies to each industry. In fact, the industry code 
of a firm not only determines the relevant indicator but also the applicable threshold. In the 
manufacturing sector, for example, the number of employees is the primary measure whereas 
in the service sector annual receipts decide about the small business status. The exact thresh-
olds vary between 100 and 1,500 employees and $ 0.75 million and $ 38.5 million, respec-
tively.
33
 The U.S. approach is clearly more refined as far as industry-specific firm characteris-
tics are concerned. This, however, increases complexity in the identification of size classes. 
Moreover, the U.S. standard does not distinguish micro, small and medium-sized enterprises 
from each other. 
                                                 
30
 Exceptions apply to certain kinds of investors such as venture capital investors, business angels, institutional 
investors or public bodies. 
31
 See European Commission (2015c) pp. 16 f. 
32
 Total assets are only considered for the banking sector. 
33
 See SBA (2016) pp. 2 ff. 
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The definitions by the European Commission and the SBA are both designed to pro-
vide simple, easy-to-verify size classifications for SME-specific policies.
34
 With regard to tax 
incentives, employment, turnover and assets are operationally suitable indicators as they are 
obtained in the ordinary tax assessment process. Their usage thus minimizes the administra-
tive costs related to potential SME tax incentives.
35
 Nevertheless, international tax codes also 
employ other criteria such as taxable income, book equity and the number of shareholders to 
target size-related tax incentives and treatments.
36
 While these indicators show similar admin-
istrative features as the aforementioned indicators, they are likely to introduce even more arbi-
trariness to the size classification of enterprises. Whether a firm is considered to be small, for 
example, should rather depend on the absolute amount of capital raised than the mere number 
of shareholders. Book equity, on the other hand, not only depends on size but also on the 
forms of financing chosen and the profitability of a firm. The same is true for taxable income 
as even the largest enterprises may only have minimal or even negative taxable income. In-
centives solely based on profits may therefore lead to misdirected incentives. Moreover, taxa-
ble income is particularly susceptible to manipulation as it is the calculation base of income 
taxation and thus the primary target of tax planning and tax avoidance activities by taxpay-
ers.
37
 
Altogether, the indicators chosen by the European Commission and the SBA in their 
definitions of SMEs – employment, turnover and total assets – appear to be the most reliable 
measures to identify micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. They can be measured and 
verified at reasonable costs which also makes them attractive from an administrative point of 
view. The same combination of an economically sensible classification at comparably low 
costs can neither be provided by other quantitative indicators nor by qualitative criteria.
38
 The 
definition of rigid absolute thresholds naturally comes along with arbitrariness, though. Small 
is a relative, somewhat ambiguous term.
39
 Consequently, there is no point in arguing for ei-
ther the EC thresholds or the SBA thresholds. Both sets of thresholds have their pros and 
                                                 
34
 See European Commission (1996) p. 4; SBA (2016) p. 1. 
35
 Minor differences may occur between financial accounts and tax accounts. Tax incentives should therefore 
explicitly refer to tax accounts.   
36
 See Section 3.1 for a comprehensive overview of available SME tax incentives and related eligibility criteria.  
37
 See Allingham/Sandmo (1972) pp. 323 ff. The other quantitative indicators, however, are – at least to a certain 
degree – also manageable as was shown by several studies on bunching behavior of taxpayers around eligibility 
thresholds. See Onji (2009) pp. 766 ff.; Almunia/Rodriguez-Lopez (2016) pp. 1 ff. For a comprehensive analysis 
of bunching behavior at eligibility thresholds for SME tax incentives, also see Section 5.1. 
38
 See CSES (2012) p. 15. 
39
 See Crawford/Freedman (2010) p. 1035. 
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cons. With regard to the European approach, however, legislators should keep in mind that 
using uniform values across all industries and countries of the European Union is a simplifica-
tion. Depending on the respective industry dynamics and domestic price levels, the given 
thresholds have different implications for different sectors and countries.
40
 Moreover, it needs 
to be pointed out that the adequacy of the European Commission’s SME definition for sorting 
and categorizing enterprises does not imply or confirm the general desirability of a size-based 
partitioning of taxpayers. 
Still, the remainder of this thesis will take the European Commission’s definition as a 
starting point. The analysis will focus on the group of enterprises that are deemed SMEs by 
this definition and the tax incentives targeted at them. Consequently, the terms micro, small 
and medium-sized enterprise as well as SME as a collective term will be used in accordance 
with the European Commission’s definition if not stated otherwise. It is also important to note 
that the term SME only relates to the size of a business. It is not a synonym for entrepreneuri-
al firms or family businesses although the latter two groups of enterprises primarily consist of 
small and medium-sized businesses.
41
 
2.2 Typology of SME Tax Incentives 
Tax incentives are special provisions of the tax code granting preferential treatment 
to certain activities, investments or taxpayers.
42
 With regard to SME tax incentives, the pref-
erential treatment takes many forms and available options for policy-makers can be broadly 
categorized along the lines of three key dimensions: 
1) Level of taxation: Does the incentive apply on the level of the enterprise or does it 
benefit the business owner upon extracting income from the business? This distinc-
tion primarily applies to businesses that are not taxed transparently (i.e., corpora-
tions, limited liability companies and – in some countries – certain forms of partner-
ships). In the case of transparently taxed entities (i.e., sole proprietors and partner-
ships), the two levels cannot be distinguished. 
                                                 
40
 The European Commission, being the responsible standard-maker, should also adjust the thresholds on a regu-
lar basis for productivity growth and inflation. See CSES (2012) p. 1. 
41
 See Hurst/Pugsley (2011) pp. 84 ff.; Kachaner/Stalk/Bloch (2012) pp. 103 f. 
42
 See Zee/Stotsky/Ley (2002) p. 1498; Klemm (2010) pp. 315 f.  
12 
 
2) Tax liability vs. compliance costs: Does the incentive address the actual tax liability 
or does it address the compliance costs that are related to the process of determining 
and settling the tax liability?  
3) Input vs. output-based incentives: Does the size of the relief depend on the amount 
and/or the kind of inputs invested within the enterprise or does it depend on the out-
come the investment generates (i.e., taxable income)? Input-based tax incentives in-
clude special depreciation schemes, investment allowances and tax credits while spe-
cial tax rates, exemptions and tax holidays constitute the most common output-based 
measures. 
In addition to the abovementioned three dimensions, further options arise in the de-
sign of SME tax incentives with regard to the specific design of the respective incentive 
types
43
 or with regard to additional eligibility restrictions not relating to firm size. Such re-
strictions refer to firm age (i.e., only new or young firms), location (i.e., only enterprises in 
certain regions), time (i.e., incentives only available for a certain period) and the sort of activi-
ty performed by the taxpayer (i.e., only businesses in a certain industry). Most importantly, 
however, incentives differ with regard to their way of targeting SMEs. They can either explic-
itly or implicitly target firms of a certain size. Explicit SME incentives use clear-cut thresh-
olds on quantitative size criteria (e.g., turnover) whereas implicit measures achieve a preferen-
tial treatment of SMEs in other ways. For example, limiting the absolute amount of available 
reliefs can induce disproportional advantages for SMEs without explicitly excluding large 
entities. If the caps are chosen appropriately, the relief only makes up a small amount of large 
businesses’ overall tax liability whereas small enterprises benefit more in relative terms.44  
For the purpose of this analysis, the term SME tax incentive is defined very broadly 
as any kind of special tax treatment that is particularly beneficial for enterprises within the 
SME spectrum given by the European Commission.
45
 This includes all benefits either emanat-
ing from schemes that are exclusively applicable to SMEs (explicit incentives) as well as 
those provisions that are especially advantageous for SMEs despite being generally applicable 
to all enterprises (implicit incentives).  
                                                 
43
 Input-based incentives, for example, may be incremental or volume-based, i.e., they only apply to investments 
exceeding a certain base amount or to the investment amount as a whole. Such features relating to specific incen-
tive types are discussed in more detail in Section 3.1.  
44
 For a more detailed discussion of implemented designs, eligibility criteria and practical examples from the EU 
Member States, see Section 3. 
45
 See European Commission (2003) pp. 36 ff. 
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2.3 Requirements for Adequate Tax Incentives  
The design of the tax system is crucial for attaining the maximum level of social wel-
fare while also generating sufficient revenues to cover the public budget. In this balancing act, 
equity, simplicity, efficiency and neutrality are the most important guiding principles.
46
 Obvi-
ously, the provision of tax incentives for particular groups of taxpayers per se violates these 
principles.
47
 Their implementation makes tax codes more complex and impacts on economic 
decision-making.
48
 Moreover, an exclusive group of taxpayers is favored over other, ineligi-
ble individuals and businesses. This is contradictory to the principles of horizontal as well as 
vertical equity.
49
  
Mostly, the correction of market failure is drawn on to justify such violations.
50
 Ac-
cording to this rationale, the benefits of removing or alleviating the effects of dysfunctions in 
the market outweigh the abovementioned disadvantages.
51
 In order to actually achieve and 
maximize a net benefit, tax incentives should generally exhibit four essential characteristics: 
1) Effectiveness: Above all, tax incentives need to effectively eliminate or at least alle-
viate the effects of the friction they are intended to address and achieve the economic 
betterment expected from the removal of the friction.
52
 In order to ensure the effec-
tiveness of an incentive, it is especially important to document why the incentive is 
implemented and how it is thought to address the underlying friction. Furthermore, 
the attainment of the goals needs to be monitored once the incentive is implemented 
so that adjustments can be made if necessary.
53
 With regard to SMEs, proponents 
bring forward a multitude of reasons for the use of tax incentives. They can be boiled 
down to two main arguments, though. First, there is not as much investment in SMEs 
as would be optimal for overall social welfare. Second, SMEs are put at a structural 
competitive disadvantage by the legal and institutional framework that would not oc-
                                                 
46
 See Arginelli (2015) pp. 10 ff.; Hansson/Brokelind (2014) pp. 170 ff. 
47
 See Klemm (2010) p. 324. 
48
 See Van Parys/James (2010) p. 401; Klemm/Van Parys (2012) p. 394. 
49
 See Shah (1995) p. 6; Hansson/Brokelind (2014) pp. 183 f. 
50
 Tax incentives for research and development (R&D) and related spillover effects as well as tax incentives 
supporting environment-friendly investments due to negative externalities are examples of market failures that 
have induced tax incentives. The attraction of foreign direct investment, regional development and employment 
creation are further motives for support schemes that have been named by policy-makers and researchers. See 
Shah (1995) pp. 4 ff.; Holland/Vann (1998) pp. 1004 ff.; Bondonio/Greenbaum (2007) pp. 121 ff. 
51
 See Shah (1995) pp. 6 ff.; Zee/Stotsky/Ley (2002) p.1501. 
52
 See Spengel/Müller-Rees/Endres/Harhoff/Heinemann/Hellwig/Hüther/Regierer/Schön/Stein (2009) p. 84. 
53
 See Storey (2014) pp. 28 ff. 
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cur in the absence of regulatory requirements.
54
 Adequate SME tax incentives should 
thus prevent underinvestment in SMEs and help to minimize competitive disad-
vantages of SMEs emanating from the regulatory framework. 
2) Simplicity and transparency: The minimization of compliance and administrative 
costs is best achieved through simple provisions that are easy to understand and 
comply with for taxpayers and easy to verify for tax administrations.
55
 Simplicity is 
especially important in the context of SME tax incentives as small businesses face 
disproportionally high compliance burdens.
56
 Transparency is another requirement 
closely related to simplicity. Taxpayers need to be able to reliably estimate the bene-
fits they receive and to adequately account for them in investment decisions.
57
 As 
decision-makers are usually risk-averse and incur costs in understanding complex 
legislation, the effect of an incentive is likely to increase in the certainty about avail-
able benefits.
58
 Besides the actual design, transparency is also influenced by the per-
sistence of an incentive over time. Frequent changes in the availability and the mag-
nitude of provided support are therefore detrimental to the transparency and the ef-
fectiveness of an incentive.
59
 Transparency also helps the government to reliably ac-
count and plan for losses in tax revenues and to adjust accordingly.
60
 
3) Neutrality: The provision of special tax treatment for a certain group of enterprises 
hurts the neutrality of the overall tax system.
61
 Tax incentives, however, should be 
designed in ways that keep the distortions to a minimum. The choice of legal form 
and financing, for example, should not be influenced. Hence, the size of the relief for 
eligible enterprises should not depend on legal form or capital structure.
62
 Moreover, 
                                                 
54
 See Section 4 for a comprehensive discussion of potential reasons to support SMEs. 
55
 See Holland/Vann (1998) pp. 998 ff. 
56
 The disproportionate compliance burden for small businesses is due to the large share of fixed costs. For an 
extensive review of the literature on compliance costs, see Eichfelder (2010) pp. 50 ff. 
57
 There are three main dimensions of transparency. First, the legal and regulatory dimension that grants a high 
degree of certainty about the support to taxpayers. Second, the economic dimension demands a clear economic 
justification of the incentives, which also needs to be communicated to the public. Last, the administrative di-
mension of transparency demands the amount of discretion of administrations in the granting of support to be 
minimal. See Zee/Stotsky/Ley (2002) p. 1502. 
58
 See Derregia/Chittenden (2007) p. 7; Bal (2014) p. 65. 
59
 See Shah (1995) p. 9; Spengel/Müller-Rees/Endres/Harhoff/Heinemann/Hellwig/Hüther/Regierer/Schön/Stein 
(2009) p. 82. 
60
 See Bal (2014) p. 69; European Commission (2015b) pp. 150 f. 
61
 See Klemm (2010) p. 324. 
62
 See Spengel/Müller-Rees/Endres/Harhoff/Heinemann/Hellwig/Hüther/Regierer/Schön/Stein (2009) p. 84; 
European Commission (2015b) pp. 150 f. 
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investment decisions of eligible businesses should not be altered but only facilitated. 
And most importantly with regard to SME tax incentives, businesses must not be 
prevented from growth as eligibility for an incentive is on the line.
63
 
4) Efficiency: This criterion refers to the relationship of the outcomes and the costs of a 
tax incentive. The benefits do not only have to exceed the costs but the incentive also 
needs to be the most efficient way to achieve the desired outcome, i.e., there must 
neither be another instrument to accomplish the same effect at lower costs nor 
measures attaining better results at the same costs.
64
 In this regard, precise targeting 
of eligible taxpayers is crucial as it ensures intended businesses to gain access to the 
incentive while also minimizing unintended benefits for other taxpayers – those who 
do not require support or already receive it from other sources.
65
 So SME tax incen-
tives need to target the right businesses that exhibit the desired characteristics while 
also avoiding misuse by other enterprises in order to limit the losses in tax revenue.
66
 
Moreover, the implementation costs on the side of the tax administration and the 
compliance costs of taxpayers need to be kept at a minimum.
67
 The same applies for 
the social costs emanating from rent-seeking and corruption.
68
 As an incentive’s ef-
fectiveness determines the outcomes of a regime while the costs are primarily driven 
by its simplicity and its neutrality, efficiency constitutes a summary measure of the 
above three criteria.  
The above characteristics constitute the basis for the following analysis of SME tax 
incentives. The criteria and requirements may in part be conflicting, though. Incentives affect-
ing eligible businesses strongly, for example, are also likely to pose a bigger threat to the in-
vestment neutrality of the tax system as more generous reliefs come along with more discrim-
ination against ineligible investments. Moreover, the precision of the targeting of eligible en-
terprises usually increases in the complexity of provisions. Anti-avoidance rules in particular 
                                                 
63
 The problem of taxpayers bunching below thresholds beyond which marginal tax rates increase has recently 
been shown by numerous studies. For SME tax incentives that naturally apply size thresholds, the problem is 
especially relevant. See Section 5.1 for a detailed analysis of the subject as well as an overview of prior litera-
ture.  
64
 Importantly, adequate tax incentives need to be more efficient than other forms of tax incentives and more 
efficient than other non-tax measures (e.g., direct subsidies). See Thuronyi (1988) pp. 1186 ff.; 
Busom/Corchuelo/ Martinez-Ros (2014) p. 571 ff.; Hansson/Brokelind (2014) pp.176 f. 
65
 See Zee/Stotsky/Ley (2002) p.1502; Crawford/Freedman (2010) pp. 1075 ff. 
66
 See Holland/Vann (1998) pp. 988 ff. 
67
 See Holland/Vann (1998) pp. 988 ff.; Zee/Stotsky/Ley (2002) p.1502; Holland/Vann (1998) pp. 988 ff. 
68
 See Klemm (2010) p. 322. 
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make provisions more complicated and have the adverse effect of raising related compliance 
costs for SMEs, thus reducing the effective relief for eligible businesses.
69
 Well-designed 
support schemes need to balance the conflicting goals appropriately. If and how preferential 
tax treatment can do this more adequately than other policy instruments with regard to SMEs 
is the key question in the evaluation of SME tax incentives. 
 
 
                                                 
69
 See Holland/Vann (1998) p. 989; Crawford/Freedman (2010) p. 1077; Van Parys/James (2010) p. 401. 
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3. SME Tax Incentives in the European Union 
The following section takes a first step in the evaluation of SME tax incentives and 
discusses currently available regimes in the European Union. Specifically, Section 3.1 starts 
with the qualitative analysis of the status quo. A comprehensive overview of the incentives as 
available for taxpayers in 2015 is provided and the main design features and their benefits as 
well as their disadvantages are discussed. On the firm level, input-based and output-based 
measures are distinguished before continuing with shareholder-level measures and purely 
administrative reliefs. Building on the results of the qualitative analysis, the firm-level incen-
tives are examined quantitatively. Using the European Tax Analyzer, a simulation program 
developed at the Centre for European Economic Research, effective tax burdens for micro, 
small and medium-sized enterprises are derived. Showing the impact of SME tax incentives 
as a function of firm size as well as other firm characteristics such as profitability and capital 
intensity allows important conclusions on the importance of the respective regimes for enter-
prises as well as on the possibly distortionary effects. Lastly, Section 3.3 summarizes the 
main findings of the qualitative and the quantitative analysis. 
3.1 Overview of Available Regimes 
3.1.1 Input-Based Tax Incentives on the Firm Level 
3.1.1.1 Accelerated Depreciation 
Input-based tax incentives base the preferential tax treatment on the amount and the 
kind of investments made by eligible taxpayers. They can be offered on the enterprise level as 
well as on the shareholder level. The latter is less common, though.
70
 The general idea behind 
these schemes is to reward investment itself rather than privileging the returns derived from 
the investment. If the incentive applies as intended, the relief is incurred early in the invest-
ment cycle and provides taxpayers with a high degree of certainty about the size of the relief 
as it is granted irrespective of the success of the project. Within the group of input-based in-
centives, measures relating to the tax base and measures relating to the tax due need to be 
distinguished. Accelerated depreciation schemes belong to the former. They allow taxpayers 
to deduct acquisition costs of depreciable assets from taxable income earlier than usual during 
                                                 
70
 All forms of SME incentives being provided on the shareholder level are discussed in Section 3.1.3 while this 
section focuses on those incentives applying on the firm level. 
18 
 
the assets’ useful life. The total amount of allowances, however, does not change and the 
overall (inter-periodic) income is not reduced either, but only accrues in later years. Business-
es incur a pure interest advantage and improved liquidity in the early investment stages.
71
  
The effect of accelerated depreciation increases in the level of interest rates as well 
as the level of the applicable tax rate. This leads to two major disadvantages. First, loss-
making firms do not benefit, at least not immediately when the relief is granted (unless they 
can offset additional losses). Accelerated depreciation therefore tends to favor profitable, 
high-performance enterprises while neglecting the weakest, least profitable businesses.
72
 Sec-
ond, schemes of accelerated depreciation provide heterogeneous support among profitable 
businesses due to differences in marginal tax rates. Such differences may occur between enti-
ties subject to the personal and the corporate income tax and between businesses of the same 
legal form being subject to different progressive rates.
73
 As a consequence, depreciation 
schemes are not neutral with regard to legal form and they discriminate against the least prof-
itable businesses.
74
 The heterogeneity in effects is also detrimental to the transparency of the 
respective tax incentives, thereby making it more difficult to adequately account for the incen-
tives in investment decisions as well as in public budget planning.  
Notwithstanding these disadvantages, six EU countries use special depreciation 
schemes in 2015 (see Table 3
75
). Belgium and Spain even offer two separate regimes. The 
available regimes differ with respect to the affected depreciable assets, the generosity of the 
scheme and applicable eligibility criteria:  
                                                 
71
 See Zee/Stotsky/Ley (2002) p. 1505. 
72
 See Klemm (2010) p. 326. 
73
 Progressive tax rates apply to transparently taxed businesses in most European countries. Moreover, several 
countries feature progressive elements in the tax rate schedule of the corporate income tax rate. See Section 
3.1.2.1 for an overview of tax rates on personal and corporate business income in the European Union. 
74
 See Holtz-Eakin (1995) p. 389. 
75
 All eligibility thresholds given in Tables 3 to 10 are reported as stated in the respective national tax codes (not 
necessarily in €). For corresponding amounts in €, see the country reports in Annex 1.  
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Table 3: Special depreciation schemes for SMEs in the EU (2015) 
Country Eligible assets Depreciation scheme Eligibility 
(firm/investment size) 
Other related provisions 
Belgium  depreciable assets acquired  full-year depreciation in year of 
acquisition (irrespective of exact 
acquisition date) 
 no. of employees ≤ 50; turnover ≤ 
€ 7.3 million; balance sh. tot ≤ 
€ 5 million; profits ≤ € 322,500 
 none 
  additional costs related to the ac-
quisition of depreciable assets 
 100% in year of acquisition 
 
 no. of employees ≤ 50; turnover ≤ 
€ 7.3 million; balance sh. tot ≤ 
€ 3.65 million; profits ≤ € 322,500 
 none 
Germany  depreciable movable assets ac-
quired 
 20% of acquisition costs in year of 
acquisition (additional to usual de-
preciation; depreciation in follow-
ing years adjusted accordingly) 
 net assets ≤ €235,000  none 
 
Hungary  machinery, equipment and certain 
vehicles (no cars) 
 100% of acquisition costs in year 
of acquisition 
 no. of employees ≤ 250; turnover ≤ 
€ 50 million; balance sh. tot ≤ 
€ 43 million 
 only in certain disadvantaged 
regions 
Lithuania  depreciable assets acquired except 
for buildings 
 free depreciation  no. of employees ≤ 10; taxable 
income ≤ € 150,000 
 further restrictions on ownership 
structure in place 
Poland  depreciable assets acquired except 
for land, buildings and passenger 
cars 
 100% of acquisition costs in year 
of acquisition 
 turnover (incl. VAT) ≤ € 1,2 mil-
lion 
 maximum eligible acquisition 
costs: €50,000 
Spain  depreciable tangible fixed assets 
and intangible assets acquired 
 twice the normal rate  turnover ≤ € 10 million  none 
  depreciable tangible assets acquired 
if unitary value ≤ € 601.01 
 free depreciation  turnover ≤ € 10 million  only if increase in personnel in 
the 24 months following the ac-
quisition 
 maximum free depreciation per 
year: € 12,020.24 
 maximum eligible assets per 
year: € 120,000 
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 Eligible assets: In each country implementing accelerated depreciation, machinery 
and equipment are eligible for the regimes whereas buildings, for which accelerated 
depreciation would be particularly advantageous due to high acquisition costs and 
low ordinary rates of depreciation, are excluded in four out of six countries. Further 
exclusions include intangible assets and cars. One of the regimes in Spain only ap-
plies to small-scale acquisitions with a unitary value below € 601. The generosity of 
the incentives as well as losses in tax revenue are thereby limited. The exclusion of 
cars probably refers to the concern of supporting private acquisitions of the entrepre-
neur. 
 Depreciation scheme: Four regimes grant either immediate or free depreciation. One 
regime doubles the annual depreciation rate while in Germany eligible businesses 
can deduct an additional 20 percent of acquisition costs in the year of the acquisition. 
Belgium merely grants immediate expensing of incidental acquisition costs and the 
full-year allowance in the year of acquisition irrespective of the exact date of acquisi-
tion. 
 Eligible enterprises: Three regimes are only accessible for micro enterprises. The 
two Spanish regimes only include micro and small enterprises and three regimes 
support all SMEs. The latter, however, are either negligible with respect to the relief 
granted (Belgium) or restricted to so-called disadvantaged areas (Hungary).  
All in all, Spain is the only country to provide depreciation-based relief for a broad 
range of assets to other firms than the very smallest micro businesses. The regimes in Germa-
ny, Lithuania and Poland seem to address established micro enterprises with a need for expan-
sion or replacement investments.
76
 It is questionable, however, in how far they help in over-
coming liquidity constraints given the low tax rates for micro companies (e.g., 5% in Lithua-
nia) and the limited acceleration of depreciation (an additional 20% of acquisition cost in 
Germany). The regime in Belgium should be considered more of a simplification than a sub-
stantial tax cut while the Hungarian regime is a generous but purely regional incentive that is 
unlikely to address the actual needs of less developed regions (e.g., adequate infrastructure, 
skilled labor).  
                                                 
76
 Start-ups often do not have positive taxable income to be offset by increased depreciation. Hence, they are 
probably not the primary focus of accelerated depreciation. 
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In general, the regimes of accelerated depreciation as implemented throughout Eu-
rope do not show very favorable properties with regard to simplicity and efficiency. Their 
complexity causes considerable compliance and administrative costs while the relief provided 
seems limited for most firms.
77
 The usefulness of the regimes appears especially doubtful as 
they overlap with other incentives (e.g., the special SME tax rate in Lithuania, the investment 
allowance in Germany), which adds additional complexity. Furthermore, it remains unclear 
why Spain needs a scheme for small-scale investments when the respective assets are already 
covered by a more broadly applicable regime.
78
 The additional relief provided by the second 
depreciation scheme can hardly be expected to incentivize businesses to hire additional per-
sonnel as it seems to be intended. Lastly, the effectiveness of the depreciation schemes is 
questionable as the businesses facing the most severe financing constraints benefit the least. 
Instead, the schemes tend to promote those companies which are not in need of additional 
funds as they generate sufficient profits. 
3.1.1.2 Investment Allowances 
Investment allowances (also called super-deductions), in contrast to special deprecia-
tion schemes, allow the deduction of a fixed percentage of eligible expenditures (e.g., person-
nel costs, costs of newly acquired assets) or balance sheet positions (e.g., shareholders’ equi-
ty, special investment reserves) on top of the general allowances provided by the tax code.
79
 
Unlike the schemes of accelerated depreciation, they decrease overall inter-periodic taxable 
income and induce a true reduction of tax payments instead of a pure interest advantage.
80
 As 
for depreciation schemes, however, the reduction of the tax burden depends on the profitabil-
ity and the marginal tax rate of eligible taxpayers. As a consequence, loss-making firms do 
not benefit if no refunds are available and if there are no opportunities to offset additional 
losses. Moreover, the extent of the relief again depends on the legal form and applicable mar-
ginal tax rates, which is detrimental to the predictability of expected reliefs (and also tax rev-
                                                 
77
 In Germany, for example, the amount of additional liquid funds induced by the tax savings in the year of ac-
quisition equals 6% of the acquisition costs of the underlying asset, given the maximum additional depreciation 
of 20% is deducted at an applicable tax rate of 30% (0.2 * 0.3 = 0.06).  
78
 In Spain, a scheme of accelerated depreciation applies for all depreciable assets. The second regime allowing 
free depreciation for small-scale investments only applies under additional conditions demanding an increase in 
the number of employees over the previous two years (see Table 3).  
79
 See Zee/Stotsky/Ley (2002) p. 1504. 
80
 See Klemm (2010) p. 317. 
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enues on the side of tax administrations).
81
 All in all, investment allowances therefore show 
similar negative properties with regard to neutrality, simplicity and transparency as deprecia-
tion schemes.  
Nonetheless, investment allowances for SMEs are offered in eight countries of the 
EU in 2015 (see Table 4). Notably, Belgium and Hungary have implemented several allow-
ances, which results in a total of 13 regimes. The schemes differ substantially with regard to 
the firms being eligible as well as the calculation bases and the generosity of the relief. Five 
out of 13 regimes privilege all SMEs whereas the other schemes exclusively refer to micro 
and small companies.
82
 In Croatia, Poland and the United Kingdom (UK), large enterprises 
incur similar allowances as SMEs but can only deduct a smaller share of eligible expenditure. 
The Netherlands, in contrast, do not tie eligibility to firm size but to the volume of eligible 
investments in so-called small-scale fixed assets. Hence, large entities are not generally ex-
cluded but effectively benefit less due to the regressive nature of the scheme.
83
 Germany, 
Hungary and the UK use caps on maximum deductible expenditures in addition to explicit 
size criteria. From an administrative point of view, these complementary restrictions cause 
additional compliance effort without having a substantial effect.
84
 Comparing the Dutch re-
gime that only restricts eligibility by limiting the amount of eligible expenditures with the 
other schemes, the approach used in the Netherlands appears superior. Firms are not as much 
discouraged from outgrowing some size category as large businesses are not explicitly ex-
cluded. Instead, the relative advantageousness of the scheme only vanishes gradually as the 
investment volume increases.
85
 On the other hand, caps on maximum annual reliefs may in-
troduce distortions between investments below and beyond the respective thresholds. Enter-
prises could, for example, delay or elongate investments.
86
 
                                                 
81
 Progressive tax rates apply to transparently taxed businesses in most European countries. Moreover, several 
countries feature progressive elements in the tax rate schedule of the corporate income tax rate. See Section 
3.1.2.1 for an overview of tax rates on personal and corporate business income in the European Union. 
82
 The size criteria of the UK R&D allowance even correspond to 200% of the thresholds given by the European 
Commission to define medium-sized enterprises. 
83
 Full relief is only granted for eligible investments up to € 55,248; no relief is offered if investments exceed 
€ 306,931. 
84
 In Germany, for example, very few enterprises with less than € 235,000 of net assets can be expected to make 
investments of more than € 200,000. 
85
 The Dutch regime creates a so-called kink where only the marginal treatment takes a jump. The other regimes 
create notches at the thresholds as the average treatment is discontinuous. Empirical evidence has proven that 
taxpayers react much stronger to notches than to kinks. See Saez (2010) pp. 180 ff.; Chetty/Saez (2013) pp. 1 ff.; 
Kleven/Waseem (2013) pp. 669 ff. 
86
 As an alternative, some regimes may therefore feature regressive schedules, for which the marginal relief only 
decreases beyond a certain threshold instead of completely ceasing to apply. Potential distortions in the timing of 
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Among the available allowances, all but one scheme are volume-based.
87
 The vol-
ume-based approach is conducive to the amount of additional investments induced
88
 and the 
simplicity of the incentives. In view of SMEs’ disproportionate compliance burden and the 
high number of potentially eligible businesses, this seems to be the appropriate choice from an 
administrative point of view. The approach, however, also causes significantly higher losses 
in tax revenue and does not differentiate between growth firms and SMEs remaining small. 
Substantially more heterogeneity among the 13 SME investment allowances exists with re-
gard to eligible expenditures. Six of them generally refer to investments in fixed assets (Bel-
gium (2), Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Poland). The seven allowances not relating to in-
vestments in fixed assets are based on very heterogeneous calculation bases. Two of them 
support equity financing (Belgium, Portugal) and two grant relief when additional employees 
are hired. Other targeted expenditures or activities include the hiring of disabled people (Hun-
gary), cost for education and training (Croatia), investments in safety measures (Belgium) and 
expenditures on R&D (UK). The actual reliefs provided by the regimes and the scope of ap-
plication are usually subject to significant limitations, though (e.g., due to regional re-
strictions, low percentages of deductible expenditure, low absolute thresholds on maximum 
allowances, restriction to the very smallest firms). Most firms therefore do not or only mar-
ginally benefit from the regimes. The basic problems relating to the effectiveness and the effi-
ciency of the allowances are therefore similar to those of the abovementioned depreciation 
schemes: The available incentives appear to have a limited impact while causing a substantial 
amount of complexity and administrative effort for taxpayers as well as tax administrations. 
Moreover, the size of the relief depends on the marginal tax rate of a taxpayer, which leads to 
discrimination between enterprises of different legal forms. Loss-making firms usually do not 
benefit at all, as refunds are generally denied (applies to all regimes except for the UK R&D 
allowance). In Belgium, even carry-forwards of unused allowances are limited. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
investments would thus be alleviated but not fully removed. Such regimes can be found for R&D tax incentives, 
e.g., in Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal. These incentives are not included in Table 4, 
though, because the thresholds on eligible expenditures are too high for the incentives to be clearly targeted at 
SMEs. The incentives, however, are described in the country reports in Annex 1. 
87
 Volume-based schemes determine the size of the allowance as a percentage of the total amount of expendi-
tures meeting the given definition of eligible expenditures. As an alternative, incremental designs only consider 
the amount of eligible expenses as far as a certain base amount, mostly the average from previous years, is ex-
ceeded. The latter approach targets marginal investments more precisely and is less costly with regard to forgone 
tax revenues. Compliance and administrative costs, though, increase significantly. See Hansson/Brokelind 
(2014) pp. 177 f.; Arginaelli (2015) pp. 27 f. 
88
 See Castellacci/Lie (2015) p. 827. 
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Table 4: Special investment allowances for SMEs in the EU (2015) 
Country Calculation basis % Eligibility 
(firm/investment size) 
Eligibility 
(other criteria) 
Other related provisions 
Belgium  depreciation of newly acquired 
fixed assets 
10.5%  no. of employees < 20  only non-corporate 
entities 
 limited carry forward (€ 946,800  or 
25% if unused part > € 3,787,210) 
  share capital + retained earnings 
 
0.5% 
 
 no. of employees ≤ 50; 
turnover ≤ € 7.3 million; 
balance sh. tot ≤ 
€ 3.65 million; profits ≤ 
€ 322,500 
 none 
 
 no carry forward 
 
  investments in safety measures 20.5%  no. of employees ≤ 50; 
turnover ≤ € 7.3 million; 
balance sh. tot ≤ 
€ 3.65 million; profits ≤ 
€ 322,500 
 none 
 
 limited carry forward (€ 946,800) 
 
  acquisition costs of assets ac-
quired or produced in 2015 
 
4%  no. of employees ≤ 50; 
turnover ≤ € 7.3 million; 
balance sh. tot ≤ 
€ 3.65 million; profits ≤ 
€ 322,500 
 none 
 
 no combination with notional interest 
deduction 
Croatia  costs for education and training 
 
20%/10% 
 
 no. of employees ≤ 250; 
turnover ≤ € 50 million; 
balance sh. tot ≤ 
€ 43 million  
 
 none 
 
 allowances (20% for small and 10% 
for medium-sized companies) grant-
ed on top of investment allowance 
(60%) for large enterprises 
Germany  future acquisition costs of depre-
ciable fixed assets  
40%  net assets ≤ € 235,000   purchase of asset 
within 3 years 
 
 allowance lowers future deprecia-
tions on acquired assets 
 maximum allowance: € 200,000  
Hungary  annual increase in number of 
employees * minimum wage * 12 
  micro enterprises with no. 
of employees < 5 
 no outstanding tax 
liability at  year end 
 none 
  investment expenses for putting 
certain business assets to use  
100%  SMEs owned by individu-
als 
 none  max. deduction HUF 30 million 
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Country Calculation basis % Eligibility 
(firm/investment size) 
Eligibility 
(other criteria) 
Other related provisions 
Hungary 
(cont.) 
 wages to employees with disabil-
ity (at least 50% disabled) up to 
statutory minimum wage 
200%  number of employees < 20  none  none 
Netherlands  acquisition costs of small-scale 
fixed assets 
28.0%  sum of eligible investments 
≤ € 55,248  
 exclusion of certain 
assets (land, dwelling 
houses, private cars) 
 allowance phases out beyond thresh-
old of € 55,745  (0% if eligible in-
vestments > € 306,931) 
  lump-sum deduction € 18,467  only individual entrepre-
neurs 
 pre-approval of tax 
authorities required 
 carry back for 3 years and carry for-
ward for 9 years 
Poland  max {investment costs; two-year 
personnel costs of employees 
newly hired for purpose of in-
vestment} 
20%/10%  no. of employees ≤ 250; 
turnover ≤ € 50 million; 
balance sh. tot ≤ 
€ 43 million  
 only in special eco-
nomic zones 
 assets / new jobs must 
be maintained for 3 
years 
 allowances (20% for small, 10% for 
medium-sized companies) granted on 
top of investment allowance (50%) 
for large enterprises 
Portugal  capital contributions upon incor-
poration / capital increases 
 
5%  no. of employees ≤ 250; 
turnover ≤ € 50 million; 
balance sh. tot ≤ 
€ 43 million 
 only companies 
owned by individuals 
and venture capital 
investors 
 none 
UK  R&D expenditures 100%  no. of employees ≤ 500; 
turnover ≤ € 100 million; 
balance sh. tot ≤ 
€ 86 million  
 none  allowance granted on top of invest-
ment allowance (30%) for large en-
terprises 
 cash refund for loss-making compa-
nies (14.5% of the loss caused by 
deduction) and for SMEs as far as 
allowance exceeds taxable income 
 maximum relief: ₤ 7.5 million  
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Still, investment allowances are a popular policy tool in supporting SME invest-
ments. Concerns about losses in tax revenue, however, seem to prevent the use of allowances 
for a wide range of investments and enterprises. Instead, the schemes are mostly tied to nu-
merous restrictions making the incentives overly complex but negligible with regard to the 
relief provided and the scope of application. The heterogeneity in SME allowances across 
Europe also indicates the lack of a generally accepted, well-founded rationale behind the re-
gimes. And even if some of the underlying policy goals are legitimate, it appears questionable 
why the hiring of disabled persons or investments in safety, education and training measures 
should be supported only in SMEs.  
3.1.1.3 Tax Credits 
Tax credits (or investment tax credits) represent an alternative form of input-based 
incentive that circumvents some of the problems related to tax allowances. Tax credits are 
also calculated as a fixed percentage of eligible expenditures or balance sheet positions. They 
are directly subtracted from the tax liability, though. Hence, tax credits are more generous if 
the same percentage of the same calculation basis is deducted.
89
 The size of the relief does not 
depend on the tax rate and even loss-making taxpayers can benefit if refunds are granted or 
deductions from other taxes than the income tax are permitted.
90
 This makes tax credits a 
more transparent and neutral instrument than tax allowances and depreciation schemes.
91
 Giv-
en that SMEs occur in a wide variety of legal forms and are more likely to incur losses than 
large firms, tax credits should therefore be considered the most suitable form of input-based 
tax incentive for supporting small and medium-sized enterprises. 
                                                 
89
 See Zee/Stotsky/Ley (2002) pp. 1504 f. 
90
 The creditable amount could, for example, be subtracted from the payroll tax which needs to be paid by loss-
making businesses (with employees) as well. See Spengel (2009) p. 272; Netherlands Enterprise Agency (2016) 
p. 2. 
91
 See Spengel/Müller-Rees/Endres/Harhoff/Heinemann/Hellwig/Hüther/Regierer/Schön/Stein (2009) pp. 96 f. 
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Table 5: Special tax credits for SMEs in the EU (2015) 
Country Calculation basis % Eligibility 
(firm/investment size) 
Eligibility 
(other criteria) 
Other related provisions 
France  depreciation of newly acquired fixed 
assets 
20% 
 
 no. of employees ≤ 250; 
turnover ≤ € 50 million; bal-
ance sh. tot ≤ € 43 million  
 none  maximum eligible expenditure: 
€ 400,000 
 immediate refund available 
  acquisition costs of depreciable 
assets (e.g., machinery and equip-
ment used for manufacturing) 
20% 
 
 no. of employees ≤ 250; 
turnover ≤ € 40 million  
 
 only in Corsica 
 owned by at least 75% 
by individual share-
holders or other SMEs 
 carryforward for 9 years; 50% 
refund available after 9 years 
(35% after 5 years); immediate 
refund for new companies 
  income tax payable (eligible share 
depends on increase in personnel 
expenses and the company’s average 
effective tax rate of last year)
92
 
0%-100% 
 
 20 ≤ no. of employees ≤ 250; 
turnover ≤ € 50 million; bal-
ance sh. tot ≤ € 43 million 
 no. of employees ≥ no. of 
employees in each of previ-
ous 2 years * 1.15 
 none  none 
Hungary  interest paid on loans from financial 
institutions 
60%  no. of employees ≤ 250; 
turnover ≤ € 50 million; bal-
ance sh. tot ≤ € 43 million  
 investments ≥ HUF 500 
million 
 not available for com-
panies in transportation 
sector and agriculture 
 
 maximum credit HUF 6 million 
Latvia  investment costs for newly founded 
companies 
20%/10%  20%: no. of employees ≤ 50; 
turnover ≤ € 10 million; bal-
ance sh. tot ≤ € 10 million 
 10%: no. of employees ≤ 
250; turnover ≤ € 50 million; 
balance sh. tot ≤ € 43 million 
 
 none  credit granted on top of credit for 
large enterprises (35%) 
 maximum overall credit: 80% of 
actual tax liability 
                                                 
92
 The eligible share of the income tax payable is calculated as follows: eligible percentage = [min {15%; (increase in personnel expenses / 15%)} – average CIT paid in previous 
year]. 
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Country Calculation basis % Eligibility 
(firm/investment size) 
Eligibility 
(other criteria) 
Other related provisions 
Malta  capital expenditure or wages of 
eligible employees for 24 months 
 
 
20% / 10% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 20%: no. of employees ≤ 50; 
turnover ≤ € 10 million; bal-
ance sh. tot ≤ € 10 million 
 10%: no. of employees ≤ 
250; turnover ≤ € 50 million; 
balance sh. tot ≤ € 43 million 
 newly founded compa-
nies and major exten-
sions of establishment 
 only certain activities 
(e.g., manufacturing, 
R&D, software) 
 investment needs to 
stay in Malta for 3 years 
 maximum eligible investment: 
€ 50 million 
 credit granted on top of credit for 
large enterprises (15%) 
 unlimited carry forward but no 
refund 
 alternative cash grant possible for 
business extensions (not for new 
ventures) 
  deductible costs (e.g., personnel 
costs, current costs, overhead, capital 
expenditure/depreciation) 
20%/10% 
 
 20%: no. of employees ≤ 50; 
turnover ≤ € 10 million; bal-
ance sh. tot ≤ € 10 million 
 10%: no. of employees ≤ 
250; turnover ≤ € 50 million; 
balance sh. tot ≤ € 43 million 
 costs must be incurred 
for research projects 
 credit granted on top of credit for 
large enterprises (25-65%) 
 maximum credit: actual tax liabil-
ity; but: indefinite carryforward 
(with inflation adjustment) 
  certain costs (e.g., wages of new 
employees, refurbishing costs, ex-
penditure for machinery and equip-
ment) 
45%  1 ≤ no. of employees ≤ 30; 
turnover ≤ € 10 million 
 companies must not be 
part of a group and be 
registered for VAT 
 maximum eligible expenses: 
€ 30,000 (€ 50,000 for start-ups) 
 increased credit (65%) for compa-
nies in the region of Gozo 
Poland  acquisition costs of innovative tech-
nology 
75% 
 
 no. of employees ≤ 250; 
turnover ≤ € 50 million; bal-
ance sh. tot ≤ € 43 million 
 investment ≤ € 50 million 
 none  maximum credit: PLN 4 million; 
further regional aid limits (up to 
70% of tax liability; depends on 
company size) 
Portugal  expenditure for R&D (capital ex-
penditure other than land and build-
ings, operating costs, personnel 
costs) 
15% 
 
 no. of employees ≤ 250; 
turnover ≤ € 50 million; bal-
ance sh. tot ≤ € 43 million 
 only new SMEs (less 
than 2 years of opera-
tion) 
 credit granted on top of credit for 
large enterprises (32.5%) 
 carry forward for 6 years 
  retained earnings 10%  no. of employees ≤ 250; 
turnover ≤ € 50 million; bal-
ance sh. tot ≤ € 43 million 
 credited amount needs 
to be reinvested within 
2 years 
 maximum credit: the lower € 5 
million and 25% of income tax 
liability 
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Country Calculation basis % Eligibility 
(firm/investment size) 
Eligibility 
(other criteria) 
Other related provisions 
Spain  no. of new employees under 30 years 
of age with indefinite employment 
contract 
€ 3,000 
per em-
ployee 
 no. of employees ≤ 50; turn-
over ≤ € 10 million 
 none  none 
  outstanding unemployment payments 
of newly and indefinitely hired em-
ployees (max. 1 year) 
50%  no. of employees ≤ 50; turn-
over ≤ € 10 million 
 none  none 
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In 2015, six Member States of the European Union provide tax credits targeted at 
SMEs (see Table 5). France, Malta, Portugal and Spain have multiple regimes in place.
93
 In 
contrast to special depreciation schemes and tax allowances, the available tax credits are 
mostly applicable to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (9 out of 12).
94
 Three of the 
regimes are even accessible for large enterprises at lower creditable rates. With regard to the 
purpose of the schemes, four tax credits are tied to SME investments in fixed assets. Further 
tax credits are granted for hiring new personnel (5 regimes), which suggests that policy-
makers expect employment in SMEs to be particularly sensitive to tax incentives. Alternative-
ly, jobs in SMEs may be considered superior to those in large enterprises or the restriction of 
employment tax credits to SMEs is simply due to budget-related constraints and EU provi-
sions on state aid.
95
 Further areas addressed by tax credits in the EU include R&D, innovation 
and financing. Interestingly, one regime credits the costs of debt financing (Hungary) whereas 
another one supports self-financing by granting a credit on reinvested retained earnings (Por-
tugal). 
In general, similar design patterns as for investment allowances are noticeable among 
tax credits. Provisions are volume-based except for two schemes basing benefits on increased 
employment (France, Spain). With regard to low-profit and loss-making firms, only France 
grants refunds. The size criteria used to identify eligible SMEs for input-based incentives 
mostly correspond to the criteria given in the SME definition by the European Commission 
(i.e., number of employees, turnover, balance sheet total).
96
 The specific thresholds may dif-
fer, though. In addition to size restrictions, most tax credits also feature further eligibility cri-
teria. Three regimes, for example, are exclusively for new ventures and major business exten-
sions (Latvia, Malta, Portugal) while others are limited to certain industries or types of in-
vestment (R&D, innovative technology). Moreover, available reliefs are capped for half of the 
schemes in addition to the explicit firm size criteria already restricting eligibility. 
Altogether, tax credits appear to be the type of input-based measure that can best sat-
isfy the requirements for adequate tax incentives. In particular, they show superior properties 
                                                 
93
 One of the French tax credits is limited to SMEs on Corsica, though. 
94
 One regime in France even explicitly excludes micro and very small firms.  
95
 EU regulation prohibits the provision of targeted support for certain enterprises or groups of enterprises that 
would give them an advantage over their competitors unless they are justifiable by reasons of general economic 
development. SMEs are considered to be of special importance for the economy and can therefore be granted 
certain forms of support that would not be permitted for large entities. See European Commission (2009) pp. 3 
ff. 
96
 See European Commission (2003) p. 39. 
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with regard to transparency and neutrality. In practice, the potential advantages of tax credits 
are not fully taken advantage of, though. Refunds are mostly denied and carry forwards are 
restricted. The enterprises requiring the most support, i.e., those with losses and low profits, 
therefore benefit the least from actually available tax credits. Moreover, investment allowanc-
es – despite their disadvantages – are still common practice in Europe, which can only be ex-
plained by fiscal and administrative considerations. In addition, several other trends in the 
design of current input-based tax incentives for SMEs appear questionable. Almost all 
measures refer to explicit size criteria, mostly the number of employees, turnover and total 
assets. While providing easy-to-track eligibility criteria, such thresholds provide strong incen-
tives to remain small or at least to appear small with the help of tax planning. An indirect tar-
geting by restricting maximum available reliefs would create fewer distortions. Lastly, many 
regimes introduce a disproportionate amount of complexity. This is due to the numerous re-
strictions and anti-misuse provisions that come along with most regimes. The multitude of 
available regimes in some countries further enhances the overall complexity even further.  
3.1.2 Output-Based Tax Incentives on the Firm Level 
3.1.2.1 Special Tax Rates 
In contrast to tax allowances and tax credits, output-based tax incentives tie the pro-
vision of a relief to the output generated by an investment rather than the investment itself, 
i.e., the profits derived from the business’s sale of goods and services.97 Special tax rates im-
posed on SME income are the most common type of output-based SME incentives. Exemp-
tions and tax holidays represent alternative forms. 
Depending on their legal form, enterprises are subject to different tax rates. While in-
corporated businesses adhere to the schedule of the corporate income tax (CIT), sole proprie-
tors apply personal income tax (PIT) rates to their business income.
98
 Differences between 
corporate and personal income tax rates exist in 26 out of 28 countries in the European Union. 
Such a tax wedge already constitutes an advantage for small businesses as they can choose 
                                                 
97
 See Arginelli (2015) p. 29. 
98
 The taxation of partnerships depends on the particular form of partnership and their treatment in the respective 
country. Mostly, they are taxed transparently and subject to the personal income tax rate. See Spengel/Schaden/ 
Wehrße (2010) pp. 44 ff. 
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their legal form in a way that minimizes applicable tax rates.
99
 Non-tax costs and benefits of 
incorporation, of course, need to be considered as well, but small entities can be assumed to 
be comparatively flexible in their legal form decision. Large businesses, in contrast, usually 
have no choice but to become a corporation.
100
  
In 22 out of 28 EU countries, progressive personal income tax rates apply to the 
business income of sole proprietors and owners of other transparently taxed entities (see Table 
6). Although progressive PIT rates are usually not intended to support SMEs, they are dispro-
portionally beneficial for owners of small-scale undertakings compared to larger entities (giv-
en that there is a positive correlation between firm size and absolute profits). CIT rates, in 
contrast, are mostly proportional.
101
 For the provision of SME tax incentives by means of spe-
cial tax rates, differences in PIT and CIT rate schedules represent an obstacle as policy-
makers can hardly address businesses of all legal forms equally. Even if the special rates are 
offered to corporate and non-corporate businesses alike, the incentive effect differs as the 
relative advantage is not the same.
102
 The neutrality of such measures with regard to homoge-
neous treatment among eligible businesses is therefore not ideal. Moreover, business income 
of individuals is taxed jointly with other types of income such as employment income or in-
come from professional services in many countries. Special tax rates for transparently taxed 
entities, i.e., benefits beyond the usually progressive rates, would thus require far-reaching 
adjustments to personal income taxation.
103
  
                                                 
99
 Croatia and Poland even grant non-corporate businesses the option to be taxed like a corporate entity. Den-
mark and Germany provide the opportunity to apply a reduced rate on retained profits in order to align the taxa-
tion of corporate and non-corporate businesses (see Table 6). 
100
 See Jacobs/Scheffler/Spengel (2015) p. 6. 
101
 All countries not applying strictly proportional CIT rates are displayed in Table 7. 
102
 See European Commission (2015b) p. 61. 
103
 In fact, a separate taxation of business income would have to be introduced. This would entail tax planning 
opportunities through the re-declaration of other income types as business income. Complex anti-avoidance 
provisions as well as significantly increased administrative costs would most likely be inevitable. Moreover, a 
potentially preferential taxation of business income may be subject to intense public scrutiny. See Sachverstän-
digenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung [Sachverständigenrat] (2003) pp. 333 ff.; 
Crawford/ Freedman (2010) pp. 1039 ff. 
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Table 6: Personal income tax rates on business income in the EU (2015) 
Country PIT rate on business income Options for alternative treatment of (non-
corporate) business income 
Other taxes on (non-corporate) business 
income 
Top rate 
Austria  up to € 11,000: 0% 
 € 11,000 to € 25,000: 36.5% 
 € 25,000 to € 60,000: 43.2143% 
 over € 60,000: 50% 
  50% 
Belgium  
(Brussels) 
 up to € 8,710: 25% 
 € 8,710 to € 12,400: 30% 
 € 12,400 to € 20,660: 40% 
 € 20,660 to € 37,870: 45% 
 over € 37,870: 50% 
 basic allowance: € 7,090 to € 7,380 
  municipal surcharge: 0% to 10% (+ 1% in 
Brussels region) on PIT payable 
53.5% 
Bulgaria  15%   15% 
Croatia  
(Zagreb) 
 up to € 26,400: 12% 
 € 26,401 to € 158,400: 25% 
 over € 158,400: 40% 
 option for CIT (20%) if:  
turnover > HRK 3 million and two of the 
three following conditions met:  
 net income > HRK 400,000 
 nr. of employees > 15% 
 depreciable assets > HRK 200,000 
 city surtax: 10% to 18% on PIT liability 
(depending on size of the municipality) 
 local business tax: HRK 0 to HRK 2,000 per 
business unit (HRK 180 to HRK 530 in Za-
greb; deductible for PIT) 
47.2% 
Cyprus  up to € 19,500: 0% 
 € 19,501 to € 28,000: 20% 
 € 28,001 to € 36,300: 25% 
 € 36,301 to € 60,000: 30% 
 over € 60,001: 35% 
  special contribution on gross monthly earn-
ings (split between employer and employee) 
 up to € 1,500: 0% 
 € 1,501to € 2,500: 2.5% 
 € 2,501 to € 3,500: 3.0% 
 over € 3,501: 3.5% 
38.5% 
Czech Republic  15%   surcharge: 7% if income over CZK 
1,277,328 
16.05% 
Denmark  
(Copenhagen) 
personal income plus net income from capital: 
 up to DKK 43,400: 0% 
 DKK 43,400 to DKK 459,200: 8.08% 
 over DKK 459,200: 23.08% 
 reduced (preliminary) taxation of retained 
profits replacing PIT and municipal tax 
(23.5%) 
 health contribution: 4% 
 municipal income tax on personal income 
plus capital income less general deductions: 
24.9% (average) 
50% 
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Country PIT rate on business income Options for alternative treatment of (non-
corporate) business income 
Other taxes on (non-corporate) business 
income 
Top rate 
Estonia  20%   20% 
Finland  
(Helsinki) 
 up to € 16,500: 0% 
 € 16,500 to € 24,700: 6.5% 
 € 24,700to € 41,300: 17.5% 
 € 41,300 to € 71,400: 21.5% 
 € 71,400 to € 90,000: 29.75% 
 over € 90,000: 31.75% 
 20% of net capital can be deemed to be 
income from capital 
 local income tax: 16.5% to 22.5% (depend-
ing on municipality; 18.5% in Helsinki) 
50.25% 
France  up to € 9,690: 0% 
 € 9,691 to € 26,764: 14% 
 € 26,765to € 71,754: 30% 
 € 71,755 to € 151,956: 41% 
 over € 151,957: 45% 
 max. combined rate of PIT, wealth tax, 
property tax, dwelling tax and additional so-
cial contributions: 50% 
  exceptional contribution on high income: 
€ 250,000 to € 500,000: 3% 
over € 500,000: 4% 
49% 
Germany  
(Berlin) 
 up to € 8,354: 0% 
 € 8,355 to € 13,469: 14% to 23.97% 
 € 13,470 to € 52,881: 23.97% to 42% 
 € 52,882 to € 250,730: 42% 
 over € 250,730: 45% 
 reduced (preliminary) taxation of retained 
profits (28.25%; 25% upon distribution) 
 solidarity surcharge: 5.5% on PIT payable 
 business tax: 7% to over 20% (depending on 
municipality; 14.35% in Berlin; deductible 
up to 13.3% for PIT purposes) 
47.79% 
Greece  up to € 50,000: 26%  
 (up to € 10,000 for start-ups in first 3 years: 
13%) 
 over € 50,000: 33% 
  33% 
Hungary entrepreneurial income subject to CIT rates 
and entrepreneurial dividend tax: 
 up to HUF 500 million: 24.4% (= 10% + 
16% * (1 - 0.1)) 
 over HUF 500 million: 31.96% (= 19% + 
16% * (1 - 0.19)) 
 lump-sum deductions 
 simplified entrepreneurial regime 
 itemized tax for small businesses 
 31.96% 
Ireland   up to € 33,800: 20% 
 over € 33,800: 40% 
  40% 
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Country PIT rate on business income Options for alternative treatment of (non-
corporate) business income 
Other taxes on (non-corporate) business 
income 
Top rate 
Italy  
(Rome) 
 up to € 15,000: 23% 
 € 15,001 to € 28,000: 27% 
 € 28,001 to € 55,000: 38% 
 € 55,001 to € 75,000: 41% 
 over € 75,000: 43% 
  regional surcharge: 1.23% to 3.33% on 
income 
 municipal surcharge: up to 0.9% on income 
 solidarity contribution: 3% on PIT payable 
if income over € 300,000 
 IRAP: 3.5% on production value (≈ income 
+ interest - net income from shareholdings) 
48.52% 
(+3.5%) 
Latvia  23%  taxation on turnover for sole proprietors 
with less than € 100,000 of turnover and not 
more than 5 employees: 
 up to € 7,000: 9% 
 € 7,000 to € 100,000: 12% (9% in first 3 
years) 
 over € 100,000: 20% 
 special regime for sole proprietors with less 
than € 50,000 of turnover and no employ-
ees: monthly payments of € 43 to € 100 (de-
pending on activity) 
 23% 
Lithuania  15%   15% 
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Country PIT rate on business income Options for alternative treatment of (non-
corporate) business income 
Other taxes on (non-corporate) business 
income 
Top rate 
Luxembourg 
(City of Lux-
embourg) 
 up to € 11,265: 0% 
 € 11,265 – € 13,173: 8% 
 € 13,173 – € 15,081: 10% 
 € 15,081 – € 16,989: 12% 
 € 16,989 – € 18,897: 14% 
 € 18,897 – € 20,805: 16%  
 € 20,805 – € 22,713: 18% 
 € 22,713 – € 24,621: 20% 
 € 24,621 – € 26,529: 22% 
 € 26,529 – € 28,437: 24% 
 € 28,437 – € 30,345: 26% 
 € 30,345 – € 32,253: 28% 
 € 32,253 – € 34,161: 30% 
 € 34,161 – € 36,069: 32% 
 € 36,069 – € 37,977: 34% 
 € 37,977 – € 39,885: 36% 
 € 39,885 – € 41,793: 38% 
 € 41,793 – € 100,000: 39% 
 over € 100,000: 40% 
  employment fund contribution:  
 if income below € 150,000: 7% 
 if income over € 150,000: 9% 
 temporary tax: 0.5% 
 municipal business tax: 6.75% on adjusted 
business profits over € 40,000 (depending 
on municipality) 
44.1% 
(+6.75%) 
Malta  up to € 8,500: 0% 
 € 8,501 to € 14,500: 15% 
 € 14,501 to € 60,000: 25% 
 over € 60,000: 35% 
  35% 
Netherlands  up to € 19,822: 36.55% 
 19,822 to € 33,589: 42% 
 33,589 to € 57,585: 42% 
 over € 57,585: 52% 
  52% 
Poland  up to € 3,091: 0% 
 € 3,091 to € 85,528: 18% 
 over € 85,528: 32% 
 flat rate tax (19%) 
 tax on turnover at rates from 3% to 20% 
(depending on activities performed) if turn-
over < € 150,000  
 32% 
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Country PIT rate on business income Options for alternative treatment of (non-
corporate) business income 
Other taxes on (non-corporate) business 
income 
Top rate 
Portugal  up to € 7,000: 14.5% 
 € 7,000 to € 20,000: 28.5% 
 € 20,000 to € 40,000: 37% 
 € 40,000 to € 80,000: 45% 
 over € 80,000: 48% 
 simplified regime: income as a fixed per-
centage of turnover (15% for most kinds of 
revenues) for certain activities (e.g., hospi-
tality sector, leisure sector) 
 solidarity tax: 
 € 80,000 to € 250,000: 2.5% 
 over € 250,000: 5% 
 extraordinary surtax: 3.5% on all income 
56.5% 
Romania  16%   16% 
Slovakia  up to € 35,022.31: 19% 
 over € 35,022.31: 25% 
  25% 
Slovenia  up to € 8,021.34: 16% 
 € 8,021.34 to € 18,960.28: 27% 
 € 18,960.28 to € 70.907.20: 41% 
 over € 70,907.20: 50% 
 flat rate tax (20%) on notional income 
(turnover less 80% notional deduction) if 
turnover < € 50,000 (€ 100,000 with at least 
one full-time employee for 5 months or 
more) 
 50% 
Spain  up to € 12,450: 19% 
 € 12,450 to € 20,200: 24% 
 € 20,200 to € 35,200: 30% 
 € 35,200 to € 60,000: 37% 
 over € 60,000: 45% 
 presumptive taxation based on physical 
parameters for some activities (e.g., restau-
rants) 
 45% 
Sweden (Stock-
holm) 
 up to SEK 430,200: 0% 
 SEK 430,200 to SEK 616,100: 20% 
 over SEK 616,100: 25% 
 reduced (preliminary) taxation of retained 
profits (22%; taxed as personal earned in-
come when used within business) 
 municipal income tax: 29.32% and 35.19% 
(average 31.99%; 29.86% in Stockholm) 
54.86% 
UK  up to GBP 31,785: 20% 
 GBP 31,786 to GBP 150,000: 40% 
 over GBP 150,000: 45% 
  45% 
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Tax-rate incentives for SMEs are therefore restricted to corporate taxation for the 
most part. Currently, eleven out of 28 countries in the European Union use corporate income 
tax rates favoring small entities over large ones (see Table 7). Three of these countries (Bel-
gium, Hungary, Netherlands) use generally applicable progressive schedules whereas the oth-
er seven countries restrict preferential progressive (five regimes) or proportional rates (five 
regimes) to SMEs.
104
 Most of the regimes explicitly excluding large enterprises are limited to 
either micro (four regimes) or micro and small companies (four regimes). Only two countries 
include medium-sized entities. Belgium does not exclude large companies explicitly but has 
implemented a phase out of the progression advantage under which high-profit companies 
with income over € 322,500 do not benefit at all. In general, preferential tax rates appear to be 
targeted at the very smallest businesses.  
The size of the relief varies widely. While Luxembourg, for example, only grants a 
relief of 1 percentage point for the first € 15,000 of income, Lithuania reduces the burden to a 
third of the standard tax rate (5% instead of 15%) for income up to € 300,000. In addition to 
the reduction of the general corporate income tax rate, France and Portugal apply progressive 
surcharges. The advantageousness of the micro business regime in Romania depends on busi-
nesses’ profit margin as the proportional rate of 3% is incurred on turnover instead of net in-
come. Interestingly, businesses cannot opt out of the regime.
105
 Hungary is another country 
providing simplified regimes for micro companies. If their turnover does not exceed HUF 30 
million (≈ € 100,000), eligible enterprises can opt for a comprehensive proportional tax of 
37% on turnover that replaces all income taxes, the value-added tax (VAT) and the company 
car tax. If turnover does not even exceed HUF 6 million (≈ € 20,000), lump-sum payments 
based on the number of employees may be chosen to replace several taxes. Another regime 
featuring lump-sum payments instead of tax rates can be found in Latvia.
106
 In contrast to 
many input-based tax incentives, preferential tax rates in the EU are only rarely tied to other 
eligibility criteria than size. Most notably, most regimes require businesses not to be part of a 
group in order to prevent taxpayers from gaining eligibility through split-ups. Belgium and 
                                                 
104
 Depending on firm size parameters, preferential progressive and proportional schedules can apply for SMEs 
in Hungary and Spain. The total number of regimes (13) therefore exceeds the number of applying countries 
(11). 
105
 Similar flat-rate taxes on turnover are available in other countries but only for non-corporate entities, e.g., in 
Poland and Slovenia. 
106
 In the European Union, further simplified regimes are available for non-corporate business income. These 
regimes, however, refer exclusively to the determination of the tax base and do not alter applicable tax rates. 
They are therefore discussed in Section 3.1.4. 
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Romania exclude certain activities (e.g., the financial sector) and the UK restricts progressive 
rates for small corporations to the oil and gas industry. In general, preferential tax rates are 
tailored to support a broad range of micro and small enterprises, though. It seems, input-based 
measures are predominantly used to incentivize investments in specific assets, industries and 
regions whereas preferential tax rates are perceived to be more of a general SME incentive. 
So why do policy-makers not use the same instruments for general investment incentives and 
incentives only promoting certain regions or sectors? Most likely, the simplicity of tax-rate 
incentives becomes increasingly important as the number of targeted taxpayers rises and po-
tential administrative challenges grow.  
Summing up, special tax rates for SMEs are a simple, easy-to-track type of incentive 
that causes only very little additional compliance and administrative costs compared to input-
based measures. In the EU, they are currently the primary instrument to provide preferential 
tax treatment to a broad range of micro and small enterprises. Given the huge number of busi-
nesses in these size classes, special tax rates come along with substantial revenue losses, 
though.
107
 Moreover, they are a kind of incentive not showing particularly desirable properties 
with respect to investment and legal form neutrality
108
 – especially given the way in which 
most schemes in the EU are currently designed. The regimes only support corporate entities 
and they discriminate against risky investments as particularly successful (high income brack-
ets) and particularly unsuccessful ventures (loss-making) benefit the least from progressive 
CIT rates.
109
 The timing of the relief is not ideal either. Taxpayers can only take advantage 
when profits are incurred, i.e., when they are likely to have access to sufficient funds for in-
vestments anyway. In addition, using taxable income as the nexus of special tax rates does not 
tie preferential treatment to additional investments and growth (as it is the case for input-
based measures) but rather to rent-seeking.
110
 Preferential tax rates therefore appear inappro-
priate to foster investments. Eligibility criteria explicitly relating to firm size – as applied for 
the vast majority of regimes – further discourage growth. In Lithuania, for example, a special 
tax rate of 5% for enterprises with less than € 300,000 in turnover is unlikely to encourage 
investments if turnover is thereby raised over the threshold with the consequence of applying 
a 15% tax rate. 
                                                 
107
 See Zee/Stotsky/Ley (2002) pp. 1503 f.; Hansson/Brokelind (2014) p. 178. 
108
 See European Commission (2015b) p. 61. 
109
 See Cullen/Gordon (2007) pp. 1479 ff.; Gentry/Hubbard (2005) pp. 87 ff. 
110
 See Dischinger/Riedel (2011) pp. 691 ff.; Arginelli (2015) pp. 42 f. 
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Table 7: Special corporate income tax rates for SMEs in the EU (2015) 
Country Standard tax rate Special tax rate Eligibility 
(firm size) 
Eligibility 
(other criteria) 
Belgium  flat rate: 33%  progressive schedule:  
 24.25% (€ 0 - € 25,000) 
 31% (€ 25,001 - € 90,000) 
 34.5% (€ 90,001 - € 322,500) 
 33% (income over € 322,500) 
 none    exclusion of  
 financial companies 
 collective investment companies 
 companies owned by other com-
panies by 50% or more 
 companies whose distributions 
exceed 13% of paid-in capital 
 members of groups with a coor-
dination center 
 companies not paying at least 
€ 36,000 to a director or active 
partner 
France  flat rate: 33.33% 
 surcharge: 3.3% (on income tax 
liability 
 income tax rate: 15% (on first 
€ 38,120 of income) 
 surcharge: 0%  
 turnover ≤ € 7,630,000 
 income tax liability ≤ € 763,000 
(only for exemption from sur-
charge) 
 company must be owned (75%) by 
individuals or other eligible SMEs 
  extra surcharge: 10.7% (on in-
come tax liability before tax 
credits) 
 extra surcharge: 0%  turnover ≤ € 250 million  none 
  flat rate for local business tax on 
value added (sales – purchases): 
 1.5% (turnover over €  50 mil-
lion) 
 flat rates for local business tax on 
value added (sales – purchases): 
 0% (turnover € 0 - € 500,000) 
 0-0.5% (turnover € 500,000 - 
€ 3 million) 
 0.5-1.4% (turnover € 3 million 
- € 10 million) 
 1.4-1.5% (turnover € 10 mil-
lion - € 50 million) 
 see turnover thresholds in col-
umn on special tax rates 
 none 
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Country Standard tax rate Special tax rate Eligibility 
(firm size) 
Eligibility 
(other criteria) 
Hungary  progressive schedule:  
 10% (HUF 0 - HUF 500 mil-
lion) 
 19% (income over HUF 500 
million) 
  none  none 
   flat rate: 37% on turnover incl. 
VAT (voluntary; replaces income 
taxes, VAT and company car tax) 
 
 turnover incl. VAT < HUF 30 
million 
 
 only individuals as shareholders 
who do not ow n shares in other 
companies 
 only companies not subject to 
excise duties and not selling waste 
products 
 company must have Hungarian 
bank account 
   HUF 50,000 per full-time em-
ployee and HUF 25,000 per part-
time employee (replaces corpo-
rate income tax, social security 
tax, health care charge and voca-
tional training contribution) 
 turnover ≤ HUF 6 million (40% 
tax levied on excess) 
 
 only limited and general partner-
ships 
 
   flat rate: 16% on accrual income 
(voluntary; replaces corporate in-
come tax, social security tax and 
training contribution) 
 no. of employees ≤ 25; turnover 
≤ HUF 500 million; balance sh. 
tot ≤ HUF 500 million 
 no companies with enforceable tax 
debt ≥ HUF 1 million 
Latvia  flat rate: 15%  progressive schedule:  
 9% (€ 0 - € 7,000) 
 12% (€ 7,001 - € 100,000) 
 20% (income over € 100,000) 
 turnover ≤ € 100,000; no. of 
employees ≤ 5 
 company must be fully owned by 
individuals 
 employees must not earn more 
than € 720 per month 
Lithuania  flat rate: 15%  flat rate: 5%  taxable income ≤ € 300,000; no. 
of employees < 10 
 company must not be owned (50% 
or more) by shareholders also own-
ing a sole proprietorship or other 
companies 
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Country Standard tax rate Special tax rate Eligibility 
(firm size) 
Eligibility 
(other criteria) 
Luxembourg  flat rate: 21% (22.47% incl. sur-
charge) 
 flat rate: 20% (21.4% incl. sur-
charge) 
 taxable income ≤ € 15,000  none 
Netherlands  progressive schedule:  
 20% (€ 0 - € 200,000) 
 25% (income over € 200,000) 
  none  none 
Portugal  flat rate: 23%  progressive rate: 
 17% (€ 0 - € 15,000) 
 23% (income over € 15,000) 
 no. of employees ≤ 250; turnover 
≤ € 50 million; balance sh. tot ≤ 
€ 43 million 
 none 
  progressive surcharge: 
 0% (€ 0 - € 1.5 million) 
 3% (€ 1.5 million - € 7.5 mil-
lion) 
 5% (€ 7.5 million - € 35 mil-
lion) 
 7% (income over € 35 million) 
  none  none 
Romania  flat rate: 16%  flat rate: 3% on turnover (manda-
tory) 
 turnover ≤ € 65,000  privately owned 
 exclusion of certain sectors (e.g., 
banks, insurance, consultancy) 
Spain  flat rate: 28%  flat rate: 25%  no. of employees ≤ 25; turnover 
≤ € 5 million 
 no. of employees must not be 
smaller than in 2009 
   progressive rate: 
 25% (€ 0 - € 300,000) 
 28% (income over € 300,000) 
 turnover ≤ € 10 million  none 
   flat rate: 24%  turnover ≤ € 10 million  only in the Basque regions of Ala-
va, Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa 
United Kingdom  flat rate: 30% (for oil & gas 
companies) 
 progressive rate: 
 19% (₤ 0 - ₤ 300,000) 
 marginal relief (between 
₤ 300,001 and ₤ 3 million) 
 30% (if income over ₤3 mil-
lion) 
 none  only for oil and gas companies 
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3.1.2.2 Exemptions 
Tax exemptions are another form of output-based incentive offered to SMEs in Eu-
rope. For owners of transparently taxed entities, they are a regular occurrence in the personal 
income tax (see Table 6), either as a part of the progressive schedule or in the form of so-
called basic allowances.
111
 Moreover, small businesses are at least partly exempt from local 
business taxes and other minor levies in seven countries of the EU in 2015 (see Table 8). The 
impact of these exemptions as well as their specific designs and targeted size classes vary 
significantly. A comparison of the regimes, however, reveals a pattern that confirms previous 
observations from the other incentive types: The exemptions either provide a rather modest 
relief for a broad spectrum of businesses or they provide more generous relief but only for the 
very smallest enterprises. Hungary, for example, exempts all businesses with less than € 10 
million of turnover from the so-called innovation tax that only amounts to 0.3% of adjusted 
net income. Spanish firms, in contrast, may be exempt from the local business tax (IAE) of up 
to 15% but eligibility requires turnover to be below € 1 million.  
Effectively, exemptions are a form of special tax rates as eligible income is taxed at a 
rate of 0%. Hence, the regimes show the same advantages and disadvantages
112
 and can be 
expected to be motivated by a similar rationale as preferential tax rates. Most importantly, 
policy-makers probably aim at administrative relief by exempting the very smallest business-
es from certain taxes. This is similar to the value-added tax where the collection costs exceed 
actual tax revenues if the business’ turnover does not reach a certain minimum.113 Exemp-
tions, however, also represent a substantial incentive to stay below eligibility thresholds, ei-
ther by remaining small, by tax planning or by evasion, as taxes can be completely avoided 
(instead of “merely” incurring a reduced rate). Regimes creating notches in the tax schedule, 
i.e., jumps in the average tax rate such as the Spanish exemption from the local business tax, 
are especially prone to creating those barriers to growth.
114
  
                                                 
111
 As mentioned before, progressive schedules and basic allowances in the personal income tax are not primarily 
intended to serve as tax incentives for small businesses, though. They are rather driven by social considerations 
to not overburden low-income individuals. See Blum/Kalven (1952) pp. 417 ff.; Mirrlees (1971) pp. 175 ff.; 
Diamond Saez (2011) pp. 165 ff. 
112
 See Zee/Stotsky/Ley (2002) p. 1504. 
113
 See Keen/Mintz (2004) pp. 562 ff. 
114
 See Kleven/Waseem (2013) pp. 672 ff.; Slemrod (2013) pp. 259 ff.   
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Table 8: Special tax exemptions for SMEs in the EU (2015) 
Country Description of exemption Eligibility criteria 
Belgium  exemption from tax on capital 
gains derived from shares of 
other companies (0.412%) 
 no. of employees ≤ 50; turnover 
≤ € 7.3 million; balance sh. tot ≤ 
€ 3.65 million  
France  exemption from local business 
tax (CVAE) on value added 
(sales minus purchases) 
 turnover ≤ € 152,500 
Germany  exemption of first € 24,500 of 
income from business tax 
 only non-corporate businesses 
Hungary   municipalities may exempt small 
businesses from local business 
tax (2% on sales minus attribut-
able costs) 
 no fixed thresholds 
  exemption from innovation tax 
(0.3% of local business tax base) 
 no. of employees ≤ 50; turnover 
≤ € 10 million; balance sh. tot ≤ 
€ 10 million) 
Luxembourg  exemption of first € 17,500 of 
income from local business tax 
(5.4%-9%) 
 none 
Portugal  50% of taxable income in first 
year of activity / 25% in second 
year 
 only companies that apply op-
tional simplified regime for mi-
cro companies: CIT rates levied 
on 
 4% of sales and services in 
hotel and restaurant sectors 
 75% of income from specific 
professional services 
 10% of remaining income 
from services 
 95% of royalty income 
 100% of other gains accrued 
 eligible companies for regime: 
 turnover ≤ € 200,000 
 bal. sh. tot. ≤ € 500,000 
 adoption of micro company 
accounting regime 
 no mandatory audit 
 80% of share capital owned by 
individuals or other eligible 
entities 
Spain  exemption from local business 
tax (IAE) 
 turnover ≤ € 1 million 
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3.1.3 Tax Incentives for Shareholders of SMEs 
For corporate entities, there are two levels of taxation: the firm level and the share-
holder level. Tax incentives can thus also be provided for the shareholders of SMEs. Obvious-
ly, such incentives primarily aim at enhancing investments in the SME sector and at improv-
ing the supply of capital for the respective enterprises. The basic idea is to increase the after-
tax rate of return on SME investments, thereby enhancing the relative attractiveness of such 
investments. As for firm-level incentives, this can be done with the help of input- as well as 
output-based incentives. Either deductions are directly granted upon investing in an SME (in-
put-based) or the proceeds derived from SME investments, i.e., dividends or capital gains, are 
taxed favorably (output-based). With regard to the investors, incentives can target institutional 
investors such as investment funds or non-institutional investors. The latter may be individu-
als as well as enterprises holding participations in other firms. 
Table 9 displays the shareholder-level incentives for SME investments that are of-
fered for non-institutional investors in the European Union in 2015.
115
 There are five coun-
tries providing substantial reliefs. Under most regimes, dividends and capital gains are (part-
ly) exempt from taxation if the underlying shareholding relates to a company that qualifies as 
an SME. Alternatively, investments in SMEs may be depreciable (France) or induce immedi-
ate allowances (Ireland, Italy). Belgium and Italy only consider investments in small enter-
prises whereas Austria, France and Ireland target medium-sized entities as well. Mostly, the 
regimes apply additional eligibility criteria relating to minimum holding periods (Belgium, 
France) or firm characteristics such as firm age (France, Italy) and the engagement in innova-
tive activities (France, Italy). In Austria and Ireland target companies must be unquoted. Fur-
thermore, some regimes restrict the size of the investment to maximum absolute amounts or 
to maximum equity shares in the respective companies.  
                                                 
115
 With regard to investor-level incentives, it needs to be pointed out that a country without specific incentives 
for SME investments does not necessarily provide unfavorable tax treatment for these ventures. The dividends 
and capital gains may, for example, be exempt due to a participation exemption or due to a general exemption of 
capital gains for individual shareholders (e.g., in Croatia, Malta, Slovakia). Table 9, however, focuses on regula-
tions specifically targeting SMEs and favoring them over investments in large enterprises in the respective coun-
try. Moreover, the table excludes provisions providing preferential treatment to capital gains upon retirement or 
death (e.g., in Belgium, Germany and Ireland) as well as any reliefs granted with regard to the inheritance tax 
(e.g., in Germany, Ireland and Spain). See OECD (2009a) p. 94. For a more detailed discussion of shareholder 
level taxes and an overview of currently applicable tax rates, see Section 4.2.3. 
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Table 9: Tax incentives for shareholders of SMEs in the EU (2015) 
Country Description of relief Eligibility criteria 
Austria  full exemption of income from 
participations in SMEs (dividends, 
capital gains, interest payments) by 
so-called intermediary investors  
 exemption of dividend payments by 
intermediaries to individuals for 
shareholdings up to € 25,000   
 no. of employees ≤ 250; turnover ≤ 
€ 50 million; balance sh. tot ≤ 
€ 43 million  
 investor must be corporate entity 
and be financed by equity 
 SMEs must be non-listed and Euro-
pean 
Belgium  reduced PIT rate on dividends from 
SMEs if shares issued in 2013 or af-
ter are held for 3 years or longer 
(20% instead of 25% after 3 years 
and 15% after 4 years) 
 no. of employees ≤ 50; turnover ≤ 
€ 7.3 million; balance sh. tot ≤ 
€ 5 million; profits ≤ € 322,500 
  possibility to create liquidation 
reserve that is subject to 10% tax 
rate instead of 25% withholding tax 
at time of liquidation 
 no. of employees ≤ 50; turnover ≤ 
€ 7.3 million; balance sh. tot ≤ 
€ 5 million; profits ≤ €322,500 
  exemption of corporate distributions 
made in spite of losses from fairness 
tax (5.15%) 
 no. of employees ≤ 50; turnover ≤ 
€ 7.3 million; balance sh. tot ≤ 
€ 5 million; profits ≤ €322,500 
France  exemption from capital gains taxa-
tion (PIT) depending on holding pe-
riod: 
 1-4 years: 50% 
 4-8 years: 65% 
 over 8 years: 85% 
 no. of employees ≤ 250; turnover ≤ 
€ 50 million; balance sh. tot ≤ 
€ 43 million  
 SME subject to CIT, less than 10 
years old when shares acquired 
  capital contributions to innovative 
SMEs can be depreciated over 5 
years by individual shareholders 
 no. of employees ≤ 250; turnover ≤ 
€ 50 million; balance sh. tot ≤ 
€ 43 million  
 SME not older than 8 years 
 15% of expenses spent on R&D 
 50% owned by individuals 
  allowance (18%) for investments in 
SMEs can be deducted from person-
al income tax base 
 no. of employees ≤ 250; turnover ≤ 
€ 50 million; balance sh. tot ≤ 
€ 43 million  
 maximum allowance: € 50,000 
(small companies) or € 20,000 (me-
dium-sized companies) 
  allowance for individual business 
owners on capital gains upon re-
tirement (max. € 500,000) 
 no. of employees ≤ 250; turnover ≤ 
€ 50 million; balance sh. tot ≤ 
€ 43 million  
  allowance (50%) on investments in 
SMEs for wealth tax purposes 
 no. of employees ≤ 250; turnover ≤ 
€50 million; balance sh. tot ≤ 
€ 43 million 
 maximum allowance: € 45,000 
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Country Description of relief Eligibility criteria 
Ireland  allowance (30% + 11%) for invest-
ments in unquoted SMEs by indi-
viduals (max. € 150,000; excess can 
be carried forward) 
 extended relief of € 100,000 in each 
of the previous 6 tax years for peo-
ple investing in newly-incorporated, 
unquoted companies who work full-
time or as a director for the compa-
ny and derived the bulk of their in-
come from employment prior to the 
investment 
 no. of employees ≤ 250; turnover ≤ 
€ 50 million; balance sh. tot ≤ 
€ 43 million  
 SME must not raise more than € 15 
million of capital in total and € 5 
million in any 12-month period 
 SME must be resident/incorporated 
in EEA 
 capital must serve the creation or 
expansion of qualifying activities 
(no land-dealing, financial services, 
film production, hotels, nursing 
homes) with increase or mainte-
nance of employment 
 additional allowance of 11% re-
quires additional employment crite-
ria to be fulfilled 
 investor must not own more than 
30% of shares unless the capital of 
the company does not exceed 
€ 500,000 
 no preferential rights to dividends, 
redemption or assets upon liquida-
tion 
 extended relief requires government 
certificate as potentially creating 
new jobs; certificate subject to ex-
tremely detailed conditions 
Italy  allowance for companies investing 
in innovative SMEs (20%; max. 
€ 1.8 million; excess can be carried 
forward) 
 SME with production ≤ € 5 million, 
not older than 7 years and active in 
innovative sectors 
 equity share ≤ € 2.5 million and 
held for at least 2 years 
 
Evaluating the regimes, input-based measures, i.e., allowances upon investment, ap-
pear more appealing than exemptions of dividends and capital gains. The latter may in fact 
rather incentivize divesture as relief is only granted upon the withdrawal of capital.
116
 Allow-
ances, in contrast, provide additional liquidity for taxpayers upfront (given the existence of 
positive income to be offset) and possibly enable more capital to be invested. Moreover, al-
lowances limit losses in tax revenue if they are accounted for in the deduction of acquisition 
costs upon the sale. On the other hand, lock-in effects may thereby be reinforced as the taxa-
ble gain upon disposal is magnified.
117
  
                                                 
116
 See Auerbach (1992) pp. 263 ff.; Seida/Wempe (2000) pp. 33 ff. 
117
 See Stiglitz (1983) pp. 259 ff.; Auerbach/Burman/Siegel (2000) pp. 355 ff.; Chari/Golosov/Tsyvinski (2005) 
pp. 2 ff.; Ivkovic/Poterba/Weisbenner (2005) pp. 1605 ff. 
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Irrespective of the specific form of relief, the above provisions on shareholder-level 
reliefs are comparatively complex. Hence, they are likely to cause substantial additional com-
pliance and administrative costs, which casts doubts on their general usefulness in the SME 
sector. Moreover, the requirement of minimum holding periods may induce lock-in effects, 
i.e., investors may not withdraw and reinvest their capital in order to ensure eligibility for 
favorable taxation. The relief of capital gains from SME investments in France, for example, 
increases in the holding period from 0% (less than one year) to 85% (over eight years). Bel-
gium instead exempts distributions from loss-making SMEs from the fairness tax, which 
clearly incentivizes the withdrawal of capital from those enterprises which are most likely to 
feature insufficient liquidity due to losses. This seems detrimental to the provision of more 
capital for SMEs, the actual goal of shareholder-level incentives. The same is true for limita-
tions on the amount of capital to be invested that apply for several regimes. Obviously, these 
restrictions cap the flow of capital that is actually intended to be fostered. The provisions may 
be necessary to avoid misuse and overly large losses in tax revenue, though. 
Apart from specific design issues, the general effectiveness of shareholder-level in-
centives in attracting additional capital to the SME sector is questionable as well. The number 
of non-institutional investors (apart from owner-managers) who are willing and able to invest 
significant amounts in small, unquoted companies is deemed to be rather limited.
118
 Even 
fewer of them are likely to have superior know-how on the evaluation of SME investments 
than specialized institutional investors
119
 – and those who have the expertise, e.g., business 
angels, probably do not need to be incentivized by some sort of tax incentive.  
 
 
                                                 
118
 See Barber/Odean (2008) pp. 785 ff. 
119
 See Puri/Zarutskie (1998) pp. 2247 ff.; Shapira/Venezia (2001) pp. 1575 ff. 
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Table 10: Tax incentives for venture capital investors in the EU (2015) 
Country 
Reliefs for venture capital (VC) 
Description of relief Eligibility criteria 
Belgium  reduced tax base for investment companies designed for venture capi-
tal investments (PRICAF): notional basis that usually leads to negligi-
ble tax liability (composed of disallowed expenses, abnormal or be-
nevolent advantages received and indemnities paid for “missing cou-
pons” in case of stock lending); annual option to apply usual regime 
 private PRICAFs exempt from tax on investment institutions 
 PRICAF = closed ended investment fund in corporate form with a 
maximum lifetime of 12 years that invests directly in non-listed and 
expanding companies; investors must be “private” (individuals or 
companies) who invest at least € 50,000 for shares of 4% to 16%; 
PRICAF must be managed by management company that is fully 
taxable for CIT purposes 
  dividends paid by PRICAF that relate to capital gains realized on 
shares and capital gains upon the liquidation or redemption of shares 
in PRIFACs are exempt from withholding taxes 
 capital gains on shares in PRICAFs exempt from PIT for individuals 
 
Denmark  venture funds are exempt from being classified as non-transparent 
entities in contrast to other fund vehicles 
 venture fund only invests in securities of SMEs with  
 balance sheet total ≤ DKK 125 million (≈ € 16.8 million) 
 no. of employees ≤ 250 
 gross profits ≤ DKK 250 million (≈ € 33.6 million) 
France  venture capital companies (SCRs) and venture capital funds (FCPRs) 
are exempt from CIT with income from securities 
 SCR = corporate entity (SA) with at least 50% of assets invested in 
shares, convertible bonds and similar securities of French or EU non-
listed companies (no participations over 40%); maximum participa-
tion in SCR is 30% 
  favorable treatment of capital gains from shareholdings in SCRs and 
FCPRs 
 exemption for individual shareholders  
 reduced tax rate of 15% (instead of progressive PIT rates of 0-45%) 
for corporate shareholders 
 capital contributions to SCRs and FCPRs can be depreciated over 5 
years by shareholders 
 minimum holding period of 5 years 
 individual shareholders must reinvest proceeds to be exempt 
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Country 
Reliefs for venture capital (VC) 
Description of relief Eligibility criteria 
France (cont.)  individual venture capital companies (SUIRs) are exempt from CIT 
and annual minimum tax for 10 years 
 SUIR = simplified stock corporation with only one shareholder and 
at least 95% of assets being shares in commercial, industrial or hand-
icraft unlisted companies from EU/EEA that are subject to CIT; tar-
get companies not older than 5 years and owned by at least 50% by 
individuals; maximum participation in target companies as well as 
SUIR is 30% 
  dividends by SUIRs exempt from PIT; social taxes (13.5%) apply 
 capital gains from SUIRs subject to progressive exemption from PIT 
as 10-year exemption of SUIR expires (otherwise fully taxable) 
 minimum holding period of 5 years for progressive exemption of 
capital gains 
Greece  closed-end venture capital mutual funds (AKES) deemed transparent 
for domestic and non-domestic investors 
 AKES’ exempt from VAT on management fees; further exemption of 
establishment, management contract and payment of unit holders’ par-
ticipation from any kind of tax, fee, stamp duty or charge 
 AKES = partnership exclusively investing in securities of unlisted 
Greek firms; minimum assets upon establishment = € 3 million and 
maximum lifetime is 15 years; minimum investment per shareholder 
is € 150,000 
Hungary  VC funds exempt from CIT and local tax; taxation on the level of the 
shareholders (no matter if individual or corporate; no participation ex-
emptions apply) 
 VC fund = legal entity under supervision of Hungarian Financial 
Services Authority that issues public or private investment units and 
is managed by an investment fund manager 
Italy  proceeds of investors of VC funds are fully exempt from income taxa-
tion (fund itself is also exempt from income taxes)  
 VC fund must 
 be mainly controlled by individuals 
 be incorporated for not more than 36 months  
 invest at least 75% of capital in small, non-listed, Italian compa-
nies (turnover ≤ € 50 million) that are subject to taxation and 
mainly controlled by individual shareholders 
Luxembourg  dividends, capital gains and interest income of venture capital compa-
nies (SICARs) exempt from CIT and municipal tax  
 SICARs exempt from net worth tax 
 SICAR = venture capital company with a minimum capital of 
€ 1 million that is managed from Luxembourg; status requires pre-
approval by financial services authority 
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Country 
Reliefs for venture capital (VC) 
Description of relief Eligibility criteria 
Luxembourg (cont.)  dividends paid by venture capital companies are not subject to with-
holding taxes 
 capital gains of non-resident individual shareholders from venture 
capital companies are always tax exempt (otherwise capital gains from 
qualified shareholdings taxable if sold within 6 months after acquisi-
tion) 
 SICAR = venture capital company with a minimum capital of 
€ 1 million that is managed from Luxembourg; status requires pre-
approval by financial services authority 
  allowance for VC investments by corporate income taxpayers (100% 
of investments; max. €5 million per investment or 30% of taxable in-
come)  
 target enterprises must use funds to develop new technologies / fab-
rications; certificate for eligible investments required 
Portugal  venture capital funds are exempt from CIT (most income derived by 
investment funds is exempt beginning 2015 whereas special tax treat-
ment of venture capital companies has been revoked) 
 disciplinary provisions on the constitution and activities performed 
(investment in companies with high growth potential and contribu-
tion to their development) 
  dividends derived from venture capital funds are subject to a withhold-
ing tax of 10% (instead of 28%) if the taxpayer is not otherwise ex-
empt; additional option to aggregate dividends with other income and 
exclude 50% of the proceeds 
 capital gains derived from venture capital funds are subject to a with-
holding tax of 10% (instead of 28%) for individual shareholders and to 
the normal CIT rate for corporate shareholders if the taxpayer is not 
otherwise exempt 
 
Spain  exemption of capital gains (99%) and dividends received (100%) for 
venture capital companies (VCC) and venture capital funds (VCF) 
 eligible capital gains must stem from shareholdings in non-financial 
and non-real-estate, non-listed companies that are held between one 
and 15 years 
  exemption (100%) of dividends paid by VCCs and VCFs 
 tax credit available for capital gains from transfer of interests in VCCs 
and VCFs (maximum = gain realized) 
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Country 
Reliefs for venture capital (VC) 
Description of relief Eligibility criteria 
United Kingdom  venture capital trusts (VCT) exempt from CIT on capital gains  venture capital trust (VCT) = company approved by HMRC that 
invests in and lends money to small, unquoted companies (70% must 
be qualifying investments) 
 gross assets ≤ £ 15 million (pre-investment) / £ 16 million (post-
investment) 
 no. of employees ≤ 250 (500 for knowledge intensive companies) 
 annual investment by VCT companies ≤ £ 5 million 
 lifetime risk finance total ≤ £ 12 million (≤ £ 20 million for 
knowledge intensive companies) 
 exclusion of certain activities (e.g., low-risk activities, financing, 
shipping, farming) 
 less than 7 years old when first benefiting from state aid (10 years 
for knowledge intensive companies) 
  for subscriptions in VCT of up to £ 200,000 individual investors are 
 exempt from PIT on dividends  
 exempt from capital gains taxation  
 eligible for tax allowance equal to subscription  
 minimum holding periods 
 3 years for exemption from capital gains tax 
 5 years for tax allowance 
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Altogether, shareholder-level incentives for non-institutional investors appear as an 
inefficient way of enhancing the capital supply for SMEs. Presumably, the plus in invest-
ments is rather modest
120
 while the costs due to the complexity of the provisions and the im-
pairment of investment neutrality are considerable. As a consequence, several countries pro-
vide incentives for venture capital (VC) companies and funds instead of shareholder-level 
measures for individual investors. VC funds and companies specialize in collecting and in-
vesting capital in young, up-coming firms that bear great risks but also great potential. Natu-
rally, these firms are in the early stages of development and part of the SME spectrum.
121
 In 
the European Union, ten countries provide tax reliefs specifically aiming at venture capital 
entities in 2015 (see Table 10).
122
 They either exempt income on the level of the VC fund 
(nine countries) or they exempt the taxpayers who derive income from the VC fund (seven 
countries). Some Member States even exempt income on both levels. Most incentives tie the 
relief to certain requirements with respect to the targeted firms of the VC fund (e.g., firm size, 
firm age, legal form, activity performed) as well as to maximum participation quotas and 
holding periods. Most of the exemptions are full exemptions.  
Given the number of available regimes, VC incentives are more popular with policy-
makers than other SME incentives on the shareholder level. In comparison with the reliefs 
granted to individuals, they provide several advantages. First of all, a broader group of poten-
tial investors can be addressed by VC incentives as the number of individuals who are able to 
appropriately evaluate the risks and the growth potential of small, unquoted companies is 
deemed to be substantially lower than the number of individuals who are willing to invest in a 
VC fund.
123
 In addition, funds improve the level of risk diversification and may be better suit-
ed to attract foreign investors.
124
 The administrative costs also decrease if the incentive is only 
granted to a limited number of investment funds instead of thousands of individual investors. 
Overall, VC incentives should thus be more effective and more efficient in enhancing the 
                                                 
120
 So far, existing empirical evidence suggests only a weak relationship between preferential shareholder taxa-
tion and the amount of investments in SMEs. See Poterba (1989) pp. 47 ff.; Gompers/Lerner (1998) pp. 156 ff.; 
Cowling/Bates/Jagger/Murray (2008) pp. 8 ff. 
121
 Obviously, not all SMEs are eligible for venture capital incentives and some of the targeted companies of VC 
funds and companies may not be SMEs. Nonetheless, the overlap of SMEs and enterprises targeted by venture 
capital should justify the classification as SME incentive, though.  
122
 Table 10 only lists those regimes favoring venture capital investments over comparable investment funds and 
companies. Even in the absence of incentives for venture capital, however, tax systems may be very favorable 
for such investments as investment funds and investment companies are generally exempt. 
123
 See Puri/Zarutskie (1998) pp. 2247 ff.; Shapira/Venezia (2001) pp. 1575 ff. 
124
 See Norton/Tenenbaum (1993) pp. 432 ff.; Ruhnka/Young (1991) pp. 120 ff. 
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supply of capital for SMEs than shareholder-level incentives targeting non-institutional inves-
tors. 
3.1.4 Administrative Reliefs 
Besides input and output-based incentives for SMEs and their owners, the Member 
States of the European Union also offer several administrative reliefs for small businesses 
(see Table 11). Administrative reliefs do not aim at reducing the amount of actual tax pay-
ments but seek a reduction of businesses’ compliance costs, which make up a significant part 
of the overall tax burden.
125
 This is especially true for small businesses due to the large por-
tion of fixed-cost components not growing proportionally in firm size.
126
 Being small there-
fore constitutes a structural competitive disadvantage that is sought to be reduced by simpli-
fied procedures in determining enterprises’ tax liability and the collection of tax payments.127  
One of the most important administrative reliefs for small businesses is simplified 
accounting. A large share of the compliance burden of most businesses is made up by the 
costs of determining taxable income. Book-keeping and the preparation of tax accounts on an 
accrual basis often require substantial effort and external expertise in firms without an in-
house tax department.
128
 23 of 28 EU countries therefore provide the smallest, mostly non-
corporate businesses with the opportunity of simplified tax accounting, mostly on a cash ba-
sis.
129
 The effect of cash-based accounts on actual tax payments should be limited as the re-
gimes mostly include adjustments to pure cash accounting with regard to the depreciation of 
fixed assets and prepayments. Otherwise, simplified regimes would have similar effects as a 
very comprehensive scheme of immediate depreciation. Numerous countries, however, do not 
only provide the option for cash accounting but even more extensive accounting simplifica-
tions in income taxation. Under so-called presumptive regimes, income is not determined on 
the basis of comprehensive accounts of revenues and expenses. Instead, the tax assessment is 
based on only a few easy-to-track indicators. In general, four kinds of regimes can be distin-
guished: 
                                                 
125
 For a comprehensive review of the existing literature on the size and the composition of tax compliance costs, 
see Eichfelder (2010) pp. 50 ff. 
126
 See Sandford/Godwin/Hardwick (1989) pp. 191 ff.; DeLuca/Stilmar/Guyton/Lee/O’Hare (2007) pp. 170 ff.; 
Eichfelder (2011) pp. 63 ff. 
127
 See Section 3.1.4 for an overview of notable administrative reliefs for SMEs in the European Union and se-
lected other countries.  
128
 See Allers (1994) pp. 125 f.; OECD (2001b) p. 60. 
129
 For a detailed description and analysis of simplified regimes of tax accounting in the EU, see Section 5.2. 
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- Lump-sum deductions: Taxpayers only record and report turnover while all expenses 
are estimated as a fixed percentage of turnover. (Percentages may vary according to 
the specific activities of the taxpayers.) 
- Turnover taxes: Taxpayer only record and report turnover. No expenses are deducti-
ble but a decreased tax rate is imposed on (gross) income. 
- Taxation based on physical indicators: No accounts (or only reduced accounts) are 
kept that the normal tax assessment is based on. Instead, the tax payable is derived 
from physical indicators such as the number of restaurant seats, the size of business 
facilities or the area of cultivable land.  
- Lump-sum payments: No taxable income is determined. Instead, taxpayers are sub-
ject to a one-off payment that replaces the usual tax assessment. 
Lump-sum deductions and turnover taxes are usually available for a wide range of 
micro businesses not exceeding a certain size (e.g., in Austria, Poland and the Slovak Repub-
lic) whereas methods based on physical indicators and lump-sum payments are restricted to 
specific sectors such as the agricultural sector or the hospitality sector. As taxpayers have to 
record and report fewer information, their compliance burden is likely to decrease significant-
ly. The deviations from standard income, however, also increase when fewer accounting 
numbers enter the determination of the tax liability. Cost-efficient, highly profitable firms do 
thus not only benefit from presumptive regimes because of reduced compliance costs but also 
because of reduced tax payments. If the regimes are too beneficial, the danger of discouraging 
growth naturally increases as businesses may want to avoid becoming ineligible. A direct dis-
advantage stemming from simplified approaches can be neglected because the regimes are 
generally rebuttable, i.e., taxpayers can opt for a normal tax assessment if this is better for 
them.
130
 Nonetheless, the usage of presumptive regimes generally appears questionable as 
every business owner should at least record her revenues and expenses and hence be able to 
determine her tax liability on the basis of cash accounts. The proper recording of all business 
transactions is also conducive for obtaining outside capital and improving the efficiency of an 
enterprise’s operations.131 Presumptive regimes should thus be seen more as an administrative 
measure to cope with a large number of micro businesses rather than an appropriate relief for 
micro businesses. 
                                                 
130
 The turnover tax in Romania is the only mandatory regime where enterprises (corporate and non-corporate) 
are inevitable taxed on turnover if their revenues do not exceed € 100,000. In some other countries, however, 
enterprises need to choose the accounting regime for multiple years (e.g., in Austria, France and Portugal). 
131
 See Sandford/Godwin/Hardwick (1989) pp. 13 f.; Carter (2007) pp. 74 f. 
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Table 11: Administrative tax reliefs for SMEs in the EU (2015) 
Country 
Exemption from VAT 
(threshold in €) 
Tax accounting Tax returns and payments 
Simplified 
accounting 
Presumption 
Lump-sum 
payments 
Waiver of 
prepayments 
Less frequent 
returns/payments 
Austria 35.000   
  
 
Belgium 15.000   
 
 
 
Bulgaria 25.565   
 
  
Croatia 30.000  
   
 
Cyprus none 
     
Czech Republic 37.000   
   
Denmark 7.000  
    
Estonia 16.000  
    
Finland 8.500  
    
France 80.000 / 32.000*   
  
 
Germany 17.500  
  
  
Greece 10.000 / 5.000*   
  
 
Hungary 20.000    
 
 
Ireland 37.500 
    
 
Italy 30.000   
 
  
Latvia 50.000    
 
 
Lithuania 45.000      
Luxembourg 25.000  
  
  
Malta 35.000 / 24.000*  
    
Netherlands 9.000  
    
Poland 35.000    
 
 
Portugal 9.976   
  
 
Romania 65.000   
   
Slovak Republic 49.790   
   
Slovenia 50.000   
   
Spain none   
  
 
Sweden none  
   
 
United Kingdom 100.000  
    
* Different thresholds apply for the provision of services and goods. 
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Among the 23 countries implementing some form of simplified tax accounting, only 
a few do not restrict eligibility to micro companies.
132
 Moreover, the regimes are generally 
only open to non-corporate businesses, which adds another violation of legal form neutrality 
to the tax code.
133
 This restriction, however, is economically justifiable as taxpayers can only 
be expected to incur significant savings in compliance costs from simplified regimes if they 
do not have to keep full accrual accounts for financial accounting. Corporate entities are usu-
ally subject to local commercial codes and financial accounting standards requiring accrual 
accounts. Their benefit from simplified tax accounting is thus likely to be limited.  
The exemption from the value-added tax is another commonly used administrative 
relief for the very smallest businesses in Europe. Cyprus, Spain and Sweden are the only 
countries where no exemption is available. Exemption thresholds in the rest of Europe range 
from € 5,000 in Greece to about € 100,000 in the UK. Once again, efficiency considerations 
on the side of the tax administrations are likely to be the main reason for this exemption as the 
collection costs for the exempt businesses would be higher than the tax revenues generated.
134
 
With regard to neutrality and the provision of a level-playing field, a VAT exemption rather 
represents a distortion as some enterprises can offer their products and services to customers 
at lower prices just because they do not have to pay VAT. In fact, the exemption may enable 
inefficient, uncompetitive businesses to stay in the market and cannibalize other businesses 
paying VAT. Exemption thresholds should therefore be kept at an administratively acceptable 
minimum in order to prevent unnecessary market distortions.
135
 Further commonly used ad-
ministrative reliefs for small businesses with regard to income taxes and VAT include re-
duced regulations on the documentation of transfer prices, less frequent tax payments and the 
exemption from prepayments. The latter two reliefs apparently address potential liquidity 
constraints of small and especially new businesses. 
Evidently, there is a multitude of possible facilitations in the process of taxation for 
small enterprises. These measures are generally well-suited to create a level playing field for 
SMEs as one of their structural competitive disadvantages is directly addressed. At the same 
                                                 
132
 For a detailed discussion of eligibility for simplified tax accounting as well as potential effects of restrictions 
to eligibility, see Section 5.2.  
133
 The only countries allowing simplified tax accounting in the corporate income tax are Hungary, Lithuania, 
Portugal and Romania. 
134
 See Keen/Mintz (2004) pp. 559 ff.; Brashares/Knittel/Silverstein/Yuskavage (2014) pp. 290 ff. 
135
 See Keen/Mintz (2004) pp. 559 ff.; OECD (2011) p. 49. 
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time, simplified procedures also reduce administrative costs on the side of tax agencies.
136
 
Too generous reliefs, however, entail the danger of holding back enterprises from growth as 
they want to remain eligible for the simplifications.
137
 Such problems are especially likely to 
arise if incentives not only reduce compliance costs but also affect the actual tax liability. 
When the determination of income is based on presumptive methods, for example, or when 
enterprises are exempt from the value-added tax (VAT), the tax liability can be affected sub-
stantially. Similarly, significant interest advantages can emerge as a consequence of cash ac-
counting or preferential modalities with regard to prepayments. Altogether, administrative 
reliefs may provide a useful policy tool to reduce the compliance burden, but they need to be 
designed and targeted carefully to prevent unintended, overly generous double-reliefs. Other-
wise, the costs of newly induced distortions could outweigh the benefits from reduced com-
pliance efforts. 
 
 
  
                                                 
136
 See OECD (2011) p. 49; Brashares/Knittel/Silverstein/Yuskavage (2014) pp. 301 f. 
137
 Firms in Spain, for example, have been found to bunch at the turnover threshold beyond which they would 
become subject to the scrutiny of the large taxpayer unit of the tax administration. Similar effects have been 
found at thresholds exempting businesses from VAT registration. See Onji (2009) pp. 766 ff.; Almunia 
/Rodriguez-Lopez (2016) pp. 16 ff. A further discussion of firms remaining small to remain eligible for SME 
incentives is provided in Section 5.1. 
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3.2 Impact of SME Tax Incentives on Effective Tax Levels in the EU 
3.2.1 Introduction 
The qualitative overview of available regimes shows that SME tax incentives are 
common practice in the EU. The incentives, however, differ significantly in their design and 
in their scope of application. The actual impact of available incentives on the majority of mi-
cro, small and medium-sized enterprises may therefore be limited for many regimes. If, how-
ever, the effects on effective tax burdens were negligible, it would be hard to make a case for 
tax incentives given the additional compliance and administrative costs. This consideration is 
particularly relevant in the context of SMEs for whom compliance costs make up a larger 
share of the tax burden than for large companies.
138
 The quantitative analysis also allows fur-
ther conclusions about the proper targeting of SME tax incentives as it helps to unveil the 
relationship between the size of reliefs and firm characteristics such as profitability, capital 
intensity and capital structure. Lastly, the effective reduction of tax burdens also hints at po-
tential distortions of investment and financing decisions introduced by size-dependent tax 
treatment (large firms versus SMEs but also micro versus small and medium-sized compa-
nies). In particular, businesses could be incentivized to not outgrow their current size class, 
which would, of course, be the opposite of the intended effect of SME tax incentives.  
In the following quantitative analysis
139
, effective tax burdens are derived using the 
European Tax Analyzer.
140
 Section 3.2.2 first introduces the European Tax Analyzer and the 
model specifics underlying the calculation of the effective tax burdens. Next, Section 3.2.3 
describes the quantification of the country-specific incentives before Section 3.2.4 compares 
the tax burdens for all size classes. Sections 3.2.5 and 3.2.6 follow up by providing compari-
sons of the different incentive types and several sensitivity checks, respectively. 
 
 
 
                                                 
138
 See Sandford/Godwin/Hardwick (1989) pp. 191 ff.; DeLuca/Stilmar/Guyton/Lee/O’Hare (2007) pp. 170 ff.; 
Eichfelder (2011) pp. 63 ff. 
139
 The quantitative analysis is joint work with Rainer Bräutigam, Maria Theresia Evers and Christoph Spengel 
and will be published as a ZEW Discussion Paper. See Bergner/Bräutigam/Evers/Spengel (forthcoming). 
140
 The European Tax Analyzer is a widely acknowledged tool for the calculation of effective tax burdens that 
has been applied in numerous studies for European Commission. See, for example, European Commission 
(2001); European Commission (2008); European Commission (2015b). 
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3.2.2 European Tax Analyzer 
The European Tax Analyzer is a simulation program to calculate effective average 
tax burdens for model enterprises in different jurisdictions. For this study, four different mod-
el enterprises are considered: a large, a medium-sized, a small and a micro company. In order 
to sample the model firms, each company in the 28 Member States of the European Union as 
reported by the AMADEUS database by Bureau von Dijk (see Figure 1) is assigned to one of 
the four size classes.
141
 Building on this classification, averages of all relevant financial indi-
cators are taken over the companies in each category. Finally, the averages define the respec-
tive model enterprises and their characteristics. Put differently, the model companies repre-
sent the average European companies in the four size classes. 
The basic idea of the European Tax Analyzer is to simulate the development of the 
model companies twice: once in a world without taxes and once in a world with taxes. The 
difference in firm values between both scenarios ultimately represents the tax burden. The 
development of balance sheet positions, sales, costs and other financial indicators therefore 
needs to be simulated over a period of ten years in the next step. The estimates also include 
macroeconomic data such as interest rates (short- and long-term rates for debtor and creditor) 
and price increases (primary products, general inflation, wages, real estate and investment 
goods)
142
 as well as data on the structure and the costs for employees and R&D. For deprecia-
ble assets, it is generally assumed that they are disposed of at the end of their useful lives and 
replaced by an identical asset. The replacement costs are adjusted for inflation. The initial 
financial endowments consist of debt and equity. Dividends are distributed annually to share-
holders whereas undistributed after-tax profits become retained earnings and can also serve as 
a further source for acquiring new assets or financing the corporation in general. Due to deriv-
ing average European model enterprises from the AMADEUS database, companies have 
identical pre-tax figures (balance sheet, profit- & loss-statement and liquidity) and are subject 
to equal macroeconomic parameters in all countries. As a consequence, differences at the end 
of the simulation period are exclusively induced by differences in tax codes.  
                                                 
141
 A two-step approach is used to generate the model companies: First, each EU company in the AMADEUS 
database is classified as either micro, small, medium-sized or large according to the definition by the European 
Commission. In a second step, average financial indicators (i.e., balance sheet, profit and loss statement, etc.) are 
determined for each category and form the financial framework of the respective model enterprises. 
142
 Interest rates are determined by the average of the monthly short-term and long-term interest rates as provided 
by the European Central Bank (MFI interest rate statistics). Assumed price increases are determined by the aver-
age of monthly or quarterly price indices provided by Eurostat and the Statistical Office of Germany for 2012. 
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Figure 1: Model companies (European Tax Analyzer) 
Balance Sheet ('000 €) Micro Small Medium Large 
Total assets 1,074 4,442 15,857 171,949 
  Fixed assets 340 1,385 5,215 58,759 
    Intangible fixed assets 21 88 340 5,199 
    Tangible fixed assets 284 1,139 4,111 41,151 
    Other fixed assets 36 158 764 12,408 
  Current assets 734 3,057 10,642 113,190 
    Stock 175 816 2,978 27,362 
    Debtors 154 993 2,911 41,938 
    Other current assets 405 1,248 4,753 43,891 
Equity & liabilities 1,074 4,442 15,857 171,949 
  Equity 509 2,268 7,035 73,194 
    Common stock 151 659 1,694 21,306 
    Other equity 358 1,609 5,341 51,888 
  Non-current liabilities 156 601 2,558 28,000 
    Long-term debt 127 416 1,796 19,937 
    Other non-current liabilities 28 185 762 8,063 
  Current liabilities 410 1,572 6,264 70,755 
    Loans 77 344 1,920 22,661 
    Creditors 246 963 3,265 32,385 
    Other current liabilities 87 265 1,079 15,709 
     Profit & Loss Statement ('000 €) 
    Sales 659 4,764 19,404 209,689 
Operating profit (loss) 72 381 1,348 14,278 
Profit (loss) before tax 62 342 1,237 13,369 
Profit (loss) after tax 48 264 957 10,384 
     Employment 
    Employees 3 21 90 628 
Costs of employees ('000 €) 84 634 2,703 21,939 
     Financial Ratios 
    Return on equity 10.45% 13.15% 15.74% 16.53% 
Profit to turnover ratio after tax 7.30% 5.30% 4.93% 4.95% 
Equity ratio 47.35% 51.06% 44.37% 42.57% 
Personnel intensity 14.18% 14.80% 14.97% 11.42% 
Intensity of machinery 26.43% 25.64% 23.63% 23.93% 
Stock intensity 16.29% 18.38% 18.78% 15.91% 
 
Each model enterprise is a corporate entity. Hence, the relevant tax codes applied in 
the taxation of the model company throughout the calculation period are those applying to 
corporations in the EU Member States in 2015. Importantly, the multi-period approach com-
bined with the modelling of an actual company allows the consideration of a multitude of tax 
rules that would not be possible otherwise. Above all, tax bases and tax codes’ impact thereon 
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can be accounted for.
143
 This is of particular importance for examining SME-specific tax in-
centives that often modify tax bases and restrict eligibility by thresholds referring to balance 
sheet totals, turnover or the number of employees. 
Figure 2: Calculation of effective tax burden (European Tax Analyzer) 
 
The actual tax burden on the corporate level is calculated by subtracting the post-tax 
value of the company at the end of the simulation period from the pre-tax value (see Figure 
2). The former equals the sum of the pre-tax cash flows and the value of the net assets of the 
company at the end of the simulation period. The post-tax value of the enterprise is based on 
the pre-tax cash flow less the tax liabilities from each period. Moreover, the value of the net 
assets at the end of the simulation period reduced by potential tax liabilities on hidden re-
serves needs to be added to arrive at the post-tax value of the company. The effective tax bur-
den is given as an absolute number.
144
  
                                                 
143
 The following provisions relating to the tax base are considered: depreciation schemes (pool vs. individual 
depreciation schemes; depreciation periods), inventory valuation (LIFO, FIFO or weighted average cost meth-
od), capitalization of R&D costs, employee pension schemes (i.e., deductibility of pension costs, contributions to 
pension funds), thin capitalization rules, earnings stripping rules, notional interest deductions, provisions for bad 
debt and guarantee accruals, avoidance mechanisms for double taxation on foreign-source income (i.e., exemp-
tion method, tax credit, deduction of foreign taxes), non-deductible items and loss relief rules (carry-back, carry-
forward). Additionally, non-profit taxes with special bases can be included (e.g., real estate tax, payroll tax). 
144
 In the current version of the European Tax Analyzer, the approach of simulating the development of a model 
company over multiple periods does not allow the derivation of meaningful, annual effective tax rates that are 
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3.2.3 Implementation of SME Tax Incentives 
Table 12 displays the currently available SME tax incentives that are included in the 
determination of effective tax burdens with the European Tax Analyzer. Calculations are 
made for all 28 Member States of the European Union. Due to the model assumptions and the 
characteristics of the model companies, not all regimes can be modelled. Since effective tax 
burdens are given as absolute numbers, the values calculated for the four model enterprises 
(micro, small medium-sized and large) cannot directly be compared with each other. Instead, 
the effective tax burden is calculated twice for each SME category: once according to the pro-
visions applying to large enterprises and once allowing for SME tax incentives. The differ-
ence between both values represents the reduction induced by SME tax incentives. Compar-
ing the relative reliefs for different size classes then enables a comparison of effect sizes.  
Further SME incentives such as preferential loss offset rules and special provisions 
on carry forwards and refunds of excess reliefs provided by tax incentives usually do not 
show in the effective tax burdens due to the underlying assumptions about the model compa-
nies’ economic development. Moreover, purely administrative reliefs cannot be captured and 
shareholder-level incentives are neglected.
145
 SME incentives limited to overly specific assets, 
activities or regions (e.g., for energy rationalization, education and training expenses or in-
vestments in special economic zones) are not considered either because they do not apply to 
the majority of SMEs or their implementation would require a more detailed specification of 
the model company that is not feasible with the AMADEUS data at hand. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
comparable to nominal tax rates and can be used for an ordinal ranking of investment alternatives. See Niemann/ 
Bachmann/Knirsch (2003) pp. 125 ff. 
145
 Shareholder taxation and the effect of incentives on this level of taxation are generally difficult to capture 
adequately because of the heterogeneity of shareholders. While investment funds and corporate investors are 
oftentimes exempt from the taxation of their proceeds, individuals are mostly not. However, even among them, 
taxation may vary significantly depending on the classification of proceeds as either capital income or business 
income. In addition, the vast majority of incentives are provided on the corporate level and previous analyses 
have found only small effects of incentives on the shareholder level. See European Commission (2015b) pp. 84 
ff. 
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Table 12: Implementation of available SME tax incentives (European Tax Analyzer) 
Country Incentive 
Implementation 
Yes/no Notes 
Austria - - - 
Belgium progressive CIT rate yes applies to each model SME 
  exemption from fairness tax no does not apply to model companies (only corporate level considered) 
  exemption from capital gains tax no does not apply to model companies (no capital gains) 
  increased notional interest deduction yes applies to micro and small model companies 
  investment allowance (10.5%) no does not apply to model companies (only for non-corporate entities) 
  investment allowance (4%) no not applicable in combination with notional interest deduction 
  investment allowance for safety measures no not implemented due to limited application (only safety measures) 
  accelerated depreciation no not implemented due to model restrictions and immateriality 
Bulgaria - - - 
Croatia reduced CIT rate for new investments no not implemented due to limited application (only new ventures and major busi-
ness extensions; similar regime for all companies in place) 
  investment allowance for costs of education and training no not implemented due to model restrictions and immateriality 
Cyprus - - - 
Czech Republic - - - 
Denmark - - - 
Estonia - - - 
Finland - - - 
France reduced CIT rate yes applies to micro and small model companies 
  exemption from surcharge on income tax liability (3.3%) yes applies to micro and small model companies 
  exemption from surcharge on income tax liability (10.7%) yes applies to each model SME 
  progressive local business tax yes effect not displayed because scheme is part of the general tax code 
  exemption from local business tax no does not apply to model companies (exceed eligibility threshold) 
  progressive minimum taxation no does not apply to model companies (exceed eligibility threshold) 
  tax credit for newly acquired assets (based on depreciation) yes applies to each model SME 
  tax credit for newly acquired assets (based on acquisition costs) no not implemented due to limited application (regional) 
  tax credit for newly hired employees no not implemented due to model restrictions 
Germany accelerated depreciation yes applies to micro model company 
  investment allowance no not implemented due to model restrictions 
  exemption from local business tax (€ 24,500) no does not apply to model companies 
Greece - - - 
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Country Incentive 
Implementation 
Yes/no Notes 
Hungary progressive CIT rate yes effect not displayed because scheme is part of the general tax code 
  exemption from local business tax yes applies to micro and small model companies (municipalities determine eligibil-
ity) 
  exemption from innovation tax yes applies to micro and small model companies 
  tax credit for interest payments yes applies to each model SME 
  investment allowances for new employees and disabled employees no not implemented due to model restrictions 
  investment allowance for certain business assets no not implemented due to model restrictions 
  accelerated depreciation no not implemented due to limited application (regional) 
  alternative regimes (simplified entrepreneurial tax, small business 
tax, itemized tax on small businesses) 
no not implemented due to model restrictions 
Ireland reduced CIT rate for new companies no not implemented due to limited application (only new companies) 
Italy - - - 
Latvia progressive CIT rate no does not apply to model companies (exceed eligibility threshold) 
  tax credit no not implemented due to limited application (regional) 
Lithuania reduced CIT rate yes applies to micro model company 
  free depreciation yes applies to micro model company 
  unrestricted loss carry forward no does not apply to model companies (no losses) 
Luxembourg reduced CIT rate no does not apply to model companies (exceed eligibility threshold) 
  exemption from local business tax (€ 17,500) yes effect not displayed because scheme is part of the general tax code 
Malta tax credit (general) yes applies to micro and small model companies 
  tax credit for R&D no not implemented due to limited application (only R&D) 
  tax credit for new ventures and major business extensions no not implemented due to limited application (only new ventures and major busi-
ness extensions and only certain activities) 
Netherlands progressive CIT rate yes effect not displayed because scheme is part of the general tax code 
  investment allowance yes effect not displayed because scheme is part of the general tax code 
 lump-sum deduction for R&D no does not apply to model companies (only for individual entrepreneurs) 
Poland immediate depreciation yes applies to micro model company 
  tax credit for innovative technology no not implemented due to model restrictions 
  investment allowance for new assets / new employees no not implemented due to limited application (regional) 
Portugal  reduced CIT rate yes applies to each model SME 
  progressive surcharge yes effect not displayed because scheme is part of the general tax code 
  exemption from corporate income tax for new companies no does not apply to model companies (only if simplified regime applied) 
  tax credit for R&D no not implemented due to limited application (only R&D) 
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Country Incentive 
Implementation 
Yes/no Notes 
Portugal (ctd.) tax credit for reinvested retained earnings no not implemented due to model restrictions 
 notional interest deduction yes applies to all model SMEs but only to initial deposits and capital increases 
Romania turnover tax no does not apply to model companies (exceed eligibility threshold) 
Slovakia - - - 
Slovenia - - - 
Spain reduced CIT rates yes applies to each model SME (more generous for micro and small companies) 
  reduced CIT rate (Basque regions) no not implemented due to limited application (regional) 
  exemption from local business tax yes applies to micro model company 
  tax credit for newly hired employees (€ 3,000 per employee) yes applies to micro and small model companies; only applies for new employees 
(model assumes employees to be eligible in first year) 
  tax credit for newly hired employees (50% of outstanding unem-
ployment payments) 
no not implemented due to model restrictions 
  accelerated depreciation yes applies to micro and small model companies 
Sweden - - - 
United Kingdom progressive CIT rate no not implemented due to limited application (only oil and gas companies) 
  investment allowance for R&D no not implemented due to limited application (only R&D) 
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3.2.4 Effective Tax Burdens by Size Class 
Table 13 shows the effective tax burdens for micro, small, medium-sized and large 
companies as well as the reduction of the tax burden induced by SME tax incentives. First, the 
lack of significant reliefs for medium-sized entities in all but three countries (France, Hunga-
ry, and Portugal) is noticeable. The reduction of their tax burden does not exceed 2% any-
where. The average relief amounts to 0.1% (0.86% if only considering the countries providing 
incentives for medium-sized entities). Whatever arguments justify the use of SME tax incen-
tives for policy-makers, they do not seem to apply to medium-sized enterprises, i.e., firms 
with 50 to 250 employees and an annual turnover between € 10 million and € 50 million.146 
As there are no significant reliefs for medium-sized companies, the ranking of the respective 
tax burdens is also a good estimate of the general levels of company taxation in the sample 
countries (see Figure 3). Clearly, substantial differences occur. France, for example, features a 
tax burden that is more than four times as high as the burden imposed on Bulgarian firms. In 
general, enterprises in Eastern European countries are subject to relatively low levels of taxa-
tion whereas the Western and the Southern European countries can mostly be found at the 
other end of the spectrum. 
Figure 3: Effective tax burden of medium-sized companies (European Tax Analyzer) 
 
                                                 
146
 The definition of medium-sized enterprises given by the European Commission also demands a balance sheet 
total between € 10 million and € 43 million. The balance sheet total is rarely used as an eligibility criterion for 
SME tax incentives, though. See European Commission (2015c) pp. 10 f. 
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For small enterprises, the number of countries providing reliefs increases to eight 
(only taking into account those considered in the European Tax Analyzer). While half of them 
provide substantial reliefs (France, Hungary, Spain), incentives in the other half feature very 
modest effects (Belgium, Malta, Portugal). The average relief amounts to 3.50% of the tax 
liability as determined for the rules applying for large taxpayers (15.17% if only considering 
countries effectively providing incentives for small companies). 
By far the most generous regime exists in Hungary where the tax burden is reduced 
by more than 60% compared to large enterprise rules. The reduction is mainly driven by ex-
emptions from the local business tax and the so-called innovation tax which are only available 
for small and micro companies.
147
 Municipalities, however, can decide against granting the 
exemption. Hence, businesses do not benefit everywhere in Hungary. In addition to the ex-
emptions, small and micro companies may also be eligible for three alternative regimes that 
completely replace ordinary income taxation based on accrual accounts (the simplified entre-
preneurial tax, the small business tax and the itemized tax on small businesses). These re-
gimes may induce even larger reliefs. The case of Hungary exemplifies two major concerns 
with SME tax incentives. Firstly, if companies are not eligible for lucrative incentives as soon 
as they outgrow the small business category, generous reliefs provide a huge discouragement 
from growth or a huge encouragement of misreporting taxable income and business size. To-
tal exemptions from certain taxes are especially prone to this problem. They create notches at 
which not only the marginal but also the average tax rate jumps. This creates stronger distor-
tions of economic decision-making than so-called kinks where only the marginal tax treat-
ment changes.
148
 The availability of a multitude of regimes and incentives
149
 is the second 
concern with Hungary. In the face of several options, entrepreneurs may experience difficul-
ties in predicting the overall available relief and choosing the regime actually minimizing the 
tax burden. A substantial part of the tax savings may thus be offset by the additional costs of 
tax planning and tax compliance. As mentioned above, the imbalance of the relief and the 
costs of planning and complying becomes even more of a concern for less generous regimes, 
e.g., in Belgium.  
                                                 
147
 Both taxes are levied on the difference of sales and certain costs directly attributable to sales. 
148
 See Slemrod (2013) pp. 259 ff., for a detailed differentiation of kinks and notches in the tax system. Section 
5.1 also includes a detailed discussion of problems emanating from jumps in the tax system.  
149
 Besides the alternative regimes, Hungary also offers several tax credits, allowances and depreciation schemes. 
See the country report in Annex 1. 
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Table 13: Effective tax burden by size class in the EU in thsd. € (European Tax Analyzer) 
Country 
Large  
enterprise 
Medium-sized enterprise Small enterprise Micro enterprise 
No incentive Incentives Reduction No incentive Incentives Reduction No incentive Incentives Reduction 
AUT 51,091.3 5,519.0 5,519.0 0.00% 1,506.9 1,506.9 0.00% 275.9 275.9 0.00% 
BEL 54,151.9 5,451.7 5,451.7 0.00% 1,533.6 1,497.3 -2.37% 298.8 262.5 -12.15% 
BLG 16,996.3 1,693.0 1,693.0 0.00% 485.4 485.4 0.00% 94.2 94.2 0.00% 
HRV 32,459.7 3,240.3 3,240.3 0.00% 933.7 933.7 0.00% 178.6 178.6 0.00% 
CYP 24,595.5 2,554.2 2,554.2 0.00% 697.2 697.2 0.00% 127.5 127.5 0.00% 
CZR 31,522.9 3,145.3 3,145.3 0.00% 900.3 900.3 0.00% 174.1 174.1 0.00% 
DEN 41,355.1 4,149.9 4,149.9 0.00% 1,185.9 1,185.9 0.00% 234.0 234.0 0.00% 
EST 32,964.6 3,281.5 3,281.5 0.00% 936.3 936.3 0.00% 182.4 182.4 0.00% 
FIN 34,494.8 3,455.9 3,455.9 0.00% 988.4 988.4 0.00% 192.9 192.9 0.00% 
FRA 75,909.9 6,935.9 6,828.8 -1.54% 1,736.9 1,641.4 -5.50% 310.4 228.7 -26.31% 
GER 53,577.4 5,291.7 5,291.7 0.00% 1,489.3 1,489.3 0.00% 288.7 287.6 -0.40% 
GRE 49,627.8 5,023.7 5,023.7 0.00% 1,463.0 1,463.0 0.00% 288.8 288.8 0.00% 
HUN 63,671.4 5,322.4 5,301.1 -0.40% 1,335.6 517.0 -61.29% 170.9 105.7 -38.17% 
IRE 21,005.3 2,095.3 2,095.3 0.00% 600.2 600.2 0.00% 116.9 116.9 0.00% 
ITA 52,459.4 5,261.3 5,261.3 0.00% 1,489.0 1,489.0 0.00% 289.5 289.5 0.00% 
LTV 27,372.4 2,755.5 2,755.5 0.00% 786.6 786.6 0.00% 156.3 156.3 0.00% 
LIT 28,234.5 2,851.2 2,851.2 0.00% 813.3 813.3 0.00% 163.3 105.4 -35.42% 
LUX 50,949.7 5,081.8 5,081.8 0.00% 1,459.5 1,459.5 0.00% 275.1 275.1 0.00% 
MAL 57,446.5 5,721.9 5,721.9 0.00% 1,637.6 1,605.7 -1.95% 316.2 284.5 -10.04% 
NED 41,482.8 4,046.4 4,046.4 0.00% 1,088.0 1,088.0 0.00% 186.1 186.1 0.00% 
POL 32,904.4 3,293.0 3,293.0 0.00% 941.8 941.8 0.00% 185.0 184.6 -0.20% 
POR 43,562.7 3,796.6 3,767.1 -0.78% 1,071.6 1,057.4 -1.33% 208.2 200.1 -3.87% 
ROM 27,385.8 2,742.0 2,742.0 0.00% 784.9 784.9 0.00% 153.9 153.9 0.00% 
SVK 37,577.1 3,758.1 3,758.1 0.00% 1,075.1 1,075.1 0.00% 210.3 210.3 0.00% 
SLV 27,954.0 2,782.2 2,782.2 0.00% 797.2 797.2 0.00% 154.2 154.2 0.00% 
ESP 55,230.1 5,494.4 5,494.4 0.00% 1,572.0 1,170.5 -25.54% 305.0 166.0 -45.56% 
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Country 
Large  
enterprise 
Medium-sized enterprise Small enterprise Micro enterprise 
No incentive Incentives Reduction No incentive Incentives Reduction No incentive Incentives Reduction 
SWE 36,867.0 3,681.7 3,681.7 0.00% 1,054.1 1,054.1 0.00% 204.9 204.9 0.00% 
UKD 36,942.8 3,720.9 3,720.9 0.00% 1,062.1 1,062.1 0.00% 212.5 212.5 0.00% 
Mean 42,137.4 4.005.2 3.999.6 -0.10% 1.122.339 1.072.404 -3,50% 212.665 197.616 -6,15% 
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For micro companies, available SME tax incentives are even more numerous and 
more generous than for small entities. 10 out of 28 countries provide measures that are im-
plemented in the calculations and the average relief per country increases from 3.50% to 
6.15% of the effective tax burden. Except for Hungary, all countries with SME tax incentives 
in place offer more generous reliefs to micro than to small enterprises (see Figure 4). Appar-
ently, policy-makers perceive the need for tax incentives to decrease in firm size across all 
three subcategories of the SME sector. Countries providing especially generous regimes for 
micro companies include Spain, Hungary, Lithuania, Belgium, France and Malta. Except for 
Lithuania, each of these countries features a comparatively high tax burden for large corpora-
tions. It seems, the higher the general tax burden, the more likely a country is to provide relief 
for small and micro businesses. Interestingly, this may evoke the problem of severely disad-
vantaging the enterprises which are just too big to be eligible for SME incentives but not big 
enough to lower the overall tax burden by engaging in international tax planning. 
Figure 4: Effect of SME tax incentives (European Tax Analyzer) 
 
 
3.2.5 Comparison of Incentive Types  
Table 14 displays the reduction in tax burdens induced by three different types of 
SME tax incentives – incentives relating to the tax base (i.e., special depreciation schemes 
and investment allowances), tax credits and special tax rates. The comparison shows special 
tax rates to be the most common as well as the most generous type of tax incentive. The aver-
age relief provided by reduced tax rates amounts to 15.17% and 16.60% of the effective tax 
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burden for small and micro companies, respectively. This is three times as high as the average 
reduction induced by tax credits (for small entities even five times as high). The relief of 
measures relating to the tax base appears negligible at less than 1% on average. Altogether, 
only one input-based tax incentive reduces the tax burden of an average micro company by 
more than 10% (Malta) whereas special tax rates regularly induce double-digit reliefs.  
There are several explanations for these findings. First of all, a number of input-
based incentives cannot be implemented into the European Tax Analyzer because they relate 
to very specific circumstances that are not met by the model companies under consideration. 
While the omissions may amplify the gap between the effects of the different forms of relief, 
they are not the main driver as is evidenced by the lower average effect per incentive (4.11% 
vs. 13.06% for small companies and 5.55% vs. 20% for micro companies, respectively). In-
stead the basic design and the intentions behind the incentives appear to be crucial. By design, 
special depreciation schemes such as in Germany and Lithuania do not change the overall tax 
liability but only the timing of tax payments. The reduction of the tax burden can thus be 
traced back to a mere interest advantage emanating from deferred tax payments.
150
 Tax allow-
ances and tax credits theoretically allow for more generous reliefs as they reduce the overall 
sum of tax payments, either directly (tax credits) or indirectly (investment allowances). The 
reliefs, however, are modest as well. Partly, this is caused by the high profitability that is as-
sumed for the model companies. For low-profit enterprises, the actual impact of input-based 
incentives may be larger than indicated by the European Tax Analyzer because the reduction 
of taxable income (of the tax liability if tax credits are considered) accounts for a larger share 
of the overall tax base (tax liability) for them. The modest relief, however, could also indicate 
other purposes than a mere reduction of the tax burden. The two allowances in Belgium and 
Portugal, for example, support equity financing. It seems their primary purpose is securing 
improved financing neutrality. The tax credits in Malta and Spain both relate to job creation 
and take employment or personnel costs as calculation bases. So the reduction of wage costs 
apparently is the aim of these regimes. Lastly, the abovementioned depreciation schemes may 
not substantially reduce the sum of tax payments but they do facilitate the financing of new 
                                                 
150
 The interest advantage naturally increases in the applicable interest rate. The calculations at hand assume an 
interest rate of 1.1%, which is evidence of the low-interest period financial markets have experienced in the past 
few years. In times of higher interest rates, special depreciation schemes may thus provide more generous reliefs. 
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investments, thereby addressing SMEs’ problems in obtaining capital in early investment 
stages.
151
  
Table 14: Effect of SME tax incentives by incentive type (European Tax Analyzer) 
Country 
Small enterprise Micro enterprise 
Tax base Tax credit Tax rate Total Tax base Tax credit Tax rate Total 
BEL -1.85% 0.00% -0.47% -2.37% -2.03% 0.00% -10.10% -12.15% 
FRA 0.00% -0.61% -4.89% -5.50% 0.00% -0.51% -25.81% -26.31% 
GER 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.40% 0.00% 0.00% -0.40% 
HUN 0.00% -1.48% -59.70% -61.29% 0.00% 0.00% -38.17% -38.17% 
LIT 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -1.95% 0.00% -53.05% -35.42% 
LUX 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
MAL 0.00% -1.95% 0.00% -1.95% 0.00% -10.04% 0.00% -10.04% 
POL 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.20% 0.00% 0.00% -0.20% 
POR -0.75% 0.00% -0.58% -1.33% -0.88% 0.00% -2.99% -3.87% 
ESP -0.24% -8.28% -17.56% -25.54% -0.38% -6.10% -39.15% -45.56% 
Mean -0,94% -4,11% -13,06% -15,17% -0,97% -5,55% -20,00% -16,60% 
Notes: Table 14 only covers countries providing SME tax incentives that can be implemented with the European 
Tax Analyzer. The average reduction for each type of incentive is calculated on a per-incentive basis, i.e., it only 
includes those countries providing the respective type of incentive. 
Altogether, it seems that input-based tax incentives address very specific issues and 
that they focus on SMEs because SMEs are considered to be especially affected by the re-
spective issues (e.g., financing constraints
152
) or because they are perceived to be crucial in 
solving the issues (e.g., unemployment, insufficient R&D activity
153
). Additionally, EU legis-
lation may force Member States to limit tax incentives to small and medium-sized enterpris-
es.
154
 Targeting specific issues, however, oftentimes requires additional eligibility criteria so 
that a multitude of firms and investments are excluded (e.g., an increase in employment, a 
restriction to R&D-specific investments or a restriction to newly founded companies). This 
shows in comparatively small average reliefs in the calculations. Eligibility criteria for prefer-
ential SME tax rates, in contrast, usually only include firm size. They appear to be the instru-
ment of choice if SMEs as a whole are intended to be relieved – whatever the motivation be-
hind this kind of incentive may be. 
                                                 
151
 For a scheme allowing immediate depreciation, the share of acquisition costs being contributed in the form of 
reduced tax payments in the acquisition year is (almost) equal to the statutory tax rate. In Spain, for example, 
immediate depreciation would thus reduce the capital requirements for the acquisition of a new machine by 25%. 
152
 See Section 4.1.4 for a comprehensive discussion of SMEs’ financing constraints. 
153
 See Section 4.1.2 for a comprehensive discussion of SMEs’ role in job creation. 
154
 The EC restricts the provision of direct and indirect state aid to selected enterprises to prevent the distortion 
of competition. SMEs are subject to less restrictive regulation. See European Commission (2009) pp. 9 ff.  
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The interplay of input-based incentives and special tax rates is another aspect worth 
examining. Four of the 10 countries with SME tax incentives provide several measures at the 
same time (only counting the incentives being implemented in the European Tax Analyzer). 
An especially interesting constellation occurs in Lithuania where the overall reduction of the 
tax burden for a micro company amounts to 35.42%. If the model company only took ad-
vantage of the special tax rate and deferred the option to immediately depreciate newly ac-
quired fixed assets, the tax savings would be much higher (53.05% of the tax burden). The 
counterintuitive result occurs because immediate expensing of acquisition costs creates hid-
den reserves that are realized at the end of the sample period of 10 years. As a consequence, 
the income in the last period exceeds the eligibility threshold for the preferential tax rate and 
the model company incurs a higher tax burden than a similarly successful company with more 
consistent taxable earnings. This phenomenon, of course, is at least partly the result of the 
model assumptions, i.e., the final liquidation. However, it also shows that one incentive can 
impede the effectiveness of other incentives if the measures are not well-aligned. Moreover, 
the example highlights the increase in complexity for taxpayers if they are confronted with a 
multitude of tax incentives. Similar effects may occur when preferential tax rates and invest-
ment allowances are provided simultaneously as the value of an allowance increases in the 
marginal tax rate. Preferential tax rates could thus, for example, impede incentives to invest in 
R&D activities. 
3.2.6 Sensitivity Checks 
Besides the size of a company, other characteristics may impact the way companies 
are affected by SME tax incentives. The following sensitivity checks therefore examine the 
effects of changes in profitability, financial leverage, employment and the amount of machin-
ery used by the model companies. The results not only show which kinds of enterprises bene-
fit the most but also provide valuable insight into the mechanics of the incentives. 
The results of the sensitivity check on profitability are displayed in Table 15. The 
relative size of the reliefs (the share of the overall tax burden that is avoided due to SME-
specific provisions) is compared for the base case (micro company) as well as a high-profit 
and a low-profit scenario. For the high-profit case, the profitability of the model company is 
raised by 30% with everything else equal (assets, liabilities, number of employees). Accord-
ingly, profitability drops by 30% in the low-profit scenario. The case of a firm with negative 
pre-tax profitability ratios is not considered. It is obvious, though, that loss-making firms 
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would only pay non-profit taxes and could not benefit from the implemented tax incentives 
unless refunds are granted on input-based measures (which is usually not the case). 
First of all, the relative size of the reliefs mostly decreases slightly as profitability is 
raised. This pattern occurs because the size of most reliefs is not affected by a 30%-increase 
in profitability
155
 while the overall tax liability grows in taxable income. Hence, the relief 
makes up a smaller share of the overall tax burden for more profitable businesses. Especially 
big differences between the three scenarios occur in France where the additional income in-
duced by the increase in profitability is not subject to preferential tax rates whereas the in-
come in the low-profit scenario is fully eligible. Consequently, the average corporate income 
tax rate is significantly lower for the low-profit than for the high-profit firm. With regard to 
input-based incentives, it needs to be highlighted that the absolute size of the relief only stays 
the same if marginal tax rates are strictly proportional in the considered interval of profitabil-
ity. If rates are progressive – usually for non-corporate entities – the advantageousness of al-
lowances and depreciation schemes increases in profitability. With progressive tax rates in 
place, such incentives would thus provide the smallest reliefs to the neediest businesses with 
the lowest profits (at least in absolute terms). 
The example of France also discloses the redundancy of eligibility criteria explicitly 
relating to size. If companies beyond a certain size ought not to benefit from an incentive, it is 
usually enough to set the amount of eligible income, assets or expenses (depending on the 
type of incentive) sufficiently low. Even if large enterprises are eligible, the relief will then 
make up such a small share of their overall tax liability that it is negligible for them. They 
benefit much less than small entities while the incentive to remain small in order not to ex-
ceed a certain size threshold is eliminated. Additionally, the administrative effort for taxpay-
ers as well as tax administrations is reduced as firm size does not need to be documented. 
Moreover, the amount of lost tax revenues should be limited given the small number of large 
enterprises (and even medium-sized ones).
156
 A reverse trend, i.e., a regime being increasingly 
beneficial as profitability is raised, can be found in Lithuania. Lithuanian micro companies 
                                                 
155
 The increase in profitability is induced by an increase in sales. Hence, the calculation basis (acquisition cost 
of fixed assets, amount of equity, number of employees) of input-based incentives stays the same. As CIT rates 
are mostly proportional, this results in constant absolute reliefs. The relief provided by preferential tax rates also 
remains unchanged as long as the amount of preferentially treated income remains constant. The income of the 
micro model company mostly exceeds the eligible amount of income substantially so that the size of the relief is 
unaffected for these regimes as well. 
156
 The percentage of large enterprises in the population of European businesses is 0.2%. For a detailed descrip-
tion of the distribution of firm sizes, see Section 4.1.1.  
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are subject to preferential tax rates which apply up to an income threshold so high that even in 
the high-profit scenario the model company’s income is fully eligible. As the share of profit 
taxes relative to non-profit taxes increases in income, the relative size of the relief also 
grows.
157
  
Table 16 shows the results of the sensitivity check on the equity ratio. A direct im-
pact of the amount of equity on the size of the relief can only be noticed in Belgium and Por-
tugal. In these two countries, companies are allowed to deduct a notional interest on equity. 
Naturally, the interest deduction increases as more equity is obtained and the incentive re-
gimes become more beneficial. Nevertheless, the average relief of all incentives considered 
decreases as the equity ratio is raised. This trend is not caused by changes in the actual size of 
the reliefs (measured in total €) but by changes in the income against which the reliefs are 
measured. As more equity is used, the amount of debt decreases so that interest payments and 
taxable income become smaller. The change in the equity ratio thus triggers a change in the 
profitability and results in the same effects already observed in the sensitivity check on profit-
ability.
158
 The trend of higher average reliefs for companies that are more levered therefore 
does not indicate the incentives to be discriminatory against equity financing but rather re-
flects the debt bias of the overall tax system. 
Tables 17 and 18 display further sensitivity checks on the amounts of machinery and 
employment used by the model company. The schemes of accelerated depreciation in Germa-
ny and Lithuania expectedly yield larger reliefs if more machinery is used. Apart from that, 
the results reinforce the above findings: As machinery and employment are raised, the related 
expenses, i.e., depreciation and personnel costs, increase and lower the income of the enter-
prise. In most countries, the absolute size of the relief remains unaffected so that the share of 
the overall tax liability that is avoided due to SME tax incentives increases. The reverse effect 
occurs when the amounts of machinery and employment decrease. The mechanism is the 
same as for the sensitivity check for profitability.
159
 
 
                                                 
157
 In Lithuania, the change in profitability also affects the taxation of the hidden reserves at the end of the sam-
ple period. As a consequence, opposing effects occur as profitability is changed. This also explains the increase 
of the overall relief in the high-profit as well as the low-profit scenario. 
158
 The changes in Lithuania deviate from the rest of the sample, i.e., the relative size of the relief increases in the 
equity ratio. This is due to the high amount of income being eligible to the preferential CIT rates.  
159
 Lithuania displays different patterns due to the abovementioned properties of the respective SME incentives. 
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Table 15: Effect of SME tax incentives by profitability (European Tax Analyzer) 
  
Profitability -30% Base case Profitability +30% 
Tax  
base 
Tax  
credit 
Tax  
rate 
Total 
∆ base 
case 
(% points) 
Tax 
base 
Tax  
credit 
Tax  
rate 
Total 
Tax  
base 
Tax  
credit 
Tax  
rate 
Total 
∆ base 
case 
(% points) 
BEL -2.17% 0.00% -11.56% -13.60% 1.45 -2.03% 0.00% -10.10% -12.15% -1.95% 0.00% -8.65% -10.61% -1.54 
FRA 0.00% -0.68% -34.48% -35.16% 8.85 0.00% -0.51% -25.81% -26.31% 0.00% -0.40% -20.48% -20.89% -5.43 
GER -0.57% 0.00% 0.00% -0.57% 0.18 -0.40% 0.00% 0.00% -0.40% -0.32% 0.00% 0.00% -0.32% -0.08 
HUN 0.00% 0.00% -42.33% -42.33% 4.16 0.00% 0.00% -38.17% -38.17% 0.00% -0.47% -34.89% -35.69% -2.48 
LIT -3.04% 0.00% -49.43% -52.24% 16.81 -1.95% 0.00% -53.05% -35.42% -1.65% 0.00% -55.40% -39.69% 4.27 
MAL 0.00% -13.49% 0.00% -13.49% 3.45 0.00% -10.04% 0.00% -10.04% 0.00% -8.02% 0.00% -8.02% -2.03 
POL -0.26% 0.00% 0.00% -0.26% 0.06 -0.20% 0.00% -0.20% -0.20% -0.16% 0.00% 0.00% -0.16% -0.04 
POR -1.17% 0.00% -3.98% -5.15% 1.28 -0.88% 0.00% -2.99% -3.87% -0.70% 0.00% -2.40% -3.10% -0.77 
ESP -0.44% -8.13% -38.96% -47.50% 1.94 -0.38% -6.10% -39.15% -45.56% -0.30% -4.88% -39.27% -44.40% -1.17 
Mean -0,85% -2,48% -20,08% -23,37% 4,24 -0,65% -1,85% -18,83% -19,13% -0,56% -1,53% -17,90% -18,10% -1,03 
Table 16: Effect of SME tax incentives by equity ratio (European Tax Analyzer) 
  
Equity -30% Base case Equity +30% 
Tax  
base 
Tax  
credit 
Tax  
rate 
Total 
∆ base 
case 
(% points) 
Tax  
base 
Tax  
credit 
Tax  
rate 
Total 
Tax  
base 
Tax  
credit 
Tax  
rate 
Total 
∆ base 
case 
(% points) 
BEL -1.10% 0.00% -10.23% -11.38% -0.77 -2.03% 0.00% -10.10% -12.15% -2.88% 0.00% -9.94% -12.81% 0.66 
FRA 0.00% -0.54% -27.63% -28.17% 1.85 0.00% -0.51% -25.81% -26.31% 0.00% -0.47% -24.21% -24.69% -1.62 
GER -0.42% 0.00% 0.00% -0.42% 0.03 -0.40% 0.00% 0.00% -0.40% -0.37% 0.00% 0.00% -0.37% -0.02 
HUN 0.00% 0.00% -39.18% -39.18% 1.01 0.00% 0.00% -38.17% -38.17% 0.00% 0.00% -36.72% -36.85% -1.33 
LIT -2.05% 0.00% -52.28% -34.03% -1.39 -1.95% 0.00% -53.05% -35.42% -1.87% 0.00% -53.73% -36.67% 1.25 
MAL 0.00% -10.75% 0.00% -10.75% 0.71 0.00% -10.04% 0.00% -10.04% 0.00% -9.44% 0.00% -9.44% -0.60 
POL -0.21% 0.00% 0.00% -0.21% 0.01 -0.20% 0.00% -0.20% -0.20% -0.18% 0.00% 0.00% -0.18% -0.01 
POR -0.14% 0.00% -3.20% -3.34% -0.53 -0.88% 0.00% -2.99% -3.87% -1.52% 0.00% -2.82% -4.34% 0.46 
ESP -0.40% -6.51% -39.11% -45.96% 0.39 -0.38% -6.10% -39.15% -45.56% -0.35% -5.73% -39.18% -45.21% -0.35 
Mean -0,46% -2,47% -19,11% -19,13% 0,03 -0,54% -2,31% -19,08% -19,10% -0,61% -2,17% -18,92% -19,01% -0,09 
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Table 17: Effect of SME tax incentives by amount of machinery (European Tax Analyzer) 
  
Machinery -15% Base case Machinery +15% 
Tax  
base 
Tax  
credit 
Tax  
rate 
Total 
∆ base 
case 
(% points) 
Tax  
base 
Tax  
credit 
Tax  
rate 
Total 
Tax  
base 
Tax  
credit 
Tax  
rate 
Total 
∆ base 
case 
(% points) 
BEL -1.76% 0.00% -9.56% -11.35% -0.80 -2.03% 0.00% -10.10% -12.15% -2.34% 0.00% -10.56% -12.78% 0.63 
FRA 0.00% -0.46% -23.33% -23.79% -2.52 0.00% -0.51% -25.81% -26.31% 0.00% -0.56% -28.66% -29.22% 2.91 
GER -0.31% 0.00% 0.00% -0.31% -0.09 -0.40% 0.00% 0.00% -0.40% -0.51% 0.00% 0.00% -0.51% 0.11 
HUN 0.00% -1.05% -36.27% -37.61% -0.57 0.00% 0.00% -38.17% -38.17% 0.00% 0.00% -39.89% -39.89% 1.71 
LIT -1.79% 0.00% -55.82% -57.36% 21.94 -1.95% 0.00% -53.05% -35.42% -2.67% 0.00% -49.94% -30.05% -5.38 
MAL 0.00% -9.03% 0.00% -9.03% -1.01 0.00% -10.04% 0.00% -10.04% 0.00% -11.25% 0.00% -11.25% 1.21 
POL -0.15% 0.00% 0.00% -0.15% -0.04 -0.20% 0.00% -0.20% -0.20% -0.25% 0.00% 0.00% -0.25% 0.05 
POR -0.55% 0.00% -2.70% -3.25% -0.62 -0.88% 0.00% -2.99% -3.87% -1.26% 0.00% -3.34% -4.60% 0.72 
ESP -0.29% -5.49% -39.30% -45.04% -0.52 -0.38% -6.10% -39.15% -45.56% -0.41% -6.81% -38.96% -46.17% 0.60 
Mean -0,44% -2,22% -19,16% -21,82% 2,73 -0,54% -2,31% -19,08% -19,10% -0,73% -2,58% -18,88% -18,96% -0,14 
Table 18: Effect of SME tax incentives by employment intensity (European Tax Analyzer) 
  
Employment -30% Base case Employment +30% 
Tax  
base 
Tax  
credit 
Tax  
rate 
Total 
∆ base 
case 
(% points) 
Tax  
base 
Tax  
credit 
Tax  
rate 
Total 
Tax  
base 
Tax  
credit 
Tax  
rate 
Total 
∆ base 
case 
(% points) 
BEL -1.98% 0.00% -9.56% -11.56% -0.59 -2.03% 0.00% -10.10% -12.15% -2.09% 0.00% -10.70% -12.81% 0.66 
FRA 0.00% -0.46% -22.74% -23.21% -3.11 0.00% -0.51% -25.81% -26.31% 0.00% -0.56% -29.48% -30.04% 3.72 
GER -0.38% 0.00% 0.00% -0.38% -0.02 -0.40% 0.00% 0.00% -0.40% -1.02% 0.00% 0.00% -1.02% 0.62 
HUN 0.00% 0.00% -36.98% -36.98% -1.19 0.00% 0.00% -38.17% -38.17% 0.00% 0.00% -39.36% -39.36% 1.19 
LIT -1.87% 0.00% -53.66% -35.55% 0.12 -1.95% 0.00% -53.05% -35.42% -2.04% 0.00% -52.37% -54.12% 18.69 
MAL 0.00% -9.50% 0.00% -9.50% -0.54 0.00% -10.04% 0.00% -10.04% 0.00% -10.66% 0.00% -10.66% 0.62 
POL -0.19% 0.00% 0.00% -0.19% -0.01 -0.20% 0.00% -0.20% -0.20% -0.21% 0.00% 0.00% -0.21% 0.01 
POR -0.83% 0.00% -2.84% -3.67% -0.20 -0.88% 0.00% -2.99% -3.87% -0.93% 0.00% -3.17% -4.10% 0.23 
ESP -0.36% -5.77% -39.19% -45.26% -0.30 -0.38% -6.10% -39.15% -45.56% -0.40% -6.46% -39.11% -45.90% 0.34 
Mean -0,52% -2,18% -18,95% -18,79% -0,31 -0,54% -2,31% -19,08% -19,10% -0,66% -2,45% -19,14% -22,20% 3,10 
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3.3 Interim Conclusion 
The qualitative as well as the quantitative analysis in this chapter display the broad 
spectrum of SME tax incentives that are currently offered in the EU. Apparently, there is no 
consensus among policy-makers about the necessity and the design of SME tax reliefs. Disre-
garding administrative reliefs and provisions for venture capital funds, 10 of 28 EU Member 
states do not explicitly target any tax benefits at SMEs.
160
 In contrast to that, some other coun-
tries such as Belgium, France and Spain have implemented a multitude of incentives for mi-
cro, small and medium-sized enterprises. The different approaches also show in the quantita-
tive analysis as effective tax burdens of SMEs are reduced by up to 61%. Geographically, 
Scandinavian and Eastern European countries mostly refrain from supporting SMEs through 
the tax code while Southern and Western Europe seem more convinced of the usefulness of 
such measures. Germany, with two minor reliefs, is in the middle of the spectrum.  
Preferential tax rates are the most common instrument to support SMEs. 11 of the 28 
EU Member States feature CIT rate schedules favoring small businesses over large ones. Im-
portantly, special tax rates usually apply to a wide range of micro and small enterprises as 
they are rarely connected to eligibility criteria not related to firm size. As a consequence, spe-
cial tax rates and exemptions account for the lion’s share of the overall tax relief for SMEs in 
the majority of countries. Output-based incentives, however, come along with significant 
problems as they only take effect when investments already generate profits. In the early in-
vestment stages, in contrast, they are mostly ineffective. Hence, output-based measures exclu-
sively provide relief to profitable firms whereas loss-making enterprises do not benefit at all. 
Moreover, the currently available progressive CIT rates are detrimental to the neutrality of the 
tax system. They discriminate against risky investments and they constitute another distortion 
to the choice of legal form. As special tax rates are mostly tied to income thresholds, they are 
also prone to misuse by means of profit shifting and accounting policies. 
Input-based incentives for SMEs are another commonly used form of tax relief in the 
European Union. Investment allowances as well as tax credits and accelerated depreciation 
schemes can each be found in about a quarter of the sample countries. Some of the countries 
such as Belgium, France and Spain even have several allowances and tax credits in place (see 
Figure 5). The input-based regimes often come along with extensive eligibility criteria. These 
                                                 
160
 The ten countries include Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Slo-
vakia, Slovenia and Sweden. 
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criteria restrict the benefits to certain kinds of companies and investments, e.g., only new 
companies, only R&D-related investments or only companies in certain regions. In other in-
stances, the incentives are granted under certain conditions such as the creation of additional 
jobs or the reinvestment of preferentially treated income. As a consequence, the number of 
affected SMEs as well as the size of average effective reliefs is much lower for tax allowanc-
es, tax credits and depreciation schemes than for output-based measures.  
The effective tax burdens as determined by the European Tax Analyzer do not take 
into account the improved liquidity that comes along with some tax incentives, though. De-
preciation schemes, for example, only aim at deferring tax payments instead of reducing 
them. The displayed reliefs may therefore not be a proper indicator of the actual usefulness of 
the regimes. Similar arguments can be made for other input-based incentives providing sup-
port in the early investment stages. The aspect of supporting SMEs in obtaining enough funds 
for their planned investments is also highlighted by the provision of shareholder-level incen-
tives. Apparently, a financing gap has been identified by policy-makers in several countries 
(e.g., Austria, Belgium, France) and is sought to be closed by tax incentives. For high-growth, 
high-risk start-ups, the problem seems to be even more pressing as evidenced by the numer-
ous available venture capital benefits in the EU.  
Overall, it appears that preferential tax rates are the primary instrument to support the 
small business sector as a whole whereas input-based and shareholder-level incentives are 
mostly designed to serve very specific purposes for which SMEs are considered key contribu-
tors. These purposes include the creation of jobs as well as the development of new products 
and technologies. The small average effect size found for input-based incentives, however, 
casts doubts on the effectiveness of currently available regimes to actually influence invest-
ment decisions, especially in view of the compliance and administrative effort related to the 
incentives. The widespread reliefs provided by output-based measures, on the other hand, 
most likely represent an intended compensation for size-related disadvantages of micro and 
small businesses, e.g., the disproportionate tax compliance burden.  
The analysis of currently available SME incentives also shows that policy-makers 
differentiate between micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. The latter are eligible for 
not even a third of all SME incentives explicitly referring to size criteria whereas small enti-
ties are only excluded from a few regimes. Apparently, the need for tax incentives is per-
ceived to be much stronger for micro and small businesses than for medium-sized enterprises. 
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The size criteria used in tax codes mostly correspond to the criteria from the SME definition 
of the European Commission (i.e., the number of employees, sales and total assets). The exact 
thresholds differ regularly, though. As an exception, eligibility for special tax rates mostly 
depends on income.  
Interestingly, only few countries abstain from explicit size criteria and favor SMEs 
implicitly by establishing absolute maximum reliefs. In the Netherlands, for example, the in-
vestment allowance as well as the progressive tax rate schedule are open to all companies but 
the effect relative to the overall tax burden is likely to be negligible for medium-sized and 
large enterprises due to the small absolute amounts of eligible expenditures and income. Such 
implicit measures offer the advantage that exceeding the respective thresholds does not vacate 
the whole relief. Instead, it only changes the marginal treatment for excess investments or 
profits, which is more conducive to the equity and the neutrality of the tax system. In addi-
tion, the danger of businesses staying small in order to remain eligible for incentives is signif-
icantly lower. The usage of explicit size criteria becomes particularly puzzling when the 
thresholds refer to assets and employment. The creation of jobs obviously is a major goal of 
many incentives. In France, for example, a tax credit is granted on the wage taxes incurred for 
newly hired employees. At the same time, however, a company is in danger of completely 
forfeiting access to the tax credit if a certain number of employees is exceeded, i.e., if too 
many people are hired. The same discrepancy occurs if asset thresholds are implemented for 
regimes supporting investments in new machinery and production facilities. Explicit eligibil-
ity thresholds thus undermine the achievement of the actual goals of the incentives.  
The current designs of many SME tax incentives in the EU also appear questionable 
with regard to the denial of refunds. If tax allowances and tax credits exceed the tax base (or 
the tax liability, respectively) only few countries grant a refund on the excess amount. More 
commonly, carry forwards or carry backs are granted. In several countries, however, even 
carry forwards are declined (or severely limited) so that low-profit and loss-making taxpayers 
forfeit the benefits. Given that low-profit firms in particular have problems to obtain enough 
capital for their investment projects, the respective incentives could exclude a large share of 
those taxpayers who are actually intended to be supported. The availability of multiple SME 
tax incentives in some countries is another noteworthy trend. As the quantitative analysis 
shows, the incentives impact on each other’s effectiveness in lowering tax burdens. The effect 
of a diminished tax base obviously depends on the applicable tax rate and vice versa. An in-
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vestment allowance for R&D investments, for example, could lose much of its appeal if the 
income is subject to a CIT rate of 15% instead of 33.33% as in France. The co-existence of 
multiple input and output-based regimes therefore adds a significant amount of complexity to 
the tax system. Given the prominent role of compliance costs for SMEs, legislators would 
probably be well-advised to provide the intended reliefs by means of a minimal number of 
regimes. 
In accordance with this, countries in the EU seem to generally agree that the compli-
ance burden connected to the tax assessment and tax collection process as experienced by 
large enterprises is excessive for the very smallest businesses. Hence, micro enterprises are 
subject to comprehensive simplifications in most countries. These include simplified account-
ing regimes, simplified collection procedures and even the exemption from certain levies such 
as the VAT and some local business taxes. The simplifications, of course, also serve the pur-
pose of optimizing net tax revenues, i.e., not incurring overly high administrative costs for the 
collection of small amounts of taxes from thousands or millions of very small businesses. 
All in all, the vast majority of SME tax incentives in the EU are not designed ideally. 
The common restriction of eligibility by explicit turnover, asset and employment thresholds is 
especially disputable as an implicit targeting of SMEs through absolute caps on available re-
liefs is the simpler and more neutral approach. Moreover, it is evident that each type of incen-
tive features at least one caveat with regard to simplicity, transparency or neutrality. Overall, 
however, tax credits appear to be the instrument satisfying these criteria the best. The effec-
tiveness and ultimately the efficiency of the regimes cannot be adequately assessed yet. This 
requires an in-depth understanding of the rationale underlying the respective SME incentives. 
The comparatively small reductions of effective tax burdens and the abundance of eligibility 
criteria and anti-avoidance provisions suggest a limited attractiveness of many regimes, 
though. The impact of most SME tax incentives could thus be limited as well. 
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Figure 5: Available SME tax incentives in the European Union (2015) 
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4. Policy Rationale for SME Tax Incentives 
The qualitative analysis in Section 3 illustrates the common use of tax incentives for 
SMEs in general and for micro enterprises in particular in the European Union. The multitude 
of available incentives naturally raises the question of the rationale behind these regimes that 
come along with significant costs. Besides substantial losses in tax revenues, the partitioning 
of taxpayers compromises the neutrality and the equity of the tax system and enhanced com-
plexity raises compliance as well as collection costs. Well-grounded SME tax incentives must 
thus provide substantial benefits in order to yield a net gain and increase the overall social 
welfare.
161
 And while it seems that supporting small businesses has become a generally ac-
cepted mantra among policy-makers and lobbyists,
162
 existing evidence on the benefits of 
SME tax incentives is mixed – at best. An adequate evaluation of the effectiveness and the 
efficiency of SME tax incentives thus requires a thorough examination of the arguments 
brought forward.  
In this endeavor, Section 4.1 focusses on the main arguments not directly related to 
taxation. This includes the importance of the SME sector coming along with its mere size 
(4.1.1), the role of SMEs for job creation (4.1.2) and innovation (4.1.3) as well as their financ-
ing constraints (4.1.4) and their socioeconomic role (4.1.5). The second part of Section 4 
complements these points and considers tax-related arguments in favor of SME tax incen-
tives. Specifically, five disadvantages for SMEs emanating from the tax system are discussed: 
incomplete loss-offsets (4.2.1), the debt bias (4.2.2), the double taxation of corporate profits 
(4.2.3), potential tax planning opportunities for multinational enterprises (4.2.4) and the dis-
proportionate compliance burden of small entities (4.2.5).  
 
  
                                                 
161
 See Zee/Stotsky/Ley (2002) pp. 1501 f.; Klemm (2010) p. 323; Arginelli (2015) pp. 17 f. 
162
 See de Rugy (2005) p. 5. 
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4.1 Non-Tax Arguments  
4.1.1 Size of the SME Sector 
The mere size of the SME sector and its importance for the economy as a whole are 
frequently cited in public discussions as a reason for special support schemes. SMEs are 
commonly labeled the “backbone”163 or the “engine”164 of the economy. A look at the statis-
tics confirms this role. SMEs account for 99.8% of all enterprises in the non-financial busi-
ness sector in the European Union and for 67% of employment and 58% of the value added 
(see Figure 6
165
). Among the three subcategories, micro enterprises make up the largest share 
as 92.7% of all businesses fall in this category. They alone provide almost 30% of all jobs in 
the EU.
166
 In the United States, where 99.7% of all businesses have less than 500 employees 
in 2012 (i.e., possess the status of an SME according to U.S. standards), the numbers are simi-
lar. SMEs also provide 48.4% of total employment in the U.S and account for about 50% of 
the GDP.
167
 Altogether, SMEs indeed make up a large part or even the majority of employ-
ment and economic output in most countries. Their importance for the economy and the job 
market is indisputable. 
The question at hand, however, is not whether SMEs produce more output and em-
ployment then large businesses in absolute terms but rather if incremental investments in 
promoted SMEs create more output and jobs than comparable investments in large companies 
that would have been undertaken in the absence of SME tax incentives.
168
 In a market econo-
my, investors take their decisions with the intention of profit maximization. They invest in the 
undertakings promising the highest returns, which are usually the most efficient and produc-
tive ones. Hence, there should not be a need for reallocating capital – unless market failure 
occurs. In general, the open market should lead to an efficient allocation optimizing social 
welfare whereas government intervention mostly causes economically suboptimal results.
169
 
The mere size of the SME sector and its absolute contribution to the economy therefore do not 
                                                 
163
 See White House (2010): https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/08/17/small-businesses-are-backbone-our-
economy-and-cornerstones-our-communities (retrieved on August 15, 2016); The Guardian (2014): http://www. 
theguardian.com/small-business-network/2014/dec/06/small-businesses-backbone-communities-john-longworth 
(retrieved on August 15, 2016). 
164
 See Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (2014): http://www.midasgruppe.de/uploads 
/media/German_Mittelstand_Motor_der_deutschen_Wirtschaft_-BMWI.pdf (retrieved on October 25, 2016). 
165
 Figure 6 is based on data provided by the European Commission. See European Commission (2015a) pp. 3 ff. 
166
 See European Commission (2015a) p. 7. 
167
 See Caruso (2015) p. 7. 
168
 See Guenther (2004) p. 22; OECD (2009a) pp. 84 ff. 
169
 See Winston (2006) pp. 73 ff. 
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constitute valid arguments for the provision of special tax incentives based on firm size. 
However, the size of the SME sector may hint at the amount of political influence of small 
businesses and their lobbyists, thus providing an explanation rather than a justification for 
politicians’ proneness to implement and preserve such measures.170 
Figure 6: Contribution of SMEs to the economy in the EU (2014) 
 
 
4.1.2 Job Creation 
While the mere size of the SME sector does not suffice as a reason for special tax re-
liefs or other regulatory advantages, there may be other arguments. SMEs’ role for employ-
ment is probably the most prominent one in public discussions. Employment, of course, is a 
major policy goal in the European Union.
171
 It is desirable from a social point of view and it 
plays a key role for the national budget.
172
 More employment means less spending for social 
benefits and increased tax revenues and social security contributions. SME tax incentives 
would thus make sense, if they led to additional SME activity that comes along with addition-
                                                 
170
 See Crawford/Freedman (2010) p. 1086; OECD (2010a) pp. 57 ff.; Qureshi (2013) pp. 19 ff. The recent Ger-
man reform of the inheritance tax serves as a prominent example of successful lobbying activities in the interest 
of SMEs. During the reform process, the association of German family enterprises opposed the omission of nu-
merous previously available reliefs upon the transfer of businesses. In the end they achieved considerable bene-
fits for such transactions that had not been envisaged in the original draft. See SZ (2016): 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ wirtschaft/erbschaftsteuer-familienunternehmen-gewinnen-die-lobbyschlacht-
1.3042505 (retrieved on November 28, 2016); taz (2016): http://www.taz.de/Debatte-Erbschaftsteuer-fuer-
Firmenerben/!5231172/ (retrieved on November 28, 2016). 
171
 See European Commission (2010a) pp. 3 ff.; European Commission (2010b) pp. 3 ff. 
172
 See European Commission (2014) pp. 11 ff. 
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al employment. Obviously, this rationale assumes SMEs to be more dynamic, to grow faster 
and to generate more jobs than large enterprises. A dollar invested in the SME sector must 
have more desirable employment implications than a dollar invested in large businesses, 
which should show in higher rates of job creation.
173
 
In public perception, the leading role of SMEs in job creation seems to be undoubt-
ed.
174
 The academic discussion whether small businesses contribute more to job creation than 
large enterprises has been fierce, though. The debate was kicked-off by French economist 
Robert Gibrat. His rule of proportionate growth, also called Gibrat’s Law, claims firm growth 
to be independent of absolute firm size.
175
 Hence, SMEs should have the same expected 
growth rates as large entities and create new jobs at the same rates. In the 1950s and 60s, 
however, empirical evidence casted major doubts on Gibrat’s Law and the assumption of pro-
portionate growth became subject to some qualifications. Most notably, Hart and Prais (1956) 
contended that it only holds for surviving firms while Simon and Bonini (1958) observed Gi-
brat’s Law to apply only if firms reach a so-called minimum efficient scale level of output. 
Businesses, in other words, need to reach a minimum size in order to generate sufficient 
economies of scale. Enterprises not reaching the minimum exit the market, which would ex-
plain the necessity for SMEs to grow faster.
176
  
Due to data limitations, empirical evidence was scarce until the 1980s when a couple 
of studies by Birch reignited the discussion on the dynamics of firm and employment 
growth.
177
 Using data from the U.S. manufacturing industry, Birch (1981) finds establish-
ments with less than 20 employees to be responsible for about two thirds of all new jobs in the 
U.S. in the period from 1969 to 1976. Establishments with more than 100 employees, in con-
trast, only provided 20% of newly created employment despite employing 65% of the total 
workforce.
178
 For the period from 1981 to 1985, Birch (1987) reports similar results and bare-
ly finds any net job creation among large enterprises.
179
 The findings strongly support the 
image of the SME sector to be the engine of growth and employment. In fact, the results indi-
cate the small business sector (firms with less than 100 employees according to Birch’s defi-
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 See Bolnick (2004) pp. 4–10 f. 
174
 See Davis/Haltiwanger/Schuh (1996a) p. 298; de Rugy (2005) p. 5. 
175
 See Simon/Bonini (1958) pp. 608 f. 
176
 See Hart/Prais (1956) pp. 161 ff.; Simon/Bonini (1958) pp. 608 ff.  
177
 See Birch (1981) pp. 3 ff.; Birch (1987) pp. 7 ff. 
178
 See Birch (1981) pp. 7 ff. 
179
 See Birch (1987) pp. 12 ff. 
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nition) to create jobs at a net rate that is at least eight times as high as the large business 
rate.
180
  
Birch’s findings shaped the academic view as well as the perception of politicians 
and the public that small businesses are the major source of employment and growth.
181
 His 
data and his analysis, however, were questioned by several authors. Numerous studies on the 
dynamics of firm growth and job creation followed his work. Interestingly, the results ob-
tained are quite diverse. While some studies confirm Birch’s findings, others report no or only 
a weak link between employment growth and absolute firm size.
182
 The diversity of results 
has also been accompanied by a discussion of several methodological questions that may – at 
least partly – have driven Birch’s results. As his findings would indeed provide a strong ar-
gument in favor of an advantageous tax treatment for SMEs, it is essential to gain an under-
standing of the underlying methodological issues and resolve the question if the SME sector 
as a whole really create more jobs. 
1) Data quality 
In his seminal paper Birch uses longitudinal data on a large sample of U.S. estab-
lishments in the period from 1969 to 1976.
183
 The data was collected by Dun and 
Bradstreet (D&B), a private-sector firm providing customers with commercial in-
formation such as credit records and ratings.
184
 Being designed for other purposes 
than research on job creation, the dataset by D&B suffers several shortcomings. First 
of all, the correctness of the employment numbers is doubtful. The sum of all jobs 
registered in the D&B files, for example, exceeds the employment totals given by the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics by 8 million jobs in 1986.
185
 Research has shown the 
data to be particularly error-prone for small and young businesses.
186
 With regard to 
Birch’s object of investigation, i.e., the role of the small business sector in job crea-
tion, this is worrisome. The recording of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as well as 
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 See Birch (1981) pp. 7 ff.; Birch (1987) pp. 12 ff. 
181
 See Davis/Haltiwanger/Schuh (1996a) pp. 297 f. 
182
 See Table A1 in Annex 2 for an overview of empirical studies on the relation of firm size and job creation. 
183
 The sample used by Birch contains about 80% of all recognized establishments during the sample period. See 
Birch (1981) p. 4. 
184
 See Dun & Bradsheet: http://www.dnb.com/company.html (retrieved on April 1, 2016). 
185
 See Davis/Haltiwanger/Schuh (1996a) p. 307. 
186
 The D&B data does, for example, not include over 90% of newly founded businesses that appear in alterna-
tive sources. See Birley (1984) pp. 66 ff.  
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changes in the organizational form of businesses are further concerns with the D&B 
data. These events are often not properly accounted for and numbers on job creation 
and destruction could be biased in favor of the small business sector.
187
  
These shortcomings of Birch’s data indeed cast some doubts on the reliability of his 
results and those of several other studies using similar data. A negative correlation of 
absolute firm size and employment growth, however, is also confirmed by numerous 
other studies, albeit at a smaller magnitude. Mostly, these studies employ datasets 
with better coverage (including micro enterprises) and a more accurate recording of 
firm births and changes in ownership structures.
188
 The basic finding of small firms 
growing faster than large enterprises should therefore not solely be attributed to poor 
data quality. The magnitude of the difference in growth rates as reported by Birch 
should be considered with caution, though. 
2) Manufacturing vs. services 
Most studies finding comparatively high growth rates for the small business sector 
(including Birch’s work) only cover manufacturing enterprises.189 Manufacturing, 
however, may be subject to different growth dynamics than other sectors. Firstly, 
growth patterns could be impacted by a general decline of the secondary sector rela-
tive to the service sector in industrialized countries. Production activities have been 
increasingly outsourced by multinational enterprises to other countries with lower 
wage costs. As a consequence, the growth rates of large companies may be extraor-
dinarily low when only considering the manufacturing sector.
190
 Secondly, small 
manufacturers could be particularly hard-pressed to reach a minimum scale of opera-
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 For many M&A transactions, firms and establishments are reported to be closed (and the jobs to be lost) by 
the S&B data although they were only acquired by new owners. The acquirer, on the other hand, would seem to 
create lots of jobs even though the increase in employment is attributable to the acquisition. As the target com-
pany should usually be smaller than the acquirer, this shortcoming in the data would lead to an underestimation 
of small businesses’ growth rates if the firm level was considered. Birch, however, examines job creation at the 
establishment level. Hence, the data shows the establishment to close down and reopen. The direction of the bias 
thus depends on the post-acquisition development of the respective establishment and the exact recording of the 
transaction. See Davis/Haltiwanger/Schuh (1996a) p. 307; Haltiwanger/Jarmin/Miranda (2013) p. 348 f. 
188
 See Dunne/Roberts/Samuelson (1989) pp. 671 ff.; Mata/Portugal (1994) pp. 227 ff.; Davids-
son/Lindmark/Olofsson (1998) pp. 87 ff.; Barnes/Haskel (2002) pp. 1 ff.; Lotti/Santarelli/Vivarelli (2003) pp. 
213 ff.; Voulgaris/Papadogonas/Agiomirgianakis (2005) pp. 289 ff.; Lotti (2007) pp. 347 ff.; Headd/Kirchhoff 
(2009) pp. 531 ff.  
189
 See Davis/Haltiwanger/Schuh (1996a) pp. 308 f. Table A1 in Annex 2 also gives a comprehensive overview 
of the existing empirical literature on the subject.  
190
 See Davis/Haltiwanger/Schuh (1996a) pp. 308 f.; Lotti (2007) pp. 349 f. 
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tions as economies of scale are more distinct in manufacturing than in the service 
sector.
191
 
The issue of a manufacturing bias has been addressed by several studies. Audretsch 
et al. (2004) examine the Dutch hospitality sector while several other works use 
samples covering most or all sectors of the respective economies. The vast majority 
of them find a correlation of absolute firm size and growth rates.
192
 The studies, 
however, generally report the magnitude of the discrepancy between large and small 
businesses to be much smaller than estimated by Birch. Armington and Odle (1982) 
as well as Davidsson et al. (1998), for example, only observe a weak negative rela-
tion when considering all sectors.
193
 Dunne and Hughes (1994) and Lotti (2007) con-
firm this and observe the differences to become even smaller (if not negligible) when 
businesses with less than 20 employees are excluded.
194
 It is, in other words, primari-
ly micro enterprises driving growth rates.  
3) Firm-level data vs. establishment-level data 
Most studies on growth dynamics and job creation aim at explaining the connection 
between firm size and firm growth. Still, Birch (1981) as well as numerous other 
works measure employment at the establishment or even the plant level.
195
 Basing 
policy advice on results from establishment-level data is problematic, though. A 
small establishment can still be part of a large firm. Hence, small establishments 
growing faster than large establishments does not necessarily prove small firms to 
                                                 
191
 In the European Union, the average size of businesses (measured in turnover) in the manufacturing sector 
substantially exceeds the average size in the service sector, which suggests firm size and economies of scale to 
play a bigger role in manufacturing. On the other hand, economies of scale may also drive results in the opposite 
direction if the advantage of being large does not even allow small businesses to compete and develop. See Eu-
ropean Commission (2004) p. 12; Hurst/Pugsley (2015) pp. 1 ff. 
192
 See Kirchhoff/Phillips (1988) pp. 261 ff.; Gallagher/Daly/Thomason (1991) pp. 269 ff.; Amirkhalkhali/ 
Mukhopadhyay (1993) pp. 223 ff.; Dunne/Hughes (1994) pp. 115 ff.; Harhoff/Stahl/Woywode (1998) pp. 453 
ff.; Heshmati (2001) pp. 213 ff.; Lotti (2007) pp. 347 ff.; Headd/Kirchhoff (2009) pp. 531 ff.; Headd (2010) pp. 
1 ff.; de Kok/Vroonhof/Verhoeven/Timmermans/Kwaak/Snijders/Westhof (2011) pp. 27 ff.; Nas-
sar/Almasafir/Al-Mahrouq (2013) pp. 266 ff.; de Wit/de Kok (2014) pp. 283 ff. The only study using a sample of 
non-manufacturing firms and not observing a clear correlation between firm size and growth rates comes from 
Audretsch et al. (2004). Their results may be caused by the peculiarities of the hospitality sector that they focus 
on, though. See Audretsch/ Klomp/Santarelli/Thurik (2004) pp. 301 ff. 
193
 See Armington/Odle (1982) pp. 14 ff.; Davidsson/Lindmark/Olofsson (1997) pp. 87 ff. 
194
 See Dunne/Hughes (1994) pp. 115 ff.; Lotti (2007) pp. 347 ff. 
195
 See Table A1 in Annex 2 for an overview of the data used by existing empirical studies on firm growth and 
job creation.  
91 
 
grow faster than large firms.
196
 With regard to justifying SME tax incentives, this is 
problematic because tax incentives target firms, not establishments. There are even 
anti-misuse provisions coming along with several of the currently available regimes 
that ought to prevent small branches of large businesses from gaining admission.
197
 
Hence, the question to be posed for the currently available regimes is not whether 
small establishments (or plants) generate more jobs but whether small firms do so.
198
  
In addition, there is a methodological problem related to establishment-level data. 
Unless sufficient ownership information is provided, such data automatically drives 
the results towards a negative relation of firm size and job creation because any job 
creation by a small establishment being part of a large company is mistakenly at-
tributed to the SME sector. As a consequence, SMEs’ role in job creation is overes-
timated while the contribution of large businesses is undervalued. The extent of this 
bias is demonstrated by Armington and Odle (1982) who report the small business 
share of net job creation to be cut in half from 78% to 39% in Birch’s data when cor-
rectly accounting for firm size (instead of establishment size).
199
 There are, however, 
numerous other studies working with firm-level data which also find a robust nega-
tive correlation of firm size and firm growth.
200
 Even Odle and Armington (1982) 
observe small entities to create a disproportionally high number of jobs. The general 
finding of small businesses growing faster and creating more jobs on average than 
large entities should thus hold for the firm level as well. Again, the difference in job 
creation rates found by firm-level studies is smaller than reported by Birch (1981), 
though. 
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4) Netting out reality and regression to the mean 
Besides the data used by Birch (1981), follow-up studies also criticized his methodo-
logical approach.
201
 Birch’s basic idea is to divide the population of firms into sever-
al size classes and to measure the number of jobs created and destroyed by each size 
category over the sample period. The net gain in employment (“net job creation”) is 
his measure of interest. Based on this measures, he assesses the relative importance 
of small and large firms for job creation.
202
  
Figure 7 illustrates how this focus on net changes in employment can give a wrong 
image of small and large businesses’ role in job creation. In the example, small busi-
nesses only generate 20% of the new jobs but they account for 100% of net job crea-
tion. Merely considering the latter number would thus imply the impression of small 
businesses being the sole creators of new jobs. For the overall employment situation, 
however, it would be more harmful to lose the jobs provided by large enterprises. 
Hence, it is important to take net as well as gross numbers of job creation into ac-
count.
203
  
Figure 7: Net and gross job creation (example) 
 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 
Small 
firms 
Large 
firms 
All firms 
Employmentt=1 30 60 60 30 120 150 
Employmentt=2 35 40 80 35 120 155 
Net change 5 -20 +20 +5 0 +5 
Small-firm share of net job creation: 100%  (= 5 / 5) 
Small-firm share in gross job creation:  20%    (= 5 / (20 + 5))  
 
The main methodological criticism of Birch, however, refers to the so-called regres-
sion fallacy (also: regression to the mean). This is a statistical pitfall that occurs 
when businesses are misclassified as either small or large due to transitory, not seri-
ally correlated shocks in employment.
204
 A (borderline) large company, for example, 
can experience a temporary one-year decline in employment. If the classification of 
firms as either small or large is solely based on this year, the company falls in the 
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small businesses category despite generally being a large enterprise. When the com-
pany returns to the normal number of employees in the following year, the new jobs 
are reported to be created by a small firm. Similarly, jobs are recorded as being lost 
by a large enterprise when a small business experiences a positive transitory shock in 
the base year before returning to the normal level of employment in the following pe-
riod. Ultimately, the regression fallacy thus always induces the growth rate of small 
enterprises to be overestimated while the large business rate is always depressed.
205
  
Birch’s analysis is especially prone to the regression fallacy because his size classifi-
cation is solely based on the number of employees in the first sample year. Davis et 
al. (1996a, b) therefore propose the use of average size measurements that take mul-
tiple years into account.
206
 For a similar dataset, they replicate Birch’s findings using 
the base-year method while not observing any systematic relation between firm size 
and employment growth for their alternative measures. They interpret this as a proof 
of Birch’s findings to be driven by the regression fallacy.207 It needs to be pointed 
out, though, that their alternative measures also lead to misclassifications and intro-
duce new bias. One bias is thus reduced at the cost of a new one. The question of 
which measure (or rather which bias) is more acceptable ultimately depends on the 
frequency of transitory shocks.  
Either way, the cumulative body of follow-up studies indicates that the general find-
ing of a negative correlation of absolute firm size and employment growth still holds 
when accounting for the regression bias. Several studies follow the approach of Da-
vis et al. (1996a, b) and still confirm small firms to create more jobs on average. The 
correlation is less distinct for average size than it is for the base-year classification in 
these studies, though.
208
 Davidsson et al. (1998), Fariñas and Moreno (2000) and 
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Botazzi et al. (2001) also run explicit tests to determine the impact of the regression 
fallacy and only find it to play a minor role.
209
  
5) Firm size vs. firm age 
In his seminal paper, Birch (1981) claims small enterprises to create more jobs on 
average than their larger counterparts. As shown above, this finding has been scruti-
nized in many follow-up analyses. Comparatively little attention, however, has been 
paid to his second main finding that firm age is also negatively correlated with net 
job creation. In fact, 80% of all new jobs in his sample are accounted for by estab-
lishments not older than four years
210
 and Birch clearly states that most small busi-
nesses are no creators of jobs. It is rather a small group of young, expanding start-ups 
that outgrow the small business category quickly.
211
 
Confirmation comes from Armington and Odle (1982), Kirchhoff and Phillips (1988) 
and Broersma and Gautier (1997) who find firm births to account for 30%, 50% and 
100%, respectively, of net job creation in their samples.
212
 Voulgaris et al. (2005) 
and Lotti (2007) report only the group of firms that are younger than 5 and 10 years, 
respectively, to have positive rates of net job creation.
213
 Further evidence comes 
from Dunne et al. (1988) and Headd and Kirchhoff (2009) who do not observe busi-
nesses to grow much at all after the start-up phase.
214
 Audretsch and Mahmood 
(1994) and Tang (2015) also believe most firms to settle in once they have reached 
the minimum efficient scale.
215
  Regression-based studies featuring firm size and 
firm age as explanatory variables find both measures to negatively affect expected 
employment growth. Interestingly, Harhoff et al. (1998) observe the relation to be 
                                                 
209
 See Davidsson/Lindmark/Olofsson (1998) pp. 87 ff.; Fariñas/Moreno (2000) pp. 249 ff.; Bottazzi/Dosi/Lippi/ 
Pammolli/Riccaboni (2001) pp. 1161 ff.  
210
 See Birch (1981) p. 8. 
211
 See Birch (1981) pp. 8 f. 
212
 See Armington/Odle (1982) pp. 15; Kirchhoff/Phillips (1988) pp. 266 ff.; Broersma/Gautier (1997) pp. 216 
ff. 
213
 See Voulgaris/Papadogonas/Agiomirgianakis (2005) p. 295; Lotti (2007) p. 355. 
214
 This empirical evidence is also in line with more recent theoretical models that seek to resolve the contradic-
tion between empirically observed growth patterns and Gibrat’s Law by interpreting growth as a learning process 
in which firms gradually find out about their deficiencies and as a consequence become increasingly efficient. As 
firms mature, the learning process slows down and so does firm growth. Naturally, firms starting out small have 
to learn more, i.e., grow faster, in order to be competitive. See Jovanovic (1982) pp. 649 ff.; 
Dunne/Roberts/Samuelson (1988) p. 509 ff.; Cabral (1995) pp. 161 ff.; Ericson/Pakes (1995) pp. 53 ff.; 
Head/Kirchoff (2009) pp. 540 f. 
215
 See Audretsch/Mahmood (1994) pp. 247 ff.; Tang (2015) pp. 659 ff. 
95 
 
more pronounced for size while Voulgaris et al. (2005), Davidsson et al. (1998) and 
Haltiwanger et al. (2013) rather see the newness of businesses driving employment 
growth.
216
  
Summing up, empirical evidence generally confirms Birch’s finding of absolute firm 
size being negatively correlated with rates of job creation and firm growth. The perception of 
solely small businesses creating new jobs is wrong, though. The prevalence of this perception 
is in part due to the results of Birch’s studies that are driven by methodological deficiencies 
and problems relating to data quality. In addition, the ignorance of Birch’s second main find-
ing is key in explaining the misconception of small businesses’ role in job creation: It is not 
small firms as a whole growing faster but only the so-called gazelles, the group of high-
growth firms that are usually both small and young.
217
 Recent evidence even suggests firm 
age to be the main determinant of expected growth whereas firm size has been found to have 
little predictive power when controlling for age. Exclusively using size criteria to target tax 
incentives therefore is an inefficient – if not ineffective – way of promoting growth and job 
creation.  
As only a small group of young and upcoming enterprises accounts for the bulk of 
net job creation, some countries try to target SME tax incentives more specifically at these 
firms. France, Malta and Portugal, for example, offer special reliefs for newly founded SMEs 
and their shareholders.
218
 Entry incentives, however, are also unlikely to have the intended 
effect on job creation because even among new firms the targeted high-growth firms only 
represent a minority. In fact, the entrepreneurship literature has identified two groups of en-
trepreneurs: On the one hand, there is the small group of progressive entrepreneurs with inno-
vative ideas who enter the market to actively seize business opportunities, while on the other 
hand, there is the vast majority of defensive entrepreneurs who are mostly made up of passive 
followers, overoptimistic gamblers and escapees from unemployment. The latter group usual-
ly does not generate much growth and does not even aspire to do so.
219
 Hence, the targeting of 
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high-growth firms creating new jobs is inadequate even when using a combination of size and 
age-related eligibility criteria.   
Furthermore, progressive entrepreneurs are unlikely to need tax incentives to start 
their businesses anyway. Intuitively, the marginal entrepreneur, i.e., the entrepreneur who 
starts a business only due to the availability of tax incentives, most likely is a defensive 
founder rather than a progressive entrepreneur. Somebody seeking to exploit an innovative 
idea or a novel business opportunity would probably engage in the venture irrespective of 
available reliefs and subsidies. The start-up decision of less competent and less ambitious 
entrepreneurs, in contrast, is more likely to be impacted by tax reliefs.
220
 Hence, start-up in-
centives tend to encourage the “wrong” entrepreneurs to start a business while the “right” 
ones receive tax benefits although they would have invested anyway. And even if some of the 
“right” taxpayers were lured into self-employment, there is no apparent reason to explicitly 
restrict start-up benefits to small and micro businesses.
221
  
Tying eligibility for SME tax incentives to increased employment (or at least to the 
retention of existing jobs) is another approach to target high-growth businesses more accu-
rately.
222
 Obviously, such incentives could induce firms to employ people they would not 
have hired in the absence of the relief. It is questionable, though, if job creation per se is an 
appropriate policy goal. A growing economy in which the allocation of resources is not im-
peded by market failure usually generates enough jobs on its own.
223
 Hence, policy-makers 
should rather focus on the provision of a neutral and investment-friendly business environ-
ment that keeps the obstacles to firm growth to a minimum.
224
 SME tax incentives, however, 
achieve the opposite. They discourage growth if eligibility is restricted by fixed turnover, as-
set or employment thresholds and – in the case of incentives tied to employment numbers – 
they distort the choice of input factors (capital vs. labor), which may hamper the overall com-
petitiveness of a country’s economy.225 And even if the above arguments are neglected be-
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cause employment is fostered for social rather than for economic reasons, the restriction of 
tax incentives to small enterprises again does not make sense unless jobs in large enterprises 
are considered to be inferior.
226
 
Altogether, job creation does not constitute a valid argument for SME tax incentives. 
If additional employment is sought, the problem should be addressed directly, e.g., through 
reduced labor costs. Size, however, is not an accurate indicator of a firm’s propensity to hire 
new employees. SME tax incentives are therefore neither efficient nor effective in generating 
new jobs. They benefit many businesses that are not intended to benefit and introduce more 
complexity and new distortions to the tax system, thereby impeding rather than fostering eco-
nomic growth. The design of many of the currently available regimes, i.e., reliefs in the form 
of output-based incentives for which eligibility is explicitly restricted by absolute thresholds 
on turnover, assets and employment, even reinforces these problems. 
4.1.3 Innovativeness 
The innovativeness of the small business sector is another argument regularly 
brought up to support SME tax incentives. Evidently, innovation is a major driver of econom-
ic growth. The introduction of new products and technologies is key to raising general 
productivity.
227
 It promotes market competition, fosters the development of new markets and 
triggers the destruction of existing ones.
228
 SME tax incentives could thus be warranted if 
they spark additional SME activity that results in additional innovations and the exploitation 
of innovations in the form of successful and sustainable businesses to the benefit of the econ-
omy as a whole.  
Similarly to R&D incentives, the innovation-based rationale for SME reliefs builds 
on the occurrence of market failure in the form of spillover effects. Such spillovers arise be-
cause the originator of an innovation often cannot exclude others from the benefits of the in-
novation, e.g., due to product imitation or the transfer of personnel.
229
 As a consequence, the 
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economy as a whole benefits more than the innovator alone.
230
 When making the decision to 
invest and innovate, however, investors only take their personal returns into account. This 
leads to a suboptimal level of resources allocated to innovative activities and ultimately to 
social welfare losses.
231
 Whether SME tax incentives represent an effective countermeasure 
against this market failure depends on their ability to spur additional SME activity that gener-
ates more innovations and positive spillovers than the investments that would have been un-
dertaken in the absence of the incentives. 
With regard to the relationship of firm size and innovativeness, there are two oppos-
ing views. While neo-classical theories suggest small firms to be particularly innovative as 
fierce competition and a lack of economies of scale force them to generate competitive ad-
vantages through product differentiation, the Schumpeterian view assumes large enterprises to 
be more innovative because only they have the market power to fully reap the benefits ema-
nating from innovations.
232
 According to the latter view, large firms are more suited to intro-
duce innovative products to the market due to better management skills and better financial 
resources. They use previous research more efficiently and derive advantages from a superior 
division of labor.
233
 Moreover, their size allows them to better absorb the high share of fixed 
costs associated with innovative activities and to adequately diversify the related risks.
234
 
Small businesses, on the other hand, exhibit easier and quicker decision-making due to leaner 
organizational structures. They can react faster to customer demands, which is an important 
advantage in recognizing and pursuing new ideas and business models. Furthermore, small 
firms and their employees may be more aware and more excited about minor innovations that 
are overlooked by large organizations.
235
  
Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether SMEs’ advantages in innovative ac-
tivities outweigh their disadvantages and whether they are indeed more innovative than large 
enterprises. Existing evidence, however, does not give a clear answer to this question. While 
early empirical research by Horowitz (1962), Hamberg (1964) and Scherer (1965) rather sug-
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gests larger firms to be more innovative, Bound et al. (1984), Mowery (1983) and Cohen 
(1987) do not find a clear link between firm size and the propensity to spend on R&D.
236
 The 
results of these early studies need to be considered with caution, though, because they feature 
limited samples predominantly consisting of large enterprises. It is therefore questionable if 
the results allow valid conclusions about the SME sector. Moreover, the measurement of in-
novation is not trivial and results have been found to be highly dependent on the specific 
measures of innovation that are referred to.
237
 As a consequence, even the large body of more 
recent empirical literature does not come to a clear conclusion whether small or large enter-
prises are more innovative. Shefer and Frenkel (2005), Akcigit (2009), Park (2011) and Wolfe 
(2012), for example, observe small firms to spend more on R&D whereas Hong et al. (2016) 
find the opposite.
238
 Results with regard to innovative outputs – measured as the number of 
new processes, products or services – are equally contradictory. While Pavitt et al. (1987), 
Kleinknecht et al. (1993), Cogan (1993), Santarelli and Piergiovanni (1996), Stock et al. 
(2002) and Hong et al. (2016) attest a negative link between firm size and the number of in-
novations, Damanpour (1992), Camisón-Zornoza et al. (2004) and Laforet (2008, 2009, 2013) 
report a positive rapport.
239
 Tsai (2005) and Tsai and Wang (2005), on the other hand, assume 
a U-shaped relation between firm size and R&D productivity.
240
 Studies not finding a clear 
relation between firm size and innovativeness include Acs and Audretsch (1988), Symeonidis 
(1996), Wakasugi and Koyata (1997), Tether (1998), Freel (2005), Hausman (2005), Lee and 
Sung (2005), Laforet and Tann (2006) and Baregheh et al. (2016).
241
 
Altogether, the diversity of empirical results suggests that there is no linear, mono-
tonic relationship between firm size and innovativeness applying across all industries, size 
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classes and countries. Innovation-related arguments do therefore not warrant the use of tax 
incentives basing eligibility solely on size criteria. And even if small firms were – on average 
– slightly more innovative than large enterprises, this does not mean that firm size is a good 
indicator of innovativeness because it is not the average investor (or investment) that matters 
but the marginal one. It is the investor in need of a tax incentive to actually make the invest-
ment who is relevant for the incentive’s effectiveness. Given the skewed distribution of firms 
with regard to innovation
242
 and the small number of actually innovative SMEs,
243
 the mar-
ginal SME investment can be assumed to not show the required positive attributes with re-
spect to innovation and spillovers. 
As firm size is an inaccurate proxy for innovation, other eligibility criteria should be 
referred to when targeting tax incentives at innovative investments and investors. In this re-
spect, R&D activity is the obvious nexus. The link between R&D and innovativeness is much 
closer than the link between firm size and innovativeness.
244
 R&D tax incentives are therefore 
the superior instrument compared to SME-specific measures. Due to superior targeting, they 
are more effective and more efficient in generating innovations and positive spillovers.
245
  
Given the adequacy of tax incentives supporting R&D investments, the most interest-
ing question with regard to small and medium-sized enterprises is whether to restrict eligibil-
ity for R&D tax incentives to SMEs. In other words, is there a valid, economically sound jus-
tification for excluding large enterprises from R&D incentives or offering more generous re-
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liefs for SMEs? In the European Union, there are currently several countries providing R&D 
incentives exclusively for SMEs or R&D incentives that are more generous for SMEs.
246
  
There are indeed arguments in support of a more pronounced need for R&D tax in-
centives among SMEs than among large enterprises. First of all, small entities have been 
found to benefit less from direct subsidies and funding schemes for R&D projects than large 
businesses. Most likely, this is due to the regulatory burden associated with the application for 
such schemes.
247
 Tax incentives being especially generous for SMEs could correct for this 
imbalance as they are less prone to selection bias than direct subsidies.
248
 Even more im-
portantly, small businesses are on average subject to more severe financing constraints and 
may therefore require tax reliefs in early investment stages more urgently.
249
 This is especial-
ly relevant for R&D projects as they are often more risky and include fewer tangible assets 
that can be liquidated if the project fails.
250
 As a consequence, obtaining capital becomes even 
more difficult for SMEs engaging in R&D.
251
 For them, the respective projects often account 
for a large share of their overall business activity and can therefore hardly be compensated for 
by other successful projects in the event of failure. Large entities, in contrast, are better suited 
to diversify the related risks due to the large number of investment objects they are usually 
engaged in.
252
 Financing constraints are thus less likely to prevent them from investing in 
R&D. In line with these considerations, R&D investments have actually been found to be 
more responsive to tax incentives in SMEs than in large enterprises. Moreover, deadweight 
losses arising from R&D incentives are higher for large enterprises.
253
 And as the principle of 
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efficiency requires the minimization of support for projects that would also be undertaken in 
the absence of tax incentives, restricting R&D tax incentives to SMEs may be warranted.  
The restriction of eligibility for R&D incentives to SMEs, however, also causes addi-
tional costs. Above all, restrictions complicate the tax code and induce additional compliance 
and administrative costs. Furthermore, the implicit taxation of growth is a problem arising 
from the limitation of eligibility to SMEs. If incentives are not available beyond certain size 
thresholds, taxpayers are discouraged from growing and exceeding the respective thresholds.
 
254
 With regard to R&D projects (which tend to be high-risk, high return ventures), this may 
lead to the absurd situation of enterprises being better off if the projects are not too successful. 
In general, implicit taxes on growth are especially dangerous in sectors emphasizing R&D 
and innovation because innovation – as mentioned before – is closely related to growth. Con-
ceptually, it would be inconsistent to provide incentives encouraging economic growth 
through innovation but also penalizing the firms that actually grow. Lastly, incentives exclu-
sively available for SMEs obviously deteriorate the investment neutrality of the tax system. 
Investments by SMEs are favored and therefore need to generate lower pre-tax rates of return 
to be undertaken. This can lead to a misallocation of human and physical capital which could 
be especially harmful in the knowledge-intense R&D sector where resources (e.g., qualified 
researchers) are scarce.
255
  
Summing up, R&D tax incentives are the more efficient and effective instrument to 
spur innovative activity compared to SME tax incentives. The above-average innovativeness 
of SMEs – which is not even free of doubt considering the current body of empirical work – 
does not support the implementation of generally applicable SME incentives.
256
 Targeting 
R&D tax incentives at SMEs, however, may have its merits as the efficiency of the incentives 
is likely to increase and the losses in tax revenue to decrease. The benefit of targeting SMEs 
need to be carefully weighed against the costs, though. Moreover, incentive designs need to 
avoid explicit size restrictions (i.e., eligibility thresholds on turnover or the number of em-
ployees). Instead, maximum absolute reliefs on input-based measures should be applied to 
target smaller entities. This practice is comparatively easy to implement as no size criteria 
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have to be documented by taxpayers (nor controlled by tax administrations). Moreover, abso-
lute caps on available reliefs prevent that firm growth is directly discouraged.
257
 At the same 
time, they provide policy-makers with an easy-to-handle instrument to control the revenue 
losses.
258
 
4.1.4 Financing Constraints 
The occurrence of market failure and related distortions can be a valid justification of 
tax incentives. The mere existence of market failure, however, does not suffice. Tax incen-
tives also have to be effective in addressing the market failure and they should be the most 
efficient instrument to do so in order to represent a sensible policy instrument.
259
  
Besides positive spillovers, asymmetric information is another market failure regu-
larly associated with SMEs that may legitimize the usage of specifically targeted tax incen-
tives. With regard to small businesses, harmful asymmetry primarily occurs between business 
insiders (i.e., owners and managers) and outside providers of capital.
260
 Naturally, an infor-
mation gap between both parties exists for all kinds of businesses as insiders (almost) always 
have superior knowledge of their firms compared to external stakeholders.
261
 The information 
gap and related problems in the acquisition of financing are particularly pronounced in the 
SME sector, though.
262
 The reasons hereof are numerous. First of all, retrieving information 
on SMEs is more expensive for outsiders as they are usually not in the focus of capital market 
analysts and information is not as easily available.
263
 Their securities are usually less fre-
quently traded than those of larger entities and the information conveyed by market pricing is 
likely to be less timely and relevant.
264
 The problem is further aggravated by the fact that 
many SMEs do not have to produce audited financial statements and that they are subject to 
fewer obligations to publicly disclose financial data. Obtaining information thus becomes 
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more laborious.
265
 And even if SMEs provide financial statements and other data on their 
businesses, the quality is often insufficient due to inadequate business skills, lower key inter-
nal reporting systems, insufficient self-presentation and a lack of intrinsic motivation to dis-
close information.
266
 The overlap of ownership and management in many small businesses is 
another factor impacting on outsiders’ information deficits as it magnifies owners’ head start 
in knowledge and their leeway in sharing the information they possess. Moreover, the financ-
es of firms and their owners are more likely to mingle in owner-managed SMEs than in larger 
entities. The picture for outside investors thereby becomes even more nebulous.
267
  
Theory suggests asymmetric information to induce adverse selection, in particular 
with regard to debt financing. As creditors are not able to adequately adjust interest rates to 
SMEs’ individual characteristics and risks, they are likely to charge uniform interest rates that 
tend to be disproportionate relative to the idiosyncratic risks of many SMEs. As a conse-
quence, only “bad risks” obtain loans whereas “good risks” refrain from accepting credits. 
The banks, in turn, further raise interest rates if only bad risks remain and the process of ad-
verse credit selection is reinforced.
268
 Additionally, asymmetric information leads to inade-
quate monitoring of lenders and potential problems of moral hazard when lenders are enabled 
to take excessive risks. Even more good risks would thereby be turned into bad risks and in-
terest rates inflate even further.
269
 In the end, lending to SMEs may become so unattractive 
that lenders are not willing to provide funds and credits rationing becomes a substantial obsta-
cle for business growth that is almost impossible to overcome for individual enterprises. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the aforementioned problems indeed cause an in-
sufficient provision of capital for at least some SMEs
270
 and that the financing gap affects the 
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formation and the development these SMEs.
271
 The true extent of the financing gap and its 
effects on social welfare are not clear, though.
272
 Especially in industrialized countries, the 
financing gap is mostly limited to a rather small group of SMEs that tend to be young, innova-
tive and characterized by above-average growth aspirations and the ensuing increased capital 
needs.
273
 The large majority of established businesses, in contrast, appear to have sufficient 
access to funds. Debt financing in particular is perceived to be rather unproblematic as banks 
have increasingly adjusted their business models to the requirements of SME lending and fi-
nancial innovations have helped to adjust for SME particularities.
274
  
If tax incentives are intended to compensate for inadequate capital supply, their pri-
mary focus should therefore be on the group of innovative, high-growth and mostly young 
SMEs. These businesses usually have the highest demand for capital
275
 but also feature some 
characteristics complicating the acquisition of funds.
276
 Debt financing and other traditional 
means of finance are usually of limited relevance for them due to the risks associated to their 
ventures. For outsiders, there is typically no or only little historic information to be evaluated 
and the business models as well as the management skills of owners and managers are un-
proven.
277
 Moreover, start-ups often incur losses in their first years and many investors prefer 
to only invest in more advanced stages of development.
278
 The lack of assets to pledge as col-
lateral is another problem of newly founded SMEs that exacerbates obtaining capital.
279
 The 
problem is particularly severe for innovative start-ups centered around R&D activities. They 
usually focus on the generation of intangibles that cannot or only hardly be liquidated if the 
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venture fails. For investors, in particular creditors, the riskiness thereby increases significant-
ly. As a consequence, they often refrain from providing capital and many innovative ventures 
have to rely on self-financing and outside risk capital financing more than other SMEs.
280
  
Given this misallocation of capital, the question at hand is whether SME tax incen-
tives do adequately address the problem. Interestingly, the group of SMEs most affected by 
financing constraints appears to be the same dynamic group that also accounts for dispropor-
tionally high rates of innovation and job creation. So there is a certain kind of SME which 
generates the positive spillovers sought by policy-makers and at the same time suffers the 
most from underinvestment due to asymmetric information. As already discussed, these firms 
only represent a very small fraction of the SME sector, though, and providing relief to enter-
prises of a certain size therefore constitutes a very inefficient way of fostering investments in 
innovative, high-growth SMEs. There are simply too many other small and medium-sized 
entities not falling into this category and a more accurate targeting with the help of additional 
eligibility criteria – as currently implemented for numerous input-based schemes – is highly 
problematic as well. The additional criteria are not very accurate indicators either, enhance the 
complexity of the schemes and introduce further distortions to the neutrality of the tax code.  
In addition to being inefficient, the majority of currently available SME tax incen-
tives also bear the risk of being ineffective in providing relief to the targeted group of young 
and innovative high-growth enterprises. Above all, special tax rates for SMEs, the most com-
monly used and most impactful form of SME tax incentives, are inept as they only take effect 
when investments generate positive returns, i.e., after the actual investment has been made 
and the information asymmetry causing financing constraints has been cut back significantly. 
Input-based tax incentives, in contrast, could provide substantial support to businesses con-
fronted with an insufficient supply of capital. If designed appropriately, i.e., if refunds are 
granted, they are effective in the early stages of investments when returns are often low or 
even negative. Moreover, tying the relief to the size of investments ensures a better targeting 
of enterprises with growth aspirations.
281
 In practice, however, refunds are rarely granted and 
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even carry forwards are regularly limited. Moreover, the reliefs actually provided by input-
based regimes are rather small compared to the savings incurred on special tax rates. It is thus 
questionable, in how far they really incentivize additional investments showing the intended 
favorable attributes and in how far they provide unnecessary relief to SME investments that 
would have been undertaken anyway and in large parts are not affected by financing con-
straints.
282
 
Besides special tax rates and input-based incentives on the firm level, shareholder-
level reliefs are another instrument that aims at providing eligible businesses with additional 
funds. They grant preferential tax treatment of dividends and capital gains from SME invest-
ments. Hence, such investments require a lower pre-tax rate of return to meet the expected 
after-tax rate of return.
283
 Investor-level incentives thereby seek to induce more external equi-
ty to be invested in the SME sector. Given that young enterprises often need to resort to risk 
capital from outside equity holders, shareholder-level reliefs could indeed be an effective in-
strument to close the financing gap of SMEs. On the other hand, investor-level incentives for 
SMEs could have adverse effects on capital allocation instead of improving it if the additional 
capital invested in the SME sector is withdrawn from more efficient alternative investments in 
large enterprises.
284
 Given that shareholder reliefs for private investors generally face the 
same problems related to targeting the right SMEs as firm-level measures, this kind of unin-
tended capital reallocation is not unlikely. Shareholder-level incentives, however, provide the 
possibility of restricting the respective measures to venture capital funds and venture capital 
companies. The targeting of high-risk, high-growth firms is thereby relocated to the fund, 
which helps the accuracy as well as the collection costs incurred by tax administrations.
285
 
The effectiveness of incentives for venture capital funds and companies, however, is only 
given if comparable entities (i.e., investment funds and investment companies) are not exempt 
from taxation anyway.
286
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Existing evidence also casts doubts on the effectiveness as well as the efficiency of 
shareholder-level incentives as research predominantly finds lower capital gains taxes to have 
positive albeit modest effects on the level of high-tech and early-stage venture investments. 
The amount of additional capital provided to SMEs could therefore be disproportionally small 
compared to the costs that are induced by market distortions and forgone tax revenues.
 287
 In 
addition, the supply of capital could not even be the main reason for financial constraints. 
Instead, the problem may stem from the demand side as business owners refrain from taking 
up capital in fear of diluted ownership and control or the restrictions emanating from cove-
nants.
288
 Moreover, owners of SMEs and their managers may forfeit opportunities for financ-
ing due to their unawareness of potential sources of funds.
289
 Obviously, tax incentives do not 
at all address these demand-side issues nor do they eliminate the actual sources of SME-
specific asymmetric information relating to financial reporting, the quality of business plan-
ning, financial management and governance systems.  
As a last argument against the use of tax incentives in the prevention of underin-
vestment in SMEs, empirical work has – at least up to now – not clearly identified the extent 
to which financial constraints of SMEs are really caused by asymmetric information (i.e., 
market failure). SMEs’ problems in acquiring funds could actually be the result of a function-
ing market mechanism simply identifying alternative investments to be superior.
290
 In fact, 
capital markets have been found to function quite well even in the presence of imperfect in-
formation while the investment readiness of start-ups has been asserted to be inadequate in 
many cases.
291
 So the government’s ability to generate a more efficient equilibrium than the 
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market by redistributing capital resources to SMEs is doubtful. Accordingly, research general-
ly recommends to refrain from direct policy intervention to close the financing gap.
292
  
Summing up, the problem of asymmetric information aggravates the acquisition of 
capital for SMEs more than for large enterprises, which puts them at a competitive disad-
vantage and is likely to induce suboptimal levels of welfare. The extent of the problem is not 
clear, though.
293
 In developed financial markets, evidence suggests the financing gap of SMEs 
to primarily occur for equity financing of innovative and young SMEs with a high potential 
for growth. These enterprises require the most funds but often cannot sufficiently resort to 
traditional instruments of financing due to the risk structure of their ventures. Using firm-level 
incentives like special tax rates, tax allowances or tax credits is subject to the same problems 
in targeting the right group of businesses that are already described in the previous sections. 
On the shareholder level, preferential taxation of dividends and capital gains from all kinds of 
SME investments seriously deteriorates the investment neutrality of the tax code. Most likely, 
this results in major distortions of capital allocation that would outweigh the benefits of re-
ducing SMEs’ financing gap. A restriction to venture capital investments would more accu-
rately target the SMEs producing positive externalities but – depending on the group of eligi-
ble investors – either the effectiveness or the practicality of this approach appears questiona-
ble. Financing constraints as a consequence of asymmetric information therefore do not con-
stitute a strong argument for SME tax incentives either – especially in the way they are cur-
rently designed in the majority of countries.  
4.1.5 Socioeconomic Role of the SME Sector 
Besides the efficiency-driven rationale, there is also the view that socioeconomic 
considerations legitimize SME support. Following this line of thought, SMEs’ role in expand-
ing the middle class, in giving individuals the opportunity for economic advancement and in 
providing jobs for people who would find it difficult to obtain employment elsewhere makes 
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them worthy of government assistance.
294
 U.S. sources describe businesses run by women, 
minorities and immigrants as being of particular importance in their communities because 
they do not only create job opportunities for the less educated but also help in building social 
networks and informal capital markets. These businesses are a possible entry into the labor 
market for the less educated and supply social benefits not obtainable for them otherwise.
295
 
Moreover, small businesses are claimed to secure a diversity in locally available services and 
products that cannot be provided by the large players and chains and are therefore highly val-
ued by the respective communities.
296
 Altogether, SME tax incentives may thus be justified 
by wider social issues.   
The social benefits of SME activities, of course, are difficult to quantify. While em-
pirical studies indeed find SMEs to provide a disproportionally large share of jobs to under-
qualified individuals, their impact on the diversity of available products and services is hardly 
measurable. Even if the prominent, socioeconomic role of small businesses is taken for grant-
ed, though, it is hard to make the case for tax incentives. If customers value the supply of cer-
tain products and services, for example, they will pay for them accordingly. There is no need 
for support through the tax system. With regard to employment and social advancement, it 
seems illogical to link support to firm size – at least if being the only eligibility criterion. If 
the hiring of certain employees is intended, then support should be awarded for hiring, not for 
being a small enterprise. In the end it boils down to the same line of argumentation already 
pursued in connection with the general role of the SME sector for the economy: Just because 
SMEs are important, they do not need to be provided with tax advantages. Just because they 
hire more underqualified people, they do not necessarily hire even more underqualified people 
when being subject to preferential tax rates. So if socioeconomic goals are the rationale be-
hind SME tax incentives, support schemes should rather address these goals directly and not 
take firm size as a proxy for other firm characteristics. And under most circumstances, non-
tax measures are probably the more effective, the more efficient and the more sustainable way 
of achieving socioeconomic goals.
297
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4.2 Structural Disadvantages of SMEs Emanating from the Tax System 
4.2.1 Incomplete Loss Offset 
As the commonly used non-tax arguments appear questionable as a justification of 
SME tax incentives, an adequate reasoning for providing such incentives may be rooted in the 
tax system itself. If the tax system discriminates against small and medium-sized firms, it cre-
ates inefficiencies in the allocation of resources and a level of investment in SMEs that is not 
optimal with regard to overall social welfare. Following this line of argumentation, tax incen-
tives could serve as a compensation aiming at a minimization of the distortions induced by the 
tax system and at reducing the level of underinvestment in SMEs. In order to assess the va-
lidity of this argument, it needs to be examined if structural tax-induced disadvantages for 
SMEs really exist and if tax incentives are the appropriate measure to address them. The lat-
ter, of course, hinges on the effectiveness and efficiency of SME tax incentives, i.e., their 
ability to provide relief to those businesses negatively affected by structural discrimination of 
the tax system and to do so at reasonable costs. 
Asymmetric treatment of profits and losses is a basic feature of modern income taxa-
tion. Taxpayers generally have to pay taxes on positive income – either corporate or personal 
income tax – whereas they do not receive any payments if they incur losses. If the govern-
ment only participates in positive returns, taxation discriminates against investment projects 
bearing a greater risk of incurring losses. Income taxation may thus discourage risk-taking.
298
 
The problem is at least partly alleviated as businesses and their owners can offset losses 
against other positive income – either from other sources of income (e.g., employment income 
or capital income) or against income from past and future years.
299
 Not in all situations, how-
ever, taxpayers have positive income to be offset, which becomes even more likely as loss 
offsets are restricted. Hence, limitations to intra and inter-periodic loss offsets increase the 
danger of risk-taking being discouraged by income taxation. In practice, this may show on 
two levels: Either investors abstain from equity investments in risky ventures or the business-
es themselves take fewer risks.
300
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 Table 19 displays the major restrictions applying to the offset of business losses in 
corporate and personal income taxation in the EU. Notably, only five countries allow losses to 
be carried back and if they do, the carry back is mostly limited to one year. Provisions on car-
ry forwards are more generous. For corporate losses, 15 countries do not have any constraints 
with regard to time and in the remaining countries losses can be carried forward for at least 
four years. Annual offsets are limited as a percentage of taxable income in nine countries and 
as a percentage of the loss carried forward in one country. Under the personal income tax, 
numerous countries have time limits in place (16) while only two countries restrict the amount 
of losses to be offset. In addition, the offset against non-business income is banned in ten 
countries and limited to certain income sources in four countries. Capital losses incurred on 
shareholdings can only be offset against other income in a couple of Member States. As a last 
major restriction, 17 countries apply loss trafficking rules, i.e., limitations to loss carry for-
wards if the ownership in a company changes at least partly. 
The first question at hand is whether these restrictions affect SMEs more severely 
than large enterprises. This would generally be the case if SMEs were more likely to incur 
losses. The AMADEUS data used to generate the model companies in Section 3.2 indeed in-
dicates the return on invested capital to be the lowest for micro enterprises and the return on 
equity to continuously increase in firm size. Moreover, SMEs are active in a smaller number 
of markets with a smaller number of products and services. Their business risks are less diver-
sified and their incomes more volatile.
301
 Hence, SMEs should indeed be more affected by 
limited loss carry forwards and loss offsets than their larger counterparts.
302
 Even more than 
an “average SME”, start-ups and young, high-risk ventures are prone to incur negative in-
come as significant losses upfront are a usual occurrence for them.
303
 Upcoming start-ups are 
also particularly affected by loss trafficking rules as a buyout as well as the participation of 
venture capitalists and business angels potentially triggers the extinction of loss carry for-
wards.
304
 Moreover, time limits on carry forwards of four or five years as implemented in 
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numerous countries
305
 may severely restrict start-ups’ ability to deduct initial losses later 
on.
306
 
Although SMEs indeed appear to suffer more from limited loss offsets, it is ques-
tionable if that really distorts investment decisions, i.e., leads to underinvestment in the SME 
sector. First of all, tax planning may at least alleviate the effects of the limitations, especially 
for start-ups who usually expect to incur upfront losses and should adjust accordingly.
307
 Sec-
ondly, investors have not been found to pay much attention to loss offset regulations in their 
investment decisions.
308
 But even if they did, the SME tax incentives analyzed in Section 3 
are not the right measure to compensate for limited loss offsets because the link between firm 
size and the propensity to be affected by restricted loss offsets is only weak. The targeting of 
special tax rates or tax credits for SMEs would thus be poor if a compensation for limited loss 
offsets was intended. Moreover, the design of currently available SME incentives suggests 
that such a compensation is not the goal as special tax rates and non-refundable input-based 
incentives only benefit taxpayers with positive income.  
If the issue of incomplete loss offsets is perceived to be a major problem for the SME 
sector, policy-makers should thus address the issue directly and reduce the respective re-
strictions – ideally for all kinds of companies. Alternatively, more generous provisions could 
be offered exclusively to new enterprises in order to prevent excessive losses in tax revenues. 
This would introduce another distortion to the tax system but at least firm age would be a 
more accurate indicator than firm size to target businesses that are likely to be actually affect-
ed by limited loss offsets. Moreover, it is an easy-to-track indicator which is less prone to 
misuse and accounting policies than firm size.  
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Table 19: Loss compensation rules for business losses in the EU (2015) 
Country 
CIT loss offset PIT loss offset 
Carry back Carry forward Carry back Carry forward 
Time 
limit 
Max.  
offset 
Time 
limit 
Max.  
offset 
Loss  
trafficking 
Time 
limit 
Max.  
offset 
Time 
limit 
Max.  
offset 
Offset against other 
income sources 
Business 
losses 
Capital 
losses 
Austria - - unlimited 75% of income no - - unlimited unlimited yes no 
Belgium  - - unlimited none yes - - unlimited unlimited no no 
Bulgaria - - 5 years none yes - - 5 years unlimited no no 
Croatia - - 5 years none no - - 5 years unlimited yes no 
Cyprus - - 5 years none yes - - 5 years unlimited yes yes 
Czech Rep. - - 5 years none yes - - 5 years unlimited limited limited 
Denmark - - unlimited none yes - - unlimited unlimited yes no 
Estonia - - - - - - - 7 years unlimited yes no 
Finland - - 10 years none yes - - 10 years unlimited yes limited 
France 1 year 1 million unlimited € 1m + 50% of inc. no - - 5 years unlimited yes limited 
Germany  1 year 1 million unlimited € 1m + 60% of inc. yes 1 year € 1 m. unlimited € 1m + 60% of inc. yes no 
Greece - - 5 years none no - - 5 years unlimited yes no 
Hungary - - 5 years 50% of income no - - unlimited unlimited limited limited 
Ireland  1 year unlimited unlimited none yes 3 years
1
 unlimited unlimited unlimited yes no 
Italy - - unlimited 80% of income yes - - 5 years
2
 unlimited yes no 
Latvia - - unlimited none yes - - 3 years unlimited yes no 
Lithuania - - unlimited 70% of income no - - unlimited unlimited no no 
Luxembourg - - unlimited none yes - - unlimited unlimited no no 
Malta - - unlimited none no - - unlimited unlimited yes no 
Netherlands 1 year unlimited 9 years none yes 3 years unlimited 9 years unlimited limited limited 
Poland - - 5 years 50% of loss yes - - 5 years 50% of loss no no 
Portugal - - 12 years 70% of income yes - - 12 years unlimited no no 
Romania - - 7 years none no - - 5 years unlimited no no 
Slovakia - - 4 years none no - - 4 years unlimited no no 
Slovenia - - unlimited 50% of income yes - - unlimited unlimited no no 
Spain - - unlimited 50%/25% of inc. no - - 4 years unlimited yes no 
Sweden - - unlimited none yes - - unlimited unlimited no no 
UK 1 year unlimited unlimited none yes 1 year unlimited unlimited unlimited limited no 
Note: Data was retrieved from ibfd.org. 
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As already discussed, the focus of many policy-makers is on innovative high-risk, 
high-growth start-ups which generate positive externalities to the benefit of the economy as a 
whole. With regard to these enterprises, two restrictions to loss offsets and carry forwards 
should receive special attention. Above all, loss trafficking provisions represent an impedi-
ment as venture capital investors and business angels regularly acquire qualified sharehold-
ings in high-growth start-ups. If loss trafficking rules are too restrictive, i.e., if they already 
kick in for minor ownership changes, the initial losses incurred by these businesses run the 
risk of being annihilated for tax purposes.
309
 This, in turn, might discourage or at least slow 
down the obtainment of outside capital by start-ups. Moreover, loss trafficking rules potential-
ly depress the selling price upon exit for the founders of start-ups, thus making investments in 
start-ups less attractive.
310
 Secondly, start-ups may suffer from too restrictive time limits for 
carry forwards. If it takes them several years to generate net profits, four or five-year carry 
forwards may not suffice to fully offset the initial losses, especially if combined with limits on 
annual offsets (e.g., in Hungary and Poland).
311
   
Summing up, incomplete loss offsets on carry forwards may indeed affect small and 
medium-sized enterprises more severely than large enterprises.
312
 Special tax rates, tax cred-
its, allowances or depreciation schemes for SMEs, however, are not the appropriate counter-
measures. Instead, it would be more effective and efficient to directly address the problem by 
granting more generous loss carry forwards and offsets. In particular, legislators should avoid 
loss trafficking rules that discourage investments in high-growth start-ups. 
4.2.2 Debt Bias 
Most income tax systems treat equity and debt finance differently. While interest 
payments on debt are usually deductible from taxable income, dividend payments are not (or 
only to a limited extent).
313
 As a consequence, interest payments lower taxable business in-
come and are exclusively taxed in the hands of the recipient of the interest whereas dividends 
are subject to double taxation on the corporate and on the shareholder level (see Figure 8 in 
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Section 4.2.3). For transparently taxed entities, the problem of double taxation does not exist 
because there is only one level of taxation. Disadvantages for equity financing, however, may 
arise if business and capital income are subject to different tax rates (progressive vs. propor-
tional).
314
  
The discrimination against equity financing constitutes a structural disadvantage for 
SMEs if they have more problems to obtain debt financing than large entities and if they have 
more difficulties to effectively deduct interest payments from the tax base due to a lack of 
positive taxable income. In general, large firms may indeed be better positioned to obtain debt 
financing as they often represent better risks for creditors. They possess more assets that can 
serve as collateral and offer better risk diversification as a result of a broader range of prod-
ucts and services being sold at the market. The lack of risk diversification also makes small 
businesses more prone to losses and thus to the danger of not being able to effectively deduct 
interest expenses. Moreover, lending to small firms could be less profitable in view of the 
fixed costs related to giving loans and the problems in obtaining information about lenders.
315
    
As outlined in Section 4.1.4, however, SMEs as a whole do not necessarily have 
problems in obtaining debt capital. Banks have increasingly adapted to the challenges of lend-
ing to small businesses and the financing gap has at least been narrowed for debt financing. 
The AMADEUS data used for the calculation of effective tax burdens in Section 3 also shows 
the average equity ratio of SMEs to exceed that of large enterprises only slightly.
316
 In addi-
tion, the challenges of lending to small businesses do not necessarily have to prevent debt 
financing altogether. Instead, they may merely increase the interest rates imposed on affected 
entities.
317
 The deductibility of interest payments would then rather benefit SMEs than it 
would hurt them. Hence, it appears that SMEs do not generally suffer from the debt bias in 
income taxation. It is rather a certain group of SMEs not being able to obtain debt financing 
and not being able to deduct interest payments due to a lack of positive taxable income. This 
group primarily includes start-ups and gazelles. Their success is often based on new ideas and 
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technologies that are unsuitable to serve as collateral and they lack proven track records of 
their business models and abilities, which aggravates the obtainment of loans.
318
  
Given that the majority of SMEs have sufficient access to debt financing as well as 
positive income to deduct interest payments from, it does not make sense to provide general 
tax incentives to SMEs as a compensation for the debt bias, e.g., in the form of special tax 
rates, special depreciation schemes or tax credits on certain kinds of investments. In fact, such 
incentives rather tend to benefit those businesses without negative income and without a 
shortage in available debt financing. The debt bias therefore does not constitute a justification 
of these kinds of incentives. Measures effectively addressing the debt bias need to embrace 
the problems arising from it and target affected firms more accurately.  
A few incentives aim more specifically at alleviating financing-related issues. In 
Belgium, for example, an additional 0.5% of notional interest can be deducted from taxable 
income by small enterprises and in Portugal 5% of initial capital contributions and capital 
increases can be deducted by SMEs. Obviously, both measures do not improve the access to 
debt financing but they make equity financing more attractive with regard to taxation and 
could indeed reduce the debt bias. It is questionable, though, in how far they really support 
the taxpayers being most affected, i.e., loss-making firms. In the absence of refunds, these 
enterprises do not benefit from additional deductions, especially if carry forwards are not al-
lowed. In Hungary, the tax credit of 60% on interest payments even has an adverse effect as it 
extends the debt bias rather than reducing it. The taxation of debt financing becomes even 
more advantageous and therefore constitutes an even bigger disadvantage for taxpayers suf-
fering from the debt bias.
319
  
Shareholder-level incentives are another group of regimes that may positively affect 
SMEs heavily relying on equity financing. They limit the double taxation of proceeds derived 
from equity investments and thereby reduce the debt bias. Once again, however, the group of 
SMEs having the most problems in obtaining debt financing and in effectively deducting in-
terest payments due to incurred losses may not benefit – at least as long as they still make 
losses. During this time, firms are unlikely to pay dividends and their shareholders may not be 
able to realize capital gains. Reduced shareholder taxation therefore does not provide immedi-
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ate relief and only kicks in as the respective SMEs generate positive returns. At this time, af-
fected businesses could probably obtain debt financing anyway and the debt bias would no 
longer put them at a competitive disadvantage. 
Altogether, the debt bias does not constitute an adequate argument for providing 
SME tax incentives in their current form, especially if the incentives do not directly relate to 
the taxation of equity financing (either at the firm level or at the shareholder level). There is 
simply no clear link between firm size and the inability to acquire loans. If the discrimination 
against equity financing is indeed perceived to be a problem, policy-makers should rather 
directly tackle the problem instead of trying to alleviate one distortion (equity vs. debt) by 
introducing another (SME vs. large). The debt bias could, for example, be addressed by gen-
erally reduced shareholder taxation or by aligning the treatment of payments on debt and eq-
uity on the firm level.
 320
 
4.2.3 Double Taxation of Corporate Profits 
In most EU countries, corporate income is taxed on the corporate level as soon as 
profits are incurred and on the shareholder level when profits are distributed or capital gains 
are realized upon the disposal of participations (see Table 20).
321
 In practice, the double taxa-
tion of corporate profits negatively affects the success of the SME sector in several ways. 
First, it may prevent business creation. If the overall level of taxation and the hurdle after-tax 
rate of return of newly founded businesses becomes too high, dependent employment and 
alternative capital market investments could be more attractive and prevent businesses from 
being started.
322
 Employment income and alternative capital market investments, however, 
are also subject to taxes that are not necessarily lower.
323
 In fact, most of the tax systems in 
the EU and other developed countries do not feature full double taxation of corporate profits. 
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Mostly, shareholder relief systems or imputation systems reduce tax wedges between the 
overall tax rate on corporate profits and the top PIT rate to a minimum or even create an ad-
vantage for corporate profits (see Table 21 and Figure 8).
324
 In view of these relief mecha-
nisms, it appears highly questionable if businesses not being started due to corporate double 
taxation should be founded in the first place. Most likely, a true entrepreneur would not be 
deterred from starting a business by a minor tax wedge, especially as the non-corporate form 
of business not being subject to double taxation is also available. 
Secondly, double taxation may slow down businesses’ growth as it prevents incorpo-
ration.
325
 In fact, the choice of legal form has been found to be impacted by tax considera-
tions, most notably differences in nominal tax rates.
326
 The welfare losses induced by the dis-
tortion of legal form choice are unclear, though. If investment decisions were distorted by the 
choice of legal form and the acquisition of funds was prevented, double taxation could indeed 
prevent firms from growing.
327
 As mentioned above, the size of the tax wedges in most EU 
countries is not very big, though. Hence, it appears unlikely that enterprises with substantial 
growth aspirations would 1) really abstain from incorporation because of a minimal tax rate 
advantage and 2) have their growth aspirations halted by being non-corporate. And even if 
that was the case, an improved alignment of (generally applicable) corporate and non-
corporate income tax rates would be the better response to the problem than the SME tax in-
centives discussed in Section 3.  
Lastly, double taxation could prevent SMEs’ success because shareholder taxation 
increases the cost of equity capital. The increase is likely to be more pronounced for SMEs 
than for large enterprises as the shareholder clienteles of both groups distinguish. Large cor-
porations usually have access to international financial markets where shareholder taxes are 
neglected.
328
 In contrast to that, SMEs are more reliant on domestic, small-scale investors for 
whom shareholder taxation plays a significant role. As a result, SMEs incur higher cost of 
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capital that – even if exclusively stemming from taxation – constitute a competitive disad-
vantage and could cause SMEs to be pushed out of the market.
329
  
Table 20: Personal income tax rates on dividends and capital gains in the EU (2015) 
Country Personal income tax rate on dividends Personal income tax rate on capital 
gains (shares) 
Austria  25%  25% 
Belgium   25%  0% 
Bulgaria  5%  0% 
Croatia  12%  0% 
Cyprus  17%  0% 
Czech Republic  15%  15% 
Denmark 
 up to DKK 49,900: 27% 
 over DKK 49,900: 42% 
 up to DKK 49,900: 27% 
 over DKK 49,900: 42% 
Estonia  20%  20,00% 
Finland 
quoted companies: 
 15% of dividend exempt 
 85% of dividend taxable 
 up to €30,000: 30% 
 over €30,000: 34% 
unquoted companies: 
 75% of dividend exempt up to 
€150,000 and the rest taxed like divi-
dends from quoted companies 
 25% of dividend taxable 
 up to €30,000: 30% 
 over €30,000: 34% 
 up to €30,000: 30% 
 over €30,000: 34% 
France 
 60% of dividend taxed at progressive 
PIT rates (0–45%) 
 progressive PIT rates (unless SME-
related incentives apply; 0–45%) 
Germany  
 if participation > 25% or optional if 
participation > 1% and shareholder 
works for company: progressive PIT 
rates on 60% of dividend (0–45%) 
 if participation < 1% or optional if 
participation < 25% and shareholder 
works for company: flat rate tax 
(26,38%) 
 if participation > 1%: progressive PIT 
rates (0–45%) 
 if participation < 1%: 25% 
Greece  10% 
 if participation > 0.5%: 15%  
 if participation < 0.5%: 0% 
Hungary  16%  16% 
Ireland   20%  33% 
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Country Personal income tax rate on dividends Personal income tax rate on capital 
gains (shares) 
Italy 
 qualified: progressive rates on 
49.72% of dividend 
 unqualified shareholdings: flat rate 
tax (26%) 
 qualified holding requires 20% of 
voting rights or 25% of capital for un-
listed companies and 2% and 5%, re-
spectively for quoted companies 
 qualified holding: progressive rates 
on 49.72% of dividend 
 unqualified shareholdings: flat rate 
tax (26%) 
 qualified holding requires 20% of 
voting rights or 25% of capital for un-
listed companies and 2% and 5%, re-
spectively for quoted companies 
Latvia  10%  15% 
Lithuania  15%  15% 
Luxembourg 
 15%  if participation > 10%: progressive 
PIT rates (0–40%) reduced by 50% 
 if participation < 10%: 0% 
Malta 
 0%  15% flat tax or progressive rates 
(exempt if listed on Malta Stock Ex-
change) 
Netherlands 
 if shareholding > 5%: 25% 
 if shareholding < 5%: exemption of 
dividend but notional tax of 1.2% on 
value of net financial assets (applica-
ble allowance: €21,330) 
 if shareholding > 5%: 25% 
 if shareholding < 5%: exemption of 
capital gains but notional tax of 1.2% 
on value of net financial assets (appli-
cable allowance: €21,330) 
Poland  19%  19% 
Portugal 
 28% or progressive tax rate on 50% 
of dividends 
 28% 
Romania  16%  16% 
Slovakia  0%  progressive tax rates (19–25%) 
Slovenia 
 25%  tax rate depending on holding period: 
 until 5 years after acquisition: 25% 
 5 years after acquisition: 20% 
 10 years after acquisition: 15%  
 15 years after acquisition: 10% 
 20 years after acquisition: 5% 
 25 years after acquisition: 0% 
Spain 
 savings income: 
 up to €6,000: 20% 
 €6,000 to €50,000: 22% 
 over €50,000: 24% 
 savings income: 
 up to €6,000: 20% 
 €6,000 to €50,000: 22% 
 over €50,000: 24% 
Sweden  30%  30,00% 
UK 
 up to total income of GBP 31,785: 
0% (=10% - 10%) 
 total income from GBP 31,785 to 
GBP 150,000: 25%(= 32.5% -7.5%) 
 total income over GBP 150,000: 
30.6% (=37.5% - 6.9%) 
 up to GBP 5,500: 0% 
 up to total income of GBP 31,785: 
18% 
 total income over GBP 31,785: 28% 
Note: Data was retrieved from ibfd.org. 
SME tax incentives on the firm level, however, appear to be an inadequate remedy. 
Compensating for one distortion by adding another is unlikely to create better overall neutrali-
ty, especially if the taxpayers affected by the initial distortion are not targeted accurately. 
With regard to targeting, addressing the shareholder level directly is the superior approach. 
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Shareholder-level incentives, however, introduce distortions and discriminate against non-
qualifying investments in large enterprises as well. In particular, special investment allowanc-
es as in France and Ireland do not provide a level playing field but rather revert a likely SME 
discrimination into a large business discrimination.
330
 In addition, the commonly used explicit 
size criteria come along with the same problems as on the firm level: more complexity in the 
tax system and a potential discouragement of growth.
331
  
Table 21: Tax wedge for corporate and non-corporate business income in the EU (2015) 
Country PIT rate (in %) CIT rate (in %) ∆ (in %-points) 
Austria 50.00 43.75 6.25 
Belgium 53.50 50.49 3,01 
Bulgaria 15.00 14.50 0.50 
Croatia 47.20 29.60 17,60 
Cyprus 38.50 12.50 26.00 
Czech Rep. 16.05 31.15 –15.10 
Denmark 50.00 55.36 –5.36 
Estonia 20.00 20.00 0.00 
Finland 50.25 42.44 7.81 
France 9.00 64.38 –15.38 
Germany 47.79 48.59 –0.80 
Greece 33.00 33.40 –0.40 
Hungary 31.96 31.96 0.00 
Ireland 40.00 57.13 –17.13 
Italy 48.52 46.35 2.17 
Latvia 23.00 23.50 –0.50 
Lithuania 15.00 27.75 –12.75 
Luxembourg 44.10 43.38 0.72 
Malta 35.00 35.00 0.00 
Netherlands 52.00 43.75 8.25 
Poland 32.00 34.39 –2.39 
Portugal 56.50 49.24 7.26 
Romania 16.00 29.44 –13.44 
Slovakia 25.00 22.00 0.00 
Slovenia 50.00 37.75 12.25 
Spain 45.00 44.92 0.08 
Sweden 54.86 45.40 9.46 
UK 45.00 44.45 0.55 
Mean 38.72 37.95 0.77 
Note: Data was retrieved from ibfd.org. 
                                                 
330
 The allowances reduce the PIT base of the investors when shareholdings in eligible SMEs are acquired and 
thereby lower personal income tax payments.  
331
 See Holtz-Eakin (1995) p. 393. 
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Figure 8: Systems of corporate taxation in the EU (2015) 
 
Note: Data was retrieved from ibfd.org.
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Even for investor-level incentives, the adequacy of tax incentives in compensating 
SMEs for corporate double taxation therefore appears questionable. Instead, a general reduc-
tion of taxes on dividends and capital gains emerges as the superior approach. It would reduce 
the disadvantages incurred by SMEs due to double taxation while avoiding the problems of 
explicit size restrictions. In practice, of course, the loss of tax revenues (compared to 
measures restricted to SMEs) is a major concern.
332
 The concern could be alleviated by limit-
ing reduced taxation to significant shareholdings, i.e., shareholdings accounting for a certain 
percentage of all outstanding shares of the respective company. Such a restriction would prac-
tically exclude shareholders of large enterprises while also achieving an improved focus on 
the shareholders who cannot avoid dividend and capital gains taxation because they make a 
living on the proceeds from their participations (mostly owner-managers of small firms). A 
differentiated treatment according to the holding quota is already implemented in several 
countries, which proves the practicability. In Germany, for example, a restriction of preferen-
tial treatment is easily achievable by increasing the part of exempt dividends and capital gains 
in the Teileinkünfteverfahren while holding everything else equal.
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4.2.4 Tax Planning Opportunities for Multinational Enterprises 
Large enterprises usually run multi-national operations whereas SMEs mostly oper-
ate exclusively on the domestic market.
334
 Cross-border operations, of course, come along 
with tax advantages and usually offer opportunities for tax planning. The overall tax liability 
can be reduced significantly as income is shifted to low-tax jurisdictions, e.g., through trans-
fer pricing, hybrid structures taking advantage of legal mismatches and tax haven finance af-
filiates.
335
 The exact amount of savings from such activities, of course, varies across countries 
and companies. Overall, anecdotal as well as empirical evidence indicate substantial reduc-
tions of tax payments, though, and the lack of opportunities for cross-border profit shifting 
could put SMEs at a structural competitive disadvantage that would not arise in the absence of 
taxation.
336
 Possibly, this warrants the use of SME tax incentives as a consolation.  
                                                 
332
 See Reister/Spengel/Finke/Heckemeyer (2009) p. 1. 
333
 In the Teileinkünfteverfahren, 60% of dividends and capital gains are taxed at the normal progressive PIT 
rates whereas the rest is exempt. For a more detailed description, see Section 6.2. 
334
 In fact, the vast majority of all SMEs in the European Union (in particular micro and small enterprises) do not 
feature any international business activities. See European Commission (2014) pp. 81 ff. 
335
 See Jacobs/Endres/Spengel (2015) pp. 885 ff. 
336
 See Huizinga/Laeven (2008) pp. 1164 ff.; Clausing (2009) pp. 703 ff.; Egger/Eggert/Winner (2010) pp. 99 ff.; 
Pinkernell (2013) pp. 180 ff.;      
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Whether effective tax rates really decrease in firm size, however, is questionable. 
Empirical evidence on the subject has been ambiguous so far.
337
 Moreover, smaller entities 
also have opportunities for tax planning that do not play a role for most large enterprises. 
Small businesses, for example, can often choose their legal form in a tax-optimal way.
338
 The 
limited number of shareholders of most micro and small enterprises also enables controlling 
owners to optimize profit distributions according to their personal needs and preferences. In 
addition, profits can be extracted with the help of contracts between the company and the 
owners (e.g., employment contracts and shareholder loans). These contracts oftentimes serve 
the purpose of saving taxes and do not necessarily reflect the real economic value of the ser-
vices provided to the firm.
339
 Besides tax avoidance, small business owners also engage in tax 
evasion more than any other group of taxpayers. Especially self-employment is used as a ve-
hicle for tax evasion.
340
  In the UK, for example, SMEs account for about half of the overall 
tax gap and the amount of evaded taxes relative to the overall amount of the estimated tax 
liability is nearly twice as high as for large enterprises (3.1% compared to 1.8%).
341
 
Altogether it is thus not clear, if and how much SMEs are really disadvantaged with 
regard to tax planning (and tax evasion) opportunities. Even if they were, this would not rep-
resent an adequate justification of SME tax incentives as they are currently implemented, 
though. As previously discussed, it is highly unlikely that compensating for one tax-induced 
distortion by introducing another distortion in the tax system leads to a higher degree of over-
all efficiency – especially if the extent and the dynamics of the initial distortion are not exact-
ly known. Moreover, imposing lower tax burdens on more mobile capital may simply be effi-
cient. So there may not even be a need for compensation. And lastly, a look at actual SME tax 
incentives shows that micro enterprises benefit by far the most whereas small and even more 
so medium-sized entities are often not affected by the regimes or only to a limited degree. It is 
predominantly micro enterprises, however, who can engage in the abovementioned tax plan-
ning and tax evasion strategies existing for narrowly held companies. Most of the currently 
                                                 
337
 See Mills/Erickson/Maydew (1998) pp. 6 ff; Wilkinson/Cahan/Jones (2001) pp. 165 ff.; Gupta/Mills (2002) 
pp. 117; Richter/Samphantharak/Timmons (2009) pp. 898 ff.; Belz/von Hagen/Steffens (2016) pp. 2 ff. 
338
 See Gordon/MacKie-Mason (1994) pp. 279 ff.; MacKie-Mason/Gordon (1997) pp. 477 ff.; Goolsbee (1998) 
pp. 143 ff.; Goolsbee (2004) pp. 2283 ff.; Luna/Murray (2010) pp. 995 ff.; Liu (2014) pp. 387 ff.; Ja-
cobs/Scheffler/ Spengel (2015) p. 6. 
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 See Jacobs/Scheffler/Spengel (2015) pp. 569 ff. 
340
 See Pissarides/Weber (1989) pp. 17 ff.; Feldman/Slemrod (2007) pp. 327 ff. 
341
 See HM Revenue & Customs (2015) p. 19. Data for the U.S. suggests small business owner to account for an 
even larger share of the tax gap. See Gale/Brown (2013) p. 881; IRS (2016) pp. 11 ff. 
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available tax incentives would thus be badly targeted if they were intended to compensate for 
an imbalance in tax planning opportunities. 
4.2.5 Compliance Costs 
Paying taxes does not only represent a burden for businesses due to the actual tax 
payments but also because determining the tax liability as well as paying the taxes cause con-
siderable compliance costs. Previous studies have estimated compliance costs to amount to up 
to 21% of turnover
342
 and 150% of taxable income for the very smallest businesses.
343
 The 
majority of studies, however, report significantly lower compliance burdens between 0.2% 
and 15% of revenues.
344
 Compliance costs are incurred for acquiring external expertise (e.g., 
tax advisers), for acquiring required materials and for hiring employees who take care of tax-
related obligations.
345
 Importantly, a substantial share of the compliance burden is made up of 
fixed and quasi-fixed costs. Moreover, large enterprises benefit from economies of scale and 
learning effects stemming from the volume and the frequency of their operations and related 
tax obligations.
346
 As a consequence, the compliance burden (relative to turnover or total as-
sets) decreases in firm size and micro and small enterprises are subject to a disproportionally 
high compliance burden.
347
 So the tax system indeed puts SMEs at a competitive disad-
vantage that would not exist in the absence of taxation.  
But does this discrimination justify the use of SME tax incentives? In contrast to the 
abovementioned structural disadvantages, enhanced compliance costs are really driven by 
firm size (or rather the lack hereof). The amount of sales of an enterprise actually determines 
how well fixed costs can be forwarded to customers through prices so that firm size is not 
only a more or less accurate proxy of the firm characteristic which truly causes the disad-
vantage but the actual reason of the disadvantage.
348
 Tax incentives based on firm size are 
thus well targeted at the businesses being affected by the disproportionate compliance burden.  
                                                 
342
 See Colmar Brunton (2005) p. 99. 
343
 See DeLuca/Stilmar/Guyton/Lee/O’Hare (2007) p. 175. 
344
 For a comprehensive literature overview on the measurement of tax compliance costs, see Eichfelder (2010) 
pp. 55 ff. 
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 See Eichfelder (2010) pp. 20 ff. 
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 See Eichfelder (2010) p. 59 f. 
347
 See Sandford/Godwin/Hardwick (1989) pp. 197 ff.; Slemrod/Venkatesh (2002) pp. 40; DeLu-
ca/Stilmar/Guyton/Lee/O’Hare (2007) pp. 174 ff. 
348
 See Eichfelder (2010) p. 217. 
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Among the different forms of relief, administrative simplifications should be the 
primary choice to address disproportionate compliance burdens. Requiring simplified tax ac-
counts, less frequent tax returns and fewer tax payments – as it is common practice in most 
EU Member States – should actually decrease enterprises’ compliance costs. Administrative 
reliefs for micro and small businesses are thus effective and efficient instruments in alleviat-
ing the compliance-related distortion introduced by the tax system. In addition, simplified 
procedures also relieve the tax administration and are likely to increase net tax revenues. The 
use of administrative simplifications for very small businesses therefore appears well-
grounded and is likely to contribute to the overall efficiency of the tax system.  
Caution needs to be exercised with regard to the generosity and the exact eligibility 
thresholds, though. Preferential treatment for small businesses naturally partitions taxpayers 
and violates the neutrality of the tax system.
349
 The relief provided needs to be carefully 
weighed against the size-related disadvantage under the ordinary compliance obligations. 
Otherwise a discrimination against micro and small businesses easily turns into a discrimina-
tion against larger entities – either because eligibility thresholds are chosen too high or be-
cause the relief provided is too beneficial. In particular, regimes may be overly generous if 
they strongly deviate from standard procedures. If income is determined presumptively, for 
example, or if special regimes replace several taxes, the determination and collection of taxes 
is not only simplified but actual tax payments are significantly altered.
350
 Taxpayers are then 
put at a substantial competitive advantage compared to ineligible competitors and may be 
strongly incentivized to not forfeit access to the special regimes by remaining small (or by 
reporting to be small).
351
 In addition, simplifications should be harmonized with non-tax regu-
lations. Eligibility thres-holds for simplified tax accounting, for example, need to consider 
financial accounting regulations. A simplified regime would be misplaced if local accounting 
standards required comprehensive double-entry and accruals-based book-keeping from the 
respective businesses anyway.  
SME tax incentives other than administrative reliefs do not actually address the prob-
lem of disproportionate compliance costs but rather seek to provide compensation by a reduc-
tion of actual tax payments. The match of taxpayers being affected by excessive compliance 
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 See Keen (2013) p. 27. 
350
 See Thuronyi (1996) pp. 406 ff. 
351
 See Section 5.1 for a discussion of taxpayers’ bunching below eligibility thresholds for SME tax incentives 
(including special regimes altering the tax base significantly compared to standard income taxation).  
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burdens and taxpayers benefiting from the incentives is not as good as for administrative re-
liefs. Hence, the case for special tax rates, allowances or tax credits can only be made if micro 
and small companies experience compliance-related disadvantages which cannot be neutral-
ized by administrative reliefs. Empirical evidence suggests that such disadvantages indeed 
exist as enhanced compliance costs were measured in tax systems actually offering simplified 
procedures.
352
 If, as a consequence, input and output-based tax incentives are granted, the 
relief should mirror the incidence of compliance costs as accurately as possible. Following 
this rationale, adequate incentives need to benefit profitable as well as loss-making businesses 
– compliance costs accrue irrespective of taxable income – and they must also benefit large 
enterprises. Furthermore, compliance costs accrue for businesses of all legal forms. So the 
compensatory relief should be provided accordingly. Lastly, compliance costs are primarily 
caused by the act of running business operations, not by making distributions to shareholders, 
which speaks against shareholder-level measures. 
The most adequate type of SME incentive to fit the abovementioned requirements is 
a refundable, generally applicable tax credit on the firm level with a capped calculation basis. 
Such a credit would benefit entities of all legal forms, irrespective of their profits and their 
specific characteristics. Moreover, the relief would mirror the regressive nature of compliance 
costs due to the cap on the calculation basis.
353
 It is questionable, though, what the calculation 
basis should be for such a tax credit. Each alternative would – at least to some degree – dis-
criminate between firms of different sizes, industries and legal forms. Moreover, any tax cred-
it would most likely cause additional compliance effort – especially for taxpayers who are 
subject to simplified accounting regulations. Obviously, this is the opposite of what is actually 
intended by the incentive.
354
 Altogether, it therefore appears that the disproportionality in 
compliance burdens is the lesser evil compared to the new distortions and administrative re-
quirements that SME tax incentives induce – even if a tax credit in the described form is cho-
sen.  
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 For a comprehensive overview of existing studies, see Eichfelder (2010) pp. 51 ff. 
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 See European Commission (2015b) p. 151. 
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 The amount of equity invested in an enterprise would probably be the most neutral calculation basis with 
regard to firm size and other firm characteristics. It is, of course, not directly related to compliance costs but 
offers the advantage of being reported in the ordinary process of determining taxable income. Basing a tax credit 
on equity would also have the positive side effect of alleviating the debt bias. On the other hand, the very small-
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the advantage of simplified accounting or at least incur additional compliance costs. 
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4.3 Interim Conclusion 
Tax incentives for specific groups of taxpayers inherently contravene fundamental 
guiding principles of modern taxation such as equity, neutrality and simplicity. Nonetheless, 
SME tax incentives are commonly used instruments in European tax policy and the question 
of their justification arises. In general, non-tax and tax-related arguments need to be distin-
guished. Non-tax rationales are mainly based on market failure that leads to underinvestment 
in the small business sector and ultimately to a suboptimal level of social welfare. In particu-
lar, positive externalities (in the form of innovations or increased job creation) and asymmet-
ric information (resulting in financing constraints) are discussed as motives for SME tax in-
centives. Theoretical as well as empirical evidence suggest that small businesses are indeed 
subject to these market failures. It is, however, not the SME sector per se but only a specific 
and rather small group of young, mostly innovative high-risk, high growth enterprises who 
have substantial problems in obtaining sufficient capital from traditional sources of finance 
and who generate positive externalities for the economy. These enterprises, the gazelles, are 
not adequately targeted by eligibility criteria merely based on firm size. In fact, it is highly 
questionable if gazelles can be targeted accurately and cost efficiently at all in the context of 
taxation. As a consequence, most SME tax incentives are highly inefficient countermeasures 
against SME-related market failures.  
In addition, the effectiveness of SME tax incentives in helping young, rapidly grow-
ing businesses to overcome market failure is doubtful. The vast majority of currently available 
regimes are designed in ways that neglect the needs of targeted firms. Gazelles tend to incur 
losses in the early stages of their lifecycle. They can often not benefit from special tax rates 
and non-refundable input-based incentives as they do not have any profits effectively being 
taxed. Instead, most SME tax incentives in the European Union primarily provide relief for 
well-established enterprises with stable, positive income. Given the limited potential for 
growth and innovation that these businesses possess as well as the evolution of the banking 
sector which has increasingly adapted to small-business lending, the majority of current SME 
tax incentives are unnecessary and ineffective in addressing market failures.  
Proponents of SME tax incentives also point to structural, size-related disadvantages 
emanating from the tax system for small and medium-sized businesses as a justification of 
SME tax incentives. Most importantly, the restriction of loss offsets, the preferential treatment 
of debt and the double taxation of corporate profits are assumed to handicap small businesses. 
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Empirical studies indeed show SMEs to be more likely to incur losses, to be less reliant on 
debt financing and to be more concerned about shareholder taxation. So current tax systems 
actually tend to put SMEs at a competitive disadvantage. Once again, however, tax incentives 
are an inadequate remedy. Neither do they remove the underlying problems nor do they target 
the affected businesses accurately. In fact, the opposite is true as the primary beneficiaries of 
the incentives, i.e., businesses with stable positive incomes, should also be the ones who are 
affected the least by the aforementioned discriminations. These well-established firms usually 
do not have problems to acquire debt or to effectively deduct interest payments and loss car-
ryovers.  
These observations clearly show that the adequacy of tax incentives as a remedy for 
structural disadvantages of the SME sector hinges on their ability to alleviate the underlying 
frictions or at least to accurately target the affected businesses. As was demonstrated, SME 
tax incentives do not fulfill either requirement for most market failures and tax-induced hand-
icaps. There are, however, a few instances where preferential tax treatment for small busi-
nesses may be warranted. Most notably, administrative reliefs are an adequate measure to 
avoid disproportionate tax compliance burdens. With regard to compliance costs, small busi-
nesses are inherently disadvantaged compared to larger entities due to the high share of fixed 
and quasi-fixed cost components that do not grow proportionally in firm size. Administrative 
reliefs for small businesses (e.g., less frequent filings and simplified accounting requirements) 
effectively reduce these costs and accurately target the overly burdened taxpayers. In this 
case, size-based tax incentives are a sensible countermeasure as firm size is the actual charac-
teristic causing the disadvantage. The incentives should not be too generous, though, and 
avoid significant alterations of the actual tax liability (e.g., due to presumptive methods of 
determining taxable income or overly generous VAT exemptions) because a disadvantage for 
small businesses could otherwise turn into an unfair advantage. Besides administrative simpli-
fications, the targeting of SMEs may also be a useful instrument in the context of R&D incen-
tives. For these regimes, the cost efficiency could be improved if the R&D activities of small 
entities show a higher responsiveness to tax reliefs. In addition, investments in and by venture 
capital funds and companies – who naturally operate in the SME sector – could be adequate 
targets of tax benefits as the usual problem of targeting the right SMEs is less prevalent there.    
Summing up, most of the commonly used justifications for SME tax incentives are 
not well-founded. Especially worrisome is the regular misperception that small businesses per 
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se are dynamic, innovative and the sole creators of jobs. In contrast to this view, the business-
es of the SME sector are actually very diverse and mere firm size should not be mistaken as a 
proxy for other firm characteristics. The vast majority of SMEs do not grow fast and do not 
show above-average innovativeness. Nonetheless, beneficial tax treatment targeted at small 
and medium-sized enterprises can be an adequate measure for certain purposes. Even when 
used for these purposes, however, the design of many currently available regimes is inade-
quate and renders the respective regimes inefficient (if not even ineffective).  
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5. Costs and Adverse Effects of SME Tax Incentives 
5.1 Taxpayer Bunching Around Eligibility Thresholds for SME Tax Incentives 
5.1.1 Introduction  
The adequacy of tax incentives hinges on their effectiveness in achieving the intend-
ed policy goals as well as the costs related to their usage. As is shown in Section 4, the effec-
tiveness of currently available SME tax incentives is limited with regard to most of the prob-
lems associated with the SME sector. Question marks, however, are not limited to the effec-
tiveness of SME tax reliefs but extend to possibly excessive costs. Losses in tax revenue, in-
creased compliance and collection efforts as well as welfare losses due to distortions of in-
vestment decisions and capital allocation are the most important caveats emanating from se-
lective preferential tax treatment.
355
 
The amount of costs entailed by tax incentives depends on the specific design of the 
regimes. In this regard, policy-makers’ tendency to use eligibility criteria explicitly referring 
to firm size (and thereby partitioning taxpayers) for SME tax incentives deserves particular 
scrutiny. Around the respective size thresholds, taxpayers are discouraged from growth as 
they forfeit preferential treatment by outgrowing the size limit. Obviously, such “taxation 
walls”356 are antithetical to the actual goals of SME tax incentives. If thresholds refer to turn-
over or income, they may induce taxpayers to curb sales. In the case of asset thresholds, nec-
essary investments may be prevented while employment thresholds can impede the hiring of 
additional personnel. Even restrictions on the number of shareholders or the amount of capital 
can be harmful as the acquisition of required funds is potentially undermined.  
Prior literature has provided extensive evidence of taxpayers bunching below size-
related thresholds. Generally, the bunching literature distinguishes between two kinds of 
thresholds: kinks and notches. Kinks are discrete changes in the slope of choice sets, i.e., 
points where the marginal treatment of target variables changes as soon as a given threshold is 
exceeded. In taxation, such points occur within progressive tax rate schedules or at caps of 
input-based incentives.
357
 Saez (2010), Chetty et al. (2011, 2013) and Le Maire and Schjern-
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 See Chen/Mintz (2011) p. 2. 
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 Progressive tax schedules induce kink points at the thresholds where the marginal tax rate jumps and income 
beyond the threshold is taxed at a higher rate. Progressive schedules, however, can also result in notches, if pref-
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ing (2013), for example, find significant bunching at kinks in the Danish and the US personal 
income tax schedules while Devereux et al. (2014) provide similar evidence for UK corpora-
tions.
358
 
Notches, on the other hand, are discrete changes in the level of choice sets. In the 
context of taxation, notches occur when some kind of preferential treatment is only granted 
for taxpayers not exceeding a certain level of a given parameter (e.g., taxable income). As 
soon as taxpayers pass the critical level, they are completely excluded from the benefits at 
stake. For special tax rates, tax credits or tax allowances, this leads to a discontinuity of the 
average tax rate. In the case of administrative reliefs (e.g., simplified accounting or disclosure 
requirements), notches induce discontinuities in the compliance cost burden.
359
 Recent empir-
ical evidence of bunching at notches in the tax system includes studies from Kleven and 
Waseem (2013), who examine multiple tax rate jumps in the Pakistani PIT schedule, as well 
as from Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez (2016) and Asatrayan and Peichl (2016), who focus 
on administrative reliefs in the Spanish and Armenian tax systems, respectively.
360
 
The magnitude of taxpayers’ bunching responses depends in large part on the size of 
the benefit that is gained through bunching.
361
 In this regard, notches naturally provide a 
stronger incentive to bunch than kinks as taxpayers around thresholds run the risk of com-
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numbers. See Saez (2010) pp. 180 ff.; Chetty/Friedman/Saez (2013) pp. 2683 ff.; Chetty/Saez (2013) pp. 1 ff. 
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pletely forfeiting potential benefits.
362
 Accordingly, existing studies generally find stronger 
and sharper bunching at notches than at kinks.
363
 Given policy-makers propensity to apply 
eligibility criteria explicitly referring to size thresholds, substantial bunching by taxpayers 
thus seems probable for most of the currently available SME tax incentives in the European 
Union.
364
  
Besides the generosity of the relief at stake, the amount of bunching also depends on 
the adjustment costs and frictions preventing taxpayers from managing their reported size 
parameters.
365
 It is, for example, well-documented that wage earners are less prone to bunch-
ing than self-employed and corporate taxpayers because wage earners are usually bound to 
employment contracts fixing the number of work hours and salaries. In order to adjust in-
come, they must change jobs or renegotiate contracts, which is generally difficult to do – at 
least in the short run.
366
 Business owners and managers, in contrast, are more flexible. They 
can freely determine how much to work, how much to sell and which prices to demand from 
customers. Moreover, they often have leeway how and when to incur tax-relevant sales and 
expenditures.
367
 Given that there is often no third party directly reporting their income, they 
also have more opportunities to bluntly misreport income, i.e., to not declare the revenues 
they have accrued. Wage earners, in contrast, have their gross income reported by employers. 
Consequently, their ability to manipulate taxable proceeds is limited.
368
 Prior literature there-
fore concludes that the stark contrast in the extent of observed bunching between wage earn-
ers and self-employed taxpayers is largely attributable to the difference in enforcement inten-
sity.
369
 
Altogether, prior evidence suggests that SME tax incentives entail significant bunch-
ing responses at the respective eligibility thresholds. The existing body of literature, however, 
rarely relates specifically to the SME regimes described in Section 3 and the size criteria pro-
                                                 
362
 In the interval around the notch, taxpayers incur a very high marginal tax rate on the portion of income or 
turnover that pushes them beyond the threshold. Any effort to acquire this portion of income or turnover is there-
fore strongly discouraged – or encouraged to be disguised. See Blinder/Rosen (1985) p. 736. 
363
 For a comprehensive overview on existing studies, see Kleven (2016) pp. 435 ff. 
364
 In 2015, 65 out of 73 regimes providing tax relief specifically targeted at SMEs included explicit size re-
strictions. These numbers do not include progressive personal tax rates, administrative reliefs and incentives 
targeted at venture capital funds and companies. See Section 3.1. 
365
 See Blinder/Rosen (1985) pp. 736 ff.; Chetty (2012) pp. 969 ff.; Devereux/Liu/Loretz (2014) pp. 19 ff. 
366
 See Chetty/Friedman/Olsen/Pistaferri (2011) pp. 762 ff.; Mortensen/Whitten (2016) pp. 26 ff. 
367
 See Kleven/Waseem (2013) pp. 693 ff.; Bastani/Selin (2014) pp. 43 ff.  
368
 Certain allowances may be used to manage income by wage earners as well, though. See Mortensen/Whitten 
(2016) pp. 26 ff. 
369
 See Liu/Lockwood (2015) pp.1 ff.; Almunia/Lopez-Rodriguez (2016) pp. 1 ff. 
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posed by the European Commission to target the SME sector (i.e., turnover, the number of 
employees and total assets). It does therefore not yet allow a comprehensive evaluation of the 
damage emanating from the notches created by currently available SME reliefs.  
The following analysis addresses this research gap and provides bunching evidence 
for six EU Member States (Belgium, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Spain). In 
these Member States, eligibility for major tax benefits is bound to explicit size thresholds re-
ferring to turnover and the number of employees. As is shown, bunching does indeed occur at 
a statistically significant level in the majority of the sample countries when these two indica-
tors are used in the design of SME tax incentives. Among the examined regimes, the case of 
the Latvian micro enterprise scheme appears particularly interesting. It includes an employ-
ment threshold at which more than 6% of all firms in the considered business population 
bunch. In order to gain a better understanding of this phenomenon and the economic implica-
tions, the cross-country comparison is complemented by an in-depth analysis of the Latvian 
micro enterprise regime. Above all, it is highly relevant for policy-makers if taxpayers show 
real economic responses, i.e., if they really remain small, or if they only underreport firm size. 
The evidence at hand suggests that real economic responses indeed occur for employment 
thresholds, which points to the particular dangers of such restrictions.  
The analysis proceeds as follows. Section 5.1.2 comprises the cross-country compar-
ison of bunching responses at size thresholds in tax codes. First, the data is presented (5.1.2.1) 
and the institutional background described (5.1.2.2). Section 5.1.2.3 then introduces the meth-
odological approach of the bunching analysis and displays the main results. Building hereon, 
Section 5.1.3 examines the Latvian micro enterprise scheme in more detail. After describing 
the specifics of the regime (5.1.3.1) and the time trend of bunching responses prior and subse-
quent to the introduction of the scheme (5.1.3.2), Section 5.1.3.3 addresses the roles of admin-
istrative reliefs and actual tax savings that are offered for eligible taxpayers. In the final part 
of the empirical analysis, the economic implications with regard to the impediment of firm 
growth induced by the micro enterprise scheme are examined (5.1.3.4). Lastly, Section 5.1.4 
concludes. 
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5.1.2 Cross-Country Comparison 
5.1.2.1 Data  
The proper assessment of firms’ bunching behavior requires data that is representa-
tive of the size distribution of businesses or – if feasible – covers the whole business popula-
tion. Recent empirical literature regularly resorts to administrative data provided by tax au-
thorities.
370
 These samples not only provide a comprehensive coverage of taxpayers of all size 
classes but also ensure high quality data on a wide range of financial indicators. Rich adminis-
trative data are rarely accessible, though. The analysis at hand therefore resorts to the 
AMADEUS database by Bureau van Dijk. The AMADEUS data provide financial infor-
mation on a broad range of businesses in the European Union. Importantly, the information is 
available over multiple years, which allows the observation of growth patterns and taxpayers’ 
changes in behavior as thresholds and regimes change.
371
 Imprecisions due to differences be-
tween financial and tax accounting can be assumed to be negligible as far as turnover and 
employment, the two indicators of interest, are concerned. Both measures usually only deviate 
insignificantly for the two accounting regimes.
372
  
5.1.2.2 Size Thresholds 
The following cross-country comparison focuses on six EU Member States that pro-
vide substantial tax benefits up to certain size thresholds, namely Belgium, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania and Spain. The sample includes administrative (simplified regimes, VAT 
exemptions) as well as non-administrative regimes (i.e., special tax rates, exemptions, allow-
ances and tax credits). The considered regimes predominantly relate to corporate entities, 
which are covered more comprehensively by the AMADEUS database. Moreover, the sample 
of examined thresholds includes regimes using turnover and employment as eligibility crite-
ria. The analysis thereby addresses an area that has been explored rather sparsely by previous 
bunching studies. The European Commission also proposes these two indicators to target 
SME incentives.
373
 They can thus be assumed to constitute a major reference point for policy-
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 See Kleven (2016) p. 436. 
371
 See Table A3 for the main summary statistics of the relevant countries and indicators referred to in the fol-
lowing analysis. 
372
 For more information on the differences between tax accounting and financial accounting, see 
Evers/Meier/Nicolay (2016) pp. 1 ff. 
373
 See European Commission (2003) pp. 36 ff. 
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makers in Europe which makes understanding the associated behavioral responses especially 
important.
374
 
Table 22: Explicit size thresholds for SME tax incentives relating to turnover and employment (2014) 
Country Threshold(s) Available SME incentives 
Additional eligibil-
ity criteria 
Belgium  turnover: 
€ 7.3m 
 employees: 50 
 
 
 enhanced notional interest deduction (0.5%) 
 investment allowance on investments in safety 
measures (20.5%) 
 exemption from capital gains tax on gains from 
shares of other companies (0.412%) 
 full-year depreciation in year of acquisition & 
immediate expensing of additional costs related 
to acquisition 
 shareholder-level reliefs 
 possibility to create liquidation reserve that is 
subject to reduced PIT rate upon liquidation 
(10% instead of 25%) 
 exemption of dividends from fairness tax that are 
made in spite of losses 
 total assets ≤ € 
3.65m (must not 
be fulfilled; re-
place either turn-
over or income 
criterion if ful-
filled) 
 taxable income ≤ 
€ 322,500 
Hungary  turnover: 
HUF 6m 
(~€ 20,000) 
 
 presumptive taxation (lump-sum payment per 
employee) replaces CIT, social security tax, 
health care charge and vocational training contri-
bution 
 exemption from value-added tax 
 legal form re-
strictions 
 turnover: 
HUF 30m 
(~€ 100.000) 
 flat rate tax (37%) on turnover replaces CIT, PIT, 
VAT and company car tax 
 individual share-
holders 
 no excise duties 
 turnover: 
HUF 500m 
(~€ 1.6m) 
 employees: 25 
 flat rate tax (16%) on income replaces CIT, social 
security tax and vocational training contribution 
 total assets: HUF 
500m (~€ 1.6m) 
 enforceable tax 
debt ≤ HUF 1 
million 
Latvia  turnover: 
€ 50,000 
 
 VAT exemption  
  turnover: 
€ 100,000 
 employees: 5 
 flat rate tax (9%) on turnover replaces CIT and 
social security contributions (thresholds: 
€ 100,000 & 5 employees) 
 exceeding thresholds leads to ineligibility in 
following year and increased tax rates on turno-
ver in current year (2% per employee; 20% in-
stead of 9% on turnover exceeding € 100,000) 
 only individual 
and managing 
shareholders 
 max. income of 
employees: € 720 
per month 
                                                 
374
 The qualitative analysis in Section 3.1 confirms that turnover, the number of employees and total assets are 
criteria regularly used to target SME tax incentives at the respective firms.  
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Country Threshold(s) Available SME incentives 
Additional eligibil-
ity criteria 
Lithuania  employees: 9  preferential tax rate on income (5% instead of 
15%) 
 free depreciation (except for buildings) 
 
 
 
 
 
 taxable income ≤ 
€ 150,000 (depre-
ciation) / 
€ 300,000 (tax 
rate) 
 owners with other 
businesses must 
not won more 
than 50% of 
company 
Romania  turnover: 
RON 220,000 
(~€ 50,000) 
 exemption from VAT  
  turnover: 
€ 65,000 
 flat rate tax (3%) on turnover replaces ordinary 
CIT (mandatory) 
 
 only privately 
owned companies 
 exclusion of 
certain sectors 
(financial, con-
sultancy) 
Spain  turnover: € 1m  exemption from local business tax (IAE) 
 
 
 turnover: € 5m 
 employees: 25 
 preferential CIT rate (instead of 30%) 
 20% on first € 300,000 of income 
 25% on income beyond € 300,000 
 no decrease in 
total employment 
since 2009 
  turnover: € 10m  preferential CIT rate (instead of 30%) 
 25% on first € 300,000 of income 
 
 
Table 22
375
 provides an overview of the considered size thresholds and the associated 
tax benefits. Each of the thresholds represents a notch in the tax system, i.e., eligibility for the 
underlying incentives is forfeited as soon as the respective threshold is exceeded. Hence, 
crossing the thresholds leads to a jump in the average tax rate or a jump in the compliance 
cost burden in the case of administrative reliefs. In Belgium, Lithuania and Spain, the thresh-
olds restrict eligibility for various depreciation schemes, allowances, tax credits and special 
tax rates. In Hungary, Latvia and Romania, administrative reliefs such as exemptions from the 
VAT and the access to simplified regimes of income taxation (mostly turnover taxes) are con-
sidered. Interestingly, the simplified regimes in Hungary and Latvia not only replace the ordi-
nary income tax but also include other duties such as social security contributions and the 
VAT. Turnover thresholds in the sample range from € 50,000 to € 10 million while employ-
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 Information on the specific regimes were retrieved from ibfd.org (retrieved on July 10, 2014). 
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ment thresholds from 5 to 50 employees are covered.
376
 The thresholds for administrative 
reliefs and simplified regimes are generally lower than those for non-administrative reliefs. It 
is also noteworthy that several of the thresholds apply to various regimes, i.e., eligibility to 
more than one relief is forfeited once a business exceeds the respective limits (e.g., in Bel-
gium, Hungary and Spain). 
5.1.2.3 Bunching Estimates 
A first graphical inspection of the size distributions shows that the amount of bunch-
ing around the thresholds varies significantly (see Table 23). While some thresholds cause 
substantial bunching, other density functions do not show major irregularities. Especially no-
ticeable jumps in the frequency of businesses occur at notches created by two of the simpli-
fied regimes in Hungary (if turnover is below HUF 6 million and HUF 30 million, respective-
ly), by both administrative reliefs in Latvia (VAT exemption and simplified income tax re-
gime) and by the exemption from the local business tax (IAE) in Spain.  
Building on the graphical evidence, the analysis proceeds by estimating the size of 
firms’ responses to tax notches in the six sample countries, i.e., the number of firms that shift 
to the size intervals just below the considered thresholds. In the absence of size-based incen-
tives, firms would locate themselves smoothly along the size distribution measured in terms 
of turnover, total assets and the number of employees. The introduction of tax benefits exclu-
sively available up to a certain firm size, however, provides businesses beyond the critical 
firm size with an incentive to be smaller in order to gain eligibility. As a consequence, firms 
in the vicinity of the eligibility threshold should decide to become smaller if the gains emanat-
ing from eligibility exceed the costs of being smaller – or at least the costs of reporting to be 
smaller.  
Following the approach developed by Saez (2010), Chetty et al. (2011) and Kleven 
and Waseem (2013), the number of firms shifting from the right side of the notch to the left is 
measured by grouping firms into turnover bins, estimating the counterfactual density (i.e., the 
size distribution as it would have looked in the absence of the notch) and comparing the coun-
                                                 
376
 Incentives for medium-sized entities are not considered. As is shown in Section 3.2, these regimes do not 
provide much of a relief to the majority of taxpayers and the number of businesses in these size intervals is too 
small to observe bunching behavior.   
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terfactual to the actual density function.
377
 Technically, the counterfactual density is derived 
by fitting a flexible polynomial function to the observed distribution except for the area below 
the notch [tL; tN] where taxpayers are expected to bunch. The bunching area is determined by 
means of visual inspection. For most thresholds, it contains several bins as taxpayers are often 
unable to bunch precisely below the threshold (due to adjustment frictions). All bunchers are 
assumed to come from the right-hand side of the threshold in the displayed area of the coun-
terfactual distribution. The variable of interest, the excess mass ?̂?𝑖, is derived by comparing 
the actual number of firms ci to the counterfactual number ?̂?𝑖 in the interval [tL; tN] below the 
notch: 
?̂? =
∑ (𝑐𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖)
𝑡𝑁
𝑖−𝑡𝐿
∑ (?̂?𝑖 / 𝑁)
𝑡𝑁
𝑖−𝑡𝐿
 
where N is the number of bins within the bunching interval [tL; tN]. b  describes the number of 
firms being lured to the bunching interval relative to the expected number of firms per bin in 
the bunching area. The relative measure allows a comparison of firms’ excess masses across 
different regimes. 
Table 23 shows the estimated density functions and counterfactuals for the sample 
thresholds. Bunching intervals are marked by dashed golden (tL) and solid red lines (tN). The 
excess mass of bunching firms equals the area in between the actual and the counterfactual 
distributions in the bunching interval. First of all, the graphs reveal a few methodological is-
sues. To begin with, the derivation of the counterfactual assumes a smooth size distribution 
and can be distorted by irregularities other than the thresholds in question. When determining 
the area for estimating the counterfactual, intervals including thresholds for other size-related 
policies are therefore avoided if possible. In some instances, however, such overlaps are in-
evitable because the number of bins and observations would not suffice to derive smooth 
counterfactuals if all other irregularities were excluded.
378
 Another issue occurs with regard to 
the distinction of real (intended) bunching and coincidental peaks in size distributions. Given 
the limited number of observations, some density functions are quite unsteady, which aggra-
vates the identification of actual bunching behavior. Methodologically, this implies a trade-off 
when determining the width of the considered bins: If the bins are chosen too narrow, the dis-
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 Employment and asset thresholds are dealt with accordingly. See Saez (2010) pp. 180 ff.; Chet-
ty/Olsen/Pistaferri (2011) pp. 749 ff.; Kleven/Waseem (2013) pp. 669 ff. 
378
 Most notably, there is an administrative notch in Spain at the turnover threshold of € 6 million where taxpay-
ers become subject to the large taxpayer unit. See Almunia/Lopez-Rodriguez (2016) pp. 1 ff. 
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tribution is not smooth enough, while too broad bins bear the risk of concealing the bunching 
behavior at the notches.
379
  
Table 23: Density functions and counterfactuals 
Country Threshold(s) Size distribution 
Belgium turnover: € 7.3m 
 
employees: 
50 
 
 
 
 
Hungary turnover: 
HUF 6m  
(~€ 20,000) 
 
 
                                                 
379
 The problem mainly occurs for turnover thresholds. Employment distributions, in contrast, tend to be very 
smooth so that even small upticks in the bunching window can be observed (e.g., in Hungary and Spain).   
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Country Threshold(s) Size distribution 
Hungary  
(ctd.) 
turnover: 
HUF 30m 
(~€ 100.000) 
 
 
 turnover: 
HUF 500m  
(~€ 1.6m) 
 
employees: 
25 
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Country Threshold(s) Size distribution 
Latvia turnover: 
€ 50,000 
 
 
 turnover: 
€ 100,000 
 
employees: 
5 
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Country Threshold(s) Size distribution 
Lithuania employees: 
9 
 
Romania turnover: 
RON 220,000  
(~€ 50,000) 
 
 
 
 turnover: 
€ 65,000  
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Country Threshold(s) Size distribution 
Spain turnover: 
€ 1m 
 
 turnover: 
€ 5m 
 
employees: 
25 
 
 
 turnover: 
€ 10m 
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The estimates of the excess mass b  and bootstrapped standard errors (200 iterations) 
are summarized in Table 24. The standard errors allow inferences on the statistical signifi-
cance of the irregularities around the notches. Overall, the quantitative results as well as the 
graphical evidence provided by the density functions and the counterfactuals confirm that 
businesses do not only manage taxable income but also turnover and the number of employ-
ees if this is required to gain eligibility for substantial tax reliefs. Neither turnover nor em-
ployment is immune to bunching activities. With regard to the whole sample of 16 thresholds, 
bunching occurs at a statistically significant level of at least 10% (5%) at 10 (6) of them. 
Bunching occurs at turnover thresholds in Hungary, Latvia, Romania and Spain and at em-
ployment thresholds in Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania. Most notably, 6.1% of the active Lat-
vian businesses covered in the AMADEUS database are estimated to bunch at the employ-
ment threshold (5 employees). Taken at face value, this means that one out of 16 firms is in-
duced to employ fewer employees than they would in the absence of the Latvian micro enter-
prise scheme. In contrast to that, no bunching can be observed in Belgium and for two of the 
three incentives in Spain.  
Based on the observed excess mass b , the most distinct bunching across the consid-
ered countries occurs for notches which imply very far-reaching consequences for taxpayers. 
At these thresholds, it is not only eligibility for a certain tax credit or a special tax rate that is 
at stake but the whole assessment process that is about to change. In Hungary, Latvia and 
Romania
380
, for example, businesses switch from a turnover tax replacing several duties (in-
cluding the corporate income tax as well as social security contributions for employees) to the 
standard system requiring separate payments and separate assessments. When regimes “mere-
ly” provide tax cuts within the ordinary corporate income tax system, however, turnover and 
employment bunching is very limited or even inexistent.  
The incentives inducing strong bunching responses by taxpayers also have in com-
mon that they relate exclusively to micro businesses, mostly the very smallest ones with less 
than € 100,000 of turnover. At thresholds applying to small enterprises, in contrast, no or only 
weak bunching is observable (e.g., in Belgium and Spain).  
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 In Hungary three different simplified regimes apply. For each of them, bunching occurs at the respective 
eligibility thresholds. In Latvia, taxpayers bunch at the VAT registration threshold as well as at the threshold up 
to which the simplified CIT regime for microenterprises applies.  
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Altogether, these findings are in line with prior literature that reports bunching for 
other indicators than taxable income to be rather limited if the notch does not come along with 
significant administrative reliefs. Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez (2016), for example, find 
bunching at the turnover threshold where taxpayers become subject to stricter audits but they 
do not discover significant bunching at non-administrative notches.
381
 Other studies providing 
evidence of turnover or employment bunching also relate to administrative notches such as 
VAT exemption thresholds
382
 and thresholds associated with stricter labor regulation
383
. Stud-
ies observing taxable income, on the other hand, find significant bunching even for incentives 
providing less generous reliefs than the above described regimes in Belgium and Spain.
384
 
This clearly indicates that taxable income is more responsive to quantitative eligibility criteria 
because it is easier to adjust, mostly through the increase of deductible expenses.
385
 
Still, substantial bunching is observable for several thresholds relating to turnover 
and employment. At these thresholds, it is either easier for taxpayers to manage turnover and 
employment or the regimes are extremely beneficial for taxpayers and induce them to make 
the efforts required to remain below the threshold. The former explanation is supported by the 
observation that it is predominantly very small businesses who bunch in the sample at hand. 
These firms are usually subject to less scrutiny from tax authorities than large companies. As 
a consequence, they may be more prone to misreporting.
386
 In addition – or as an alternative 
explanation – the simplified regimes and exemptions could be particularly beneficial as they 
enable substantial savings in compliance costs as well as substantial tax savings. The turnover 
taxes in Hungary and Latvia, for example, replace not only the corporate income tax but also 
social security contributions and, in the case of Hungary, health care charges and vocational 
training contributions. Paying taxes under the simplified regime is thus less laborious and – if 
the tax rate on turnover is not set overly high – economic. The latter should be assumed given 
legislators’ general intention of supporting the eligible businesses.  
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 See Almunia/Lopez-Rodriguez (2016) pp. 1 ff. They find bunching at an enforcement notch where taxpayers 
become subject to tax audits by the large taxpayer unit. 
382
 See Schivardi/Torrini (2004) pp. 1 ff.; Gourio/Roys (2014) pp. 377 ff.; Garicano/Lelarge/Van Reenen (2016) 
pp. 3439 ff. 
383
 See Onji (2009) pp. 766 ff.; Liu/Lockwood (2015) pp. 1 ff. 
384
 See Chetty/Friedman/Olsen/Pistaferri (2011) pp. 749 ff.; Chetty/Friedman/Saez (2013) pp. 2683 ff.; Brock-
meyer (2014) pp. 477 ff.; Devereux/Liu/Loretz (2014) pp. 19 ff.; Mortensen/Whitten (2016) pp. 1 ff. 
385
 See Brockmeyer (2014) pp. 498 ff. 
386
 The owner’s absolute control over business operations in very small owner-managed firms and the 
comingling of private and business-related transactions may constitute further factors contributing to increased 
avoidance and evasion activities in the micro-business sector. 
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Table 24: Bunching estimates for major size thresholds  
Country Indicator Threshold 
Excess mass 
(relative) 
Excess mass 
(absolute) 
Excess mass  
(% of population) 
Standard  
error 
t-statistic 
Significance 
level 
Belgium turnover € 7.3m 0.233 8 0,0% 0.363 0.642 - 
 no. of employees 25 0.929 9 0,0% 0.930 0.999 - 
Hungary turnover HUF 6m 2.315 2,792 0,7% 0.235 9.851 ** 
 turnover HUF 30m 0.722 289 0,1% 0.176 4.102 * 
 turnover HUF 500m 0.120 16 0,0% 0.191 0.628 - 
 no. of employees 25 0.427 240 0,1% 0.114 3.746 * 
Latvia turnover € 50,000 1.701 696 0,8% 0.200 8.505 ** 
 turnover € 100,000 0.572 152 0,2% 0.100 5.720 * 
 no. of employees 5 0.908 5,034 6,1% 0.036 25.222 ** 
Lithuania no. of employees 9 0.292 59 0,1% 0.077 3.792 * 
Romania turnover RON 220,000 8.549 3,816 0,9% 0.598 14.296 ** 
 turnover € 65,000 1.337 1,696 0,4% 0.083 16.108 ** 
Spain turnover € 1m 0.501 424 0,1% 0.095 5.274 * 
 turnover € 5m -0.100 -61 0,0% 0.122 -0.820 - 
 no. of employees 25 0.175 288 0,0% 0.064 2.734 - 
 turnover € 10m 32 0.243 0,0% 0.146 1.664 - 
Notes: Excess mass (% of population) displays the share of bunchers in the population of business covered by the AMADEUS database with a turnover of at least € 1,000 in the 
respective country. Standard errors are derived with a bootstrapping procedure (200 iterations). ** and * denote significance levels of 5% and 10%, respectively.
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All in all, the cross-country comparison of bunching estimates suggests that firms – 
in particular the very smallest businesses – manage turnover and the number of employees 
when it is required to retain eligibility for highly beneficial tax incentives. As evidenced by 
the limited or inexistent bunching responses to non-administrative regimes in Belgium, Lithu-
ania and Spain, the elasticity of reported turnover and employment appears to be smaller than 
for taxable income, though. Most likely, income is easier to adjust than the latter two indica-
tors. Still, substantial irregularities in size distributions based on turnover and employment 
occur in Hungary, Latvia and Romania, mainly at thresholds where eligibility for simplified 
regimes replacing the ordinary income tax ends. Obviously, these regimes provide benefits 
that are big enough for taxpayers to put up with the adjustment costs necessary to remain eli-
gible – either in the form of underreporting or in the form of forgone growth opportunities. 
 
5.1.3 Latvia’s Micro-Enterprise Scheme  
In view of the observed bunching activities around eligibility thresholds for simpli-
fied regimes – in particular in Latvia – it is important to gain a better understanding of the 
drivers and the consequences of taxpayer bunching. The micro enterprise scheme in Latvia 
lends itself to this purpose for several reasons. First of all, the recent introduction of the re-
gime facilitates the identification of the causal relationship between the regime and the ob-
served bunching patterns. The data at hand covers years before and after the reform so that 
firm responses to the micro enterprise scheme can be distinguished from those being caused 
by previously existing regulations. Second, the micro enterprise tax includes separate eligibil-
ity thresholds for turnover and employment, which allows a comparison of effects at both 
decision margins. Lastly, AMADEUS offers a comparatively good coverage even of the 
smallest corporations in Latvia. The danger of underestimating or overestimating effects due 
to sample selection is thus smaller than for other countries. 
5.1.3.1 Institutional Background 
The micro enterprise tax was introduced by the Latvian government in September 
2010. At first, it was only applicable for new firms but in 2011 eligibility was extended to all 
enterprises. With the reform, the government wanted to encourage entrepreneurship. It was 
mainly driven by the financial crisis that hit Latvia particularly hard in 2009 and 2010 and led 
to increased unemployment as well as to workers leaving the country en masse. The reform 
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introducing the micro enterprise tax also included a simplification of business registration 
procedures and efforts to enhance the availability of financing for the business sector.
387
  
The micro enterprise tax replaces the corporate income tax as well as any social se-
curity payments for employees by a lump-sum charge of 9% on turnover. The regime can be 
applied if last year’s turnover did not exceed € 100,000 and the number of employees 
amounted to five at most. Moreover, employees’ salaries are capped at € 720 per month. Ex-
ceeding either threshold in the current period leads to ineligibility for the regime in the fol-
lowing year and penalty charges in the current year. Specifically, 2% of turnover have to be 
paid per employee beyond the threshold of five and any turnover exceeding € 100,000 is 
taxed at 20% instead of 9%.
388
 
The tax regime itself combines administrative reliefs
389
 with actual tax savings for 
most eligible businesses. The tax base, i.e., turnover, is easier to determine and to document 
than taxable income.
390
 In addition, there is only one tax payment to be made instead of (at 
least) two, that is the CIT and social security contributions. The exact amount of actual tax 
savings mainly depends on the profit margin of the taxpayers and the number of employees. 
Loss-making firms and those with barely positive profit margins should rather seek a tax as-
sessment based on income while the preference for turnover taxation should be more pro-
nounced among profitable and labor-intensive firms.  
5.1.3.2 Time Trends 
As a first step in the empirical examination of taxpayer bunching in Latvia, Figures 9 
and 10 display the development of the firm size distribution around the eligibility thresholds 
for employment and turnover, respectively, from 2009 to 2014. Around the employment 
threshold (see Figure 9), no irregularity in the density function is observable prior to the in-
troduction of the regime in 2009; neither does a statistically significant effect occur in the 
year of the introduction in 2010 when it was only available for new enterprises.  
Starting in 2011, however, the excess mass b  of firms to the left of the notch be-
comes noticeable and increases annually until reaching the maximum of 0.9084 in 2014. Put 
                                                 
387
 See Leibus (2012) pp. 116 ff. 
388
 Salary payments exceeding the maximum salary of € 720 are taxed at 20% as well. 
389
 As a part of the micro enterprise regime, firms are also allowed to apply simplified, cash-based accounting for 
VAT purposes. 
390
 See Thuronyi (1996) pp. 410 ff.; European Commission (2007b) pp. 14 ff.  
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differently, by 2014 there are almost twice as many firms employing five employees than ex-
pected in a regulatory environment without any benefits restricted to firms with five or fewer 
employees. Taken at face value, there would be 5,000 more jobs available, if every firm in the 
excess mass below the threshold only employed one more person. Assuming the counterfac-
tual size distribution from 2014, the number of jobs lost due to bunching behavior would even 
amount to over 20,000. This is more than 3% of all jobs actually provided by the firms in the 
sample.
391
 
With regard to turnover, a similar trend can be observed as the number of firms 
bunching below the threshold of € 100,000 also increases monotonously from 2011 to 
2014.
392
 Noticeably, the bunching also becomes increasingly sharp from 2012 to 2014, i.e., 
taxpayers gather more precisely at the threshold of € 100,000, which is in line with previous 
literature documenting learning effects over time as taxpayers become more accustomed to 
newly introduced thresholds.
393
 
Altogether, Figures 9 and 10 clearly support the notion of the micro enterprise tax 
regime inducing the bunching behavior at the eligibility thresholds of five employees and 
€ 100,000 of turnover.394 The differences in growth patterns and reported financial indicators 
that are discussed in the following can therefore be assumed to actually be effected by the 
introduction of the simplified tax regime in 2010.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
391
 Adding up the employees of all firms reported in the sample yields a number of 629,439 total jobs provided. 
The amount of missing jobs, according to the counterfactual, amounts to 22,669 jobs, which equals 3.6% of the 
total number of jobs. These calculations should be considered with caution, though, as they neglect any second-
order effects. The latter could alter the numbers significantly (in both directions). 
392
 For 2009 and 2010, AMADEUS does not provide reliable data on turnover. These two years are therefore 
excluded.  
393
 See Saez (2010) pp. 180 ff.; Chetty/Friedman/Saez (2013) pp. 2683 ff. 
394
 Besides the micro enterprise support program including the micro enterprise tax, no other size-related policies 
referring to the thresholds of five employees and € 100,000 of turnover were introduced in Latvia during the 
sample period.  
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Figure 9: Bunching at employment threshold in Latvia (2009–2014) 
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Figure 10: Bunching at turnover threshold in Latvia (2011–2014) 
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5.1.3.3 Tax Savings vs. Administrative Relief 
As the micro enterprise scheme affects the tax liability as well as the compliance 
burden of companies, there are different factors potentially motivating firms to bunch below 
the eligibility thresholds. They could avoid the increased compliance efforts associated with 
exiting the simplified scheme or they could seek reduced tax payments emanating from the 
altered tax base. Which one of the two factors primarily drives firms’ bunching behavior is 
ultimately an empirical question.  
As described above, the micro enterprise tax is based on turnover instead of taxing 
net income. The regime is thus more beneficial for highly profitable entities than it is for less 
or even unprofitable firms. In fact, turnover taxation is highly unattractive for loss-making 
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enterprises who would not pay any income taxes under the ordinary regime. Instead, they 
could build up future loss carry forwards that reduce future tax payments. In the case of the 
Latvian micro enterprise scheme, however, social security contributions also need to be taken 
into consideration as they make up a potentially large share of the tax burden. Precisely, the 
maximum turnover tax of € 9,000 (which equals 9% of the eligibility maximum of 
€ 100,000), is still lower than the due social security contributions (24%) for five employees 
who earn close to the maximum salary of € 720 per month that is allowed under the regime 
(5 * € 720 * 12 * 24% = € 10,368). Hence, even in the absence of positive net income, the 
regime is usually beneficial. Assuming the average turnover of potentially eligible businesses 
of € 40,000 and a staff of five employees, for example, a firm would have to incur losses of 
€ 45,000 or more to be better off under the ordinary regime than under the micro enterprise 
scheme.
395
 
Building on these calculations, Figures 11a-c display the bunching behavior of dif-
ferent subsamples of firms that distinguish with regard to their profitability. Figure 11a shows 
the size distribution of all firms with a positive pre-tax profit while figure 11b covers all loss-
making firms. Figure 11c only includes those businesses who incur at least € 45,000 of losses 
in 2014. Profitable firms incur the largest tax savings and should thus display the strongest 
bunching responses. The firms in Figure 11c, in contrast, should have little reason to choose 
the micro enterprise tax if they only consider the size of the tax liability in the current period. 
If bunching is observed even for these enterprises, this would strongly indicate administrative 
aspects to play a role for the attractiveness of the micro enterprise scheme as well. 
Expectedly, Figures 11a-c show bunching to be the most distinct among profitable 
firms (b  = 0.7618 in Figure 11a compared to b  = 0.2512 in Figure 11c). However, even for 
unprofitable businesses (Figure 11b) and highly unprofitable businesses (Figure 11c), bunch-
ing is recognizable and statistically significant at the 5% level (all loss-making firms) and the 
10% level (only firms with at least € 45,000 of losses), respectively. Bunching at eligibility 
thresholds for the simplified regime in Latvia therefore seems to be driven by tax savings as 
well as administrative considerations. Comparing the size of the excess masses in Figure 11a 
(0.7618) and 11c (0.2512), suggests that tax savings constitute the more important driver of 
bunching, though.  
                                                 
395
 The calculation of turnover figures for which taxpayers are indifferent between both regimes assumes loss 
carry-forwards to be fully deductible in future periods at the current CIT rate of 15% on net income. Consequent-
ly, the indifference loss can be derived as follows: € 40,000 * 9% ≈ € 10,368 – lossindiff * 15%.  
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igure 11: Bunching at employment threshold in Latvia in 2014 by profitability 
Figure 11a: Profitable firms
 
Figure 11b: Loss-making firms
 
Figure 11c: Firms with losses ≥ € 45,000 
 
This finding also highlights that the attractiveness of the micro enterprise scheme 
partly stems from taxpayers’ self-selection into the available regimes. Eligible taxpayers can 
choose if they want to be taxed on turnover or if they prefer income-based taxation. Larger 
entities, in contrast, are stuck in the ordinary regime. This asymmetry, of course, is in contra-
diction to the guiding principles of horizontal equity and vertical equity as taxpayers incurring 
the same amount of income can end up with completely different tax liabilities while taxpay-
ers with entirely different amounts of taxable income could end up with the same tax liabil-
ity.
396
  
 
                                                 
396
 See King (1983) pp. 99 ff.; Pashev (2006) pp. 399 ff. In fact, the turnover tax even introduces regressive ele-
ments to income taxation as the average tax rate on income decreases in a firm’s profitability. This is opposed to 
the guiding principle of vertical equity.  
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5.1.3.4 Real Responses, Intertemporal Substitution and Underreporting 
In view of taxpayers’ bunching responses to the eligibility thresholds for the micro 
enterprise scheme in Latvia, the question of potential implications for mid and long-term firm 
growth occurs. Given that the simplified regime aims at supporting the growth of companies 
and the hiring of new staff, any impediment to firm and employment growth would naturally 
be opposed to the goals of the regime. Bunching, however, could also be the result of inter-
temporal substitution and underreporting, which would be less harmful with regard to social 
welfare. 
In order to gain a better understanding of the economic effects of bunching at em-
ployment and turnover thresholds, Table 25 explores the impact of the Latvian employment 
and turnover limits in the vicinity of the respective thresholds in 2012 and 2013.
397
 If taxpay-
ers’ bunching is primarily due to intertemporal substitution and short-term adjustments that do 
not have a lasting impact on firm growth, bunchers and non-bunchers should not show overly 
significant differences with regard to their growth patterns after having been observed to 
bunch. There should be roughly the same amounts of growing, declining and stagnating firms. 
If, however, bunching has a lasting effect on firm growth, i.e., if bunching leads to an ongoing 
stagnation in the development of the respective firms, bunchers should also be much less like-
ly to grow after they have bunched.  
Accordingly, column (1) of Table 25 compares the shares of firms that either in-
crease (INCREASE), retain (CONSTANT) or decrease the number of employees (DECREASE) 
after they were observed to have either five employees (subsequently labeled as bunchers) or 
six employees (non-bunchers). The results in column (1) reveal statistically significant differ-
ences between bunchers and non-bunchers. The share of firms exactly retaining their staff 
level is significantly larger among firms with five than it is among firms with six employees 
(by 17.4 percentage points). Moreover, bunchers are significantly less likely to hire additional 
personnel once they have gathered exactly at the employment threshold of five employees (by 
8.3 percentage points). Put differently, retaining eligibility for the micro enterprise tax dis-
courages one out of twelve firms with five employees from hiring. The magnitude of the dif-
ferences in growth probabilities also indicates that bunching at the employment threshold is 
not only the result of a minor one-year adjustment but rather of a lasting deceleration of (re-
                                                 
397
 Statistically significant bunching at the employment threshold occurs in 2012 for the first time. Growth rates 
for firms bunching in 2014 cannot be considered because the required data from 2015 are not yet available. 
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ported) employment growth. At least for those firms directly below the employment thresh-
old, the regime therefore falls short of achieving its primary goal of creating more jobs. In 
addition, firms with six employees are found to be especially prone to laying off people (by 
9.1 percentage points), which grants them future eligibility for the micro enterprise scheme. 
Hence, firms around the threshold do not only respond to the micro enterprise scheme by re-
maining small but they are even motivated to lay off employees in order to gain eligibility.  
Table 25: Growth patterns for bunching and non-bunching firms 
 
Change in employment 
(1) 
Change in turnover 
(2) 
5 employ-
eest 
6 employ-
eest 
∆ [95k;100k]t [100k;105k]t ∆ 
INCREASEt+1 0.145 0.228 –0.083** 0.233 0.244 –0.011 
   (0.007)   (0.025) 
CONSTANT t+1 0.540 0.366 0.174** 0.518 0.435 0.083 
   (0.010)   (0.029) 
DECREASE t+1 0.315 0.406 –0.091** 0.248 0.320 –0.072 
   (0.009)   (0.026) 
Observations 11,196 1,221 
Notes: The data are for 2012 and 2013. Changes in the number of employees are defined as follows: INCREASE 
= 1 if no. of employeest+1 > no. of employeest and zero otherwise; CONSTANT = 1 if no. of employeest = no. of 
employeest+1 and zero otherwise; DECREASE = 1 if no. of employeest+1 < no. of employeest and zero otherwise. 
Changes in turnover are defined as follows: INCREASE = 1 if turnovert+1 ≥ 1.2 * turnovert; CONSTANT = 1 if 
0.8 * turnovert ≤ turnovert+1 ≤ 1.2 * turnovert and zero otherwise; DECREASE = 1 if turnovert+1 ≤ 0.8 * turnovert 
and zero otherwise. Averages for INCREASE, CONSTANT and DECREASE are given for all firms with 5 and 6 
employees, respectively. ∆ reports the difference in averages between both groups. ** and * denote significance 
levels of 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Column (2) of Table 25 compares the growth patterns of bunchers and non-bunchers 
at the turnover threshold. Specifically, firms reporting turnover in between € 95,000 and 
€ 100,000 are compared to firms with turnover between € 100,000 and € 105,000. They are 
classified as stagnant if their turnover does not increase or decrease by more than 20% after 
they are observed to be either bunchers or non-bunchers (i.e., above or below the turnover 
threshold).
398
 Interestingly, no statistically significant differences in growth patterns are ob-
servable for bunchers and non-bunchers around the turnover threshold of € 100,000. It ap-
pears that turnover thresholds are less susceptible to actually and lastingly slow down firm 
growth than employment thresholds (which is also indicated by the smaller b  at the turnover 
threshold). 
                                                 
398
 The threshold of 20% is chosen such that the relative increase is similar to the previously analyzed increases 
in employment (i.e., hiring one employee means an increase of 20% for a firm previously employing five em-
ployees).  
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Table 26: Growth patterns for bunching and non-bunching firms (robustness checks) 
 
Year prior to regime 
(1) 
Ineligible firms 
(2) 
Matched sample (1-to-1) 
(3) 
Matched sample (1-to-5) 
(4) 
Matched sample (kernel) 
(5) 
5 emp. 6 emp. ∆ 5 emp. 6 emp. ∆ 5 emp. 6 emp. ∆ 5 emp. 6 emp. ∆ 5 emp. 6 emp. ∆ 
INCREASE 0.337 0.346 –0.009 0.256 0.275 –0.019 0.145 0.229 –0.084** 0.145 0.228 –0.083** 0.145 0.229 –0.084** 
   (0.053)   (0.013)   (0.011)   (0.009)   (0.008) 
CONSTANT 0.349 0.353 –0.004 0.451 0.381 –0.070* 0.540 0.360 0.180** 0.540 0.355 0.185** 0.540 0.367 0.173** 
   (0.053)   (0.014)   (0.013)   (0.010)   (0.010) 
DECREASE 0.314 0.301 0.013 0.293 0.344 –0.051* 0.315 0.411 –0.096** 0.315 0.417 –0.102** 0.315 0.404 –0.089** 
   (0.051)   (0.013)   (0.013)   (0.010)   (0.010) 
Observat. 325 4,984 11,196 11,196 11,196 
Notes: The data are for 2009 and 2010 in column 1 and for 2012 and 2013 in columns 2 to 5. Changes in the number of employees are defined as follows: INCREASE = 1 if no. 
of employeest+1 > no. of employeest and zero otherwise; CONSTANT = 1 if no. of employeest = no. of employeest+1 and zero otherwise; DECREASE = 1 if no. of employeest+1 < 
no. of employeest and zero otherwise. Averages for INCREASE, CONSTANT and DECREASE are given for all firms with 5 and 6 employees, respectively. ∆ reports the differ-
ence in averages between both groups. ** and * denote significance levels of 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Methodologically, there may be several concerns with the above approach of com-
paring differences in growth patterns of bunching and non-bunching firms around the em-
ployment threshold. First of all, there could be structural differences between firms with five 
employees and those with six that do not have anything to do with the micro enterprise 
scheme in Latvia but drive the growth probabilities of the respective firms. Table 26 address-
es this issue in several ways. In column (1), the shares of growing, stagnating and declining 
entities are compared for 2009 and 2010, the years when the regime had not yet taken effect. 
If there are structural differences between enterprises with five and with six employees, the 
results for 2009 and 2010 should be similar to the results in 2012 and 2013. However, no sig-
nificant differences in growth patterns are found for the former period. Apparently, Latvian 
firms with five employees and those with six can be expected to develop similarly in the ab-
sence of the micro enterprise scheme. 
In line with this finding, column (2) examines growth patterns for 2012 and 2013, 
but only considers enterprises (with five and six employees) which reported more than 
€ 100,000 of turnover. These firms should mostly be ineligible for the micro regime or only 
benefit to a limited degree.
399
 Expectedly, the differences in the shares of growing, stagnating 
and declining firms are much smaller and statistically less significant than for firms not ex-
ceeding the turnover threshold. Again, this reinforces that there are no structural differences 
between firms with five and with six employees which induce differences in growth patterns. 
Instead, the results in columns (1) and (2) suggest the micro enterprise scheme to be the driv-
ing force discouraging firms with five employees from growing and incentivizing those with 
six employees to reduce the number of employees.  
Selection bias is another concern with regard to the baseline results in Table 25. 
Firms with certain characteristics may be more susceptible to bunching than others and if 
these firms showed different growth dynamics irrespective of the micro enterprise regime, the 
results would not display a causal effect but rather a correlation of firm characteristics and the 
propensity to bunch. Columns (3) to (5) address this issue by performing several matching 
procedures. It is the basic idea of these procedures to generate a control group, i.e., a group of 
firms with six employees, that is made up of firms being as similar as possible to the firms in 
the bunching group. If this adjusted control group still shows different growth patterns, it is 
                                                 
399
 Businesses with more than € 100,000 are ineligible in future years. If they did not exceed the turnover thresh-
old in the previous year, they are eligible in the current period, though, and subject to considerably higher tax 
rates on the excess turnover. See section 5.1.3.1. 
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reasonable to assume that the latter are induced by the introduction of the micro enterprise 
scheme. The degree of similarity is based on a so-called propensity score. Following the ap-
proach developed by Heckman et al. (1997) and Dehejiba and Wahba (1999), it is derived by 
means of a probit estimation
400
 including all relevant and observable firm characteristics that 
are likely to impact future growth as well as the likeliness of being a (non-)buncher (e.g., total 
assets, turnover, growth rates in previous periods).
401
 Building on the propensity score, the 
control group is generated with a matching algorithm, which – based on the propensity scores 
– assigns observations from the group of firms with six employees to the new control group. 
In column (3), 1-to-1 matching is applied, while the estimates in columns (4) and (5) build on 
nearest-neighbor matching with five matching partners and kernel matching.
402
 For each 
matching algorithm, the results from Table 25 are confirmed. Matching firms with five and 
six employees, respectively, does not change the main finding of bunchers refraining from 
hiring personnel and non-bunchers tending to lay off people in order to gain eligibility.  
Lastly, the question occurs if the differences observed in growth patterns for bunch-
ers and non-bunchers reflect real economic responses or if they are simply the result of (per-
manent) underreporting. Prior bunching studies have indeed found taxpayers to predominant-
ly bunch by underreporting instead of actually reducing firm size or forfeiting growth oppor-
tunities.
403
 The underreporting can occur in the form of entrepreneurs taking advantage of 
(legal) reporting choices or in the form of businesses engaging in fraudulent misreporting. 
Distinguishing real responses and underreporting, of course, is not a trivial task given that the 
analysis builds on data reported by the firms in question. What points at real responses in the 
context of the Latvian micro enterprise tax is, above all, the fact that the most distinct bunch-
ing is observed for employment. Reporting the number of employees can generally be as-
sumed to involve less discretion than reporting turnover or, even more so, taxable income.
404
 
Consequently, an entrepreneur is probably forced to commit fraud, namely to hire illicit 
                                                 
400
 The results of the probit estimation are displayed in Table A4 in the appendix. 
401
 See Heckman/Ichimura/Todd (1997) pp. 605 ff.; Dehejia/Wahba (1999) pp. 1053 ff. 
402
 Kernel matching uses weighted averages of all observations in the control group. The weights reflect the 
propensity score. Each matching algorithm is performed with replacement, i.e., observations from the control 
group can be used multiple times. For a detailed description of the matching algorithms as well as derivation of 
the matching score, see Caliendo/Kopeinig (2005) pp. 5 ff. 
403
 See Saez (2010) pp. 196 ff.; Brockmeyer (2014) pp 492 ff.; Liu/Lockwood (2015) pp. 27 f.; Almunia/Lopez-
Rodriguez (2016) pp. 53 ff.; Asatrayan/Peichl (2016) pp. 22 ff.  
404
 Underreporting income is often easily achieved by increasing expenditures, e.g., through preponed invest-
ments. Turnover, on the other hand, generally provides less leeway with regard to legal accounting choices. 
Transactions, of course, could be postponed by a few days or weeks around the end of the accounting period, 
thereby achieving lower recorded sales in a given period. See Brockmeyer (2014) pp. 492 ff. 
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workers, if he intends to underreport the number of employees. Even misreporting, however, 
is presumably more difficult in the context of employment than it is for other indicators as it 
requires the cooperation of the respective (non-)employee, who forgoes the benefits of con-
tractual employment and renders himself liable to prosecution as well.
405
 Altogether, irregu-
larities in employment numbers are thus very likely to reflect real responses rather than mis-
reporting.
406
 
Notwithstanding these arguments, other factors than the actual abandonment of hir-
ing activities could drive the observed bunching. Bunchers could, for example, refrain from 
employing people and instead hire them as independent service providers, effectively turning 
employment into contract work. If firms were able to circumvent employment-based thresh-
olds by such means, the actual distortion of firm growth and the related misallocation of re-
sources would be smaller than indicated by the results in Tables 25 and 26.
407
 In this case, the 
development of firm size indicators other than employment should not differ for bunching and 
non-bunching enterprises as taxpayers would continue to grow and not have a reason to un-
derreport these other indicators.
408
  
Table 27 tests this conjecture by regressing the post-2012 growth rates with regard to 
employment, turnover and total assets on BUNCH_5EMP, a dummy variable indicating 
whether a firm bunched at the employment threshold in 2012. In other words, the regressions 
measure the impact of being a buncher (i.e., a firm with five employees) in a given year on the 
expected growth rate in the following year for the three firm size indicators defined by the 
European Commission. The regression equation is as follows: 
GROWTHi,t = β0 + β1BUNCH_5EMPi,2012 + β2X + εi 
where GROWTHi,t is the growth rate with regard to the respective indicator (i.e., employment, 
turnover or total assets) of firm i in period t (i.e., in 2013 or in 2014) and X is a vector of con-
                                                 
405
 Misreporting turnover, in contrast, does not necessarily require the support of third parties, especially when 
products or services are sold to end consumers who cannot offset acquisition costs for VAT purposes.  
406
 This assumption is shared and supported by recent papers examining the impact of size-dependent labor regu-
lation. See Schivardi/Torrini (2004) pp. 1 ff.; Braguinsky/Branstetter/Regateiro (2011) pp. 1 ff.; Gourio/Roys 
(2014) pp. 377 ff.; Garicano/Lelarge/Van Reenen (2016) pp. 3439 ff. 
407
 Deadweight losses would still occur, though, as enterprises have to put effort into arranging their affairs in 
ways that ensure the retention of eligibility for the micro enterprise regime. See Feldstein (1999) pp. 674 ff. 
408
 Turnover growth may be affected if the respective businesses are also at risk of breaking the turnover thresh-
old. The percentage of businesses bunching at both thresholds only amounts to a very small percentage, though. 
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trol variables (the natural logarithms of the absolute levels of turnover, total assets, employ-
ment and profit before taxes in 2012 as well as growth rates with regard to turnover, total as-
sets and employment in previous years). All firms of the business population are included in 
the estimations. If firms do not actually slow down growth but only underreport employment, 
the estimated coefficient for BUNCH_5EMP should be negative when considering employ-
ment growth (column (1)) and insignificant for turnover and total assets (columns (2) and (3)) 
as there is no obvious reason to underreport the latter two measures.
409
   
Table 27: The influence of bunching on firm growth 
 
Growth rate2012-2013 Growth rate2012-2014 
Employ. 
(1) 
Turnover 
(2) 
Tot. Ass. 
(3) 
Employ. 
(4) 
Turnover 
(5) 
Tot. ass. 
(6) 
BUNCH_5EMP –0.032*** –0.033** –0.051*** –0.048*** –0.065*** –0.102*** 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.021) (0.023) 
LN_TURNOVER2012 0.043*** –0.084*** 0.045*** 0.066*** –0.132*** 0.072*** 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.010) (0.007) 
LN_ASSETS2012 –0.001 0.067*** –0.085*** –0.000 0.075*** –0.167*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.009) 
LN_EMPLOYEE2012  –0.053*** 0.032*** –0.007 –0.096*** 0.052*** –0.006 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
LN_PROFIT2012 –0.005*** –0.022*** 0.025*** –0.003 –0.020*** 0.052*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) 
GROWTH_TO2011-2012 0.001 –0.037*** –0.002 –0.003 –0.042*** 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.013) (0.012) 
GROWTH_TO2010-2012 0.010*** –0.006 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.001 0.037*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) 
GROWTH_AS2011-2012 0.043*** 0.109*** 0.008 0.056*** 0.116*** 0.027 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.016) (0.017) 
GROWTH_AS2010-2012 0.012*** 0.013** –0.008 0.015*** 0.014* –0.031*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) 
GROWTH_EM2011-2012 –0.028** 0.046** –0.010 –0.015 0.061** 0.005 
 (0.011) (0.020) (0.018) (0.015) (0.030) (0.032) 
GROWTH_EM2010-2012 –0.030*** 0.011 0.028** –0.042*** 0.027 0.055*** 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.018) (0.019) 
Constant –0.372*** 0.411*** 0.296*** –0.599*** 0.887*** 0.767*** 
 (0.017) (0.044) (0.035) (0.025) (0.066) (0.061) 
Observations 25,088 25,096 25,108 24,242 24,249 24,257 
Adj. R
2
 0.055 0.041 0.035 0.067 0.033 0.051 
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate with respect to the number of employees in columns (1) and 
(4), turnover in columns (2) and (5) and total assets in columns (3) and (6). BUNCH_5EMP is a dummy variable 
indicating if a firm employed exactly 5 employees in 2012. LN_TURNOVER, LN_ASSETS, LN EMPLOYEE and 
LN_PROFIT are the natural logarithms of reported turnover, assets, employment and profit before tax in 2012. 
GROWTH_TO, GROWTH AS and GROWTH_EM are the growth rates with regard to turnover, total assets and 
employment. All estimates are derived using OLS regressions. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
***, ** and * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
                                                 
409
 The coefficient in column (3) could even be positive if labor is replaced by capital in the production process. 
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The results in columns (1) to (3) indicate that being a buncher reduces expected 
growth with regard to the number of employees as well as with regard to turnover and total 
assets. The coefficients for the latter two indicators (–0.033 and –0.051, respectively) are neg-
ative at all conventional significance levels and even exceed the coefficient for employment 
(–0.032). The results suggest that the employment threshold not induces taxpayers to stop 
hiring but ultimately affects overall firm growth irrespective of the size indicators considered. 
As a consequence, turnover and asset growth stagnates as well. This finding is reinforced by 
the results in columns (4) to (6), where the two-year growth rates of employment, turnover 
and total assets are used as dependent variables. The coefficients for BUNCH_5EMP again 
remain negative and highly significant for all three indicators. In fact, the magnitude becomes 
even higher. Hence, bunching appears to not only be driven by underreporting or firms delay-
ing expansions for a short period of time. Instead, even a couple of years after bunching at the 
employment threshold, enterprises still grow at a slower pace and irrespective of the consid-
ered firm size indicator, which hints at substantial real responses being responsible for the 
observed bunching patterns.   
5.1.4  Conclusion 
The empirical analysis of taxpayer bunching shows businesses to actively avoid the 
forfeiture of SME tax incentives by bunching below the size-based eligibility thresholds. In 
contrast to the majority of previous studies, the analysis at hand focusses on thresholds refer-
ring to turnover and the number of employees. These thresholds create notches in the tax sys-
tem as eligibility for regimes runs out as soon as businesses exceed the respective limits. In 
general, bunching responses for these two indicators appear to be weaker than for taxable in-
come. This can most likely be explained by the ease of managing income as opposed to other 
size measures.  
With regard to the different types of SME incentives, taxpayers are found to be espe-
cially prone to bunching when eligibility for simplified regimes is at stake. These regimes 
mostly provide far-reaching facilitations in the determination of the tax base as well as sub-
stantial tax savings. In contrast to that, only limited bunching is observed for tax incentives 
that are part of the ordinary assessment procedures of the corporate income tax, i.e., special 
CIT rates, allowances and tax credits. 
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The investigation of firms’ bunching behavior at the eligibility thresholds of one of 
the simplified regimes, the Latvian micro enterprise scheme, yields further insights. First of 
all, bunching patterns strongly suggest that the administrative relief as well as the potential for 
tax savings associated with turnover taxes induce taxpayers to bunch. With regard to the rela-
tive significance of each factor, the tax savings aspect dominates for most Latvian businesses. 
In this respect, the micro enterprise tax is particularly beneficial for highly profitable firms, 
who have the strongest interest in being taxed on turnover and who are also the most suscep-
tible to bunching. 
The second main finding of the analysis of the Latvian micro enterprise regime is 
that bunching behavior cannot only be attributed to mere underreporting. The results rather 
suggest taxpayers around the employment threshold to really avoid hiring additional employ-
ees or even to lay off people in order to gain eligibility for the scheme. As a consequence, 
overall firm growth slows down. Obviously, this is the opposite of the intended effect and 
should be seen very critical. Given the high number of firms around the threshold of five em-
ployees (over 10% of all businesses), the bunching implications for the job market are consid-
erable. The number of jobs falling away due to bunching could amount to over 3% of all jobs 
actually provided by the sample firms. 
Altogether, two main policy implications emerge from the above analysis. First, pol-
icy-makers should avoid explicit size thresholds as far as possible when designing SME tax 
incentives. In particular, they should refrain from employment thresholds, as they are most 
likely to induce real responses in the form of reduced hiring activity and firm growth. As a 
second take-away, legislators should be careful not to offer overly advantageous regimes 
when trying to simplify taxation for the very smallest businesses. Taxing turnover instead of 
income, for example, can lead to huge savings for enterprises, especially those with high prof-
it margins. As a consequence, competition between eligible and ineligible firms is severely 
distorted and the equity of the tax systems suffers considerably. Departing from net income as 
the calculation basis of the corporate (or personal) income tax should thus be the last resort 
for policy-makers.  
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5.2 Distortion of Legal Form Choice 
If SME tax incentives are exclusively available for certain kinds of SMEs, other dis-
tortions than the abovementioned bunching behavior of taxpayers may occur. The guiding 
principle of neutrality generally dictates reliefs to be granted irrespective of legal form and 
other firm characteristics.
410
 In practice, however, eligibility for currently available regimes as 
well as the actual size of the relief are highly dependent on the specific properties of taxpay-
ers, e.g. the form of financing they choose, the amount of taxable income they incur or the 
industry and regions they operate in. Hence, SME incentives are likely to not only discrimi-
nate against large enterprises but also against SMEs that are ineligible due to other features 
than firm size. 
Simplified regimes of tax accounting are one example of discriminatory SME reliefs. 
The simplified cash-based regimes are usually offered exclusively to non-corporate entities 
and may therefore influence the legal form decision of entrepreneurs. As a consequence, busi-
nesses may ultimately operate under legal forms that would not be optimal for them in the 
absence of taxation, e.g., in terms of liability or access to capital. The following study tests 
this conjecture, thereby providing an enhanced understanding of the distortionary effects of 
SME tax incentives.
411
  
5.2.1 Introduction 
This paper addresses the broad research question whether accounting rules affect real 
economic decisions. Specifically, we study whether the ability to choose simplified methods 
of tax accounting is an important consideration in legal form decisions. While prior research 
explored the impact of statutory tax rates on legal form choice,
412
 our study focuses on re-
gimes of simplified tax accounting and the incentive they provide to choose the legal form of 
business that offers eligibility.   
                                                 
410
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pp. 143 ff.; Goolsbee (2004) pp. 2283 ff.; Luna/Murray (2010) pp. 995 ff.; Liu (2014) pp. 387 ff. 
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The effect of tax accounting rules on policy goals and aggregate outcomes such as 
equitability and neutrality have been assessed by previous literature.
413
 More recently, Gon-
charov and Jacob (2014) show that the definition of taxable income on a cash or accrual basis 
is driven by the tax regulator’s intention to achieve a desirable distribution of corporate tax 
revenues and, at the same time, affects the correlation between tax revenues and economic 
activity.
414
 We investigate whether tax accounting rules actively support a shift of firms and 
economic activity to the non-corporate sector of business.  
In many countries, small businesses can use simplified methods of accounting to de-
termine their taxable income. Most commonly, cash-based accounting is offered as an alterna-
tive to the accrual approach. Simply paying tax on the amount of cash collected minus ac-
ceptable operating expenses is supposed to be associated with a significant reduction in tax 
compliance costs.
415
 In several countries, cash accounting is complemented by elements of 
presumptive taxation, i.e., certain kinds of expenses are not recorded but estimated, resulting 
in an even higher degree of simplification. The latest country to allow small businesses to 
shift from accrual to simplified tax accounting is the United Kingdom. In 2012, Treasury 
Minister David Gauke announced:
 416
  
‘We want the smallest businesses to be able to choose the method of ac-
counting that works best for their business. The simplified system will pro-
vide this flexibility, give greater certainty, and simplify the tax calculations 
for many small businesses.’ 
Tax-related compliance costs include a substantial part of fixed components. As a 
consequence, the compliance burden, as a percentage of income, becomes disproportionally 
higher the smaller the scale of business.
417
 By providing simplified tax accounting for small 
enterprises, legislators seek to prevent small firms from being placed at a competitive disad-
vantage. From this point of view, simplified tax accounting can be considered as enhancing 
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efficiency by avoiding underinvestment in the small business sector.
418
 At the same time, spe-
cial tax regimes may, paradoxically, impose efficiency costs themselves if they are not well 
integrated with the normal tax system.
419
 
Simplified tax accounting is generally only available to non-corporate businesses.
420
 
As a consequence, it potentially introduces distortions at the boundary between self-
employment in the form of sole proprietorships and owner-managed incorporated businesses. 
If simplified tax accounting is indeed associated with a net benefit, taking into account reduc-
tions in compliance costs as well as the non-tax benefits of proper bookkeeping, its (un-
)availability can change the relative gain to incorporation.
421
 
We test this conjecture using a sample of corporate share data derived from Euro-
stat’s Business Demography for 27 European countries over the period 2004 - 2010. Employ-
ing a difference-in-differences approach, we estimate the effect of variation in eligibility 
thresholds for simplified tax accounting by comparing the change in countries' non-corporate 
shares of business before and after a change in thresholds relative to the change in non-
corporate shares of business in countries with a constant regime. We subsequently generalize 
the approach by including full sets of fixed effects for the time and cross-section dimension of 
our data. In a series of additional analyses, we explore the timing of responses, refine the 
measurement of the scope of simplified tax accounting and check the robustness of our results 
to different definitions of the dependent variable as well as alternative estimation strategies 
that account for nonlinearities in the empirical relationship at stake.  
Our results suggest that simplified tax accounting indeed distorts legal form deci-
sions of eligible businesses. Quantitatively, we estimate an increase of the eligibility threshold 
by € 100,000 to increase the non-corporate firm share by about 0.47 percentage points. More-
over, our results suggest that a 1% shift in the eligibility threshold increases the non-corporate 
share of business by about 0.013 percentage points. Taking the example of the United King-
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dom, where simplified tax accounting was introduced in 2012, back-of-the-envelope calcula-
tions on the basis of our results show that about one in a hundred newly eligible entrepreneurs 
might refrain from incorporation due to the introduction of the simplified regime.  
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. To the best of our knowledge, 
we are the first to study the impact of simplified tax accounting on legal form decisions. Some 
previous studies, however, have examined whether accounting rules affect business decisions. 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) find that managers would sacrifice long-term value to 
report smoother earnings and Graham, Hanlon, and Shevlin (2010) provide evidence that fi-
nancial reporting consequences affect corporate investment and profit repatriation deci-
sions.
422
 Only a very few studies deal with special tax regimes in the context of legal form 
choice.
423
 General evidence for a tax rate effect on incorporation decisions in the United 
States is put forward by Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1994), MacKie-Mason and Gordon 
(1997), Goolsbee (1998 & 2004), Luna and Murray (2010), and most recently by Liu 
(2014).
424
 For Europe, the impact of tax rate differences between non-corporate and corporate 
businesses on legal form choice is documented by de Mooij and Nicodème (2008).
425
 We fol-
low the general approach adopted in these studies and explain variation in aggregate corporate 
shares of business. 
A further contribution of this study is that it informs about behavioral responses to 
compliance costs. While there is some international evidence on the approximate size of the 
compliance cost burden,
426
 the behavioral implications remain largely unknown. Previous 
studies consider behavioral responses to compliance costs mainly in terms of compliance it-
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self.
427
 We know of no study that examines the response to compliance costs at other behav-
ioral margins. Selection into eligibility for simplified tax accounting, by becoming or remain-
ing non-corporate, would be one of the few empirical indications that compliance costs indeed 
affect economic decision-making. Moreover, knowing the size of the behavioral distortion 
that arises from selective eligibility for simplified tax accounting allows inferences on the tax 
compliance cost burden itself. In fact, our results reinforce previous estimates of the size of 
tax-related compliance costs ranging between 0.6% and 3.7% of taxable income.
428
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 5.2.2 presents theoretical considera-
tions on the effect simplified tax accounting exerts on the choice of legal form. Section 5.2.3 
provides an overview on simplified tax accounting in Europe and demonstrates our legal form 
data. The empirical analysis follows in Section 5.2.4 before Section 5.2.5 concludes. 
5.2.2 Theoretical Considerations 
Simplified tax accounting aims at approximating the standard tax base with a mini-
mum of compliance effort. In the case of cash accounting, which is the most prevalent form of 
simplification, the difference compared to standard accrual accounting boils down to the mere 
timing of positive and negative income components, leaving total profits over time unaffect-
ed. Under cash accounting, transactions are recorded when cash is received or disbursed, 
whereas under accrual accounting receipts and expenses are realized as they accrue. However, 
provisions governing timing issues under accrual accounting are among the most difficult to 
put into practice. Granting relief from these complications, cash accounting can thus be highly 
advantageous in terms of compliance costs.
429
 This is especially true if it eliminates the need 
for a professional tax adviser, which is a major cost driver in tax compliance.
430
  
On the other hand, accrual accounting with proper double-entry bookkeeping also 
has advantages. By accurately showing the ebb and flow of business income, it provides a 
clear picture of the financial status of the business to all its stakeholders. The benefits of ac-
crual accounting also include better access to external finance, improved relations with cus-
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tomers and suppliers, and the discovery of inefficiencies.
431
 By choosing simplified account-
ing, the entrepreneur forgoes these benefits and thus incurs additional costs.
432
   
In view of existing empirical evidence on tax complexity as a major driver of non-
compliance,
433
 simplified tax accounting may also have consequences with respect to tax 
avoidance and evasion. On the one hand, simplified regimes eliminate accruals and the tax-
payer's associated discretion. Hence, the opportunities for managing taxable income as well as 
the potential for unintentional underreporting could be reduced.
434
 In addition, complicated 
accounting regulations make it costly for the taxpayer to comply with reporting require-
ments.
435
 Decreasing the complexity of bookkeeping under simplified tax accounting and, at 
the same time, less expensive audits, could therefore curb cost-driven evasion behavior. On 
the other hand, with self-preparation of tax records becoming easier and the need for profes-
sional preparation services being reduced accordingly, the tax advisor as an important 'en-
forcement instance', who corrects misunderstandings, reminds of specific obligations, and 
explicitly warns against deliberate or inadvertent non-compliance, may fall away.
436
 In addi-
tion, there could be greater scope for tax evasion if businesses have employees whose income 
tax deductions and social security contributions need to be accounted for properly. Whether, 
on balance, simplified tax accounting can be considered as a compliance enhancing factor or a 
regime that enables non-compliance and is for this latter reason sought by some taxpayers, 
remains a priori an open question.  
After all, under the theory of organizational choice by Scholes and Wolfson (1987), 
the legal form is chosen to minimize tax costs and transaction costs, including expenses in-
curred for bookkeeping, record-keeping, and data-processing.
437
 Non-tax benefits of incorpo-
ration are limited liability, increased liquidity of equity and enhanced diversification opportu-
nities on the investors’ part. Agency costs arising from the separation of management and 
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control may be the negative side to that.
438
 With respect to tax considerations, previous evi-
dence suggests that the difference between personal and corporate income tax rates affects 
legal form decisions.
439
 Notwithstanding these non-tax factors and tax-rate considerations, 
entrepreneurs who value the benefits of simplified tax accounting highly will opt against in-
corporation as only the non-corporate form permits to enjoy simplified accounting. Simplified 
tax accounting thus introduces a potentially relevant distortion in the choice of legal form. If 
the benefit of simplified tax accounting is sufficiently high for at least some firms to choose 
an otherwise less preferable legal form, simplified tax accounting for non-corporate firms 
should empirically influence the corporate share of business activity.  
In the empirical analysis, we will test this conjecture by estimating the degree to 
which the allocation of business activity across legal forms in 27 European economies has 
responded to changes in eligibility thresholds for simplified tax accounting.  
5.2.3 Institutional Background and Data 
5.2.3.1 Overview of Simplified Tax Accounting in Europe 
Providing regimes of simplified tax accounting is common practice in Europe. In all, 
19 out of 27 sample countries offered reliefs from comprehensive accrual accounting to small 
non-corporate enterprises in 2010 (see Table 28 for an overview). Most of these regimes build 
on cash-basis accounting. As a consequence, eligible enterprises do not have to account for 
balance sheet items such as provisions, accrued expenses, and deferred income – the items 
requiring the highest degree of accounting literacy.
440
 They should therefore cause the highest 
compliance burden as proper handling is time-consuming and might even entail the hiring of a 
professional tax adviser. Using cash-basis accounting, business owners can refer to actual in- 
and outflows, which are substantially easier to keep track of – for both the taxpayer as well as 
tax administrations. Furthermore, simplified regimes often come along with reduced formal 
requirements for enterprises. Eligible businesses, for example, do not have to draw up a bal-
ance sheet or an inventory. The majority of simplified regimes, however, demand some ad-
justments to the purely cash-based determination of income. Periodization according to accru-
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al principles occurs in particular with respect to the depreciation of fixed assets and prepay-
ments (e.g. in France, Germany, Greece).  
On the other hand, some countries do not only provide the opportunity to account for 
profits on a cash basis but even relieve taxpayers from recording some kinds of expenses (e.g. 
Austria, Bulgaria, Spain). Under these regimes, certain lump-sum percentages of turnover are 
deducted to arrive at net income before taxes. 
Table 28: Regimes of simplified tax accounting in Europe (2004–2010) 
Country Accrual relief Threshold in € 
(2004) 
Threshold in € 
(2010) 
Industry  
differentiation 
Further  
simplifications  
Austria yes 400,000  700,000  no yes 
Belgium yes 500,000  500,000  no yes 
Bulgaria yes 25,565  25,565  yes yes 
Cyprus no - - yes no 
Czech Republic yes 237,304  988,768  no yes 
Denmark no - - - - 
Estonia yes none none no no 
Finland no - - - - 
France yes 230,000  231,000  yes yes 
Germany yes 350,000  500,000  no no 
Greece yes 1,500,000  1,500,000  no yes 
Hungary yes 90,751  90,751 no yes 
Ireland no - - - - 
Italy yes 25,823  30,000  - - 
Latvia yes 63,497  282,207  no yes 
Luxembourg no 50,000  50,000  no no 
Malta no - - - - 
Netherlands no - - - - 
Norway no - - - - 
Poland yes 800,000  1,200,000  no yes 
Portugal yes 99,760 99,760 yes yes 
Slovakia yes 35,000  35,000  no yes 
Slovenia yes 42,000  42,000  no yes 
Spain yes 601,012  600,000  no yes 
Sweden no 83,881  314,554  no no 
Switzerland no - - - - 
United Kingdom no - - - - 
Notes: Accrual relief indicates, whether the respective countries apply some sort of simplified regime of tax 
accounting that provides for major reliefs from accrual accounting during the sample period. The information is 
taken from the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) and national tax codes. Threshold in € 
(2004) and Threshold in € (2010) present applicable turnover thresholds up to which simplified accounting can 
be applied in the first and last years of the sample period for firms engaged in personal service activities. Industry 
differentiation reports whether turnover thresholds vary across industries in a country. Further simplifications 
indicate the availability of simplifications going beyond a change from the accrual to the cash basis (i.e., pre-
sumptive elements). 
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Simplified regimes of tax accounting are generally available for non-corporate enti-
ties only (i.e., businesses whose income is subject to the personal income tax). A striking dif-
ference between countries, however, relates to the scope of eligible businesses as size re-
strictions vary substantially.
441
 Bulgaria, for example, only offers relief to businesses with less 
than € 25,565 of turnover, whereas the Estonian and Polish tax codes are much more gener-
ous. The majority of countries implement turnover thresholds between € 50,000 and 
€ 1,000,000.  
Figure 12: Development of turnover thresholds for simplified tax accounting (2004–2010) 
 
Notes: The figure displays turnover thresholds restricting eligibility for simplified tax accounting. Only countries 
with changes in thresholds during the sample period 2004–2010 are included in the graph.   
 
Importantly, in ten out of 19 countries thresholds have changed within the sample pe-
riod, i.e., between 2004 and 2010 (see Figure 12). Some countries only implemented minor 
changes (France, Hungary, Italy, Spain), whereas other countries have substantially extended 
the scope of application of their simplified regimes in 2007 (Austria, Czech Republic, Ger-
many, Latvia) and in 2008 (Poland, Sweden). While the turnover thresholds may appear low, 
they cover the vast majority of businesses in most countries. In Germany, for example, more 
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than 80% of all businesses would be eligible for simplified tax accounting in 2010.
442
 The 
determination of eligibility is generally based on last year’s turnover and a switch back to 
simplified rules is possible once turnover has fallen below the threshold. Austria and Germa-
ny take into account the two years preceding the respective fiscal period.  
Interestingly, some countries also discriminate between industries, i.e., they only of-
fer simplified tax accounting to certain economic sectors (Bulgaria, Cyprus) or they have dif-
ferent thresholds in place for the manufacturing and service sectors (France, Portugal). Legal 
obligations to keep financial accounts, if at all existent for sole proprietors, are generally har-
monized with the eligibility for simplified tax accounting. Hence, businesses do not face fi-
nancial accounting requirements beyond those from the tax code. 
5.2.3.2 Legal Form Data 
The data on the distribution of legal forms comes from Eurostat’s Business Demog-
raphy. This database provides data on the number of active firms and the number of persons 
employed aggregated at 2-digit NACE industry levels
443
 for 30 European countries.
444
 Our 
data comprise seven years from 2004 to 2010 and distinguish the following legal forms: 
 Sole proprietorships: personally owned firms with unlimited personal liability; 
 Corporations: private or publicly quoted joint stock companies with limited liability 
for those owning shares; and 
 Personally owned limited or unlimited liability partnerships and other forms such as 
co-operatives and associations. 
We calculate the non-corporate share of business as the number of sole proprietor-
ships divided by the sum of sole proprietorships and corporations. The calculation of the non-
corporate employment share is done accordingly. The partnership category contains corpo-
rately taxed entities as well as transparently taxed firms. A clear assignment to either the non-
                                                 
442
 See Statistisches Bundesamt (2016) p. 9. 
443
 In 2008, the industry classification was redefined from NACE 1.1 to NACE 2.0. We apply the conversion 
scheme described in Table A8 in the appendix to arrive at consistent industry groupings for all years. 
444
 For the empirical analysis, Romania and Lithuania are excluded from the sample as sole proprietorships were 
not adequately covered in these countries. See Eurostat: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/ An-
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corporate or the corporate sector and thus to either simplified or non-simplified tax account-
ing cannot be made. We therefore exclude partnerships from our standard measures of non-
corporate shares but will address the issue in the robustness checks of our analysis. 
Table 29: Non-corporate shares of business by country (2004–2010) 
Country Non-corporate share (%) Country Non-corporate share (%) 
 Nr. of firms Employment  Nr. of firms Employment 
Austria 79.0 33.7 Latvia 37.4 6.6 
Belgium 44.2 11.9 Luxembourg 24.9 8.2 
Bulgaria 52.7 20.5 Malta 71.5 25.6 
Cyprus 49.9 16.2 Netherlands 67.9 14.0 
Czech Rep. 82.5 27.7 Norway 49.1 10.0 
Denmark 56.6 16.3 Poland 93.8 49.7 
Estonia 27.6 4.6 Portugal 69.7 25.5 
Finland 54.4 6.6 Slovakia 77.5 33.9 
France 55.2 28.0 Slovenia 63.3 22.3 
Germany 79.1 28.0 Spain 60.3 22.9 
Greece 93.2 51.3 Sweden 54.8 13.2 
Hungary 62.5 21.6 Switzerland 57.2 20.0 
Ireland 50.8 17.2 UK 29.6 7.4 
Italy 79.1 32.6 Average 60.1 21.3 
Notes: The non-corporate share of business is the average ratio of the number of sole proprietorships on the 
number of all firms (excluding partnerships) throughout the sample period (2004–2010). Alternatively, the non-
corporate share of business is the average ratio of people employed in sole proprietorships on the number of 
people employed in all firms (excluding partnerships) throughout the sample period (2004–2010). 
 
Table 29 presents overall shares of sole proprietorships per country in the sample. 
Shares in employment are significantly lower than in the number of establishments during the 
sample period (60.1% vs. 21.3%). This is in line with previous literature showing bigger enti-
ties to be more likely to incorporate than small firms. Moreover, large differences across 
countries can be observed. While 93.8% of Polish firms have not incorporated, the corre-
sponding rate in Luxembourg amounts to only 24.9%. Table 30 reports the share of sole pro-
prietorships by industry. Again, the percentage is much smaller for employment than for the 
number of firms. The highest shares occur in the service and retail sectors, where firms tend 
to be small. 
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Table 30: Non-corporate shares of business by industry 
Industry Non-corporate share (in %) 
 
Nr. of firms Employment 
Manufacturing 50.6 13.2 
Utilities 31.9 3.7 
Construction 63.9 29.1 
Retail 62.8 29.8 
Hotels and restaurants 65.2 36.5 
Transport, storage & telecommunications 61.7 19.0 
Real estate 36.5 20.7 
Professional and scientific services 61.8 35.2 
Other service activities 57.9 23.3 
Notes: The non-corporate share of business is the average ratio of the number of sole proprietorships on the 
number of all firms (excluding partnerships) throughout the sample period (2004–2010). Alternatively, the non-
corporate share of business is the average ratio of people employed in sole proprietorships on the number of 
people employed in all firms (excluding partnerships) throughout the sample period (2004–2010).   
 
5.2.4 Empirical Analysis 
5.2.4.1 Baseline Results 
Our considerations in Section 5.2.2 suggest that simplified accounting can lead en-
trepreneurs to prefer the non-corporate form over the incorporated form of business. Ideally, 
firm-level data that is representative of the business population across legal forms would lend 
itself for a regression discontinuity analysis with incorporation as a binary outcome and turn-
over as the assignment variable. With treatment determined by whether turnover falls below 
the eligibility threshold for simplified tax accounting, one could estimate the effect of the 
simplified regime on the choice of legal form around this cutoff. However, due to differences 
in publication requirements between legal forms, available firm-level data usually has a 
strong bias towards corporate entities and in particular small non-corporate entities are clearly 
underrepresented. Consequently, we follow previous studies on organizational form choice 
and resort to aggregate data on the shares of legal forms in the business population for our 
empirical analysis (see Section 5.2.3).  
The question of interest is whether the proportion of non-corporate business is influ-
enced by non-corporate firms’ eligibility for simplified tax accounting. Considering our inter-
national legal form data, this setting calls for a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach. Spe-
cifically, we estimate the effect of variation in eligibility thresholds for simplified tax ac-
counting by comparing the change in countries' non-corporate shares of business before and 
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after a threshold change relative to the change in non-corporate shares of business in countries 
with a constant regime. After an increase in the eligibility threshold the non-corporate share 
of business should increase relative to the control group with constant regimes if, at least for 
some of the eligible firms, the benefit of simplified accounting outweighs the gains from in-
corporation. 
Although most previous empirical studies analyzing the choice of legal form use the 
same type of aggregate data,
445
 it admittedly has some drawbacks. In particular, not all firms 
that constitute the business population reflected in our aggregate data are affected by the 
changes in eligibility thresholds for simplified accounting. Specifically, a considerable num-
ber of firms will feature turnover either substantially below the old threshold or above even 
the new threshold. Still, we will focus our empirical analysis on major shifts in eligibility 
thresholds of at least 20% that will affect an important share of business populations, espe-
cially in view of the fact that enterprises with up to € 1 million of turnover represent 92.7% of 
all businesses in the European Union (European Commission, 2015).
446 
As is shown in Sec-
tion 5.2.3, there are six countries in the sample that increased turnover thresholds for simpli-
fied tax accounting substantially.  
Along these lines, Figure 13 plots the difference between the non-corporate share of 
business in treatment and control countries for a period ranging from two years before to two 
years after the reforms that occurred during our sample period. Specifically, the non-corporate 
share of business, averaged across industries, is determined separately for each year and each 
treatment country before subtracting the corresponding non-corporate share in the control 
group of countries and, finally, averaging these differences across the six threshold increase 
events.  
Figure 13 shows no apparent trend in the difference between treatment and control 
group in the two years prior to a threshold change. After a reform, however, average non-
corporate shares of business in treatment and control group diverge by 0.044 (t-value: 7.06), 
i.e., the non-corporate share in treatment countries increases relative to the countries in the 
control group when the eligibility threshold increases. It appears that the proportion of non-
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 See Gordon/MacKie-Mason (1994) pp. 279 ff.; MacKie-Mason/Gordon (1997) pp. 477 ff.; Goolsbee (1998) 
pp. 143 ff.; Goolsbee (2004) pp. 2283 f.; De Mooij/Nicodème (2008) pp. ff.; Liu (2014) pp. 478 ff. 
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 See European Commission (2015a) p. 3. 
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corporate business is indeed influenced by the scope of eligibility for simplified tax account-
ing.  
Figure 13: Difference in development of non-corporate shares in treatment and control countries 
 
Notes: The figure displays the average difference between the non-corporate share of business in treatment and 
control countries for a period ranging from two years before to two years after the respective reforms that oc-
curred during our sample period. Specifically, the non-corporate share of business, averaged across industries, is 
determined separately for each year and each treatment country before subtracting the corresponding non-
corporate share in the control group of countries and averaging these differences across six major threshold in-
crease events.  
Complementing the visual evidence, we estimate the regression formulation of our dif-
ference-in-differences approach that compares the development of non-corporate shares in 
countries experiencing an extension of eligibility for simplified tax accounting to the coun-
tries with no reform during the sample period:  
NONCORPi,j,t = β0 + β1POST_INCREASEi,j,t + β2TREATi,j,t + β3POSTi,j,t + εi,j,t     (1) 
The dependent variable NONCORP is the non-corporate share of business, as defined 
in Section 5.2.3, in country i and industry j in year t. The dummy variable TREAT equals one 
if the turnover threshold for simplified tax accounting increases by at least 20% during the 
sample period in the respective country-industry cell and it is zero otherwise. POST is a time 
dummy distinguishing pre- and post-treatment observations. It switches from zero to one in 
the year of the reform. The main variable of interest is POST_INCREASE which is a dummy 
that equals one if the respective country-industry cell has experienced an increase in the turn-
over threshold for simplified accounting by year t, and zero otherwise. In other words, 
POST_INCREASE is the interaction of the variables TREAT and POST in equation (1). Its 
estimated coefficient ?̂?1 will measure the average treatment effect of extended eligibility for 
simplified tax accounting on the non-corporate share of business.  
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Table 31: Eligibility for simplified tax accounting and non-corporate shares of business (baseline results) 
 
2007 
reforms 
 2008 
reforms  
All reforms: 2010 vs. 2004  
 
All reforms: All sample years 
 
Distributed lag model 
Baseline 
D-I-D 
 Baseline 
D-I-D 
 Baseline 
D-I-D 
+ Country &  
industry  
dummies 
 + Time-
variant con-
trols 
+ Country- 
industry  
fixed effects 
 One lag Two lags 
  (1)  (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
POST_INCREASEt 0.037***  0.060*** 
 
0.071*** 0.038*** 
 
0.025*** 0.026***  0.022*** 0.016*** 
 
(0.008)  (0.015) 
 
(0.010) (0.008) 
 
(0.006) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) 
POST_INCREASEt-1           0.006 -0.002 
           (0.005) (0.004) 
POST_INCREASEt-2            0.014*** 
            (0.003) 
TREAT 0.118***  0.180***  0.124***        
 
(0.023)  (0.031)  (0.020)        
POST -0.059***  -0.062***  -0.087*** -0.064***       
 (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006) (0.005)       
Constant 0.474***  0.467***  0.490*** 0.712***  3.181*** 2.842***  2.832*** 2.411*** 
 (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) (0.025)  (0.361) (0.302)  (0.304) (0.320) 
Country dummies             
Industry dummies             
Country-industry FE             
Year dummies             
Additional Controls             
Long-run effect           0.027*** 0.028*** 
           (0.006) (0.006) 
Observations 6,469  5,857 
 
2,106 2,106 
 
7,030 7,030  7,030 6,016 
R
2
adj 0.049  0.063  0.083 0.745  0.752 0.132  0.132 0.100 
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Notes: The dependent variable is the non-corporate firm share which equals the number of sole proprietorships 
divided by the number of all firms (excluding partnerships). POST_INCREASE is a dummy variable that takes 
the value 0 if the eligibility threshold for simplified tax accounting in the respective country-industry cell has not 
been increased by at least 20% compared to the base year (2004) and the value 1 otherwise. TREAT is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 for treatment countries and 0 for countries of the control group. POST is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 0 for pre-treatment years and 1 for post-treatment years. Regressions (1)–(5) are 
from OLS estimation and regressions (6)–(8) are from fixed effects (within) regression. Additional controls in-
clude TAX, GNIC, MINCAP and UNEMP. Explanatory variables are defined as given in Table A5 in the appen-
dix. Standard errors clustered at the country-industry level are given in parentheses; *, **, *** represent signifi-
cance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
As shown in Section 5.2.3, our setting contains events in six countries, which can be 
divided into two groups based on the timing of the treatment: countries extending eligibility 
for simplified accounting in 2007 (Austria, Czech Republic
447
, Germany and Latvia) and 
countries doing so in 2008 (Poland and Sweden). In columns (1) and (2) of Table 31, we sep-
arately estimate equation (1) for threshold changes, that is, treatments, respectively in 2007 
and 2008. Thus, observations in the treatment group underlying results in column (1) of Table 
31 are from Austria, Czech Republic, Germany and Latvia, whereas the treatment underlying 
column (2) occurred in Poland and Sweden. In both regressions, control group observations 
are from countries with no threshold change throughout the sample period. The estimated 
coefficients of POST_INCREASE of 0.037 and 0.060 are significant at 1% confidence, re-
spectively in columns (1) and (2). These results reflect the graphical evidence from Figure 13.  
Next, we would like to evaluate all reforms in one regression. Still referring to the 
above baseline DiD equation (1), we reduce the sample to the first and the last year of our 
observation period, that is, 2004 and 2010, in column (3) of Table 31. This approach enables a 
uniform definition of pre-treatment period (2004) and post-treatment period (2010) for all six 
natural experiments no matter when exactly reforms were implemented during that time peri-
od. At the same time, it reflects a rather long-term response and is less sensitive to short-term 
dynamics. The estimated coefficient of POST_INCREASE again turns out positive and signif-
icant at all conventional significance levels.  
Specifications in columns (1) to (3) of Table 31 are supposed to capture differences 
between control and treatment groups by the binary treatment group dummy (TREAT). How-
ever, as thresholds for simplified tax accounting are set by the individual countries, unob-
served country characteristics could be the source of omitted variable bias potentially con-
                                                 
447
 The Czech Republic increased eligibility twice (in 2007 and 2009). Following Valta (2012), we assign the 
treatment to 2007, which is the first as well as the larger increase of the threshold. See Valta (2012) p. 671. 
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founding the estimates in previous regressions. Such unobserved factors may include the legal 
and accounting tradition of a country as well as the state of development of capital markets or 
the availability of certain hybrid legal forms. Besides country-level influences, industry-
specific conditions may drive corporate and non-corporate shares of business. For example, 
the benefit of incorporation is higher in industries where firms are larger and face greater di-
versifiable risk.
448
 We therefore proceed by extending the baseline estimation equation (1) and 
add full sets of country dummies and industry dummies in column (4) of Table 31. Relative to 
specification (3), the estimated coefficient of POST_INCREASE drops by almost one half to 
0.038 but remains statistically significant at 1% confidence. 
Next, we analyze all the observations in our data set at once and estimate the differ-
ence-in-differences approach on our full sample with seven years of data from 2004 to 2010 
and with all treatments in 2007 and 2008. Therefore, we extend the baseline difference-in-
differences set-up to a more generalized DiD approach.
449
 Specifically, we now use a full set 
of year dummies instead of the single binary variable POST to control for aggregate fluctua-
tions. Furthermore, additional time-variant variables enter the equation in column (5) of Table 
31 to control for otherwise omitted factors and country-specific trends. Importantly, we con-
trol for the difference between the statutory top personal and the corporate income tax rate 
which according to previous empirical evidence affects the proportion of incorporated 
firms.
450
 As incorporation goes along with limited liability, company laws in most countries 
require a certain minimum capital for corporate entities. Raising (lowering) the required 
amounts of capital complicates (facilitates) incorporation for small businesses. We therefore 
include the minimum capital requirement as a further control variable in the regression. To 
control for business cycle effects on the non-corporate share of business, we also include the 
logarithm of gross national income per capita and the unemployment rate. Descriptive statis-
tics for these variables are provided in Table 31. Specification (5) of Table 31 additionally 
controls for these time-variant factors and yields an estimated coefficient of 
POST_INCREASE of 0.025 that is significant at all conventional levels.  
 
                                                 
448
 See Fama/Jensen (1983a) pp. 301 ff.; Fama/Jensen (1983b) pp. 327 ff. 
449
 See Bertrand/Mullainathan (2003) pp. 1043 ff.; Valta, (2012) pp. 670 ff. 
450
 See Gordon/MacKie-Mason (1994) pp. 279 ff.; MacKie-Mason/Gordon (1997) pp. 477 ff.; Goolsbee (1998) 
pp. 143 ff.; Goolsbee (2004) pp. 2283 f.; De Mooij/Nicodème (2008) pp. 478 ff.; Liu (2014) pp. 387 ff. 
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Table 32: Eligibility for simplified tax accounting and non-corporate shares of business (control variables) 
 Country 
TAX 
(% points) 
GNIC  
($) 
MINCAP  
(€) 
UNEMP  
(in %) 
COMPLEX 
 
Austria 5.24 38,506 35,000 4.60 0 (170) 
Belgium 17.36 36,456 18,550 7.96 0 (156) 
Bulgaria 1.82 12,323 2,186 8.64 1 (616) 
Cyprus 5.89 29,570 0 4.76 0 (149) 
Czech Republic –9.97 23,529 7,910 6.71 1 (557) 
Denmark 0.14 38,280 15,921 4.99 0 (135) 
Estonia 0.00 18,486 2,556 9.24 0 (81) 
Finland 12.01 36,091 4,071 7.79 0 (243) 
France 7.90 33,711 0 8.67 0 (132) 
Germany –4.49 36,169 25,000 8.94 0 (215) 
Greece 10.70 27,666 14,143 9.60 0 (224) 
Hungary –5.35 18,253 7,556 8.17 1 (277) 
Ireland –5.79 36,789 0 7.10 0 (76) 
Italy 5.61 32,557 10,000 7.34 1 (285) 
Latvia 0.36 16,549 1,983 10.69 0 (253) 
Luxembourg –2.94 58,071 12,395 4.71 0 (59) 
Malta 0.00 22,791 1,165 6.83 - 
Netherlands 10.05 42,047 18,000 3.87 0 (134) 
Norway –0.86 54,524 12,493 3.47 0 (87) 
Poland –3.31 16,289 9,298 12.14 1 (325) 
Portugal 0.44 23,663 5,000 8.27 1 (298) 
Slovakia 0.00 19,981 5,000 13.53 0 (257) 
Slovenia 4.04 26,057 7,500 5.87 1 (260) 
Spain 1.96 30,421 3,005 12.34 0 (197) 
Sweden 7.28 39,567 9,736 7.20 0 (122) 
Switzerland –5.38 47,100 14,490 4.04 0 (63) 
United Kingdom 0.17 36,466 0 5.83 0 (110) 
Notes: All data are for 2010. TAX shows the tax rate differential (here shown in %-points) of the top marginal 
personal income tax rate on business income and the overall corporate income tax rate including dividend taxa-
tion on income from small corporations. GNIC per capita shows the gross national income per capita. MINCAP 
captures the statutory capital requirements (here scaled in €) for corporate entities. UNEMP captures the unem-
ployment rate (here shown in %) in the sample period. All numbers are given as averages during the sample 
period. COMPLEX is a dummy variable indicating how laborious preparing tax returns and paying corporate 
taxes in a country is. It takes the value 1 if more than the median amount of time is required by taxpayers and 0 if 
not (underlying values according to statistics provided by the World Bank are given in brackets). 
 
Finally, we fully exploit the panel structure of our data and control for individual 
country-industry fixed effects in column (6) of Table 31 and thus arrive at the regression 
equation 
NONCORPi,j,t = β0 + β1POST_INCREASEi,j,t + γ xi,t + ϕi,j + δt + εi,j,t           (2) 
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where the vector x includes the time-variant country-level controls and δt is a year-fixed ef-
fect. The country-industry fixed effects (ϕi,j) nest both the country dummies and the industry 
dummies previously included and capture the influence of time-constant country-industry-
level factors on the propensity to incorporate. The estimated coefficient of POST_INCREASE 
amounts to 0.026 and is highly statistically significant. 
Given the influence of simplified tax accounting on the choice of legal form, the last 
specifications (7) and (8) of Table 31 examine the timing of non-corporate shares’ reaction to 
increased eligibility for simplified tax accounting in more detail. We therefore estimate dis-
tributed lag models with one lag of POST_INCREASE in column (7) and with two lags of 
POST_INCREASE in column (8) of Table 31. Considering the results, the coefficient of the 
contemporaneous variable in column (7) is highly significant and positive whereas the lagged 
effect is found to be positive but insignificant. By contrast, the model with two lags in column 
(8) yields significant positive coefficients for both the contemporaneous effect and the two-
year lag while the coefficient for the one-year lag remains statistically insignificant. All in all, 
the distributed lag models give some evidence for the shift in the non-corporate share to mate-
rialize over multiple years after the reform. Given the substantial multi-collinearity between 
the contemporaneous variable and its lags, however, estimating the effect at each lag precisely 
is generally difficult.
451
 Still, in both models the estimated long-term response as given by the 
sum of the estimated coefficients of LN_THRESHOLD and its lags is highly statistically sig-
nificant and respectively amounts to 0.027 in column (7) and 0.028 in column (8) of Table 31. 
As this is generally consistent with our previous results, we are confident that the static model 
used in previous regressions adequately captures the response. 
5.2.4.2 Refined Measurement of the Treatment Effect and Cross-Sectional Tests 
The regressions so far used the binary variable POST_INCREASE to identify the ef-
fect of an extension of eligibility for simplified tax accounting on the non-corporate share of 
business. To be able to make some more precise and nuanced statements about the marginal 
effect of an increase in turnover thresholds, we refine our main explanatory variable and sub-
stitute the dummy POST_INCREASE with a continuous variable THRESHOLD that directly 
reflects the applicable turnover thresholds (scaled in million euro). In all other respects, we 
stick to our generalized specification (column (6), Table 31) that controls for time-constant 
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 See Wooldridge (2013) p. 346. 
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confounding factors at the country-industry level, captures aggregate fluctuations via year 
fixed effects and includes a set of additional time-varying covariates as potential sources of 
omitted country-specific trends.   
Considering the results, the estimated coefficient of 0.047 in column (1) of Table 33 
means that, for example, an increase of turnover thresholds by € 340,000, which is about the 
average threshold increase in the reform countries, is expected to lead to an increase in the 
non-corporate share of business by 1.6 percentage points. Adjusting eligibility thresholds for 
inflation in column (2) of Table 33 does not alter our findings substantially. 
Specifications (1) and (2) in Table 33 assume that the effect of a change in 
THRESHOLD on the non-corporate share of business is constant. Given the skewed size dis-
tribution of enterprises, however, the effect likely flattens out for higher initial thresholds, i.e., 
an increase from € 200,000 to € 300,000 has more of an impact than a change from € 1 mil-
lion to € 1.1 million. Moreover, larger firms might be less inclined to respond to the benefits 
arising from simplified accounting due to non-tax benefits associated with incorporation. 
Hence, we continue onwards using turnover thresholds in logs in column (3) of Table 33. The 
specification yields a positive and significant coefficient of 0.013 for LN_THRESHOLD. Tak-
en at face value, this result implies that a 1% increase in the eligibility threshold is associated 
with a 0.013 percentage point increase in the non-corporate share of business.  
Next, we investigate whether the responsiveness of the corporate firm share to 
changes in eligibility thresholds varies with the general complexity of the tax system. Specifi-
cally, we expect accounting simplifications to be more attractive when the alternative ‘ordi-
nary’ regime is rather complex. For this cross-sectional test, we construct a dummy variable 
COMPLEX that marks countries with complex tax systems. COMPLEX equals one for coun-
tries where the time to comply with relevant tax rules, according to the World Bank, is above 
the sample median and zero otherwise. The underlying World Bank indicator approximates 
how many hours per year a domestic model corporation needs for the preparation of its tax 
returns and the actual payment of all relevant taxes. It reflects the time required to collect in-
formation, prepare separate mandatory tax accounting books, complete and file tax returns 
with proper agencies and arrange payment or withholding.  We include COMPLEX in our 
regression and interact it with LN_THRESHOLD. As shown in column (4) of Table 33, the 
coefficient of the interaction between LN_THRESHOLD and COMPLEX indeed proves statis-
tically significant and positive. Hence, the relief provided by simplified tax accounting in-
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creases in the complexity of the ordinary procedures of determining and paying taxes. This 
result corroborates the notion of simplified accounting regimes affecting the choice of legal 
form primarily through a reduction in compliance costs. 
Table 33: Eligibility for simplified tax accounting and non-corporate shares of business (refined measurement) 
 Eligibility  
threshold 
Inflation-adj. 
threshold 
Log threshold Tax complexity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
THRESHOLD 0.047***    
 
(0.016)    
THRESHOLD_INFL  
 
0.046**  
 
  
(0.018)  
 
LN_THRESHOLD    0.013** 0.005 
   (0.005) (0.006) 
LN_THRESHOLD#COMPLEX 
 
  0.005*** 
  
  (0.001) 
COMPLEX 
 
  0.022* 
  
  (0.013) 
Constant 2.756*** 2.740*** 2.946*** 2.345*** 
 (0.305) (0.306) (0.317) (0.346) 
Year dummies     
Country-Industry FE     
Additional controls     
Observations 7,030 7,030 7,030 5,807 
R
2
adj 0.127 0.126 0.126 0.099 
Notes: The dependent variable is the non-corporate firm share which equals the number of sole proprietorships 
divided by the number of all firms (excluding partnerships). All regressions control for country-industry fixed 
effects (within estimation) and a full set of year dummies. THRESHOLD is the turnover threshold up to which 
non-corporate enterprises are eligible for simplified tax accounting (in million euro). LN_THESHOLD is the 
natural logarithm of THRESHOLD. COMPLEX is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the required time to 
prepare tax returns and pay taxes in a country exceeds the respective sample median and 0 otherwise. Additional 
controls include TAX, GNIC, MINCAP and UNEMP. These variables are defined and scaled as given in Table A5 
in the appendix. Full regression results including the coefficients for all control variables are provided in Table 
A6 in the online appendix. Standard errors clustered at the country-industry level are given in parentheses; *, **, 
*** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
After all, the regressions in Tables 31 and 33 provide robust evidence of a statistical-
ly significant effect of changes in eligibility thresholds for simplified tax accounting on the 
non-corporate share of business. This is consistent with eligible enterprises responding to the 
incentives that arise from simplified tax accounting with respect to their choice of legal form. 
Using the results from Table 33, we can now illustrate the economic size of the effect.  
To this aim, we take the introductory example of the United Kingdom (see Section 
5.2.1) and carry out some back-of-the-envelope calculations. The country recently launched a 
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new regime of simplified tax accounting for non-corporate entities with turnover up to 
£ 77,000 (€ 96,500). Taking our results from column (1) of Table 33, the share of sole propri-
etorships is predicted to increase ceteris paribus by about 0.45 percentage points in re-
sponse.
452
 However, only about 40% of registered enterprises fall below the turnover thresh-
old of £ 77,000. Consistently, the non-corporate share of firms in that specific segment of the 
UK business population should ceteris paribus increase by 1.1 percentage points (= 
0.0045/0.40) in response to the new regime. Hence, with respect to this UK scenario, our re-
sults suggest that per one hundred firms within the scope of eligibility for simplified tax ac-
counting about one business that would incorporate absent simplified accounting now decides 
against incorporation. 
In addition, let us compare this response to the tax rate effect on legal form choice 
and calculate an equivalent change in the tax rate differential between non-corporate and cor-
porate firms. Using the consensus tax semi-elasticity of the corporate share of business of 0.7 
reported by de Mooij and Ederveen (2008)
453
, our results suggest that the effect from the in-
troduction of simplified tax accounting up to the turnover threshold of € 96,500 is equivalent 
to a 0.9 percentage point decrease in the tax rate difference between non-corporate and corpo-
rate firms.
454
 In other words, the estimated response of the corporate firm share to the new 
scheme of simplified accounting in the UK reflects an incentive not to incorporate which is 
equivalent to a ceteris paribus cut in the top personal tax rate by 0.9 percentage points. Inter-
estingly, this rough estimate is consistent with previous estimates of the relative tax compli-
ance cost burden, ranging between 0.6% and 3.7% of taxable income.
455
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 The response is calculated as follows: 0.0045 = 0.047 * EUR 96,500 / EUR 1,000,000. The THRESHOLD 
coefficient of 0.047 is taken from Table 33, column 1 (THRESHOLD is scaled in million euro). The data on size 
intervals of the business population in the UK are available from the Office for National Statistics. See Office of 
National Statistic: http://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/business/activitysizeandlocation/datasets/uk 
businessactivitysizeandlocation (retrieved on August 23, 2016). 
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 See De Mooij/Ederveen (2008) pp. 680 ff. 
454
 Again, taken at face value, column (1) of Table 33 suggests that the corporate firm share in the UK decreases 
by 0.45 percentage points or 0.6% (= 0.45 / (1-0.30)) in response to simplified tax accounting available up to the 
threshold of GBP 77,000. Taking the consensus tax semi-elasticity of 0.7 reported in De Mooij and Ederveen 
(2008), a decrease of the corporate share by 0.6% could also be induced by a decrease of the tax rate differential 
between profits from non-corporate and corporate business by 0.9 percentage points (–0.9 = –0.6 / 0.7), which 
can be achieved by a corresponding cut in the top personal income tax rate. See De Mooij/Ederveen (2008) pp. 
680 ff. 
455
 See Slemrod/Sorum (1984) pp. 461 ff.; Blumenthal/Slemrod (1992) pp. 373 ff.; Slemrod (1996) pp. 355 ff.; 
Eichfelder (2010) pp. 53 ff. 
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5.2.4.3 Robustness Checks 
In a series of robustness checks, we deal with potential non-linearity of the empirical 
relationship at stake and check the robustness of our results to alternative definitions of the 
dependent variable. All robustness analyses control for time-constant confounding factors at 
the country-industry level, capture aggregate fluctuations via year fixed effects and include a 
set of additional time-varying covariates to capture potential sources of omitted country-
specific trends.  
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 34, we take into account that the corporate share of 
business is a proportion bounded between zero and one. As a consequence, the effect of the 
explanatory variable cannot be constant for all initial levels of non-corporate shares. To ad-
dress this issue, we first use a logit transformation of the dependent variable.
456
 In other 
words, we map the bounded variable NONCORP to the real line, whereby the transformed 
variable equals ln (NONCORP / (1 – NONCORP)). Employing a logit transformation, though, 
has the caveat of excluding all observations of the non-corporate share taking the values zero 
and one, since the transformation is not defined at these values. As an alternative, Papke and 
Wooldridge (1996 & 2008) recommend a non-linear fractional logit model.
457
 Their approach 
avoids the abovementioned problem by fitting a generalized linear model (GLM) with a bi-
nomial distribution and a logit link function using quasi-maximum likelihood estimation.
 
With both estimation approaches our results turn out robust. Estimated coefficients of 
LN_THRESHOLD are again positive and significant at the 5% level when we employ the logit 
transformation in column (1) and the fractional logit model in column (2).
458
 
In the next two columns (3) and (4) of Table 33, we address the issue of how to in-
clude partnerships in the calculation of corporate shares. A clear assignment of partnerships 
either to the non-corporate or the corporate sector is not feasible because the partnership cate-
gory in Eurostat’s Business Demography does not separately report data for limited and un-
limited partnerships. Hence, it is impossible to determine whether the respective entities are 
subject to non-corporate or corporate tax treatment. We therefore assign partnerships to the 
corporate sector in column (3) and to the non-corporate sector in column (4) of Table 34. In 
both cases, we find that the inclusion of partnerships does not significantly affect our results. 
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 See Lesaffre/Rizopoulos/Tsonka (2007) pp. 72 ff. 
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 See Papke/Wooldridge (1996) pp. 619 ff.; Papke/Wooldridge (2008) pp. 121 ff. 
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 Table A7 in the appendix presents the marginal effects for the generalized linear model. 
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Table 34: Eligibility for simplified tax accounting and non-corporate shares of business (robustness checks) 
  
Non-linear estimation 
 
Inclusion of partnerships  Non-corporate 
share of 
employment 
Log  
transformation 
GLM  Corporate Non- 
corporate 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4)  (5) 
LN_THRESHOLD 0.068** 0.035** 
 
0.012** 0.011**  0.006 
 
(0.029) (0.015) 
 
(0.005) (0.005)  (0.007) 
Constant 13.273** 14.665***  2.872*** 2.908***  1.187** 
 (1.781) (2.026)  (0.317) (0.306)  (0.485) 
Year dummies         
Country-Industry FE        
Additional controls        
Observations 6,815 7,030 
 
7,029 7,029  6,090 
R
2
adj 0.128 -  0.100 0.149  0.045 
Notes: In regressions (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the non-corporate firm share which equals the num-
ber of sole proprietorships divided by the number of all firms (excluding partnerships).  In column (3), the de-
pendent variable is the non-corporate firm share but it is defined as the number of sole proprietorships divided by 
the number of all firms (including partnerships). In regression (4), non-corporate firm share is the number of 
non-corporate entities (including partnerships) divided by the number of all firms (including partnerships). In 
column (5), non-corporate employment share is the ratio of the number of persons employed in sole proprietor-
ships on the number of persons employed in all firms (excluding partnerships). All regressions except regression 
(2) control for country-industry fixed effects and a full set of year dummies. Regression (2) estimates a general-
ized linear model with a binomial distribution and a logit link function using quasi-maximum likelihood and 
includes full sets of country, industry and year dummies. LN_THRESHOLD is the natural logarithm of the turn-
over threshold up to which non-corporate enterprises are eligible for simplified tax accounting (in million euro). 
Additional controls include TAX, GNIC, MINCAP and UNEMP. These variables are defined and scaled as given 
in Table A5 in the appendix. Standard errors clustered at the country-industry level are given in parentheses; *, 
**, *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Lastly, we are interested in whether the distortion of legal form decisions induced by 
simplified accounting also comes along with a significant shift of employment from the cor-
porate to the non-corporate sector. In order to find this out, regression 5 of Table 34 uses the 
non-corporate share in employment as dependent variable in contrast to the non-corporate 
share in the number of businesses that was referred to in all previous regressions. In the re-
spective column (5) of Table 34, the estimated coefficient of LN_THRESHOLD (0.006) is 
positive but small and statistically insignificant at conventional significance levels. Hence, 
variation in eligibility thresholds for simplified accounting has a rather negligible effect on 
the number of persons actually employed in the non-corporate sector. As employment is con-
centrated in larger companies, this finding reflects that only the smallest businesses are target-
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ed by simplified tax accounting. Moreover, large companies generally tend to be less respon-
sive to tax-related incentives in their legal form.
459
  
5.2.5 Conclusion 
This study investigates whether the ability to choose simplified methods of tax ac-
counting is an important consideration in legal form decisions. Most European countries pro-
vide simplified, cash-based rules of tax accounting for small firms that considerably deviate 
from their general accrual tax accounting rules. Simplified tax accounting, however, is only 
available for non-corporate businesses. If simplified tax accounting was indeed associated 
with a net benefit, its (un-)availability could change the relative gain to incorporation.  
We test this conjecture using a sample of corporate share data derived from Euro-
stat’s Business Demography for 27 European countries over the period 2004 - 2010. Employ-
ing a difference-in-differences approach, we estimate the effect of variation in eligibility 
thresholds for simplified tax accounting by comparing the change in countries' non-corporate 
shares of business before and after a change in thresholds to the change in non-corporate 
shares of business in countries with a constant regime. The results from our generalized dif-
ference-in-differences regressions suggest that simplified tax accounting indeed distorts legal 
form decisions of eligible businesses. Quantitatively, we estimate an increase of the eligibility 
threshold by € 100,000 to increase the non-corporate firm share by about 0.47 percentage 
points. Moreover, our results suggest that, in relative terms, a 1% shift in the eligibility 
threshold increases the non-corporate share of business by about 0.013 percentage points. 
Taking the introductory example of the United Kingdom, where simplified tax accounting 
was introduced in 2012, back-of-the-envelope calculations on the basis of our results show 
that about one in a hundred newly eligible entrepreneurs might refrain from incorporation due 
to the introduction of the simplified regime.  
While our findings are consistent with businesses seeking to reduce accounting-
related compliance costs, we acknowledge that our approach, like any empirical study, is sub-
ject to some limitations. In particular, the aggregate nature of our legal form data makes it 
impracticable to trace legal form decisions around the relevant turnover cut-offs directly at the 
micro-level. Whereas our approach allows the detection of a statistical effect, we can only 
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 See Goolsbee (2004) pp. 2283 ff.; De Mooij/Nicodème (2008) pp. 478 ff. 
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approximate the response elasticities. We therefore propose that future research further ex-
plores this relevant real response to accounting rules once comprehensive and representative 
micro data on the distribution of legal forms in the business population are made accessible.    
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5.3 Interim Conclusion 
Tax incentives for specific groups of taxpayers are inherently opposed to the princi-
ple of neutrality that should be key in the design of tax systems. In some cases, a deterioration 
of the overall neutrality of the tax system is justifiable, e.g., by the alleviation of market fail-
ures. In the case of SME tax incentives, though, the benefits are mostly limited while the costs 
are substantial.  
Distortions of investment and legal form decisions constitute one major source of the 
welfare costs of SME tax incentives. The empirical evidence at hand documents distortions, 
which – at least to some degree – can be traced back to inadequate incentive designs. Above 
all, the ill-advised practice of applying eligibility criteria explicitly referring to firm size leads 
to adverse effects. If outgrowing certain size criteria comes along with the forfeiture of the 
benefits, firm growth around the thresholds obviously is discouraged. As a consequence, tax-
payers bunch at the kinks and notches created by the thresholds. They avoid outgrowing the 
size criteria given in tax codes as the costs of losing the incentives exceeds the benefits of 
growth. For income thresholds, comparatively small incentives have been shown to induce 
quite distinct bunching responses by taxpayers, which are predominantly attributable to mis-
reporting. Turnover and employment, two of the SME indicators proposed by the European 
Commission, in contrast, appear to be less responsive, most likely because they are not as 
easy to manipulate. Still, substantial bunching occurs at some notches in the examined coun-
tries. In particular, simplified regimes replacing ordinary income taxes as well as other duties 
such as social security contributions and the VAT offer benefits to the very smallest business-
es which are big enough for these businesses to actually pass up growth opportunities. The 
evidence suggests that the benefits relate to the actual tax liability as well as to the administra-
tive burden induced by taxation.  
In line with these results, access to simplified tax accounting also distorts the legal 
form decision of entrepreneurs. As the simplified procedures are usually only available for 
non-corporate entities, they constitute an incentive to refrain from incorporation. Quantitative-
ly, about one in a hundred entrepreneurs remains non-corporate if he can thereby dodge more 
complex regulations on tax accounting. For policy-makers, these results do not only show the 
significance of compliance costs for small businesses but also the importance of a careful de-
sign of SME tax incentives. Obviously, certain distortions cannot be avoided completely. 
With regard to simplified tax accounting, for example, an extension of the regimes to corpo-
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rate entities is likely to be useless as corporations are usually obliged to keep accruals-based 
books for financial reporting purposes anyway. Moreover, other eligibility criteria than turno-
ver thresholds are hardly feasible so that administrative notches are practically inevitable. 
Legislators should, however, be careful not to offer too beneficial regimes that deviate starkly 
from the standard procedures. Otherwise, the transition to the ordinary regime becomes an 
actual barrier to growth. As far as non-administrative reliefs such as tax credits or special al-
lowances are concerned, explicit size criteria should clearly be avoided. If small businesses 
are intended to benefit more from the respective regimes than large entities, absolute caps on 
available reliefs are the superior approach. Such caps do not directly discourage businesses 
from growing and they are easier to handle from an administrative point of view. 
Besides distortions of investment and legal form decisions, SME tax incentives come 
along with further disadvantages. First of all, provisions awarding special treatment to certain 
taxpayers raise the complexity of the tax code, which increases compliance costs for taxpay-
ers as well as the collection costs on the side of tax administrations.
460
 Given small business-
es’ sensitivity to compliance costs, policy-makers should thus be particularly careful if and 
how to install discriminatory provisions. Additional opportunities for tax planning and misuse 
are another factor to consider in this regard.
461
 Even in the absence of misuse, though, SME 
tax incentives cause substantial losses in (net) tax revenues. Due to the large number of 
SMEs, even incentives of limited generosity can have significant repercussions. In the U.S., 
for example, SME tax incentives have been estimated to induce revenue costs of $ 11.5 bil-
lion in 2009, which amounts to about 0.5% of the overall federal tax collections and almost 
8% of the corporate tax revenue.
462
 Limiting the number of eligible SMEs by additional crite-
ria, on the other hand, makes provisions even more complex and less attractive for the ad-
dressed small businesses who suffer from disproportionate compliance burdens anyway.  
Negative effects on the overall fairness of the tax system and unwanted redistributive 
properties are further concerns over the use of SME tax incentives. In the end, all taxes are 
carried by individuals, most notably the owners whose returns are diminished by business 
taxes. As the owners of small businesses are, on average, significantly richer than the rest of 
                                                 
460
 See Chen/Mintz (2011) p. 17. 
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 See Bird/Wallace (2004) pp. 143 ff.; Keen (2013) p. 27.  
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 This number does only include the incentives explicitly targeted at SMEs. Adding indirect benefits for small 
businesses, the figure could be substantially higher. See Department of the Treasury (2010) p. iii; Looney (2011) 
p. 132. 
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the population, SME tax incentives could introduce regressive elements to taxation, thus mak-
ing the rich even richer.
463
 From a policy perspective, the introduction of SME tax incentives 
may also be dangerous because incentives are difficult to revoke. Once businesses have got 
used to certain benefits, policy-makers usually refrain from taking them back. Oftentimes, 
businesses and lobbyists even demand the extension of reliefs. In the case of SME tax incen-
tives, this could mean an extension to large businesses or an increased generosity of the incen-
tives.
464
  
Summing up, the costs and adverse effects outweigh the benefits for the vast majori-
ty of currently available SME tax incentives, in particular the non-administrative regimes. 
Policy-makers should therefore shift their focus to the provision of a neutral and simple tax 
system. Instead of trying to compensate for one distortion by introducing another, the removal 
of the actual frictions – especially those emanating from the tax system – must be pursued. 
Accordingly, exclusive benefits for SMEs should generally be refrained from. This would not 
only be conducive to the simplicity and the neutrality of taxation, but it would also free re-
sources for broadly applicable tax reductions and additional public spending, e.g., on educa-
tion and infrastructure.
465
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 See Guenther (2009) p. 24; Looney (2011) pp. 129 f. On the other hand, theoretical as well as empirical evi-
dence suggests that employees and customers also carry a substantial part of the tax burden imposed on busi-
nesses. See Harberger (1962) pp. 215 ff.; Diamond/Mirrlees (1971a) pp. 8 ff.; Harberger (2006) pp. 283 ff.; 
Gravelle (2013) pp. 185 ff.  
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 See Crawford/Freedman (2010) p. 1086; Alt/Preston/Sibieta (2010) pp. 1226 ff.; Ar-
nold/Brys/Heady/Johansson/Schwellnus/Vartia (2011) p. F73. 
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6. Designing an Investment-Friendly Tax System for SMEs – The Case of Germa-
ny  
The above analysis provides evidence that SME tax incentives are usually not an ad-
equate policy tool to encourage innovation, job creation and economic growth. Neither are tax 
incentives the right instrument to correct for elements of the tax system that systematically 
discriminate against SMEs (except for excessive compliance burdens). Instead, policy-makers 
should directly address the shortcomings of the tax system and provide a generally invest-
ment-friendly tax environment for all businesses including SMEs. For SMEs – especially for 
the innovative high-growth SMEs being targeted by numerous policy initiatives – neutrality, 
simplicity and the absence of impediments to growth and internationalization are the most 
important properties of an attractive tax system. The following study examines in how far 
German policy-makers have succeeded in this endeavor since 2000.
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6.1 Introduction 
Despite the highlighted significance of SMEs in Germany – the so-called Mittel-
stand – German policy-makers have mostly refrained from the usage of SME tax incen-
tives.
467
 While this approach is commendable, the overall investment-friendliness of the Ger-
man tax system has been questioned regularly.
468
 The two most recent major tax reforms in 
Germany – the Steuersenkungsgesetz in 2001 and the Unternehmensteuerreformgesetz in 
2008/09 – explicitly aimed at improving investment conditions in Germany, thereby creating 
jobs and increasing Germany’s long-term attractiveness as an investment destination. The 
endeavor, however, has been perceived to be unsuccessful.
469
 Germany’s tax system is still 
seen as a competitive disadvantage rather than a factor encouraging business activity. The 
following analysis investigates whether this perception is justified or if the reforms actually 
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 The study is joint work with Christoph Spengel and was originally conducted for the German Sachverstän-
digenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung [Sachverständigenrat], a leading German 
institution that annually evaluates the development of the economy and advises policy-makers. See Sachverstän-
digenrat (2015) pp. 336 ff.; Spengel/Bergner (2015) pp. 1 ff. The data on the cost of capital and effective tax 
rates is taken from a study by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) for the European Commis-
sion. See ZEW (2015) pp. 1 ff. 
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 Disregarding administrative reliefs such the VAT exemption and the option of simplified tax accounts for the 
very smallest businesses, only two minor SME tax incentives exist in Germany. The investment reserve and the 
scheme of accelerated depreciation only apply to micro businesses and their impact on effective tax burdens is 
very limited. See Section 3.1.1 and the country report on Germany in Annex 1. 
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 See Evers/Spengel/Braun (2015) pp. 3 ff.; Schlie/Spengel/Malke (2015) pp. 570 ff.  
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 See Kleinedam/Liebchen (2007) pp. 409 ff.; Homburg (2006) pp. 6 ff. The rather negative perception also 
became apparent in the mass media. See Spiegel (2007): http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/reform-der-
unternehmensteuer-steinbruecks-mogelpackung-a-459998.html (retrieved on July 20, 2016). 
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increased the competitiveness of the German tax system. The focus of the analysis is in par-
ticular on potential impediments for small and up-coming SMEs.  
The following analysis includes a review of the most important elements of the 
Steuersenkungsgesetz in 2001 and the Unternehmensteuerreformgesetz in 2008/09 (Section 
6.2) as well as an extensive quantification of the effects of the reforms with the help of the 
Devereux/Griffith Model (Section 6.4). The latter is a neoclassical model, which calculates 
after-tax costs of capital and average effective tax rates for investments based on the national 
tax codes in the EU (Section 6.3). It enables a cross-country comparison of effective tax bur-
dens of domestic and cross-border investments as well as a comparison of different types of 
investments and forms of financing. The analysis thus allows conclusions about the develop-
ment of the international competitiveness of the German tax system and – probably even more 
important with regard to SMEs – about its neutrality and the induced discrimination against 
SMEs. The exclusion of transparently taxed entities is a limitation of the analysis with the 
Devereux/Griffith model. Chapter 6.4.4 therefore complements the quantitative analysis and 
gives an overview of the most important developments in the taxation of sole proprietors and 
partnerships before Section 6.5 summarizes the main findings of the analysis. 
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6.2 German Tax Reforms in 2001 and 2008/09 
At the end of the 1990’s, the taxation of corporate entities and their shareholders dis-
tinguished significantly from today’s approach as Germany applied a dividend imputation 
system. Under this approach, double taxation is avoided by imputing the amount of corporate 
income tax paid to the personal income tax payable on the shareholder level. 
 In 1999, corporations were subject to a split corporate income tax rate. Retained 
profits were taxed at 40% whereas a reduced rate of 30% was applied to distributed profits. 
Hence, retained profits were significantly disadvantaged. Besides the corporate income tax, 
corporations were subject to the solidarity surcharge (5.5% of the corporate income tax paya-
ble) and the trade tax (on average about 15% of the adjusted taxable income), which was de-
ductible for the determination of its own tax base as well as the corporate income tax base. 
Altogether, the average nominal tax rate on profits on the corporate level amounted to 52.35% 
in 1999. With regard to taxable income, a broadening of the tax base had kicked in prior to 
1999 as increasingly restrictive rules on the recognition of provisions and the offset of losses 
were established.
470
 
On the shareholder level, distributed profits were fully subject to the progressive per-
sonal income tax schedule. As mentioned before, the corporate income tax paid was deducted, 
thereby reducing the personal income tax payable. Ultimately, distributed profits were thus 
only subject to the personal income tax of the shareholder (including the solidarity surcharge) 
and the trade tax. The progressive income tax rate in 1999 ranged from 23.9% to 53% and 
decreased in the following year (to 22.9% and 51%, respectively). Individuals’ capital gains 
from the disposal of shares were exempt from the personal income tax if the shares were held 
for at least one year and if the holding quota did not exceed 10%.
471
 
Altogether, Germany – with a nominal tax burden of over 50% – had the reputation 
of a high-tax country around the turn of the millennium and the full imputation system for 
dividends was increasingly criticized for being too complicated, too prone to misuse and even 
illegitimate under European law. The government therefore initiated a tax reform in 2001, the 
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 The restrictions included, for example, restricted set-offs of losses incurred by foreign permanent establish-
ments or the limitation of loss carrybacks. For a comprehensive description of the German taxation of corpora-
tion before the reform in 2001, see Jacobs/Scheffler (1998) pp. 136 ff. 
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the regular rate applied to capital gains from shares that were classified as business assets. 
197 
 
Steuersenkungsgesetz, that intended the provision of comprehensive tax reliefs for businesses, 
employees and families by lowering nominal tax rates while broadening the tax base. The 
reform intended to enhance the competitiveness of Germany’s economy and to promote 
growth and job creation. Further goals included improved equity and transparency in the tax 
system and more planning dependability. 
Most importantly, the Steuersenkungsgesetz replaced the full imputation system with 
a shareholder relief system, the so-called Halbeinkünfteverfahren. Under this system, double 
taxation was reduced by a lower corporate income tax rate and a 50% exemption of distribu-
tions on the shareholder level. Other major changes included the modification of depreciation 
rules, the reduction of PIT rates and the imputation of a part of the trade tax to the personal 
income tax for transparently taxed entities (see Table 35 for an overview).
472
 
Table 35: Major changes introduced by the Steuersenkungsgesetz (2001) 
Change Description 
Standardization and reduction of the 
CIT rate 
 25% on retained and distributed profits 
Introduction of the Halbeinkünftever-
fahren for the taxation of dividends 
 exemption of 50% of dividends from corporations on the share-
holder level 
 taxation of the other 50% at the progressive personal income tax 
rate plus solidarity surcharge 
 application also for shareholdings in foreign companies and 
shareholdings classified as business assets 
Change of capital gains taxation (dis-
posal of shareholdings classified as 
non-business assets) 
 application of the Halbeinkünfteverfahren for sales within 1 year 
 application of the Halbeinkünfteverfahren if a qualified share-
holding (> 1%) existed in the 5 years prior to the sale 
 exemption of capital gains from unqualified shareholdings 
(< 1%) 
Modification of depreciation rules 
 reduction of depreciation rate for movable assets from 30 to 20% 
(declining balance method) 
 extension of the depreciation period for buildings (business fa-
cilities) from 25 to 33 years 
Stepwise reduction of progressive PIT 
rate 
 from 51% (2000) to 48.5% (2001–2003), 45% (2004) and even-
tually 42% in 2005 (top rate) 
 from 22.9% (2000) to 19.9% (2001–2003), 16% (2004) and 
eventually 15% in 2005 (bottom rate) 
Exemption of dividends and capital 
gains from the disposal of sharehold-
ings for corporate entities  
 5% of dividends and capital gains taxable as non-deductible 
business expense  
 includes outbound investments if no CFC rules apply 
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198 
 
Change Description 
Reduction of withholding tax on capi-
tal investments 
 from 25% to 20% 
Tax relief for transparently taxed busi-
nesses 
 (partly) imputation of the trade tax in the personal income tax 
(180% of the Gewerbesteuermessbetrag – ca. 40% of the average 
trade tax payable)  
 
In the years following the 2001 tax reform, some minor changes occurred that had an 
impact on businesses’ effective tax rates. In 2003, the corporate income tax rate was tempo-
rarily increased to 26.5% and in 2006 the depreciation rate for movable business assets was 
raised to 30% again. In 2007, a new maximum PIT rate of 45% was introduced.  
In spite of the comprehensive reform in 2001, Germany still exhibited comparably 
high tax burdens for corporations. The Unternehmensteuerreformgesetz in 2008/09 therefore 
aimed at further improving the conditions for growth and employment and at making Germa-
ny more attractive for foreign investors. Securing long-term tax revenues was another crucial 
motivation for the reform. The most important component of the reform was the evolution of 
the shareholder relief system. The corporate income tax rate was further reduced and the Hal-
beinkünfteverfahren was replaced by the Teileinkünfteverfahren and the Abgeltungsteuer. 
Moreover, the trade tax was modified again while the tax base of the corporate income tax 
further broadened (see Table 36 for an overview of the changes).
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Table 36: Major changes introduced by the Unternehmensteuerreformgesetz (2008/09) 
Change Description 
Reduction of the CIT rate  from 25% to 15% 
Introduction of the Abgeltungsteuer and the 
Teileinkünfteverfahren for the taxation of 
dividends derived from shareholdings classi-
fied as non-business assets 
 gross taxation of dividends at 25% (plus solidarity sur-
charge) for shareholdings not classified as business as-
sets (Abgeltungsteuer) 
 no deduction of related expenses except for a lump-sum 
deduction of 801 € (Sparerpauschbetrag) 
 if holding quota over 25% or if over 1% and shareholder 
is also an employee of the respective company (= quali-
fied shareholding), the shareholder has the option of ap-
plying the Teileinkünfteverfahren: taxation of 60% of the 
dividend at progressive PIT rate of the shareholder (simi-
lar to Halbeinkünfteverfahren but with a less generous 
exemption)  
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Change Description 
Introduction of the Abgeltungsteuer and the 
Teileinkünfteverfahren for the taxation of 
capital gains derived from the disposal of 
shareholdings classified as non-business as-
sets 
 gross taxation of capital gains at 25% (plus solidarity 
surcharge) for shareholdings not classified as business 
assets that have not reached holding quota of at least 1% 
within the 5 years prior to the disposal (Abgeltungsteuer) 
 application of the Teileinkünfteverfahren if shareholding 
reached holding quota of at least 1% within the 5 years 
prior to the disposal (= qualified shareholding) 
Introduction of the Teileinkünfteverfahren for 
shareholdings classified as business assets 
 application of the Teileinkünfteverfahren for dividends 
and capital gains from shareholdings classified as busi-
ness assets (irrespective of the holding quota) 
Introduction of the Abgeltungsteuer for inter-
est payments (non-business assets) 
 income from interest payments subject to the Abgeltung-
steuer if derived from assets not classified as business 
assets 
Modification of depreciation rules  
 abolition of declining balance method 
 immediate depreciation only for assets with acquisition 
costs up to € 150 (again increased to 410 € in 2010) 
Modification of the trade tax 
 trade tax payable no longer deductible as a business ex-
pense 
 standardization and decrease of base rate (Gew-
erbesteuermesszahl) for all legal forms 
 increased imputation of trade tax within the PIT (maxi-
mum of 3.8 times the base rate (previously 1.8) for trans-
parently taxed businesses) 
 extended catalogue of non-deductible expenses for fi-
nancing and leasing (25%) 
 reduction of non-deductible interest payments that are 
added to the tax base from 50% to 25% 
Introduction of the interest barrier 
(Zinsschranke) 
 interest expenses fully deductible up to the amount of 
taxable income from interest payments  
 beyond this amount interest expenses are deductible up 
to € 1 million or 30% of EBITDA 
 restriction not applicable if taxpayer is neither a member 
of a group nor inadequately financed by shareholder debt 
and if certain criteria with regard to the equity ratio are 
satisfied 
Other changes 
 more restrictive loss trafficking rules 
 introduction of a reduced proportional PIT rate for re-
tained profits (deferred taxation upon distribution)  
Since 2008, business taxation in Germany has not experienced major changes. Minor 
modifications include the temporary re-emergence of the declining balance method for the 
depreciation of movable assets in 2009 and 2010 (maximum depreciation rate: 25%) as well 
as the introduction of more generous rules for loss offsets in the corporate income tax and a 
relaxation of the interest barrier (maximum for deductible interest expenses not covered by 
qualifying interest income increased from € 1 million to € 3 million). 
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6.3 Measuring Effective Tax Rates with the Devereux/Griffith Model 
This examination of the general investment friendliness of the German tax system 
and its evolution from 1999 to 2014 centers around the calculation of effective tax rates of 
corporations.
474
 The analysis covers domestic as well as outbound (German investor with a 
foreign subsidiary) and inbound cross-border investments (foreign investor with a German 
subsidiary). Effective tax burdens are measured in two ways. First, the cost of capital is con-
sidered. It primarily influences the volume of investments and the competitiveness of busi-
nesses. Second, the analysis uses effective average tax rates (EATR) of profitable invest-
ments. This measure drives the basic decision to invest as well as location decisions of com-
panies. Both indicators are calculated for Germany and the other EU Member States to not 
only allow conclusions on the evolution of investment conditions in Germany but also on 
Germany’s competitiveness and the appropriateness of its reforms with regard to the interna-
tional tax competition.  
The neoclassical Devereux/Griffith Model is the approach chosen to calculate the 
cost of capital and effective average tax rates.
475
 The calculation of the former is based on a 
marginal (normalized) one-period investment (i.e., the after-tax net present value is zero). The 
model determines the cost of capital that a business must generate in order to pay investors 
exactly the required minimum rate of return (usually derived from comparable capital market 
investments). The tax burden of the marginal investment, the so-called effective marginal tax 
rate (EMTR), is calculated as follows: 
EMTR = 
p
rp
~
~  , 
where p~ denotes the costs of capital and r the after-tax rate of return. 
The model assumes the size of the investment to be extended until marginal returns 
equal marginal costs. The cost of capital impacts the volume of investments and a country’s 
relative attractiveness for investment extensions compared to alternative investment locations. 
As the cost of capital is given for different types of assets and financing, the model also al-
lows a differentiated analysis of the impact of taxes with regard to these factors. Lastly, the 
                                                 
474
 The exclusive consideration of corporations, of course, represents a limitation of the model as many SMEs, 
especially micro enterprises, do not incorporate. Section 6.4.4, however, also discusses the development of effec-
tive tax rates for transparently taxed entities.  
475
 See Devereux/Griffith (1999) pp. 1 ff.; Devereux/Griffith (2003) pp. 107 ff. The following summary of the 
approach also builds on the detailed model descriptions given in previous studies. See Sachverständigenrat 
(2001) pp. 296 ff.; European Commission (2015b) pp. 104 ff. 
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cost of capital is an indicator of price floors below which businesses are pushed out of the 
market. Higher (lower) cost of capital requires higher (lower) prices and deteriorates the com-
petitiveness. Hence, the analysis of the cost of capital points to potential effects of taxes on 
international competition. 
Oftentimes, investors are more interested in the effects of taxation on profitable un-
dertakings than they are in marginal investments. Such investments feature a positive net pre-
sent value and generate so-called economic rents. The measure of interest for these invest-
ments is the effective average tax rate (EATR). It is more useful in scenarios where investors 
face the choice between alternative profitable investments, e.g., if a subsidiary can be founded 
in different locations or if alternative production technologies are available. The EATR ac-
cording to the Devereux/Griffith Model is calculated as the difference of the pre-tax and the 
after-tax net present value (R* and R, respectively) divided by the discounted pre-tax rate of 
return p: 
EATR = 
r
p
RR


1
*
. 
The calculation of the EATR is based on the tax-induced reduction of the NPV. From 
the point of view of the investor, the attractiveness of an investment at a certain location in-
creases in its NPV and decreases in the EATR.  
The model by Devereux/Griffith also relates the EATR to the EMTR, thereby dis-
playing the similarities and differences of both measures: 
EATR = 
us
p
pp
EMTR
p
p



~~
. 
Disregarding taxation on the shareholder level, the EATR represents the weighted 
average of the EMTR and the nominal CIT rate su on returns exceeding the cost of capital.
476
 
Accordingly, the EATR and the EMTR are the same for marginal investments (i.e., when the 
rate of return equals the costs of capital). If the rate of return increases, however, the EATR 
approaches the nominal tax rate su.  
For tax purposes, deductions such as depreciation (partly) offset positive future cash 
flows when determining taxable income. The role of provisions relating to the tax base and 
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 For a detailed description of this relation as well as the following remarks, see Spengel/Lammersen (2001) 
pp. 222 ff. 
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the tax rate therefore depends on the relative size of the cash flows. Marginal investments 
have a net present value of zero, i.e., the present value of future cash flows merely equals the 
initial investment. Hence, provisions relating to the tax base are comparatively influential in 
this scenario underlying the calculation of the EMTR. Highly profitable investments, in con-
trast, feature larger cash flows. The EATR is therefore primarily driven by the tax rate apply-
ing to the difference of cash flow and deductible tax-related expenses (see Figure 14 for an 
overview of the most important drivers of both measures).  
Figure 14: Measures of effective tax burden and main drivers (Devereux/Griffith model) 
 
Altogether, a comprehensive evaluation of the effects of the German tax reforms in 
2001 and 2008/09 on the investment climate requires the cost of capital
477
 as well as the 
EATR. The cost of capital is an indicator of the price floor of businesses. It allows conclu-
sions about the competitiveness of businesses which operate in the same markets but are sub-
ject to different tax systems. Moreover, the cost of capital is needed for inferences on the vol-
ume of potential investments. The EATR, on the other hand, is the relevant measure for 
choices between different investment projects and locations. 
                                                 
477
 The cost of capital and the EMTR can be used interchangeably as each measure is based on a marginal in-
vestment and both measures are directly connected to each other, i.e., the EMTR increases in the cost of capital. 
The cost of capital, however, is the more intuitive measure to interpret. The analysis in Section 6.4 therefore 
focuses on the cost of capital as the main measure of interest. 
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In the calculation of effective tax burdens for Germany and the other EU Member 
States, differences in tax systems, types of applicable taxes, tax bases and tax rates are distin-
guished on the level of the company and the level of the investor. The underlying economic 
model of the Dervereux/Griffith approach assumes a domestic company and a domestic inves-
tor in the base setting. The company can invest in five types of assets while the required capi-
tal can either stem from self-financing, new equity or debt financing. In the case of self-
financing, the profits of the company are retained and increases in company value are realized 
as capital gains when the shares are disposed of at the end of the investment period. In the 
case of new equity, only dividends are paid, whereas debt financing induces interest payments 
at a fixed interest rate. Only profits exceeding this rate are distributed as dividends. On the 
investor level, three kinds of investors are distinguished: 1) investors being exempt from taxa-
tion, 2) investors with a qualified holding underlying the maximum nominal tax rate and 3) 
investors with an unqualified holding underlying the maximum nominal tax rate (see Figure 
15). 
Figure 15: Framework for domestic investments (Devereux/Griffith model) 
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Based on the scheme displayed in Figure 15, the following components of the tax 
code are included in the calculations: 
 Income taxes on the company level that are affected by the investments undertaken 
and the types of financing used  
 nominal tax rates 
 depreciation on intangible assets, machinery and buildings 
 valuation of inventory 
 deductibility of interest expenses 
 structure of the corporate income tax systems 
 non-profit taxes on the company level 
 nominal tax rates 
 tax bases 
 income tax on the shareholder level 
 on dividends 
 on capital gains 
 on income from interest payments 
 wealth tax at the investor level 
 on shareholdings 
 on receivables of natural persons depending on the kind of shareholding (quali-
fied or unqualified) 
Moreover, assumptions on the types of assets, investors and financing as well as the 
pre-tax rate of return, the real interest rate, the inflation rate and the economic depreciation 
period of assets need to be made (see Table 37). Given five possible asset classes, three ways 
of financing and three types of investors, 45 investment scenarios exist in the model. In order 
to keep the analysis manageable, the analysis does not consider each combination separately 
but uses overall effective tax rates that are derived as weighted averages of all possible com-
binations. While a balanced average is taken across all types of assets and investors, self-
financing is weighted stronger (55%) than new equity (10%) and debt financing (35%). Addi-
tionally, the following analysis displays the cost of capital and the EATR separately for the 
company and the investor level. 
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Table 37: Model assumptions (Devereux/Griffith model) 
Assumptions on applicable types of taxes and tax bases 
Company level 
corporate income tax, surcharges, local business taxes, non-profit 
taxes 
Investor level personal income tax, wealth tax, surcharges 
Tax base 
depreciation, method of valuing inventory, deductibility of interest 
expenses 
Types of assets intangible assets, buildings, machinery, financial assets, inventory 
Assumptions on assets, financing and investors 
Financing self-financing, new equity financing, debt financing 
Investors 
maximum (marginal) nominal tax rate (qualified and unqualified 
holding), zero tax rate  
Weighting of assets, investors and financing 
proportional weighting for different types of assets (20% each) and 
investors (33.3% each); unbalanced weighting for different forms of  
financing (55% self-financing, 10% new equity financing, 35% 
debt financing) 
Assumptions on depreciation, inflation, interest rate and pre-tax rate of return 
Economic depreciation period 
12.5 years for 
intangibles 
53 years for 
buildings 
11 years for 
machinery 
Inflation rate 2% 
Real interest rate 5% 
Pre-tax rate of return (EATR) 20% 
Although shareholder taxation is included in the analysis, its importance for invest-
ment decisions is not clear. It is highly dependent on the spectrum of investors of a company. 
In the case of SMEs, which often feature a small number of natural persons as shareholders – 
possibly even making their living on the proceeds from the company – investor-level taxes 
can be assumed to play a significant role. In contrast to that, multinational companies with 
larger numbers of shareholders usually do not take personal income taxation into account in 
their decision-making. Reasons hereof include the lack of information about the individual 
circumstances of the shareholders as well as the irrelevance of personal taxes resulting from 
the exemption of many (institutional) shareholders and the high degree of mobility of capital. 
Moreover, the required rate of return for large enterprises is likely to be independent from the 
domestic supply of capital. Instead, large businesses can access global capital markets on 
which the taxation of capital income in single countries is of very limited relevance. Domestic 
personal taxes therefore rather affect the saving decisions of domestic investors than the actu-
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al cost of capital of (public) companies.
478
 In order to cover all possible scenarios and because 
of the special focus on SMEs, taxes on the investor level are considered separately for domes-
tic investments in the following analysis. 
 
  
                                                 
478
 Personal income taxes may still be relevant for the costs of capital if an imputation system is applied domesti-
cally and the shares are predominantly held by taxpayers with unlimited tax liability. This case should be the 
exemption rather than the rule for multinational companies, though.  
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6.4 Costs of Capital and Effective Average Tax Rates for German Investments 
6.4.1 Cost of Capital and Effective Average Tax Rate for Domestic German Investments  
6.4.1.1 Corporate Level 
a)  Cost of Capital 
Tables 38 and 38 display the development of the cost of capital on the corporate level 
for the purely domestic case from 1999 to 2014. The calculations distinguish the three forms 
of financing (see Table 38
479
) and the five possible types of assets (see Table 39). 
From 1999 to 2014, the average cost of capital on the corporate level decreased from 
7.7% to 6.5%. Disregarding the investor level, investment conditions in Germany improved 
for corporate businesses. At the end of the period, the pre-tax rate of return required from in-
vestments in order to be profitable is 1.2 percentage points lower than in 1999. Since the Un-
ternehmensteuerreformgesetz in 2008/09, however, the cost of capital has remained at the 
level of 6.5% due to a lack of reforms. 
Table 38: Cost of capital of domestic investment on corporate level in Germany by type of financing (Deve-
reux/Griffith model)  
CoC in % SF EF DF Ø 
1999 10.4 8.1 3.5 7.7 
2000 10.4 8.1 3.5 7.7 
2001 8.4 8.4 4.6 7.1 
2002 8.4 8.4 4.6 7.1 
2003 8.6 8.6 4.6 7.2 
2004 8.4 8.4 4.6 7.1 
2005 8.4 8.4 4.6 7.1 
2006 8.3 8.3 4.5 7.0 
2007 8.3 8.3 4.5 7.0 
2008 7.4 7.4 4.7 6.5 
2009 7.3 7.3 4.6 6.4 
2010 7.3 7.3 4.6 6.4 
2011 7.4 7.4 4.7 6.5 
2012 7.4 7.4 4.7 6.5 
2013 7.4 7.4 4.7 6.5 
2014 7.4 7.4 4.7 6.5 
 
                                                 
479
 As described in Section 6.3, the average cost of capital is derived by an unbalanced weighting of the three 
forms of financing: self-financing (55%), equity financing (10%) and debt financing (35%). The same weighting 
is applied in the remainder of the analysis. 
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With regard to the different forms of financing (see Table 38), self-financing and 
new equity financing were unburdened significantly whereas the cost of capital for debt fi-
nancing increased. Moreover, the cost of capital of both forms of equity financing were 
aligned in 2001. The development was especially beneficial for businesses with limited access 
to capital markets – a group that includes the majority of SMEs. Real investments (i.e., build-
ings, intangibles and machinery) were subject to smaller reliefs compared to financial assets. 
Their relative advantage in terms of cost of capital was reduced from 3.2 percentage points in 
1999 (10% compared to 6.8%) to 0.8 percentage points in 2014 (7.2% compared to 6.4%). 
Investments in financial assets were therefore more incentivized than real investments.  
Table 39: Cost of capital of domestic investment on corporate level in Germany by asset type (Deve-
reux/Griffith model) 
CoC in % Buildings 
Intangi-
bles 
Machinery 
Financial 
assets 
Inventory Ø 
1999 7.5 6.4 6.8 10.0 7.9 7.7 
2000 7.5 6.4 6.8 10.0 7.9 7.7 
2001 7.3 6.1 6.9 8.2 6.9 7.1 
2002 7.3 6.1 6.9 8.2 6.9 7.1 
2003 7.4 6.1 6.9 8.4 7.0 7.2 
2004 7.3 6.1 6.9 8.2 6.9 7.1 
2005 7.3 6.1 6.9 8.2 6.9 7.1 
2006 7.3 6.1 6.3 8.2 6.9 7.0 
2007 7.4 6.1 6.3 8.2 6.9 7.0 
2008 6.7 5.7 6.4 7.2 6.3 6.5 
2009 6.7 5.7 6.0 7.2 6.3 6.4 
2010 6.7 5.7 6.0 7.2 6.3 6.4 
2011 6.7 5.7 6.4 7.2 6.3 6.5 
2012 6.7 5.7 6.4 7.2 6.3 6.5 
2013 6.7 5.7 6.4 7.2 6.3 6.5 
2014 6.7 5.7 6.4 7.2 6.3 6.5 
 
Looking at the two major reforms, the effects of the Steuersenkungsgesetz in 2001 
are clearly noticeable. The alignment of the corporate income tax rate for retained and distrib-
uted profits to 25% (from 40% and 30%, respectively) equalized the cost of capital for both 
forms of equity financing (8.4%). While the cost of capital on self-financing decreased signif-
icantly from 10.4%, new equity financing experienced a slight increase of the cost of capital. 
The two main drivers of this development were the reduction of the CIT rate and the broaden-
ing of the tax base. For self-financing, the tax rate cut outweighed the increasingly restrictive 
depreciation rules (i.e., reduced depreciation rates for movable assets and buildings) while the 
extended tax base dominated in the case of new equity. For debt financing, an even larger 
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increase in the cost of capital occurred (from 3.5% to 4.6%) with new depreciation rules as 
well as the diminished value of interest deductions due to the reduced CIT rate being the main 
causes. With regard to the years prior to 1999, it needs to be mentioned that investment condi-
tions had already deteriorated for some taxpayers because of more restrictive rules on loss 
offsets. Provisions on loss offsets, however, cannot be implemented in the Devereux/Griffith 
model. 
Altogether, the Steuersenkungsgesetz reduced the average cost of capital over all 
forms of financing and all types of assets from 7.7% to 7.1%. Especially the alignment and 
the reduction of the CIT rate improved the investment conditions for businesses. Moreover, 
the neutrality of the tax system with regard to financing was improved. The relief for equity 
financing is especially important for young and innovative SMEs which often have problems 
in acquiring debt financing. On the negative side, the new depreciation rules reduced the rela-
tive attractiveness of real investments compared to financial investments. In particular, ma-
chinery was affected. It is the only asset type for which the cost of capital increased (from 
6.8% to 6.9%). 
In the years following the reform in 2001, the cost of capital remained mostly con-
stant until the Unternehmensteuerreformgesetz in 2008/09. Only the temporary increase of the 
CIT rate and the increase of the depreciation rate for movable assets caused small changes, 
i.e., an increase from 7.1% to 7.2% in 2003 and a reduction from 7.1% to 7.0% in 2006.  
The second major tax reform in 2008/09 followed a similar approach as the first one: 
The tax rate was reduced from 25% to 15% at the cost of a broadened tax base (abolition of 
the declining balance method of depreciation). Accordingly, the changes in the cost of capital 
on the corporate level were similar to those occurring in 2001. For equity financing the reduc-
tion in the CIT rate outweighed the deterioration of depreciation rules (cost of capital reduced 
from 8.3% to 7.4%) whereas debt financing was subject to higher cost of capital after the re-
form (4.7% compared to 4.5%). The value of interest deductions decreased due to the reduced 
tax rate. On average, the cost of capital was reduced from 7.0% to 6.5%. Moreover, the neu-
trality with respect to financing was further improved. A substantial difference of 2.7 percent-
age points in the cost of capital, however, remained between equity and debt financing. Real 
investments again suffered from more restrictive depreciation rules. Financial assets, in con-
trast, were unaffected. Lastly, it needs to be noticed that other disadvantageous changes for 
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taxpayers cannot be modelled. This includes the introduction of the interest barrier (§ 4h 
EStG, § 8a KStG), the extension of the tax base for trade tax purposes (§ 8 No. 1 GewStG)
480
 
and the more restrictive loss trafficking rules (§ 8c KStG) that may be of particular relevance 
for the founders and acquirers of young, high-growth companies. Start-ups typically incur 
losses in the early stages of their lifecycle and cannot fully offset them prior to the exit of the 
original founders. Considering the goal of increasing Germany’s long term attractiveness by 
improving the tax environment for investments, growth and employment, the changes of the 
tax reform in 2008/09 – at least partly – appear questionable. Especially the discrimination of 
real investments and the interest barrier as an additional impediment to acquiring finance 
could entail unwanted effects. 
In the years following the reform in 2008, no significant changes in the cost of capi-
tal occurred. The temporary re-emergence of the declining balance method for the deprecia-
tion of movable assets induced a minor decrease in 2009 and 2010. 
Taking the observation period as a whole, the average cost of capital decreased from 
7.7% to 6.5%, which represents a substantial improvement of the investment-friendliness of 
the tax system. In addition, the neutrality with regard to financing was significantly enhanced 
as the costs of capital for self-financing and new equity were aligned and the disadvantage of 
equity compared to debt reduced from over five percentage points to 2.7. The main driver of 
this positive development was the reduction of the CIT rate from 40% and 30%, respectively, 
to 15%. The broadening of the tax base worked against the reliefs provided by lower tax rates. 
Above all, real investments were affected by the new depreciation rules which is not ideal 
with regard to the goals of the reforms: the creation of growth and employment. Further 
measures which are likely to impede the achievement of these goals cannot be implemented 
with the Devereux/Griffith model: the interest barrier, restricted loss offsets and loss traffick-
ing rules as well as the broadening of the tax base of the trade tax. 
b)  Effective Average Tax 
Tables 40 and 41 show the effective average tax rate on the corporate level for do-
mestic investments in Germany from 1999 to 2014. As for the cost of capital, the different 
forms of finance (see Table 40) and the types of assets (see Table 41) are distinguished. The 
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 The model captures the addition of 25% of the interest expenses but not the addition of parts of the rents and 
leasing payments incurred by taxpayers.  
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overall development of the EATR as well as the directions of the separate effects of tax rate 
and tax base-related measures are similar to the patterns observed for the cost of capital. Most 
importantly, the average EATR decreased from 40.4% to 28.2%. The attractiveness of Ger-
many as an investment destination has improved. In contrast to the cost of capital, though, the 
reduction of the tax rate plays a more important role for the EATR. Changes in the tax base 
do not affect the underlying profitable investment significantly.
481
 
Table 40: EATR of domestic investment on corporate level in Germany by type of financing (Devereux/Griffith 
model)  
EATR in % SF EF DF Ø 
1999 47.9 41.5 28.4 40.4 
2000 47.9 41.5 28.4 40.4 
2001 39.8 39.8 28.4 35.8 
2002 39.8 39.8 28.4 35.8 
2003 41.1 41.1 29.2 37.0 
2004 39.8 39.8 28.4 35.8 
2005 39.8 39.8 28.4 35.8 
2006 39.5 39.5 28.0 35.5 
2007 39.5 39.5 28.1 35.5 
2008 31.5 31.5 22.1 28.2 
2009 31.3 31.3 21.8 28.0 
2010 31.3 31.3 21.8 28.0 
2011 31.5 31.5 22.1 28.2 
2012 31.5 31.5 22.1 28.2 
2013 31.5 31.5 22.1 28.2 
2014 31.5 31.5 22.1 28.2 
 
Considering the EATRs of the different forms of financing (see Table 40), self-
financing experienced a strong relief during the observation period from 1999 to 2014 (from 
47.9% to 31.5%). In addition, the EATRs for self-financing and new equity became the same 
after the tax reform in 2001. Again, the reductions and the alignment of the CIT rate to 25% 
and later to 15% were the drivers of this development. For debt financing, the EATR re-
mained constant at 28.4% after the reform in 2001 and it decreased significantly after the 
2008/09 reform (from 28.1% to 22.1%). Hence, the reduction in the CIT rate fully compen-
sated for the broadening of the tax base or even outweighed the latter for profitable invest-
ments financed with equity. This highlights the enhanced role of statutory tax rates for the 
EATR compared to the tax base. The minimal effect of the temporal re-emergence of the de-
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 See Section 6.3. 
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clining balance method for the depreciation of movable assets in 2009/2010 provides further 
confirmation. 
Table 41: EATR of domestic investment on corporate level in Germany by asset type of financing (Deve-
reux/Griffith model) 
EATR in 
% 
Buildings Intangibles Machinery 
Financial  
assets 
Inventory Ø 
1999 39.9 36.8 37.8 46.8 40.8 40.4 
2000 39.9 36.8 37.8 46.8 40.8 40.4 
2001 36.6 32.8 35.1 39.2 35.3 35.8 
2002 36.6 32.8 35.1 39.2 35.3 35.8 
2003 37.7 33.9 36.3 40.5 36.5 37.0 
2004 36.6 32.8 35.1 39.2 35.3 35.8 
2005 36.6 32.8 35.1 39.2 35.3 35.8 
2006 36.6 32.8 33.5 39.2 35.3 35.5 
2007 36.7 32.8 33.5 39.2 35.3 35.5 
2008 29.2 25.6 28.0 30.7 27.6 28.2 
2009 29.2 25.6 26.8 30.7 27.6 28.0 
2010 29.2 25.6 26.8 30.7 27.6 28.0 
2011 29.2 25.6 28.0 30.7 27.6 28.2 
2012 29.1 25.6 28.0 30.7 27.6 28.2 
2013 29.1 25.6 28.0 30.7 27.6 28.2 
2014 29.1 25.6 28.0 30.7 27.6 28.2 
 
The distinction of different assets also illustrates the significance of the reduced tax 
rate for profitable investments (see Table 41). Even the EATR of investments in machinery, 
the asset type being affected the most by less generous depreciation rules, decreased signifi-
cantly after each reform (by 2.7 percentage points in 2001 and by 5.5 percentage points in 
2008). 
6.4.1.2 Investor Level  
a)  Cost of Capital 
If investments are undertaken by SMEs, the taxation of capital income at the investor 
level is likely to be decision-relevant as well. Shareholders of SMEs often rely on the pro-
ceeds to make their living. Table 42 shows the development of the cost of capital on the in-
vestor level for domestic investments from 1999 to 2014 (which includes the personal income 
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taxation of capital income as well as the taxes incurred on the corporate level).
482
 On the in-
vestor level, the shareholder can either be exempt from income taxes or he can be subject to 
the maximum marginal tax rate of the personal income tax schedule. For the latter case, inves-
tors with a qualified shareholding and with an unqualified shareholding are distinguished
483
, 
i.e., three cases in total. 
Beginning in 2001, the cost of capital of exempt investors has equaled those on the 
corporate level. Effectively, there is no taxation of such investors. The values therefore serve 
as a measuring stick and help to distinguish the effects on the corporate and on the investor 
level. In 1999 and 2000, the cost of capital on the investor level were smaller than on the cor-
porate level because of the imputation system that granted exempt taxpayers a refund of the 
corporate income tax withheld on the company level. 
Table 42: Cost of capital of domestic investment on investor level in Germany (Devereux/Griffith model) 
CoC in % Exemption 
Maximum marginal rate 
Qualified  
holding 
Unqualified  
holding 
1999 7.4 5.8 3.7 
2000 7.4 5.9 3.9 
2001 7.1 4.4 3.8 
2002 7.1 4.4 3.8 
2003 7.2 4.5 3.9 
2004 7.1 4.7 4.1 
2005 7.1 4.8 4.3 
2006 7.0 4.8 4.2 
2007 7.0 4.6 4.0 
2008 6.5 4.3 3.7 
2009 6.4 5.9 5.8 
2010 6.4 5.9 5.8 
2011 6.5 6.0 5.9 
2012 6.5 6.0 5.9 
2013 6.5 6.0 5.9 
2014 6.5 6.0 5.9 
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 On the corporate level, the calculations assume a mixture of the different types of assets and financing as 
described in Section 6.3. So the effects occurring on the corporate level also resurface on the shareholder level 
but are complemented by the changes on the level of the investor. This section also includes a separate calcula-
tion of the cost of capital for each form of financing. The asset types, however, are not examined separately as 
the differences in the cost of capital would only stem from the effects on the corporate level already discussed 
before. 
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 Currently, a qualified shareholding requires the investor to have held at least 1% of the shares within the five 
years prior to the disposal of the shareholding. If the requirement is met, the capital gains are considered busi-
ness income and thus subject to the Teileinkünfteverfahren. Otherwise the Abgeltungsteuer applies. The taxation 
of dividends also is affected by the qualification of the holding as a qualified shareholding. For an overview of 
the previous regimes and a more detailed description of the current differentiation, see Section 6.2.  
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The development of the cost of capital for non-exempt taxpayers differs completely 
from the corporate pattern. For qualified shareholdings, the cost of capital decreased signifi-
cantly from 5.9% to 4.4% in 2001. The reduction, however, was reversed in 2009 when the 
cost of capital returned to 5.9%. For unqualified holdings, the Steuersenkungsgesetz in 2001 
did not bring a noticeable change (from 3.9% to 3.8%) whereas the reform in 2008/09 in-
creased the cost of capital from 3.7% to 5.8%, which exceeds the initial level from 1999.
484
 
The opposing effects of both reforms also become apparent when distinguishing the different 
forms of financing (see Table 42). The 2001 reform lowered the cost of capital for self-
financing significantly (if the investor holds a qualified shareholding) while the Unterneh-
mensteuerreformgesetz in 2008/09 increased the tax burden on both forms of equity finance 
(i.e., self-financing and new equity).   
The effect of the tax reform in 2001, i.e., lowering the cost of capital for qualified 
shareholders, was mainly driven by the abolition of the imputation system that led to the in-
troduction of the Halbeinkünfteverfahren. Under the new regime, 50% of dividends and capi-
tal gains were exempt on the investor level while the other half was subject to the progressive 
PIT rate. For dividends, the change did not lead to a drop in the cost of capital because the 
50% exemption of dividends merely compensated for the loss of the previously available im-
putation of corporate income taxes. Capital gains, however, were fully taxable before the re-
form and partly exempt (50%) after it. The cost of capital incurred on self-financing was re-
duced significantly, which also drove the decrease of the cost of capital. The capital gains of 
investors with unqualified shareholdings, in contrast, were exempt before as well as after the 
reform.
485
 Hence, no significant change occurred. Exempt investors did not benefit from the 
newly introduced Halbeinkünfteverfahren either as their capital income was fully exempt an-
yway. 
The increase of the cost of capital for non-exempt taxpayers by the Unternehmen-
steuerreformgesetz in 2008/09 (from 4.3% to 5.9% and from 3.7% to 5.8%, respectively) was 
due to the removal of the Halbeinkünfteverfahren. Naturally, exempt taxpayers were not af-
fected. For qualified shareholders, the Teileinkünfteverfahren replaced the Halbeinkünftever-
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 Most of the changes of the Unternehmensteuerreformgesetz from 2008 that address the investor level only 
took effect in 2009. The effects on the cost of capital and the effective average tax rate therefore only occur in 
2009 as well. 
485
 If participations were held as private assets, capital gains upon the disposal of shares could only be subject to 
taxation if the disposal was classified as a gain from so-called speculative transactions (§ 23 EStG a.F.). Such 
gains were incurred if the underlying shares had not been held for at least one year (until 1999) or six months 
(from 2000 to 2008), respectively. The model at hand assumes longer holding periods. 
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fahren. As a consequence, only 40% instead of 50% of dividends and capital gains were ex-
empt. The remainder was subject to the top marginal PIT rate, which caused the increased 
cost of capital. Shareholders with unqualified holding quotas
486
 were subject to the Abgel-
tungsteuer after 2009, i.e., dividends as well as capital gains were taxed at a proportional rate 
of 25%. Under the new regime, non-exempt investors were significantly worse off compared 
to the previously applicable regime (Halbeinkünfteverfahren for dividends and full exemption 
for capital gains). Overall, the increased burden at the investor level exceeded the reductions 
achieved on the corporate level by the Unternehmensteuerreformgesetz in 2008/09. The dif-
ference between exempt shareholders being subject to a substantial relief and non-exempt 
shareholders experiencing the opposite effect also indicates a shift of the tax burden from 
large to small enterprises as it is mostly institutional and foreign shareholders who are exempt 
and who tend to invest in larger entities with access to capital markets. 
Table 43: Cost of capital of domestic investment on investor level with top personal tax rate in Germany (Deve-
reux/Griffith model) 
CoC 
in % 
Qualified holding Unqualified holding 
SF EF DF Ø SF EF DF Ø 
1999 7.3 4.7 3.8 5.8 3.3 5.2 4.3 3.9 
2000 7.4 4.7 3.8 5.9 3.3 5.2 4.3 3.9 
2001 4.1 4.7 4.9 4.4 2.9 4.8 5.0 3.8 
2002 4.1 4.7 4.9 4.4 2.9 4.8 5.0 3.8 
2003 4.2 4.8 4.9 4.5 3.0 4.9 5.0 3.9 
2004 4.4 5.1 4.9 4.7 3.3 5.2 5.0 4.1 
2005 4.7 5.4 4.8 4.8 3.6 5.4 4.9 4.3 
2006 4.7 5.3 4.8 4.8 3.6 5.4 4.9 4.2 
2007 4.4 5.0 4.8 4.6 3.2 5.1 4.9 4.0 
2008 3.9 4.4 4.8 4.3 2.8 4.5 4.9 3.7 
2009 6.4 7.4 4.6 5.9 6.3 7.4 4.6 5.8 
2010 6.4 7.4 4.6 5.9 6.3 7.4 4.6 5.8 
2011 6.5 7.4 4.7 6.0 6.3 7.5 4.7 5.9 
2012 6.5 7.4 4.7 6.0 6.3 7.5 4.7 5.9 
2013 6.5 7.4 4.7 6.0 6.3 7.5 4.7 5.9 
2014 6.5 7.4 4.7 6.0 6.3 7.5 4.7 5.9 
 
Given that SMEs usually feature a small number of shareholders with qualified holding 
quotas and high personal tax rates, they benefited from the 2001 reform but were disadvan-
taged by the changes in 2008/09. Only comparing 1999 and 2014, a slight increase of the cost 
of capital can be observed for this group of investors. By introducing the Abgeltungsteuer and 
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 Qualified holding quotas differ for dividends (25%) and capital gains (1%). A shareholding of 1% may suf-
fice for dividend taxation as well if the shareholder is also an employee of the enterprise.  
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the Teileinkünfteverfahren in 2009, policy-makers clearly thwarted their goal of providing a 
supportive tax environment for SME investments in Germany. The introduction of the in-
vestment reserve and the extended application of accelerated depreciation for micro compa-
nies (§ 7g EStG) most likely did not adequately compensate for these disadvantages either as 
most SMEs are not even eligible (see Section 3.2).
487
 
b)  Effective Average Tax Rate 
Table 44 displays the development of the EATR on the investor level. The abolition 
of the imputation system in 2001 clearly benefited investors with high marginal tax rates. As 
there was no longer an imputation of corporate income taxes available, the CIT paid on the 
corporate level became definite. For taxpayers with high PIT rates, this disadvantage was 
compensated for by the exemption of dividends and capital gains (50%) within the Halbein-
künfteverfahren. Exempt taxpayers, on the other hand, did not benefit from the newly intro-
duced relief because they were exempt anyway. As a consequence, the EATRs of the different 
types of taxpayers approached each other. In 2008, however, they drifted apart again as the 
Halbeinkünfteverfahren was replaced by the Abgeltungsteuer and the Teileinkünfteverfahren. 
The advantage of a low personal income tax rate or even an exemption regained importance. 
The overall effect on the EATR was not as extreme as on the cost of capital, though, because 
the EATR and the underlying profitable investment were predominantly influenced by the 
corporate income tax rate. The latter was reduced by the Unternehmensteuerreformgesetz, 
which compensated almost completely for the disadvantages on the investor level. 
Distinguishing the three forms of financing (see Table 45) confirms the observations 
from the cost of capital. The improved neutrality with regard to financing achieved by the 
2001 reform, was nullified by the second reform in 2008/09. Comparing new equity with debt 
financing for qualified holdings, the latter was even more advantaged in 2014 than at the be-
ginning of the sample period. Self-financing was also discriminated against due to the aboli-
tion of the tax-exempt status of capital gains. Overall, however, the reduction of the corporate 
tax rate sufficed to achieve a decrease of the EATR in 2014 compared to 1999. 
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 Both measures are not included in the calculation of the cost of capital and the EATR because of their limited 
scope of application. 
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Table 44: EATR of domestic investment on investor level in Germany (Devereux/Griffith model) 
EATR in % Exemption 
Maximum marginal rate 
Qualified  
holding 
Unqualified  
holding 
1999 24.1 45.0 49.4 
2000 24.1 43.9 48.3 
2001 35.8 37.2 38.9 
2002 35.8 37.2 38.9 
2003 37.0 38.1 39.8 
2004 35.8 36.9 38.6 
2005 35.8 36.7 38.4 
2006 35.5 36.6 38.2 
2007 35.5 36.8 38.5 
2008 28.2 30.7 32.5 
2009 28.0 38.7 38.9 
2010 28.0 38.7 38.9 
2011 28.2 38.9 39.1 
2012 28.2 38.9 39.1 
2013 28.2 38.9 39.1 
2014 28.2 38.9 39.1 
 
Table 45: EATR of domestic investment on investor level with top personal tax rate in Germany (Deve-
reux/Griffith model) 
EATR  
in % 
Qualified holding Unqualified holding 
SF EF DF Ø SF EF DF Ø 
1999 52.1 47.5 45.8 49.4 43.8 47.9 46.1 45.0 
2000 51.2 46.1 44.4 48.3 42.9 46.5 44.7 43.9 
2001 38.2 39.6 40.0 38.9 35.0 39.5 39.9 37.2 
2002 38.2 39.6 40.0 38.9 35.0 39.5 39.9 37.2 
2003 39.2 40.6 40.6 39.8 36.1 40.6 40.6 38.1 
2004 38.1 39.6 39.1 38.6 35.1 39.5 39.1 36.9 
2005 38.1 39.6 38.4 38.4 35.1 39.6 38.3 36.7 
2006 38.0 39.5 38.2 38.2 35.0 39.4 38.2 36.6 
2007 38.0 39.4 39.0 38.5 34.9 39.4 38.9 36.8 
2008 31.5 33.0 34.0 32.5 28.3 32.8 33.9 30.7 
2009 40.3 42.7 35.7 38.9 39.9 42.7 35.7 38.7 
2010 40.3 42.7 35.7 38.9 39.9 42.7 35.7 38.7 
2011 40.4 42.9 35.9 39.1 40.0 42.9 35.8 38.9 
2012 40.4 42.9 35.9 39.1 40.0 42.9 35.8 38.9 
2013 40.4 42.9 35.9 39.1 40.0 42.9 35.8 38.9 
2014 40.4 42.9 35.9 39.1 40.0 42.9 35.8 38.9 
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6.4.1.3 Interim Conclusion 
The German taxation of corporate businesses has drastically changed since 1999. 
The dividend imputation system was replaced by the shareholder relief system in 2001. The 
second major reform in 2008/09 further reduced the tax burden on the corporate level whereas 
effective tax rates on dividends and capital gains on the investor level increased. Moreover, 
the Abgeltungsteuer was introduced. The overall trend in German business taxation during the 
sample period is the reduction of tax rates at the cost of a broader tax base. As a consequence, 
the reduction in effective tax rates primarily benefits profitable businesses.  
Interestingly, the effects of the 2001 and 2008/09 reforms are highly dependent on 
the characteristics of the respective businesses, especially on the form of financing. Tempo-
rary progress with regard to financing neutrality was reversed in 2008/09. Currently, debt fi-
nancing is subject to much lower effective tax rates than equity financing. In the absence of a 
notional interest deduction on equity or even more fundamental tax reforms, this problem is 
difficult to overcome on the corporate level. On the shareholder level, however, a more gen-
erous taxation of dividends and capital gains could easily alleviate the discrimination of equi-
ty financing. With regard to fostering growth and employment, it is also critical that the re-
duction in effective tax rates can – to a large part – be traced back to financial investments 
whereas real investments were hit particularly hard by the broadening of the tax base. In addi-
tion, frequent changes of depreciation rules impede the planning security of businesses. 
The question whether investment conditions in Germany have improved during the 
last 15 years depends on the relevance of shareholder taxation. On the corporate level, the cost 
of capital as well as the EATR were reduced significantly. On the investor level, in contrast, 
the improvement is much less pronounced – if at all existent. This is mostly due to the intro-
duction of the Abgeltungsteuer and the Teileinkünfteverfahren in their current forms. Overall, 
the tax burden was redistributed from the corporate to the shareholder level. 
For SMEs, the increased taxation of shareholders is especially harmful. Their share-
holders are less likely to be exempt from taxation and usually do not have the opportunity to 
avoid taxation by means of international tax planning (at least not at reasonable costs
488
). 
Moreover, the shareholders of SMEs often require the income from their businesses to make 
their living so that the avoidance of shareholder taxation by retaining profits is not feasible 
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 See Spengel (2003) p. 92.; OECD (2010a) p. 126. 
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either. These problems are most likely to occur for the very smallest firms. Exactly these 
companies, however, are those targeted by the investment reserve and the regime of accelerat-
ed depreciation introduced in 2008, which exhibits the inconsistency of the German tax poli-
cy. Even if the incentives compensate for the general tax-related disadvantages experienced 
by SMEs after 2008, special provisions make the tax code more complicated. SMEs, of 
course, are particularly sensitive to compliance costs and suffer the most from additional 
complexity.  
The discrimination against equity financing is another example of a tax policy work-
ing against the goal of supporting young and innovative owner-managed companies that are 
perceived to be the engine of growth for the economy. As discussed above, such businesses 
often have problems to acquire debt financing and are therefore more reliant on self-financing 
and new equity. But exactly these forms of financing are heavily disadvantaged whereas es-
tablished, multi-national companies remain largely unaffected. They have better access to 
debt and to international capital markets.  
6.4.2 International Comparison of Effective Tax Burdens on Domestic Investments 
6.4.2.1 Corporate Level 
The above analysis displays the development of the investment conditions in Germa-
ny. An international comparison, however, is required to evaluate the true competitiveness of 
Germany’s tax environment. The following section compares the cost of capital and the 
EATRs of the 28 Member States of the EU and their development from 1999 to 2014. The 
location of investments has been found to be significantly influenced by tax considerations.
489
 
For SMEs, of course, the possibilities of relocating their business activities are often limited 
compared to large entities. They are mostly forced to stay at their original location even if the 
tax environment is highly unattractive. Hence, the cost of capital should be the more im-
portant measure for many SMEs than the EATR.
 490
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 See Devereux/Griffith (2003) pp. 107 ff.; Heckemeyer/Feld (2011) pp. 233 ff.; de Mooij/Ederveen (2008) 
pp. 680 ff. 
490
 The cost of capital represents the return of a marginal investment whereas the EATR is based on a profitable 
investment yielding a return in excess of the market return. The EATR therefore is the more important tax-
related criterion for starting operations at a certain location. The cost of capital rather impacts on the size of the 
investment once it has been made. 
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Nonetheless, the comparison of international effective tax burdens is relevant for 
SMEs as well. First of all, about half of the German SMEs is involved in cross-border activi-
ties.
491
 Even if they produce exclusively in Germany, these SMEs are likely to compete in the 
same markets as businesses from other jurisdictions facing other tax systems and thus other 
cost of capital.
492
 Moreover, the differentials in effective tax burdens provide insight into the 
extent to which (large) multinational companies can obtain an advantage over smaller domes-
tic enterprises by relocating some of their activities abroad.
493
 Such a tax advantage comple-
ments the non-tax benefits of internationalization and induces a distortion of competition be-
tween domestic and multinational enterprises. Lastly, the comparison improves the under-
standing of how discriminatory the German tax environment is against SME investments 
compared to other countries. The discrimination may, for example, emanate from favoring 
debt over equity financing or from excessive shareholder taxation.  
a)  Cost of Capital 
Table 46 shows the cost of capital on the corporate level in 2014. Germany features 
comparatively high cost of capital (6.5%) that are exceeded in only four countries (France, 
Malta, Spain, UK). The EU average is at 6.0% with the EU-15 countries exhibiting substan-
tially higher cost of capital than the EU 13 (6.2% vs. 5.7%). The difference between Germany 
and the “old Europe” is rather small (0.3 percentage points) whereas the new Member States 
display significantly lower effective tax burdens on average (0.8 percentage points). From a 
tax perspective, multinational companies should thus tend to extend investments in other EU 
countries rather than in Germany. Moreover, enterprises exclusively operating from Germany 
may find it harder than their foreign counterparts to offer products and services at sufficiently 
low prices due to an unfavorable tax environment. In today’s international markets – especial-
ly in the single market of the European Union – this could be a noticeable competitive disad-
vantage. 
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 Kranzusch and Holz (2013) estimate 40.5% of micro enterprises to be involved in either direct or indirect 
international activities in 2012. For small and medium-sized entities, the percentage increases to 71.9% and 
82.3%, respectively. See Kranzusch/Holz (2013) p. 37. 
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 As mentioned in Section 6.3, the cost of capital is an indicator of the long-term price floors of producers. 
Hence, it provides insight into the competitiveness of the prices at which German SMEs can offer their products 
or services abroad as well as on domestic markets. 
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 The cost of capital and the EATRs of domestic investments only partly describe the attractiveness of an in-
vestment location. The tax burden emanating from repatriating the profits also needs to be taken into considera-
tion when evaluating the tax advantage of a multi-national company from relocating activities. In practice, how-
ever, the tax burden on repatriating profits is often neglected (as are personal taxes). 
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Considering the sample as a whole, the cost of capital exceeds the underlying capital 
market return of 5% in each country in 2014. Consequently, business taxation most likely 
reduces the volume of real investments compared to financial assets. The results also exhibit 
the preferential treatment of debt financing that is favored over equity everywhere in the EU. 
Equity financing is even subject to substantially higher tax burdens in Belgium and Italy, the 
two countries implementing a notional interest deduction on equity. 
Table 46: Cost of capital of domestic investment on corporate level in the EU in 2014 (Devereux/Griffith mod-
el) 
COC in % SF EF DF Ø 
AUT 6.9 6.9 4.6 6.1 
BEL 6.2 6.2 3.9 5.4 
BUL 5.6 5.6 4.8 5.3 
CRO 6.0 6.0 4.2 5.4 
CYP 6.3 6.3 4.9 5.8 
CZR 6.2 6.2 4.5 5.6 
DEN 6.8 6.8 4.5 6.0 
EST 5.0 6.9 5.0 5.2 
FIN 6.4 6.4 4.7 5.8 
FRA 8.9 9.5 5.6 7.8 
GER 7.4 7.4 4.7 6.5 
GRE 7.1 7.1 4.6 6.2 
HUN 6.6 6.6 4.9 6.0 
IRE 6.2 6.2 4.9 5.8 
ITA 5.8 5.8 4.6 5.4 
LAT 6.1 6.1 4.9 5.7 
LIT 6.0 6.0 4.8 5.6 
LUX 7.0 7.0 4.1 6.0 
MAL 8.2 8.2 4.4 6.8 
NED 6.8 6.8 4.5 6.0 
POL 6.4 6.4 4.7 5.8 
POR 7.4 7.4 4.4 6.3 
ROM 6.1 6.1 4.8 5.7 
SVK 6.4 6.4 4.5 5.7 
SLV 6.2 6.2 4.7 5.7 
ESP 8.8 8.8 5.3 7.6 
SWE 6.5 6.5 4.6 5.8 
UKD 7.3 7.3 5.5 6.7 
Ø (EU 28) 6.6 6.7 4.7 6.0 
Ø (EU 15) 7.0 7.1 4.7 6.2 
Ø (EU 13) 6.2 6.4 4.7 5.7 
Table 47 shows the development of the cost of capital in Germany and the EU from 
1999 to 2014. Although Germany still exhibits higher cost of capital, the reforms in 2001 and 
2008/09 improved Germany’s relative position within Europe. The difference compared to the 
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European average was reduced from 1.4 percentage points in 1999 (7.7% vs. 6.3%) to 0.5 
percentage points in 2014 (6.5% vs. 6.0%) and Germany went from featuring the second-
highest cost of capital to ranking 23rd among the 28 Member States. From a pure tax perspec-
tive, there is still little reason to extend investments in Germany if businesses have the oppor-
tunity to do so elsewhere but the competitive disadvantage of enterprises operating from 
Germany was reduced substantially. Interestingly, the gap could be closed in spite of the lack 
of reforms since 2008 and the general European trend of reduced cost of capital. In fact, 
France, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania and Slovenia are the only countries recording an increase in 
the cost of capital across all three forms of financing.
494
 Most of the EU countries alleviated 
the discrimination against equity capital during the sample period. The reduction of corporate 
income tax rates, which led to a devaluation of interest deductions, is the main driver of this 
development. The general standstill in reform efforts in the last five years is another trend that 
cannot only be observed in Germany but all across Europe. 
Table 47: Cost of capital of domestic investment on corporate level in the EU 1999–2014 (Devereux/Griffith 
model) 
CoC  
in % 
Germany Ø EU 28 (excl. GER) Ø EU 15 (excl. GER) Ø EU 13 
Ø SF EF DF Ø SF EF DF Ø SF EF DF Ø SF EF DF 
1999 7.7 10.4 8.1 3.5 6.3 7.4 7.5 4.3 6.5 7.7 7.7 4.3 6.1 7.1 7.2 4.4 
2000 7.7 10.4 8.1 3.5 6.2 7.2 7.3 4.4 6.5 7.7 7.7 4.3 5.9 6.6 6.9 4.5 
2001 7.1 8.4 8.4 4.6 6.2 7.2 7.4 4.4 6.5 7.7 7.7 4.3 6.0 6.7 7.0 4.6 
2002 7.1 8.4 8.4 4.6 6.3 7.2 7.3 4.5 6.6 7.7 7.7 4.4 5.9 6.7 6.8 4.6 
2003 7.2 8.6 8.6 4.6 6.2 7.2 7.2 4.5 6.5 7.7 7.7 4.4 5.9 6.6 6.7 4.6 
2004 7.1 8.4 8.4 4.6 6.2 7.0 7.1 4.5 6.5 7.7 7.6 4.4 5.8 6.4 6.6 4.6 
2005 7.1 8.4 8.4 4.6 6.1 6.9 7.0 4.6 6.4 7.5 7.5 4.5 5.7 6.2 6.4 4.7 
2006 7.0 8.3 8.3 4.5 6.0 6.8 6.9 4.6 6.3 7.3 7.3 4.5 5.7 6.3 6.4 4.6 
2007 7.0 8.3 8.3 4.5 6.0 6.7 6.8 4.6 6.3 7.2 7.2 4.5 5.7 6.2 6.4 4.7 
2008 6.5 7.4 7.4 4.7 6.0 6.7 6.8 4.6 6.2 7.1 7.1 4.6 5.7 6.2 6.3 4.7 
2009 6.4 7.3 7.3 4.6 6.0 6.7 6.8 4.6 6.3 7.2 7.2 4.6 5.7 6.2 6.3 4.7 
2010 6.4 7.3 7.3 4.6 5.9 6.6 6.7 4.6 6.2 7.1 7.1 4.6 5.6 6.1 6.3 4.7 
2011 6.5 7.4 7.4 4.7 5.9 6.6 6.6 4.6 6.1 7.0 7.0 4.6 5.6 6.1 6.3 4.7 
2012 6.5 7.4 7.4 4.7 5.9 6.6 6.7 4.6 6.2 7.0 7.0 4.6 5.6 6.1 6.3 4.7 
2013 6.5 7.4 7.4 4.7 5.9 6.6 6.7 4.7 6.2 7.0 7.0 4.7 5.7 6.2 6.3 4.7 
2014 6.5 7.4 7.4 4.7 6.0 6.6 6.7 4.7 6.2 7.0 7.1 4.7 5.7 6.2 6.4 4.7 
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b)  Effective Average Tax Rate 
As described above, the EATR of profitable investments is the more relevant meas-
ure when deciding between different investment destinations. Table 48 shows the EATRs of 
the countries of the European Union from 1999 to 2014. Again, Germany is among the coun-
tries with the highest EATRs. The effective average tax rate of 28.2% exceeds the European 
average by 7.4 percentage points and only three countries exhibit higher values (France, Mal-
ta, Spain). The tax environment thus provides little incentives to invest in Germany. Similar 
to the cost of capital, the average of the EU 15 (24.4%) is significantly higher than the mean 
EATR of the new Member States (17.0%).  
Table 48: EATR of domestic investment on corporate level in the EU in 2014 (Devereux/Griffith model) 
EATR in % SF EF DF Ø 
AUT 26.0 26.0 17.3 23.0 
BEL 29.3 29.3 21.9 26.7 
BUL 10.2 10.2 6.7 9.0 
CRO 18.9 18.9 11.9 16.5 
CYP 17.2 17.2 11.6 15.2 
CZR 19.0 19.0 12.4 16.7 
DEN 25.2 25.2 16.7 22.2 
EST 15.8 23.1 15.8 16.5 
FIN 20.7 20.7 13.9 18.4 
FRA 42.6 44.3 33.1 39.4 
GER 31.5 31.5 22.1 28.2 
GRE 27.2 27.2 18.2 24.1 
HUN 21.6 21.6 15.0 19.3 
IRE 16.2 16.2 11.0 14.4 
ITA 25.5 25.5 21.2 24.0 
LAT 16.1 16.1 10.9 14.3 
LIT 15.5 15.5 10.2 13.6 
LUX 29.1 29.1 18.9 25.5 
MAL 36.5 36.5 24.3 32.2 
NED 25.6 25.6 16.9 22.6 
POL 19.8 19.8 13.2 17.5 
POR 30.7 30.7 20.3 27.1 
ROM 16.8 16.8 11.2 14.8 
SVK 22.1 22.1 14.4 19.4 
SLV 17.5 17.5 11.6 15.5 
ESP 36.3 36.3 25.9 32.6 
SWE 22.0 22.0 14.6 19.4 
UK 25.0 25.0 17.7 22.4 
Ø (EU 28) 23.3 23.6 16.2 20.8 
Ø (EU 15) 27.2 27.4 19.1 24.4 
Ø (EU 13) 19.0 19.6 13.0 17.0 
  The ranking of the EU countries is clearly driven by nominal CIT rates. Countries 
with high rates, e.g., France, Portugal and Spain, are at the bottom of the ranking while the 
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Eastern European jurisdictions with very low CIT rates are atop and make up the group of the 
most attractive investment destinations (only considering taxes). In comparison to the cost of 
capital rankings, Belgium and Italy take significantly different positions. The notional interest 
deduction in these two countries significantly reduces the tax burden on marginal invest-
ments. Profitable investments, however, yield returns that exceed the notional interest. The 
excess return is subject to the comparatively high corporate income tax rate, which drives the 
EATR. 
Table 49: EATR of domestic investment on corporate level in the EU 1999–2014 (Devereux/Griffith model) 
EATR 
in % 
Germany Ø EU 28 (excl. GER) Ø EU 15 (excl. GER) Ø EU 13 
Ø SF EF DF Ø SF EF DF Ø SF EF DF Ø SF EF DF 
1999 40.4 47.9 41.5 28.4 28.3 32.0 32.1 21.7 29.7 33.6 33.6 22.6 26.8 30.3 30.5 20.8 
2000 40.4 47.9 41.5 28.4 26.9 30.1 30.6 20.8 29.5 33.3 33.3 22.4 24.1 26.6 27.8 19.1 
2001 35.8 39.8 39.8 28.4 26.3 29.6 30.1 20.2 29.3 33.1 33.1 22.3 23.2 25.8 27.0 17.9 
2002 35.8 39.8 39.8 28.4 25.7 29.0 29.2 19.4 29.1 33.0 33.0 22.0 22.0 24.7 25.2 16.7 
2003 37.0 41.1 41.1 29.2 24.9 28.1 28.4 18.9 28.8 32.6 32.6 21.7 20.7 23.3 23.8 15.8 
2004 35.8 39.8 39.8 28.4 24.0 27.0 27.3 18.2 28.4 32.1 32.1 21.4 19.2 21.5 22.2 14.7 
2005 35.8 39.8 39.8 28.4 22.6 25.4 25.7 17.1 27.2 30.8 30.8 20.6 17.6 19.7 20.3 13.5 
2006 35.5 39.5 39.5 28.0 22.2 25.0 25.3 17.0 26.5 29.9 29.9 20.3 17.6 19.7 20.4 13.5 
2007 35.5 39.5 39.5 28.1 21.6 24.3 24.6 16.6 25.6 28.9 28.9 19.6 17.3 19.4 20.0 13.3 
2008 28.2 31.5 31.5 22.1 21.1 23.7 24.0 16.2 25.1 28.2 28.2 19.3 16.8 18.8 19.4 12.8 
2009 28.0 31.3 31.3 21.8 21.4 24.0 24.3 16.4 25.4 28.6 28.6 19.5 17.0 19.0 19.6 13.0 
2010 28.0 31.3 31.3 21.8 20.7 23.3 23.5 16.0 24.8 27.9 27.9 19.0 16.4 18.3 18.9 12.7 
2011 28.2 31.5 31.5 22.1 20.5 22.9 23.2 15.8 24.2 27.2 27.2 18.7 16.5 18.4 18.9 12.7 
2012 28.2 31.5 31.5 22.1 20.5 23.0 23.2 15.8 24.4 27.4 27.4 18.8 16.3 18.2 18.8 12.6 
2013 28.2 31.5 31.5 22.1 20.9 23.4 23.6 16.2 24.6 27.6 27.6 19.1 16.9 18.8 19.4 13.1 
2014 28.2 31.5 31.5 22.1 20.8 23.3 23.6 16.2 24.4 27.2 27.4 19.1 17.0 19.0 19.6 13.0 
 
The development of EATRs during the sample period from 1999 to 2014 resembles 
the patterns observed for the cost of capital (see Table 49): Except for France and Ireland, the 
EATRs have generally decreased due to reduced statutory tax rates.
495
 Germany has experi-
enced a significant decrease as well (from 40.4% to 28.2%) but the gap to the majority of Eu-
ropean countries has not been closed. Since 2008, no major changes have occured – neither in 
Germany nor on the European level. It remains to be seen if this indicates the end of the inter-
national tax competition or if the means of competition have simply changed (e.g., IP boxes 
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and tax incentives related to the tax base).
496
 With regard to the three sources of finance, the 
EATRs also reflect the trend of debt financing still being favored throughout Europe. But the 
advantage over equity financing is smaller in 2014 than around the turn of the millennium 
(10.3 percentage points in 1999 compared to 7.1 in 2014). In Germany, the difference is com-
paratively large (9.4 percentage points), which is mainly driven by the high CIT rate. 
6.4.2.2 Investor Level 
a)  Cost of Capital 
Table 50 shows the cost of capital for domestic investments on the investor level, 
i.e., including company taxation as well as personal income taxes of the investors, in 2014. 
The model assumes the investors to come from the same country as the company they invest 
in. The cost of capital on the investor level thus allows inferences about the competitiveness 
of enterprises competing in the same market but producing in different countries, for which 
the personal income taxes of the shareholders are relevant. This group of enterprises is mostly 
made up of SMEs that are owned by a small number of shareholders with qualified holding 
quotas and high personal income tax rates. Hence, the analysis focusses on the case of non-
exempt investors with qualified shareholdings. 
At 6.0% Germany exhibits a comparatively high cost of capital in 2014 that is only 
exceeded by five countries (Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain). 
The EU average is 5.5% with no big differences between the EU 15 (5.5%) and the EU-13 
countries (5.4%). In some countries, the cost of capital is below the assumed return of a com-
parable capital market investment (5.0%), which incentivizes real investments rather than 
investing in financial assets. This phenomenon can be explained by financial investments be-
ing disadvantaged with regard to taxes in the respective countries. In Cyprus, for example, 
income from interest payments is subject to a higher tax rate than dividends and capital gains. 
A look at the different forms of financing reveals that no country has a tax system 
which is completely neutral with regard to debt and equity financing. By trend, debt is fa-
vored over equity with Malta being the only country where new equity is the most beneficial 
source of capital. Foreign competitors thus face similar distortions as German enterprises with 
regard to financing. Oftentimes, there are multiple reasons for the differences in the cost of 
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 See Evers/Miller/Spengel (2015) pp. 502 ff. 
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capital between equity and debt. Not only the level of company taxes matters but also the in-
terplay of the corporate income tax with the taxation of dividends, interest income and capital 
gains as well as the level of taxes on these three kinds of capital income. 
Table 50: Cost of capital of domestic investment on investor level with qualified shareholding in the EU in 2014 
(Devereux/Griffith model) 
CoC in % SF EF DF Ø 
AUT 6.0 7.0 4.6 5.6 
BEL 4.7 7.7 4.0 4.8 
BUL 5.4 5.4 4.8 5.2 
CRO 6.0 7.4 4.2 5.5 
CYP 3.9 5.1 5.0 4.4 
CZR 4.9 6.2 4.6 4.9 
DEN 5.3 6.9 4.6 5.2 
EST 6.0 6.9 5.0 5.7 
FIN 5.3 5.9 4.8 5.2 
FRA 4.9 5.9 6.0 5.4 
GER 6.5 7.4 4.7 6.0 
GRE 6.4 6.5 4.6 5.8 
HUN 6.6 8.3 4.9 6.2 
IRE 4.9 7.9 4.9 5.2 
ITA 4.6 5.5 4.6 4.7 
LAT 6.1 6.1 4.9 5.7 
LIT 6.7 7.4 4.7 6.1 
LUX 7.4 8.5 4.1 6.4 
MAL 6.7 4.5 4.5 5.7 
NED 6.7 7.8 4.5 6.1 
POL 5.7 6.4 4.7 5.4 
POR 6.2 7.3 4.4 5.7 
ROM 5.6 6.2 4.8 5.4 
SVK 6.1 4.7 4.5 5.4 
SLV 4.1 6.2 4.8 4.5 
ESP 8.0 8.9 5.3 7.2 
SWE 5.4 6.6 4.6 5.3 
UK 4.6 5.5 5.5 5.0 
Ø (EU 28) 5.7 6.6 4.7 5.5 
Ø (EU 15) 5.7 7.0 4.8 5.5 
Ø (EU 13) 5.7 6.2 4.7 5.4 
 
Table 51 shows the development of the cost of capital on the investor level from 
1999 to 2014.
497
 The shareholding is assumed to be qualified and held by an individual who is 
subject to the maximum personal income tax rate. First of all, the European average did not 
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 See Table A11 in Annex 6 for an overview of the cost of capital on the investor level for each sample coun-
try. 
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change significantly during the observation period (5.6% in 1999 and 5.5% in 2014). For the 
old and the new Member States, however, opposing trends can be observed: In EU-15 coun-
tries the cost of capital on the investor level increased substantially whereas the opposite oc-
curred for the EU-13 states. Insofar, the trends on the investor level clearly distinguish from 
the corporate level. Germany provided much lower cost of capital to investors in between the 
two reforms in 2001 and 2008/09 than many other EU countries. As the investor level is espe-
cially relevant for SMEs, the tax environment in this time span was particularly favorable for 
them. Despite emphasizing the importance of the so-called “Mittelstand”, however, Germany 
gave up the advantage by redistributing the tax burden from the corporate to the investor lev-
el. Large enterprises benefited while smaller businesses suffered from increased cost of capi-
tal, which reiterates the adverse effect of the Unternehmensteuerreformgesetz for SME in-
vestments.  
Table 51: Cost of capital of domestic investment on investor level with qualified shareholding in the EU 1999–
2014 (Devereux/Griffith model) 
CoC 
in % 
Germany Ø EU 28 (excl. GER) Ø EU 15 (excl. GER) Ø EU 13 
Ø SF EF DF Ø SF EF DF Ø SF EF DF Ø SF EF DF 
1999 5.8 7.3 4.7 3.8 5.6 6.1 6.9 4.4 4.9 4.9 6.1 4.5 6.3 7.3 7.6 4.4 
2000 5.9 7.4 4.7 3.8 5.4 5.7 6.6 4.5 4.9 4.9 6.1 4.5 6.0 6.7 7.2 4.5 
2001 4.4 4.1 4.7 4.9 5.6 6.0 6.9 4.5 5.1 5.3 6.5 4.5 6.0 6.7 7.4 4.5 
2002 4.4 4.1 4.7 4.9 5.6 6.0 6.8 4.5 5.2 5.4 6.6 4.5 5.9 6.6 7.1 4.6 
2003 4.5 4.2 4.8 4.9 5.6 6.1 6.8 4.6 5.2 5.4 6.5 4.6 6.0 6.8 7.1 4.6 
2004 4.7 4.4 5.1 4.9 5.5 5.9 6.7 4.6 5.3 5.5 6.6 4.6 5.8 6.4 6.9 4.6 
2005 4.8 4.7 5.4 4.8 5.4 5.7 6.5 4.6 5.2 5.3 6.3 4.6 5.6 6.1 6.6 4.7 
2006 4.8 4.7 5.3 4.8 5.3 5.6 6.4 4.6 5.2 5.3 6.4 4.6 5.5 6.0 6.3 4.6 
2007 4.6 4.4 5.0 4.8 5.5 5.8 6.6 4.7 5.4 5.6 6.8 4.6 5.6 6.1 6.4 4.7 
2008 4.3 3.9 4.4 4.8 5.6 5.9 6.7 4.7 5.6 5.8 7.0 4.7 5.6 6.0 6.3 4.7 
2009 5.9 6.4 7.4 4.6 5.6 6.0 6.8 4.6 5.6 5.9 7.1 4.6 5.6 6.1 6.5 4.7 
2010 5.9 6.4 7.4 4.6 5.6 5.9 6.9 4.7 5.5 5.8 7.2 4.6 5.6 6.0 6.6 4.7 
2011 6.0 6.5 7.4 4.7 5.6 5.9 6.9 4.7 5.6 5.8 7.2 4.6 5.6 6.0 6.5 4.7 
2012 6.0 6.5 7.4 4.7 5.5 5.8 6.9 4.7 5.6 5.9 7.4 4.6 5.4 5.7 6.3 4.7 
2013 6.0 6.5 7.4 4.7 5.5 5.8 6.8 4.7 5.7 6.0 7.4 4.7 5.4 5.6 6.2 4.7 
2014 6.0 6.5 7.4 4.7 5.5 5.7 6.6 4.7 5.5 5.7 7.0 4.8 5.4 5.7 6.2 4.7 
 
The difference in the cost of capital between Germany and the European average 
solely stems from equity financing, in particular the financing through new equity. The re-
spective costs of capital amount to 6.5% (self-financing) and 7.4% (new equity), which ex-
ceeds the EU averages by 0.8 percentage points. Debt financing instead is equally burdened as 
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in the rest of Europe (4.7%). So Germany’s tax environment is not only disadvantageous for 
SMEs in general – due to the high burden at the investor level – but among SMEs, those with 
problems in obtaining debt finance are even worse off. The group of young and innovative 
high-risk start-ups typically belongs to the latter. Hence, the basic design of the German tax 
system is most harmful for those enterprises that are generally perceived to be the most im-
portant ones for long-term economic growth. 
b)  Effective Average Tax Rate 
In the ranking of EATRs on the investor level under the assumption of a qualified 
shareholding being taxed at the maximum personal rate, Germany also exhibits one of the 
highest values in the EU (39.1%) that exceeds the EU average by 8.8 percentage points (see 
Table 52). Denmark, France, Ireland and Spain join Germany at the bottom of the ranking
498
 
while the EU-13 countries again feature the lowest EATRs due to their low nominal tax rates. 
Considering the development over the sample period, some differences occur compared to the 
cost of capital on the investor level (see Table 53). In 1999, Germany’s EATR amounted to 
49.4%, which was 13.5 percentage points above the EU average. The Steuersenkungsgesetz in 
2001 decreased the EATR to 38.9% so that the gap was narrowed to 5.6 percentage points. 
Afterwards no significant changes occurred in Germany
499
 whereas the EATRs in the rest of 
Europe were lowered by 4 percentage points on average (from 34.3% to 30.3%). The attrac-
tiveness of Germany as a destination for profitable investments has thus deteriorated since 
2001. It needs to be mentioned, though, that the reduction in EATRs is mainly caused by the 
EU-13 countries.  
In 2001, the discrimination against equity financing was removed so that the EATRs 
of self-financing and new equity closed in on the European average (only 2.6 and 1.7 percent-
age points, respectively, above the mean). The 2008/09 reform, however, re-established the 
advantage of debt financing. As a consequence, the EATRs of all three financing sources ex-
ceed European averages significantly and the gap between equity and debt financing is even 
bigger than in the rest of Europe. Start-ups which have to rely on self-financing and outside 
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 See Table A12 in Annex 6 for the EATRs of qualified shareholders being taxed at the maximum personal 
income tax rate for the individual countries of the EU. 
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 The changes implemented by the 2008 reform neutralized each other almost completely. While the reduction 
of the CIT rate reduced the EATR at the investor level, the switch from the Halbeinkünfteverfahren to the Abgel-
tungsteuer and the Teileinkünfteverfahren on the shareholder level had the opposite effect. As the measures on 
the shareholder level only took effect in 2009, a temporary dip in the EATR occurs in 2008. 
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equity due to the riskiness of their business therefore encounter a rather unattractive tax envi-
ronment in Germany. 
Table 52: EATR of domestic investment on investor level with qualified shareholding in the EU in 2014 (Deve-
reux/Griffith model) 
EATR in % SF BF FF Ø 
AUT 35.3 38.1 31.5 34.3 
BEL 36.8 44.2 35.1 36.9 
BUL 12.7 12.3 10.1 11.7 
CRO 26.8 31.6 20.8 25.2 
CYP 17.4 21.7 21.6 19.3 
CZR 22.6 27.1 21.4 22.6 
DEN 42.4 46.0 41.0 42.3 
EST 20.1 23.5 16.3 19.1 
FIN 31.9 33.6 30.2 31.5 
FRA 49.4 51.1 51.3 50.2 
GER 40.4 42.9 35.9 39.1 
GRE 31.3 32.0 25.9 29.5 
HUN 30.2 35.8 24.6 28.8 
IRE 43.3 49.4 43.3 43.9 
ITA 33.5 35.9 33.6 33.7 
LAT 21.7 22.0 17.3 20.2 
LIT 27.4 29.8 20.1 25.1 
LUX 40.2 43.2 31.2 37.3 
MAL 31.2 24.0 24.0 28.0 
NED 37.6 40.8 31.4 35.7 
POL 27.9 30.1 24.7 27.0 
POR 39.8 42.5 35.1 38.4 
ROM 24.0 25.9 21.2 23.2 
SVK 20.7 15.4 14.3 17.9 
SLV 24.6 31.3 26.8 26.1 
ESP 44.8 46.7 39.0 43.0 
SWE 34.7 37.7 32.5 34.2 
UK 31.9 34.4 34.4 33.0 
Ø (EU 28) 31.1 33.6 28.1 30.3 
Ø (EU 15) 38.1 41.1 35.4 37.4 
Ø (EU 13) 23.6 25.4 20.2 22.6 
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Table 53: EATR of domestic investment on investor level with qualified shareholding in the EU 1999–2014 
(Devereux/Griffith model) 
EATR 
in % 
Germany Ø EU 28 (excl. GER) Ø EU 15 (excl. GER) Ø EU 13 
Ø SF BF FF Ø SF BF FF Ø SF BF FF Ø SF BF FF 
1999 49.4 52.1 47.5 45.8 35.9 37.4 39.1 32.7 37.4 37.6 40.3 36.3 34.3 37.2 37.9 28.7 
2000 48.3 51.2 46.1 44.4 34.3 35.4 37.4 31.6 37.2 37.4 40.0 36.2 31.2 33.4 34.7 26.7 
2001 38.9 38.2 39.6 40.0 34.3 35.6 37.9 31.2 37.6 38.1 40.9 36.0 30.7 32.9 34.7 26.0 
2002 38.9 38.2 39.6 40.0 33.5 34.9 37.0 30.4 37.2 37.8 40.5 35.4 29.5 31.7 33.3 25.1 
2003 39.8 39.2 40.6 40.6 32.6 34.0 35.9 29.3 36.7 37.3 39.9 35.0 28.1 30.5 31.5 23.3 
2004 38.6 38.1 39.6 39.1 31.3 32.5 34.7 28.5 36.5 37.1 39.8 34.7 25.7 27.6 29.2 21.8 
2005 38.4 38.1 39.6 38.4 29.7 30.7 32.8 27.2 35.6 36.0 38.6 33.9 23.4 25.1 26.5 20.0 
2006 38.2 38.0 39.5 38.2 29.3 30.3 32.3 27.0 35.3 35.7 38.6 33.6 22.9 24.5 25.6 19.8 
2007 38.5 38.0 39.4 39.0 29.3 30.5 32.6 26.6 35.2 35.9 38.9 33.1 23.0 24.7 25.8 19.6 
2008 32.5 31.5 33.0 34.0 28.9 30.1 32.2 26.1 35.2 36.1 39.1 32.7 22.2 23.7 24.9 19.1 
2009 38.9 40.3 42.7 35.7 29.7 31.0 33.2 26.7 36.1 37.1 40.1 33.5 22.8 24.5 25.8 19.4 
2010 38.9 40.3 42.7 35.7 30.2 31.3 34.1 27.4 36.7 37.5 41.1 34.2 23.1 24.6 26.5 19.9 
2011 39.1 40.4 42.9 35.9 30.1 31.3 33.9 27.4 37.3 38.1 41.6 34.8 22.5 23.9 25.5 19.3 
2012 39.1 40.4 42.9 35.9 30.6 31.5 34.3 28.1 38.0 38.8 42.3 35.4 22.6 23.7 25.8 20.1 
2013 39.1 40.4 42.9 35.9 30.9 31.8 34.5 28.6 38.4 39.2 42.6 35.9 22.9 23.8 25.8 20.7 
2014 39.1 40.4 42.9 35.9 30.3 31.1 33.6 28.1 37.4 38.1 41.1 35.4 22.6 23.6 25.4 20.2 
 
6.4.2.3 Interim Conclusion 
The comparison of the cost of capital and the EATRs of Germany and the other 
countries in the European Union indicates that Germany – from a pure tax perspective – is not 
an attractive investment destination. On the corporate as well as on the investor level effective 
tax burdens are among the highest in the European Union and do not provide incentives to 
start or extend operations in Germany. For SMEs, the above-average tax burden poses the 
threat of deteriorated competitiveness with enterprises from other countries featuring lower 
cost of capital and lower effective tax rates. SMEs are even more affected by this disad-
vantage than large entities as they often do not have the opportunity to relocate their opera-
tions. Moreover, they do usually not have access to international capital markets, which ex-
poses them to investor-level taxes. The latter are another driver of high effective tax burdens 
in Germany, in particular since 2009. Lastly, the analysis reveals that almost all countries 
treat debt more favorably than equity financing and that this problem is hard to overcome – 
even if a notional interest deduction is granted on equity. Still, the discrimination of equity is 
more pronounced in Germany than in the majority of Member States, which is closely related 
to the comparatively high nominal tax rates in Germany that drive the value of the interest 
deductions.  
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Considering the time trend from 1999 to 2014, Germany exhibits above average cost 
of capital and EATRs on both the corporate and the investor level throughout the sample pe-
riod. While the gap becomes smaller on the corporate level due to reductions of the CIT rate, 
the 2008/09 reform prevents a similar, clear-cut trend on the investor level. While the EATR 
also decreases, the development of the cost of capital goes in the opposite direction. The re-
duced CIT rate plays a lesser role for marginal investments and cannot compensate for the 
additional burden induced by the Abgeltungsteuer and the Teileinkünftverfahren.  
6.4.3 Cost of Capital and Effective Average Tax Rate for Cross-Border Investments 
6.4.3.1 Extension of the Model  
The analysis of cross-border investments requires an extended framework of the 
model company and the investment project (see Figure 16). It assumes the investment to be 
undertaken by a legally independent subsidiary that is exclusively owned by a parent compa-
ny in another country. From a German point of view, investments can either be made by a 
German parent company through a foreign subsidiary (outbound investments) or by a foreign 
company through a German subsidiary (inbound investments). Each EU Member State is con-
sidered as a potential location either for the parent or the subsidiary. Similar to the parent 
company, the subsidiary can obtain capital through self-financing, new equity or debt financ-
ing. Accordingly, the returns are repatriated as either capital gains, dividends or interest pay-
ments. 
In order to comprehensively model the tax-related consequences of cross-border in-
vestments, the calculations have to include the national legislation on foreign business activi-
ties as well as the provisions from double tax treaties.
500
 In addition, a multitude of possible 
combinations of assets and financing options emerge. For the sake of simplicity and clarity, 
the analysis assumes the same mixture of assets for the subsidiary and the same weights of 
equity and debt financing for the parent company as in the domestic case. The financing of 
the subsidiary, in contrast, is not fixed. It is an important instrument for tax optimization. The 
cost of capital and EATRs are therefore given separately for each of the three financing op-
tions. With regard to the different levels of taxation, the analysis only considers the corporate 
levels, i.e., the taxes incurred by the subsidiary and the parent company, whereas personal 
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Devereux/Griffith (1999) pp. 1 ff.; Spengel (2003) pp. 134 ff.; Lammersen (2005) pp. 250 ff. 
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taxes on the investor level are neglected. As they only capture the costs of refinancing the 
parent company, personal taxes do not influence the actual decision where to locate a subsidi-
ary.  
The analysis of cross-border investments enables a more meaningful evaluation of 
the attractiveness of Germany as an investment destination than the comparison of the cost of 
capital and the EATRs of purely domestic investments. A tax burden on domestic investments 
that is significantly higher than on outbound investments signals a very unattractive tax envi-
ronment for investors. Vice versa, a low tax burden on inbound investments compared to do-
mestic investments in the other EU Member States indicates the German tax system to incen-
tivize investments. With regard to SMEs, the results provide an indication whether operating 
exclusively from Germany induces a severe tax-related disadvantage compared to larger mul-
tinationals.  
Figure 16: Framework for cross-border investments (Devereux/Griffith model) 
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6.4.3.2 Outbound-Investments 
a)  Cost of Capital 
Table 54 shows the development of the cost of capital for outbound investments of a 
German parent company in a foreign subsidiary in the EU. The weighted average (55% self-
financing, 10% new equity and 35% debt financing) as well as separate values for the three 
possible sources of finance of the subsidiary are given. The cost of capital is displayed as an 
average for outbound investments in each country of the EU, EU 15 and EU 13, respectively, 
and compared to the case of a purely domestic investment in Germany.
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Table 54: Cost of capital of outbound investment of German parent company 1999–2014 (Devereux/Griffith 
model) 
CoC 
 in % 
Ø EU 28 Ø EU 15 Ø EU 13 GER 
Ø SF EF DF Ø SF EF DF Ø SF EF DF Ø 
1999 6.5 5.4 6.1 8.1 6.6 5.7 6.1 8.1 6.4 5.1 6.0 8.1 7.7 
2000 6.4 5.2 5.9 8.0 6.6 5.7 6.0 8.0 6.2 4.7 5.8 8.1 7.7 
2001 6.6 6.0 6.6 7.3 6.8 6.4 6.6 7.3 6.5 5.6 6.5 7.4 7.1 
2002 6.6 6.1 6.5 7.3 6.9 6.5 6.7 7.3 6.4 5.6 6.3 7.3 7.1 
2003 6.6 5.9 6.4 7.4 6.8 6.4 6.6 7.4 6.3 5.4 6.2 7.4 7.2 
2004 6.5 5.9 6.3 7.3 6.8 6.4 6.6 7.4 6.2 5.3 6.0 7.2 7.1 
2005 6.4 5.8 6.1 7.2 6.7 6.3 6.5 7.4 6.0 5.2 5.6 7.1 7.1 
2006 6.3 5.7 6.0 7.2 6.6 6.1 6.3 7.4 6.0 5.2 5.6 7.1 7.0 
2007 6.3 5.6 5.9 7.2 6.5 6.0 6.2 7.4 6.0 5.2 5.5 7.1 7.0 
2008 6.1 5.8 6.0 6.7 6.4 6.2 6.3 6.7 5.8 5.4 5.6 6.6 6.5 
2009 6.1 5.8 6.0 6.6 6.4 6.2 6.4 6.7 5.8 5.4 5.6 6.5 6.4 
2010 6.1 5.7 5.9 6.6 6.4 6.1 6.3 6.7 5.8 5.3 5.6 6.6 6.4 
2011 6.1 5.7 5.9 6.6 6.3 6.0 6.2 6.7 5.8 5.3 5.6 6.6 6.5 
2012 6.1 5.7 5.9 6.6 6.3 6.1 6.2 6.7 5.8 5.3 5.6 6.6 6.5 
2013 6.1 5.7 6.0 6.7 6.4 6.1 6.3 6.8 5.9 5.3 5.7 6.6 6.5 
2014 6.1 5.7 6.0 6.7 6.4 6.1 6.3 6.8 5.9 5.4 5.7 6.6 6.5 
 
During the whole sample period the cost of capital of domestic investments in Ger-
many has exceeded the average cost of capital of outbound investments in the European Un-
ion. Hence, German enterprises with foreign subsidiaries are incentivized to extend their in-
vestments abroad rather than their domestic activities. The gap, however, was reduced signifi-
cantly from 1.2 percentage points in 1999 to 0.4 percentage points in 2014. Due to the low 
average CIT rates in other EU countries, self-financing is usually the tax-efficient way to fi-
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nance the subsidiary. Only considering this option, the gap between a domestic investment in 
Germany and an outbound investment narrowed from 2.3 percentage points in 1999 to 0.8 
percentage points in 2014. 
The cost of capital of domestic investments converge towards those of outbound in-
vestments because of the reduction of the CIT rate in 2001 and 2008. The 
Steuersenkungsgesetz in 2001 also led to increased cost of capital for outbound investments 
because only 95% of dividends paid to the German parent have been exempt since 2001 (§ 8b 
Abs. 5 KStG) while they were fully tax-free before. Additionally, equity financing experi-
enced an increase in the cost of capital in 2001 because – in face of a reduced CIT rate – the 
tax savings from deducting the interest paid for refinancing the investment on the level of the 
parent company have diminished. Debt financing, in contrast, became more advantageous due 
to the reduced CIT rate. Interest payments made by the subsidiary were only subject to a tax 
rate of 25% instead of 30% or even 40% after the Steuersenkungsgesetz. Similar effects occur 
for the Unternehmensteuerreformgesetz of 2008/09 that also decreased the CIT rate (from 
25% to 15%). Accordingly, the cost of capital of outbound investments increased slightly for 
equity financing and decreased for debt. The average went down from 6.3% to 6.1%. Further 
factors contributing to these movements include the reduction of CIT rates in the other Mem-
ber States and the modification of the tax base of the German trade tax.
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b)  Effective Average Tax Rate 
The development of the EATR of outbound investments confirms the patterns ob-
served for the cost of capital (see Table 55). The tax burden on domestic investments has been 
higher than the burden on outbound investments throughout the sample period although a 
substantial reduction of the gap was accomplished (from 17.1 percentage points in 1999 to 5.9 
percentage points in 2014). German companies are thus incentivized to open a subsidiary 
abroad rather than to start additional domestic activities. Comparing the EATRs in 1999 and 
2014 reveals that the EATR did not change significantly for outbound investments whereas 
the EATR for domestic investments decreased by 12.2 percentage points (from 40.4% to 
28.2%). Self-financing is also the tax-efficient source of capital for the subsidiary when con-
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sidering profitable investments (EATR of 20.8% compared to 21.6% and 24.6% incurred 
when obtaining new equity or debt).  
In 2001, the EATR increased from 21.5% to 29.6% for outbound investments while 
the EATR of domestic investments dropped by almost 5 percentage points (from 40.4% to 
35.8%). This development was driven by the reduction of the exemption of dividends from 
foreign subsidiaries from 100% to 95% (§ 8b Abs. 5 KStG) and the CIT rate cut which low-
ered the value of interest deductions incurred for refinancing the investment. The latter effect, 
however, played a lesser role for profitable than for marginal investments. Instead, the rise of 
the EATR occurred due to an assumption underlying the model. According to this assumption 
the returns of the investment are reinvested on the level of the parent company whereas the 
distributions to shareholders are derived from domestic activities. As a consequence, even 
foreign investments induced a refund under the split CIT rate in 1999 and 2000 if returns were 
distributed to investors. The refund enhanced the value of the investment and thus reduced the 
EATR. As the 2001 reform removed the split CIT rate this model-based effect vanished and 
the EATR increased. Insofar, the jump of the EATR most likely is not representative of the 
actual effect on businesses’ investment incentives and needs to be interpreted carefully. In 
2008, the EATR dropped for debt-financed outbound investments (from 27.4% to 24.6%) and 
remained almost the same for equity financing. Overall, the EATR dropped from 23.7% to 
22.6%. The changes can mainly be traced back to the cut of the CIT rate from 25% to 15% 
and the abovementioned consequences on the taxation of capital gains, dividends and interest 
income on the level of the parent company as well as the reduced value of interest deductions 
incurred for refinancing the investment. As in the period between the two reforms, the tax rate 
reductions in the other EU Member States also contributed to the reduction of the EATR.  
Although the reforms of 2001 and 2008/09 reduced the tax burden on domestic in-
vestments on the corporate level, marginal as well as profitable investments are still subject to 
lower effective tax rates if undertaken in other EU countries. The low CIT rates in many 
Member States are the main reason for the disadvantage of domestic investments. The 
Steuersenkungsgesetz of 2001 and the Unternehmensteuerreformgesetz of 2008/09 only nar-
rowed the gap in nominal CIT rates but did not close it. The tax system therefore encourages 
enterprises to start and extend business activities abroad rather than in Germany. Given that 
SMEs often only have operations in Germany, this is another disadvantage they face in the 
competition with large multi-national companies.  
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Table 55: EATR of outbound investment of German parent company 1999–2014 (Devereux/Griffith model) 
EATR 
in % 
Ø EU 28 Ø EU 15 Ø EU 13 GER 
Ø SF EF DF Ø SF EF DF Ø SF EF DF Ø 
1999 23.3 19.1 21.5 29.4 23.8 20.3 21.8 29.4 22.8 17.8 21.2 29.3 40.4 
2000 21.5 17.0 19.5 28.1 22.9 19.5 20.6 28.6 20.0 14.2 18.3 27.5 40.4 
2001 29.6 27.4 29.4 32.1 31.1 29.8 30.5 33.0 28.0 24.8 28.1 31.2 35.8 
2002 29.0 26.9 28.6 31.4 31.0 29.8 30.5 32.7 26.8 23.9 26.5 30.1 35.8 
2003 28.3 25.9 27.6 31.2 30.7 29.3 30.0 32.8 25.7 22.4 25.1 29.5 37.0 
2004 26.9 24.6 26.1 29.8 30.3 28.9 29.6 32.2 23.2 20.0 22.3 27.3 35.8 
2005 24.7 22.5 23.6 28.1 29.1 27.6 28.3 31.3 20.0 17.0 18.4 24.6 35.8 
2006 24.4 22.1 23.1 28.0 28.4 26.8 27.5 31.1 20.1 17.1 18.5 24.6 35.5 
2007 23.7 21.3 22.3 27.4 27.5 25.8 26.4 30.4 19.5 16.5 17.8 24.2 35.5 
2008 22.6 21.2 22.0 24.6 26.5 25.6 26.2 27.6 18.4 16.4 17.5 21.3 28.2 
2009 22.8 21.5 22.3 24.7 26.8 26.0 26.5 27.8 18.5 16.6 17.7 21.4 28.0 
2010 22.2 20.7 21.6 24.3 26.1 25.3 25.8 27.3 18.0 15.9 17.0 21.1 28.0 
2011 22.0 20.4 21.2 24.2 25.6 24.6 25.2 27.0 18.0 15.9 17.0 21.2 28.2 
2012 22.1 20.6 21.4 24.3 25.8 24.8 25.3 27.1 18.2 16.0 17.2 21.3 28.2 
2013 22.5 20.9 21.8 24.7 26.0 25.0 25.5 27.4 18.7 16.6 17.8 21.7 28.2 
2014 22.3 20.8 21.6 24.6 25.8 24.7 25.3 27.4 18.5 16.6 17.6 21.4 28.2 
 
6.4.3.3 Inbound Investments 
a)  Cost of Capital 
Table 56 shows the development of the average cost of capital of inbound invest-
ments of a foreign parent company from EU Member States in a German subsidiary. The av-
erage cost of capital of domestic investments in the Member States (excluding Germany) 
serves as a measuring stick for the attractiveness of inbound investments in Germany.
503
  
During the whole sample period the average cost of capital of inbound investments in 
Germany has exceeded the cost of capital of purely domestic investments in other Member 
States. Hence, foreign companies are incentivized to extend operations in their residence 
countries rather than in Germany. Since 1999, the disadvantage of the inbound investment has 
diminished by more than 50%, though (from 1.3 percentage points to 0.6 percentage points). 
Due to the comparatively high CIT rate in Germany, debt financing is the tax-efficient way to 
finance inbound investments. The interest payments reduce the profits to be taxed in Germany 
and instead are subject to the CIT rate of the parent company. As a result of the tax rate cuts 
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 The numbers correspond to the EATRs in Table 47. For the investment in a foreign company only the 
weighted cost of capital across all forms of financing (55% self-financing, 10% outside equity, 35% debt financ-
ing) are presented. 
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in 2001 and 2008, the edge of debt financing was reduced but not completely removed (be-
cause average foreign CIT rates are still lower).
504
 Even using debt finance, however, domes-
tic investments in other EU countries exhibit a slight advantage over inbound investments in 
2014 (6.2% compared to 6.3%). Interestingly, debt-financed inbound investments held the 
advantage before the 2001 reform (6.0% compared to 6.2%). The overall effect of the 
Steuersenkungs-gesetz and the Unternehmensteuerreformgesetz on inbound investment activi-
ty from foreign companies is therefore not clear. It is highly dependent on the financing mix 
chosen for German subsidiaries. In this respect, the add-back of interest payments (25%) to 
the tax base of the trade tax and the interest barrier need to be highlighted as impediments to 
debt-financed inbound investments. 
Table 56: Cost of capital of inbound investment in German subsidiary 1999–2014 (Devereux/Griffith model) 
CoC in 
% 
Ø Inbound EU 28 Ø Inbound EU 15 Ø Inbound EU 13 
EU 28  
(domestic) 
Ø SF BF FF Ø SF BF FF Ø SF BF FF Ø 
1999 7.6 9.1 7.5 6.2 7.4 8.8 7.1 6.3 7.8 9.5 7.9 6.0 6.3 
2000 7.6 9.3 7.7 5.8 7.4 9.2 7.0 6.1 7.8 9.5 8.3 5.5 6.2 
2001 7.4 7.5 8.0 6.8 7.3 7.3 7.4 7.1 7.6 7.7 8.7 6.5 6.2 
2002 7.5 7.5 8.0 6.9 7.4 7.4 7.5 7.2 7.6 7.6 8.7 6.5 6.3 
2003 7.6 7.7 8.3 6.8 7.5 7.6 7.6 7.2 7.7 7.8 8.9 6.4 6.2 
2004 7.3 7.6 7.8 6.7 7.3 7.4 7.4 7.1 7.4 7.9 8.2 6.2 6.2 
2005 7.3 7.6 7.8 6.5 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.0 7.4 7.9 8.3 6.0 6.1 
2006 7.2 7.5 7.7 6.4 7.1 7.2 7.3 6.8 7.3 7.8 8.1 5.9 6.0 
2007 7.1 7.5 7.6 6.3 7.1 7.3 7.3 6.7 7.2 7.8 7.8 5.9 6.0 
2008 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.2 6.5 6.5 6.6 6.6 6.6 7.0 7.0 5.8 6.0 
2009 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.2 6.5 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.9 6.9 5.8 6.0 
2010 6.5 6.7 6.7 6.1 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.9 6.9 5.7 5.9 
2011 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.1 6.5 6.5 6.6 6.5 6.6 7.0 7.0 5.8 5.9 
2012 6.6 6.8 6.8 6.1 6.5 6.5 6.6 6.5 6.6 7.0 7.1 5.8 5.9 
2013 6.6 6.8 6.8 6.2 6.5 6.5 6.6 6.5 6.6 7.0 7.1 5.8 5.9 
2014 6.6 6.8 6.8 6.2 6.5 6.5 6.6 6.5 6.6 7.0 7.0 5.8 6.0 
 
 
                                                 
504
 Only inbound investments financed with new equity or retained profits benefit from the cut of the CIT rate as 
the profits of the subsidiary are taxed at a lower rate before being repatriated. For debt-financed investments, in 
contrast, the interest payments can be deducted from the tax base of the subsidiary anyway. The beneficial effect 
of the deduction decreases as a consequence of the diminished tax wedge, which explains the increase in the cost 
of capital for debt financing in 2001 (from 5.8% to 6.8%). In 2008, the slight reduction even for the debt scenar-
io can be explained by the modification in the tax base of the trade tax (addition of 25% of interest payments to 
the tax base instead of previously 50%). 
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b)  Effective Average Tax Rate 
Table 57 presents the development of the EATR of inbound investments of EU par-
ent companies in German subsidiaries. As a comparison, the average EATR of domestic in-
vestments in the Member States (excluding Germany) is also given.
505
 
Table 57: EATR of inbound investment in German subsidiary 1999–2014 (Devereux/Griffith model) 
EATR 
in % 
Ø Inbound EU 28 Ø Inbound EU 15 Ø Inbound EU 13 
EU 28 
(domestic) 
Ø SF BF FF Ø SF BF FF Ø SF BF FF Ø 
1999 41.7 46.1 41.5 37.5 39.8 44.8 38.6 36.1 43.7 47.5 44.6 39.0 28.3 
2000 42.0 46.6 42.0 37.4 39.8 44.7 38.6 36.0 44.4 48.6 45.7 38.9 26.9 
2001 39.0 39.1 40.5 37.3 36.5 36.7 36.9 35.8 41.7 41.7 44.4 38.9 26.3 
2002 38.8 38.9 40.3 37.1 36.8 37.0 37.1 36.2 40.9 41.0 43.7 38.1 25.7 
2003 39.9 40.3 41.7 37.7 37.9 38.3 38.5 36.9 42.0 42.3 45.1 38.5 24.9 
2004 37.5 38.3 38.8 35.5 36.6 36.8 36.9 36.0 38.6 39.9 40.8 35.1 24.0 
2005 37.4 38.3 38.8 35.2 36.4 36.7 36.8 35.7 38.5 40.0 40.9 34.6 22.6 
2006 37.0 37.9 38.4 34.7 36.0 36.4 36.5 35.1 38.1 39.6 40.5 34.3 22.2 
2007 36.4 37.6 37.7 34.0 36.0 36.5 36.6 34.8 36.9 38.7 38.9 33.2 21.6 
2008 29.2 29.7 29.9 27.9 28.7 28.6 28.8 28.6 29.7 30.9 31.0 27.1 21.1 
2009 29.0 29.5 29.7 27.9 28.7 28.5 28.8 28.7 29.4 30.6 30.8 26.9 21.4 
2010 28.9 29.5 29.6 27.6 28.4 28.4 28.5 28.4 29.4 30.7 30.8 26.7 20.7 
2011 29.1 29.7 29.9 27.7 28.6 28.6 28.8 28.4 29.6 30.9 31.1 26.9 20.5 
2012 29.1 29.8 29.9 27.7 28.6 28.6 28.8 28.4 29.7 31.1 31.2 26.9 20.5 
2013 29.2 29.8 30.0 27.7 28.6 28.7 28.8 28.4 29.8 31.1 31.2 27.0 20.9 
2014 29.2 29.9 29.9 27.7 28.8 28.9 29.0 28.5 29.6 30.9 30.9 26.9 20.8 
 
During the whole period from 1999 to 2014 the EATR of inbound investments from 
the EU has exceeded the average EATR of domestic investments in the respective countries. 
The gap, however, narrowed from 13.4 percentage points (41.7% compared to 28.3%) to 8.4 
percentage points (29.2% compared to 20.8%). The same trend appears when considering 
debt financing separately (a difference of 9.2 percentage points in 1999 compared to 6.9 in 
2014). The latter is also the most beneficial source of capital of a German subsidiary if profit-
able investments are undertaken. Hence, the attractiveness of founding a German subsidiary 
has increased since 1999. Domestic investments in the EU Member States, however, are still 
more beneficial from a pure tax perspective. 
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 The numbers are taken from Table 49. 
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6.4.3.4 Interim Conclusion 
The analysis of effective tax burdens for cross-border investments from 1999 to 2014 
shows Germany’s improved attractiveness as an investment destination. The comparison of 
domestic investments in Germany and outbound investments in the EU reveals that the tax 
advantage of founding new subsidiaries abroad as well as extending foreign business activi-
ties there has significantly diminished for German parent companies since 1999. Moreover, 
the analysis for inbound investments displays the foundation of new subsidiaries in Germany 
to be more beneficial for foreign enterprises compared to 1999. The results for the extension 
of already existing operations are mixed: The cost of capital of inbound investments over all 
three forms of financing has approached the cost of capital for domestic investments in other 
EU countries but debt financing – the tax-efficient source of capital – has not benefited from 
the reforms. 
The positive trend is mainly driven by the CIT rate cuts in 2001 and 2008. However, 
investments abroad are still subject to lower effective tax rates than investments in Germany. 
There is still a competitive disadvantage emanating from the comparatively high level of the 
income taxes on corporate income at a rate of about 30% (15% corporate income tax about 
15% trade tax). This rate would have to be further reduced in order to make Germany an 
equally or even more attractive investment destination than most other EU countries. The lim-
ited deductibility of interest payments within the German trade tax is another factor potential-
ly impeding the attraction of inbound investments. It negatively affects subsidiaries financed 
with debt, which is especially critical as debt financing is the tax-efficient way of providing 
German subsidiaries with capital from the EU. 
6.4.4 Taxation of Transparently Taxed Enterprises    
The major limitation of the above analysis is the exclusive focus on corporate busi-
nesses. The majority of German enterprises – especially in the SME sector – are non-
corporate entities such as partnerships and sole proprietorships, though.
506
 Hence, an over-
view of the most important consequences for transparently taxed enterprises is required for a 
comprehensive evaluation of the 2001 and 2008/09 reforms. 
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 In 2013, 18.2% of German SMEs were corporations, 13.5% were partnerships and 68.5% were sole proprie-
torships. See Statistisches Bundesamt: https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesamtwirtschaftUmwelt/ 
UnternehmenHandwerk/Unternehmensregister/Tabellen/UnternehmenRechtsformenWZ2008.html#Fussnote2 
(retrieved on July 20, 2016). 
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In Germany, income from partnerships and sole proprietorships is usually subject to 
the trade tax and the progressive personal income tax on the level of the owner as soon as it 
accrues.
507
 The partnership (or sole proprietorship) itself is not regarded a taxable entity. Only 
the owners are subject to income taxation. The investor-level tax burdens of corporations 
therefore represent the appropriate measuring stick for investments in transparently taxed 
businesses. The provisions on the determination of taxable income are mostly the same for 
corporate and non-corporate enterprises.
508
 Hence, both types of businesses are equally affect-
ed by the modifications of depreciation rules during the sample period from 2000 to 2014. 
Different effects of the 2001 and the 2008/09 reforms on effective tax burdens can therefore 
only stem from statutory tax rates and the interaction of the trade tax and the income tax (see 
Table 58). 
Before the Steuersenkungsgesetz in 2001, partnership income was subject to a lower 
(combined) statutory tax rate than corporate income that is distributed as a dividend. The ad-
vantage stems from a limited PIT rate of 43% for business income in 2000. Dividends, in con-
trast, were taxable at the full PIT rate of 51%. Accordingly, the cost of capital and the EATR 
of transparently taxed entities should be significantly lower than for corporate investments 
financed with new equity.
509
 The 2001 reform removed the cap of PIT rate at 43% for busi-
ness income but the imputation of the trade tax payable to the personal income tax and the 
reduction of the general PIT rate outweigh this disadvantage. As a result, the combined statu-
tory tax rate decreased and was still below the respective corporate rate after 2001. In fact, the 
advantage became even bigger in the following years as the top PIT rate dropped even further 
to 42%.  
The 2008 reform, in contrast, significantly increased the effective tax burden of sole 
proprietorships and partnerships as a broadening of the tax base (i.e., more restrictive depreci-
ation rules) was complemented by an increase in the overall statutory tax rate (from 46.3% to 
48.4%). The raise was caused by the increase of the applicable personal income tax rate (the 
PIT cap was re-introduced in 2006 and again abolished in 2008) and the abolition of the trade 
                                                 
507
 The Unternehmensteuerreformgesetz in 2008 also introduced the option of profit retention for transparently 
taxed entities. The retained profits, however, are immediately subject to trade tax and a reduced PIT rate. Upon 
distribution, the profits are taxed again. 
508
 Only the very smallest non-corporate businesses have the option to apply an adjusted form of cash accounting 
to determine income (§ 4 Abs. 3 EStG). 
509
 A similar study indeed finds lower cost of capital and a lower EATR for partnerships before the 
Steuersenkungs-gesetz in 2001 as well as after the reform in 2001 and 2005. See Sachverständigenrat (2001) pp. 
303 ff. 
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tax deduction in the PIT base. Both factors outweigh the positive effect of the increase of the 
amount of imputed trade tax (multiplier of 380% instead of 180%).  
Given the tax rate cut for alternative capital market investments, the cost of capital 
and the EATR of investments in transparently taxed entities can be assumed to have experi-
enced a significant increase in 2008. The advantage in nominal tax rates of non-corporate le-
gal forms over corporate entities disappeared for the most part as well. The combined statuto-
ry rate for corporations exceeds the overall statutory burden on partnerships only by 0.7 per-
centage points in 2009 (see Table 58). Moreover, the option to provide shareholder debt in-
stead of equity – that is not available for transparently taxed businesses and their owners – has 
become more valuable because interest income is now subject to the Abgeltungsteuer (25%) 
on the investor level (unless the investor owns more than 10% of the company’s share capi-
tal). As an advantage for sole proprietorships and partnerships, they have the opportunity to 
retain profits since the Unternehmensteuerreformgesetz in 2008. Under the new regime, re-
tained profits are subject to a reduced PIT rate of 28.25% when they accrue. However, a de-
ferred taxation at 25% kicks in upon distribution. Obviously, the combined rate (28.25% plus 
25%) is comparatively high so that the regime is only attractive under very specific circum-
stances (high marginal tax rate, long re-investment horizon) and provides very limited relief 
for the otherwise disadvantageous changes for transparently taxed entities in 2008.
510
 
Altogether, the trends observed for transparently taxed businesses confirm the results 
from the quantitative analysis for corporate entities. The 2001 reform improved the invest-
ment attractiveness of the German tax system whereas the 2008 reform had the opposite ef-
fect. For sole proprietors and partnerships – or rather their owners – the deterioration in 2008 
was even worse than for the shareholders of corporations. Hence, the mostly non-corporate 
SME sector has been confronted with a particularly adverse tax environment in Germany 
since 2008. 
                                                 
510
 Given a pre-tax rate of return of 5% and a personal income tax rate of 30%, for example, the option of retain-
ing profits is only beneficial if profits are reinvested for 324 years. See Jacobs/Scheffler/Spengel (2015) p. 607.  
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Table 58: Statutory tax rates on corporate and non-corporate business income in Germany 2000–2014 
 
Corporation Non-corporate entity 
CIT rate 
PIT rate 
(dividends) 
Overall 
PIT rate 
(business income) 
Trade tax 
lowers income? 
Trade tax  
imputed? 
Overall 
2000 30% / 40% 51.0% 61.8% 43.0% yes no 55.0% 
2001 25.0% 0.5 * 48.5% 54.9% 48.5% yes 180% 52.0% 
2002 25.0% 0.5 * 48.5% 54.9% 48.5% yes 180% 52.0% 
2003 26.5% 0.5 * 48.5% 55.8% 48.5% yes 180% 52.0% 
2004 25.0% 0.5 * 45.0% 53.7% 45.0% yes 180% 48.9% 
2005 25.0% 0.5 * 42.0% 52.8% 42.0% yes 180% 46.3% 
2006 25.0% 0.5 * 45.0% 53.7% 42.0% yes 180% 46.3% 
2007 25.0% 0.5 * 45.0% 53.7% 42.0% yes 180% 46.3% 
2008 15.0% 0.5 * 45.0% 47.2% 45.0% no 380% 48.4% 
2009 15.0% 25.0% 49.1% 45.0% no 380% 48.4% 
2010 15.0% 25.0% 49.1% 45.0% no 380% 48.4% 
2011 15.0% 25.0% 49.1% 45.0% no 380% 48.4% 
2012 15.0% 25.0% 49.1% 45.0% no 380% 48.4% 
2013 15.0% 25.0% 49.1% 45.0% no 380% 48.4% 
2014 15.0% 25.0% 49.1% 45.0% no 380% 48.4% 
Notes: The given statutory tax rates assume a qualified shareholder who is subject to the top personal tax rate. The multiplier for trade tax is fixed at 428%, the German average 
of 2001. For the corporate case, a distribution of profits as dividends is assumed.  
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6.5 Interim Conclusion 
The Steuersenkungsgesetz 2001 and the Unternehmensteuerreformgesetz 2008/09 
improved the investment conditions in Germany noticeably. Disregarding investor-level taxa-
tion, the average cost of capital decreased from 7.7% to 6.5% and the EATR from 40.4% to 
28.2%. So the return that an investment worth undertaking needs to yield is 1.2 percentage 
points lower in 2014 than in 1999. Compared to the European mean of 6.0%, however, Ger-
many still features above-average cost of capital. Multinational investors should therefore 
prefer extending activities elsewhere in the EU while cutting investments in Germany. More-
over, the results imply an inferior competitiveness of German companies that offer similar 
products and services in the same markets as their foreign counterparts. The incentives for 
founding or relocating companies are better captured by the EATR than the cost of capital. 
Considering EATRs, Germany also features one of the highest tax burdens in Europe that 
exceeds the European average (23.3%) by 4.9 percentage points. Hence, the tax system pro-
vides no or only little reason to relocate business activities to Germany or to start them there. 
Including investor-level taxes changes the picture significantly. The introduction of 
the Halbeinkünfteverfahren in 2001 reduced the cost of capital and the EATR for qualified 
shareholders who are subject to high personal income tax rates from 5.9% to 4.4% and from 
48.3% to 38.9%, respectively. The 2001 reform generally benefited equity financing more 
than debt financing. The transition to the Teileinkünfteverfahren and the Abgeltungsteuer in 
2008, however, removed the reliefs at the investor level. The cost of capital returned to the 
initial level of 5.9%. Unqualified shareholders also suffered an increase of the cost of capital 
to 5.8%, which exceeds the pre-2001 value by 1.9 percentage points. Moreover, equity financ-
ing is massively discriminated against since 2008. With regard to the EATR, smaller increas-
es occurred in 2008 due to the heightened meaning of the corporate income tax rate. Similar 
to the corporate level, Germany ranks among the countries with the highest effective tax bur-
dens at the investor level. The cost of capital (6.0%) as well as the EATR (39.1%) both ex-
ceed EU averages substantially (5.5% and 30.3%, respectively).  
For transparently taxed entities, a similar picture emerges. The 2001 reform reduced 
the tax burden on investments in sole proprietorships and partnerships whereas the 2008 re-
form had the opposite effect. For sole proprietors and partnerships – or rather their owners – 
the deterioration in 2008 was even worse than for the shareholders of corporations as they 
experienced a significant increase in the statutory tax rate. Obviously, this affects the mostly 
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non-corporate SME sector in particular and further contributes to a comparatively unattractive 
tax environment for SMEs in Germany. 
For cross-border investments, two scenarios need to be distinguished: investments by 
a German company in a foreign subsidiary (outbound investments) and investments by a for-
eign parent company in a German subsidiary (inbound investments). During the whole obser-
vation period from 1999 to 2014 the cost of capital and the EATR of domestic investments in 
Germany exceed the values for outbound investments in the other EU Member States. Hence, 
German companies owning subsidiaries abroad are incentivized to extend investments in 
these subsidiaries rather than their domestic activities. The disadvantage of domestic invest-
ments in Germany has decreased, though, from 1.2 to 0.4 percentage points for the cost of 
capital and from 17.1 to 5.9 percentage points if the EATR is considered. Only taking self-
financing as the tax-efficient way of providing capital to the subsidiary, the gap has decreased 
from 2.3 to 0.8 percentage points (from 23.4 to 7.4 percentage points for the EATR). The 
Steuersenkungsgesetz as well as the Unternehmensteuerreformgesetz contributed to this trend 
by reducing the corporate income tax rate but they did not completely remove Germany’s 
disadvantage. 
For inbound investments, the cost of capital and the EATR also exceed the corre-
sponding values for (domestic) investments in other EU Member States during the whole 
sample period from 1999 to 2014. Foreign companies should therefore tend to invest in their 
country of origin rather than in Germany. However, the gap also narrowed for inbound in-
vestments. While they featured a cost of capital that was 1.3 percentage points higher than the 
average of domestic investments in the EU in 1999, the number decreased to 0.6 percentage 
points in 2013. Correspondingly, the difference for the EATR changed from 13.4 to 7.4 per-
centage points. In contrast to that, a slight advantage (0.1 percentage point) of inbound in-
vestments in 1999 has transformed into a slight disadvantage in 2014 (0.2 percentage points) 
when considering a subsidiary that is exclusively and tax-efficiently financed with debt.  
The financing neutrality of the German tax system was substantially improved by the 
Steuersenkungsgesetz in 2001 as the big advantage of debt financing on the corporate as well 
as on the investor level was reduced. Businesses with limited access to the capital market 
therefore experienced an improved investment environment. In addition, the abolition of the 
split corporate income tax rate equalized the tax burdens of self-financing and new equity. 
The increased taxation of shareholders after the Unternehmensteuerreformgesetz in 2008/09, 
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however, reinforced the discrimination of equity financing. The corporate level, of course, 
remains unaffected by shareholder taxation but the deductibility of interest expenses also 
makes debt the superior source of capital if investor-level taxes are neglected. 
The distinction of different asset classes in the above analysis indicates real invest-
ments (buildings, intangibles and machinery) to be subject to smaller reliefs than financial 
assets. Although the incentives for undertaking real investments have increased as well, their 
relative advantageousness compared to financial assets has deteriorated. The broadening of 
the tax base in 2001 and 2008 is the driver of this development as it mostly affected real in-
vestments (in particular the more restrictive depreciation rules). Further deteriorations of the 
investment friendliness of the German tax code stem from increasingly restrictive loss-offset 
rules (minimum taxation, more restrictions on loss carry backs, loss trafficking rules), the 
interest barrier and the addition of interest payments to the tax base of the trade tax. Other 
countries have installed similar provisions, though. 
Altogether, the analysis of effective tax burdens on the corporate level for domestic 
as well as for cross-border investments shows an increase of Germany’s attractiveness as an 
investment destination. The positive trend is mainly driven by the substantial reductions of the 
corporate income tax rate. The comparison with other EU Member States, however, reveals 
that the level of effective tax rates is still comparatively high. In this regard, no major efforts 
have been undertaken since 2008. For a further gain in attractiveness, German business taxa-
tion requires another cut in tax rates being applied on entrepreneurial profits. 
If the taxation of capital gains, dividends and interest income on the level of the 
shareholders is taken into account, a different picture emerges. The reliefs implemented by the 
Steuersenkungsgesetz in 2001 were almost completely nullified by the 2008/09 reform. More-
over, equity financing was put at a substantial disadvantage compared to debt financing. A 
removal of this imbalance requires a lower tax rate on dividends or a more extensive exemp-
tion of proceeds from equity investments. Alternatively, equity financing could be relieved on 
the corporate level, e.g., by means of a notional interest deduction. 
The general findings, of course, apply to large enterprises as well as to SMEs. Both 
groups benefit from the reduction of effective tax burdens on the corporate level and the im-
proved competitiveness of the German tax system. Nonetheless, the analysis exposes the 
structural disadvantages for SMEs emanating from the tax system. First of all, debt financing 
induces lower effective tax burdens than equity because interest payments are mostly deducti-
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ble from taxable income whereas dividends are not. For the majority of SMEs, access to debt 
finance is not as big a problem as it used to be. Young and innovative SMEs, however, usual-
ly have to rely more on equity than established businesses. Hence, the lack of financing neu-
trality in the tax system hurts exactly those enterprises which are among the most important 
ones for sustainable, long-term economic growth and which have the most problems in ob-
taining funds. The reform in 2008/09 even aggravated the problem in Germany and – consid-
ering the investment conditions for innovative start-ups – was a step in the wrong direction.  
The increased taxation of shareholders is another deterioration of investment condi-
tions which primarily affects SMEs. They usually feature fewer shareholders with higher 
holding quotas than large corporations. The shareholders of SMEs often need the proceeds 
from their businesses to make a living and cannot retain profits. Moreover, they are subject to 
comparatively high personal tax rates. The shareholders of multi-national companies, in con-
trast, are often exempt from shareholder taxation so that the redistribution of the tax burden 
from the corporate to the shareholder level is in part a redistribution from large to small enter-
prises. It is unclear, though, if policy-makers were not aware of this effect or if they accepted 
the discrimination of SMEs as the price to pay for staying competitive in the international tax 
competition. The development of the effective tax burden for non-corporate businesses may 
suggest the latter as it further contributes to the obvious deterioration of investment conditions 
for SMEs in Germany. 
Lastly, SMEs exclusively operating from Germany experience disadvantages due to 
the lower levels of effective tax rates in most other EU countries. If SMEs do not have the 
opportunity to relocate their activities, they are in danger to fall behind German competitors 
incurring lower tax burdens through outbound investments as well as international competi-
tors incurring lower tax burdens through domestic investments in their residence countries or 
even inbound investments to Germany that are financed adequately. This tax-related disad-
vantage, of course, can only be removed or attenuated if the level of taxation in Germany will 
be further reduced in the future.  
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7. Conclusion 
(1) The SME sector, as defined by the European Commission, comprises micro, small 
and medium-sized enterprises, ranging from 0 to 250 employees, from € 0 to € 100 
million of turnover and from € 0 to € 86 million of total assets. SMEs account for the 
bulk of economic activity in the European Union and they are essential to Europe’s 
economic development and prosperity. As a consequence, the need for specific SME 
support, most notably in the form of tax incentives, is a popular credo among Euro-
pean policy-makers.  
(2) Tax incentives for specific groups of taxpayers should be treated with caution, 
though. Above all, the tax system needs to be as fair, as simple and as neutral as pos-
sible. Distortions in the allocation of resources need to be held to a minimum. Natu-
rally, discriminatory treatment of small and large firms is contradictory to these guid-
ing principles and there must be valid reasons when privileging either group. If such 
reasons are given, the adequacy of tax incentives depends on their ability to properly 
address and alleviate the targeted problems as well as on the costs associated with 
their implementation. In order to ensure their efficiency and avoid unintended ad-
verse effects, they must be designed in a simple, transparent and neutral way. 
(3) With regard to currently available regimes, SME tax incentives are common practice 
in the Member States of the European Union. Most notably, reduced income tax rates 
are regularly offered to micro and small businesses as well as to their owners. In ad-
dition, input-based incentives such as special depreciation schemes, tax allowances 
and tax credits can be found in numerous tax codes. The latter are frequently limited 
to rather specific areas of application, e.g., to certain underprivileged regions or to 
certain kinds of investments. Given these restrictions in the scope of application, the 
vast majority of regimes in the European Union does not have a significant impact on 
the tax burdens of most SMEs. Comparing the three classes of SMEs, micro compa-
nies receive by far the most generous benefits, whereas small and – even more so – 
medium-sized entities are rarely subject to substantial tax cuts. Besides reductions in 
tax payments, the very smallest enterprises also benefit from administrative reliefs 
throughout the European Union. The simplifications range from less frequent tax 
payments and returns over simplified accounting requirements up to special regimes 
building on alternative tax bases (e.g., turnover) or even lump-sum payments. 
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(4) Given the multitude of available SME incentives, the question of their justification 
arises. In general, the market mechanism should be assumed to induce the best avail-
able allocation of resources unless frictions prevent the well-functioning of the mar-
ket. If, however, market failure does indeed occur and results in underinvestment in 
the SME sector, policy-intervention could be warranted. With regard to small busi-
nesses, positive externalities in the form of job creation and innovation as well as 
asymmetric information between business insiders and outsiders are the most com-
monly cited market failures. The latter induces an insufficient provision of capital as 
investors are unwilling to invest when they cannot properly assess the associated 
risks. 
(5) Existing evidence does generally not confirm that the SME sector as a whole is af-
fected by the aforementioned market failures. Instead, it is only a very small group of 
young and dynamic firms who feature an above-average propensity to generate jobs 
and innovation and who are subject to increased problems of obtaining sufficient fi-
nancing due to their heightened capital needs and the uncertainty associated to their 
business models. The majority of SMEs, however, are not (or not so much) affected 
by market frictions. Tax incentives relying on size as the main eligibility criterion are 
thus not targeted adequately. In addition, most of the currently available regimes tend 
to provide exactly those businesses with the most generous reliefs that are the least 
affected by market failure, i.e., the well-established and highly profitable enterprises. 
Start-ups and upcoming high-growth, high-risk firms, by contrast, can often not take 
full advantage as they regularly do not have the positive income required to benefit 
from preferential tax rates and input-based, non-refundable tax credits and allowanc-
es.   
(6) Disadvantages of smaller entities emanating from the tax system constitute another 
line of argumentation in favor of providing SME tax incentives. Most prominently, 
SMEs are assumed to be discriminated against because their compliance burden is 
disproportionally high. Given that compliance costs are largely made up of fixed and 
quasi-fixed costs, whose impact decreases in firm size, there is indeed a case to be 
made for SME incentives. Firm size actually is the characteristic causing the problem 
and it should thus be the characteristic to be referred to when targeting compensatory 
relief. Naturally, the relief itself should relate to the underlying friction, which im-
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plies the provision of administrative reliefs rather than other instruments aiming at 
the actual tax liability (e.g., special tax rates).  
(7) In addition, SMEs are assumed to be disadvantaged by the tax system because they 
do not have the tax planning opportunities of large entities, because they are more af-
fected by the double taxation of corporate profits and restricted loss offsets and be-
cause they are more reliant on equity financing that is traditionally disadvantaged in 
modern income tax systems. These alleged tax-related discriminations, however, do 
not justify the use of SME incentives. Evidently, owners of small businesses evade 
more taxes than any other group of taxpayers by mingling private and business af-
fairs. Moreover, they have substantial leeway to organize operations in tax-
minimizing ways as well, e.g., by choosing their legal form adequately, by timing 
profit distributions according to their preferences or by setting up contract relations 
with their businesses. Moreover, the double taxation of corporate profits, the discrim-
ination of equity and the restriction of loss offsets do not necessarily affect small 
businesses more than large entities; and even if they did, the obvious approach would 
be to address the issues directly instead of trying to alleviate one distortion by intro-
ducing a new one. 
(8) Besides displaying a lack of effectiveness in addressing the problems associated to 
the SME sector, SME tax incentives also come along with significant welfare costs. 
First of all, they introduce additional complexity to the tax code. The compliance 
costs of taxpayers as well as the collection costs of tax administrations are thereby 
increased, which is especially critical in the SME sector where the compliance bur-
den plays a crucial role. Further costs arise due to deficient designs of tax incentives 
that lead to unnecessary violations of the neutrality of the incentive itself as well as 
of the tax code as a whole.  
(9) Eligibility criteria explicitly referring to firm size constitute a particularly critical 
design feature of many SME tax incentives. If only entities up to a certain income, 
turnover or asset threshold are granted relief, taxpayers are incentivized to either un-
derreport their business size, to defer growth or to permanently remain small. Ac-
cordingly, the bunching analysis of prominent size thresholds in the tax codes of six 
Member States of the European Union displays significant taxpayer bunching at 
turnover and employment thresholds, in particular when the eligibility for complete 
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exemptions and simplified regimes is at risk. The latter tend to combine administra-
tive facilitations with overly generous tax cuts, thereby creating considerable distor-
tions in the competition between eligible and ineligible businesses. Moreover, firm 
growth and job creation is severely impeded by explicit size criteria, especially when 
the number of employees is referred to. Obviously, a slowdown of firm growth is the 
exact opposite of the intended effect of tax incentives.  
(10) The distortion of the legal form choice is another problem arising from discriminato-
ry SME tax incentives. If certain benefits are exclusively provided to either corporate 
or non-corporate entities, businesses are inclined to choose the legal form that grants 
eligibility. Simplified tax accounting, for example, is generally only provided for 
non-corporate entities. As is shown empirically, this induces a statistically significant 
amount of firms to choose the non-corporate form of business. Specifically, about 
one in a hundred entrepreneurs is found to refrain from incorporation if he can there-
by avoid complex, accruals-based accounting regulations. Not only does this show 
the significance of compliance costs for the very smallest enterprises, but it also hints 
at possible welfare losses if the choice of legal form impacts on entrepreneurs’ risk 
aversion and their ability to acquire capital. 
(11) Altogether, the use of SME tax incentives is mostly inappropriate. Considering cur-
rently available regimes, the majority of incentives are ineffective in addressing the 
problems of the SME sector. The provisions are regularly not well designed and 
cause unnecessary complexity in the tax code as well as additional distortions to in-
vestment, financing and legal form decisions. Essentially, they do not fulfill a single 
one of the four postulated quality criteria for adequate tax incentives: effectiveness, 
simplicity, neutrality and efficiency. Some exceptions need to be made, though. 
Above all, administrative reliefs are an appropriate instrument to alleviate the dis-
proportionate compliance burden of small businesses and to save collection costs on 
the side of the tax administration as well. In addition, R&D tax incentives and the 
taxation of venture capital investments are areas where enhanced benefits for SMEs 
can make sense as the overriding problem of accurately targeting the small group of 
dynamic and innovative SMEs is less prevalent in these sectors. It needs to be high-
lighted, though, that even then explicit size criteria should be avoided. Instead, abso-
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lute caps on available reliefs represent the superior approach of targeting SMEs. 
Such caps are easier to implement and cause fewer distortions. 
(12) Given the inappropriateness of most SME tax incentives, the focus of tax policies 
supporting SMEs should shift to the provision of a generally neutral and simple tax 
system that benefits investments in large as well as small and medium-sized entities. 
In Germany, the two most recent reforms of the corporate and the personal income 
tax in 2001 and 2008/09 indeed had the explicit goal of creating an investment-
friendly and internationally competitive tax environment. This endeavor, however, 
was only partly accomplished. Germany still features one of the highest effective tax 
burdens for corporations in Europe. And while effective tax rates were broadly and 
substantially reduced by the 2001 reform, the changes in 2008 and 2009 had – to a 
large part – adverse effects, especially for SMEs. Most importantly, the tax burden 
on the corporate level was reduced at the expense of the shareholder level. Given the 
relative importance of shareholder taxation for small and large companies, this de-
velopment predominantly hurts the SME sector. The discrimination of equity financ-
ing and overly restrictive loss offset and loss trafficking rules are further elements 
that are especially detrimental to the attractiveness of the German tax system for 
young, dynamic and innovative enterprises. The removal of these obstacles to growth 
– and not the provision of specific and mostly ineffective SME tax incentives – 
should be the focal point of legislators in Germany as well as in other countries. 
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Appendix 
 
Annex 1: Country Reports 
In the following, available SME tax incentives and special regimes in the 28 countries of the 
European Union and selected other countries are described. Moreover, the country reports 
inform about other – generally applicable – provisions that might benefit or discriminate 
against SMEs. The focus of the summaries is on corporate income taxation. Transparently 
taxed enterprises, however, are subject to the majority of incentives, too (except for special 
CIT rates).
511
  
The summaries also include special SME tax incentives for sole proprietors, partnerships and 
the shareholders of SMEs. Moreover, provisions targeted at newly founded enterprises are 
accounted for because most of them are either micro, small or medium-sized enterprises when 
starting their operations. Lastly, size-related reliefs in value-added taxation are considered. 
Although the final consumer is the subject of the value-added tax, reliefs do effectively bene-
fit enterprises – in terms of compliance costs as well as actual tax payments. The terms micro, 
small and medium-sized enterprises are used in accordance with the standards given by the 
European Commission
512
 if not stated otherwise. 
 
Austria 
On the firm level, Austria does not offer special tax incentives for SMEs. There is only an 
adjusted minimum tax for newly founded companies of € 1,092 that only benefits low-income 
companies. On the shareholder level, Austria grants full exemption to income from participa-
tions in unlisted European SMEs (i.e., dividends, capital gains and interest payments) for so-
called intermediary investors. Intermediary investors must be corporate entities financed with 
equity capital. For individual investors, dividends from such intermediary investors are ex-
empt from income taxation up to € 25,000. 
                                                 
511
 If eligibility thresholds are reported in local currencies other than €, comparable euro amounts are given in 
brackets. Exchange rates as of December 31, 2015 were referred to for the conversion.  
512
 The European Commission defines micro, small and medium-sized enterprises as businesses not exceeding 
certain thresholds for the number of employees (20/50/250), turnover (€ 2 million/€ 10 million/€ 50 million) and 
total assets (€ 2 million/€ 10 million/€ 43 million). See Section 2.1 and European Commission (2003) p. 39. 
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Enterprises are exempt from the value-added tax (VAT) if their turnover is lower than 
€ 35,000. Moreover, enterprises with less than € 100,000 of turnover in the preceding year 
only have to file VAT returns and make VAT payments on a quarterly basis (instead of 
monthly). Suppliers with a turnover of less than € 110,000 may pay VAT on a cash basis. 
 
Belgium 
Belgium has numerous incentives for SMEs in place. For tax purposes, an enterprise must 
meet the following criteria to be considered an SME: 
 not more than 50 employees (and not more than 100 employees even if the other 
criteria are fulfilled); 
 turnover does not exceed € 7 million; 
 balance sheet total does not exceed € 5 million 
 profits do not exceed € 322,500. 
Belgium offers several investment allowances. The general investment deduction for SMEs 
amounts to 10.5% of the depreciation taken on assets. The rate has varied between 10.5% and 
12.5% since 2009.
513 
The incentive is restricted to companies with fewer than 20 employees. 
Unused amounts can be used in subsequent years with a maximum carry-forward of 
€ 946,800 (or 25% if the unused part exceeds € 3,787,210). Additionally, an allowance of 
20.5% is granted to SMEs for investments in safety measures either in the year of the invest-
ment or the following year. Concerning carry-forwards the same rules apply as for the above 
deductions. A notional interest deduction is available for all Belgian companies. It amounts to 
4% of qualifying equity.
514
 SMEs, however, are allowed to deduct an additional 0.5%. Since 
2012, carry-forwards are no longer possible.  
With regard to depreciation, SMEs may – irrespective of the exact date of acquisition – de-
duct 100% of the ordinary annual depreciation for an asset in the year of acquisition.
515
 More-
over, all costs related to the acquisition of depreciable assets can be immediately depreciated. 
Newly founded companies can also immediately depreciate all costs of establishment. 
                                                 
513 
The exact rates in this period are as follows: 10.5% from 2009 to 2011, 12.5% in 2012 and 11.5% in 2011.  
514 
The exact rates for large companies from 2009 to 2013 are as follows: 4.307% in 2009, 4.473% in 2010, 3.8% 
in 2011, 3.425% in 2012 and 3% in 2013. The respective rates for SME are 0.5% higher. 
515
 Until 2010, the regime was more generous. SMEs could incur depreciations on all assets that were twice as 
high as the normal rate in the first three years of usage. 
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SMEs may shift income into a tax-exempt reserve of at most € 37,500 or 50% of retained 
earnings. The maximum size of the reserve can be further reduced by the following circum-
stances: 
 occurrence of capital gains on shares that are eligible for participation exemption; 
 occurrence of exempt capital gains on cars used for business purposes; 
 occurrence of gains on debt claims against managers, shareholders and their 
spouses or children;  
 paid-up capital is decreased.  
The income entering the reserve needs to be re-invested within three years. The reserve must 
not be used in combination with the notional interest deduction on equity.  
SMEs in Belgium also benefit from progressive corporate income tax rates (rates are given 
excluding the surcharge of 3%):  
 24.25% on income ≤ € 25,000; 
 31% on income between € 25,000 and € 90,000; 
 34.5% on income between € 90,000 and € 322,500; 
 33% on all income beyond that. 
Certain types of companies are not allowed to apply the reduced rates (financial companies, 
collective investment companies, companies owned by other companies by 50% or more, 
companies whose distributions exceed 13% of paid-in capital, members of groups with a co-
ordination center and companies not paying at least € 36,000 to a director or active partner). 
The size of the tax credit on R&D investments – if utilized – is adjusted to the progressive 
schedule.  
Further reliefs for SMEs include exemptions from the special tax on capital gains (0.412%) 
and the so-called “Fairness Tax”. The latter is levied at 5.15% (including austerity surcharge) 
upon distributions that are made in spite of losses or in the absence of taxable income due to 
other tax incentives. Moreover, 80% of SMEs’ income derived from self-developed patents 
are tax exempt. Large firms only benefit from this exemption if the underlying patents were 
acquired. With regard to administrative regulations, SMEs do only have to make yearly tax 
payments (instead of quarterly).  
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On the shareholder level, dividend distributions from SMEs with respect to shares issued after 
July 1st 2013, are subject to reduced withholding taxes if they are made at least three years 
after issuance (20% in the third year and 15% in the fourth and subsequent years instead of 
25%). For this purpose, the following conditions need to be met:  
 The shares must be held continuously and in full ownership by the same share-
holder for three or four years. 
 The shares must be issued in exchange for cash contributions.  
 The statutory minimum amount of capital must be paid up. 
Capital gains of SMEs from their subsidiaries are completely exempt from capital gains taxa-
tion if the subsidiaries meet certain qualitative criteria. 
Lastly, there is an advance payment system in place for the taxation of liquidation proceeds 
from SMEs. Eligible SMEs may create a "liquidation reserve" from after-tax profits which 
must be maintained on a separate equity owner's account. The liquidation reserve immediately 
is subject to a separate non-deductible tax of 10%. In return, no dividend withholding tax is 
due upon liquidation. If the liquidation reserve is distributed as a dividend within 5 years, 
though, a dividend withholding tax of 15% is due (5% if distributed after more than 5 years). 
Newly founded enterprises may immediately depreciate all costs of establishment and costs 
related to the creation of the enterprise. 
With regard to the VAT, SMEs are exempt if their turnover does not exceed € 15,000. 
 
Bulgaria 
Bulgaria does not have special tax incentives for SMEs. Small companies are subject to ad-
ministrative reliefs, though. Enterprises whose net sales in the previous year were below 
BGR 300,000 (≈ € 150,000) do not have to make advance tax payments and those with net 
sales below BGR 3,000,000 (≈ € 1,500,000) only have to make quarterly advance payments 
(instead of monthly). In addition to that, simplified accounting standards apply for SMEs. 
VAT registration is only required for enterprises with more than € 25,565 of turnover. 
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Croatia 
Croatia provides comprehensive investment incentives for new undertakings. Income from 
new investments (also by existing enterprises) can be subject to corporate income tax rates 
that are reduced by up to 100% for 10 years. The exact amount of the reduction depends on 
the size of the investment and on the number of newly created jobs related to the investment: 
 100% reduction if investment of at least € 3 million and related to 15 new em-
ployees; 
 75% reduction if investment of at least € 1 million and related to 10 new employ-
ees; 
 50% reduction if investment of less than € 1 million and related to 5 new employ-
ees. 
For micro companies with up to 10 employees, a special regime exists that grants a 50% relief 
(resulting in a tax rate of 10% compared to the normal 20%) if the investment amounts to at 
least € 50,000 and creates 3 new jobs. Before the Law on Investment Promotion (2012), Croa-
tia offered a similar incentive schedule without a special schedule for micro companies and 
with higher thresholds for eligibility: 
 100% reduction if investment of at least € 8 million and related to 75 new em-
ployees (50 for R&D activities); 
 80% reduction if investment of at least € 4 million and related to 50 new employ-
ees (25 for R&D activities); 
 65% reduction if investment of at least € 1.5 million and related to 30 new em-
ployees (15 for R&D activities); 
 50% reduction if investment of € 300,000 (€ 100,000 for R&D activities) to € 1 
million and related to 10 (5) new employees. 
In addition, extensive reliefs were available for companies in economically weak regions. 
These regional incentives have been abolished. Croatia also provides a special allowance for 
eligible costs for general education and training (60%) and special education and training 
(25%) for employees. The percentages increase for medium-sized to 70% and 35%, for small 
and micro enterprises to 80% and 45%, respectively.  
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VAT registration is only required if the turnover exceeds HRK 230,000 (≈ € 30,000). Quarter-
ly VAT payments (instead of monthly) can be made if the turnover is below HRK 800,000 (≈ 
€ 100,000). 
 
Cyprus 
There are no tax incentives for small and medium-sized enterprises in Cyprus.  
 
Czech Republic 
The Czech Republic provides comprehensive investment incentives for new undertakings. 
Income from new investments (also by existing enterprises) can be subject to full exemption 
from the corporate income tax for 10 years. The exemption applies if the following conditions 
are met: 
 investment of at least CZK 100 million (≈ € 3,7 million) in the manufacturing sec-
tor; 
 investment of at least CZK 10 million (≈ € 370,000) and creation of at least 40 
new jobs in so-called technological centers; 
 creation of at least 40 new jobs in strategic service centers. 
Businesses are exempt from the VAT if their turnover is below CZK 1 million (≈ € 37,000). 
 
Denmark 
There are no tax incentives specifically targeted at SMEs in Denmark. With regard to admin-
istrative obligations, there is a relief from transfer pricing documentation for small companies 
with not more than 250 employees, a maximum turnover of DKK 250 million (≈ € 33 million) 
and a maximum balance sheet total of DKK 125 million (≈ € 17 million). The relief only ap-
plies if no transactions with other entities outside the EEA are made. For VAT purposes, no 
registration is required if turnover is below DKK 50,000 (≈ € 7,000). Half-yearly payments 
(instead of monthly) are allowed if taxable revenues are below DKK 5 million (≈ € 670,000). 
Quarterly payments suffice if revenues do not exceed DKK 50 million (≈ € 7,000). 
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Estonia 
Estonia provides no special tax incentives for corporate SMEs. This is due to the Estonian tax 
system that does not tax corporate income as such but only corporate distributions. Conse-
quently, there are no reliefs of corporate income at all. 
Registration for VAT is only required if turnover exceeds € 16,000. 
 
Finland 
Finland does not provide tax incentives specifically targeted at SMEs. There is a regime of 
accelerated depreciation for fixed assets being used in production activities (200% of the usu-
al depreciation rate on machinery, equipment and industrial buildings). The regime used to be 
restricted to SMEs until 2013 but is now available for all enterprises. Moreover, the super 
deduction of 100% of salary costs incurred for R&D projects is capped at € 400,000. SME 
should therefore benefit more than large enterprises. 
Businesses with less than € 8,500 of turnover are exempt from VAT. If turnover is below 
€ 25,000, only yearly VAT payments need to be made, if it is below € 50,000, only quarterly 
payments are required (instead of monthly). Moreover, SMEs are subject to reduced docu-
mentation requirements with regard to transfer prices. 
 
France 
France offers a multitude of tax incentives specifically designed for SMEs. The provisions 
include tax credits, special tax rates and various exemptions from income tax. Enterprises are 
generally considered SMEs if they comply with the SME criteria by the European Commis-
sion. 
A special tax rate of 15% is available for SMEs with less than € 7,630,000 of turnover. The 
SME must be held directly or indirectly by individuals or other SMEs fulfilling the aforemen-
tioned condition. The special corporate income tax rate applies to income up to € 38,120 (in-
stead of the usual rate of 33.33%). The surcharge of 3.33% is dispensed for all SMEs meeting 
the turnover criterion, whereas all other enterprises incur the surcharge on income tax pay-
ments beyond the threshold of € 763,000. Since 2012, another surcharge of 10.7% (5% until 
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2012) is in place for all companies with an income of more than € 250 million, which, by def-
inition, does not apply to SMEs.  
Furthermore, micro enterprises may use simplified rules to determine taxable income if two of 
the following three criteria are met: 
 turnover ≤ € 534,000; 
 balance sheet total ≤ € 267,000; 
 number of employees ≤ 10. 
Micro enterprises with less than € 82,200 (sale of goods) or € 32,900 (services) of income, 
respectively, may even opt for lump-sum expense deductions from turnover to determine their 
taxable income (71% for sales activities; 50% for service activities; 34% for professional ser-
vices). 
France also offers several tax credits for SMEs. A credit of 20% is granted on expenditures 
related to innovative activities up to € 400,000. Another credit is available for SMEs with at 
least 20 employees. The credit equals the difference of the income tax payable multiplied with 
a rate reflecting the size of the increase in employment and the corporate income tax paid ef-
fectively in the preceding year (→ income tax payable * employment rate – income tax pay-
ablet-1). The employment rate ranges from 0 to 100% with 100% reflecting an increase of 15% 
or more in personnel expenses compared to the preceding year. The credit only applies if the 
number of employees compared to each of the previous two years increased by at least 15%. 
Until 2014, another one-off corporate tax credit was granted to SMEs for expenses related to 
the hiring of an employee to develop export activities outside the EU. The credit amounted to 
50% of qualifying expenses and was limited to € 40,000 over a two-year period. Lastly, there 
is a special tax credit for SMEs on the island of Corsica. The credit amounts to 20% and is 
granted on the following investments:  
 depreciable assets that qualify for declining-balance method depreciation; 
 the installation or arrangement of commercial premises; 
 software necessary for the use of the aforementioned assets or premises; 
 renovation of hotels. 
In order to be applicable, enterprises’ turnover must not exceed € 40 million, the number of 
employees must not exceed 250 and at least 75% of the shares need to be held by individuals 
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or other SMEs. Unused credits can be carried forward for 9 years. A partial refund is available 
after 5 years (35%; 50% after 9 years). New firms are granted an immediate refund.   
A full exemption from the business tax (CAVE) applies to SMEs if their turnover is below 
€ 152,500. Due to allowances, businesses with a turnover below € 500,000 are effectively 
exempt as well. Moreover, the allowance creates a progressive tax rate structure for the busi-
ness tax: 
 turnover between € 0 and € 500,000: 0%; 
 turnover between € 500,000 and € 3 million: 0% to 0.5%; 
 turnover between € 3 million and € 10 million: 0.5% to 1.4%; 
 turnover between € 10 million and € 50 million: 1.4% to 1.5%. 
In addition, newly founded innovative SMEs are subject to an exemption from corporate in-
come tax in the first two years of operations (100% in the first year, 50% of income derived in 
the second year of their innovative activities). Eligible SMEs must not be older than eight 
years and pursue R&D activities that account for at least 15% of the total expenses incurred. 
The incentive also includes exemption from the local business tax and social security contri-
butions. Until 2011 SMEs were even granted five years of relief (three years with an exemp-
tion of 100% and two years with 50%). Newly created companies may also benefit from tax 
exemptions in certain regions (“redevelopment areas”) for the first five years of operations. 
The exemption decreases gradually from 100% to 75%/50%/25% in the last three years of the 
five-year period. The maximum relief that can be obtained from this incentive amounts to 
€ 200,000. The same limit applies to the exemption of income from SMEs that were created 
to take over companies in hardship. The regime is only available in certain regions and only 
in the first two years of operation of these newly founded SMEs. Another five-year exemption 
(100%) is offered to newly created companies in tax-free urban zones. Enterprises need to 
have at least one employee in order to be eligible. The maximum exemption equals € 100,000 
per year and further tax incentives can be used under this regime. 
Another exemption from income taxes exists for SMEs with regard to capital gains from the 
sale of a complete branch of activity excluding gains on immovable property. The exemption 
amounts to 100% if the value of the branch does not exceed € 300,000 and to 50% if it is be-
tween € 300,000 and € 500,000. At least 75% of the disposing SME must be held directly or 
indirectly by individuals or other SMEs.  
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Further preferential treatments for SMEs include the following: 
 SMEs are eligible for an immediate refund of the R&D tax credit that is generally 
applicable for enterprises of all size classes. The R&D tax credit at 30% is also 
capped as only expenses up to € 100 million are eligible. Beyond the threshold the 
credit is reduced to 5%, which can only affect large enterprises. 
 SMEs are subject to beneficial provisions concerning the immediate recognition 
of losses from foreign branches. The offsetting enterprise must not have more 
than 2,000 employees, be subject to corporate income tax and be owned (75%) by 
individuals or other enterprises fulfilling the above two conditions. Moreover, the 
source state must impose income taxes that are comparable to the French taxes 
and have an administrative assistance clause in the tax treaty with France. The 
maximum cash benefit from this regime must not exceed € 500,000.  
Shareholders of SMEs benefit from various other reliefs:  
 Retiring SME owners are eligible for an allowance of € 500,000 on the sale of 
their shares in the SME. Capital gains of directors of SMEs who sell their shares 
upon retirement are also exempt if certain requirements concerning the holding 
period are met. 
 Capital gains from the disposal of shares in SMEs are (partly) exempt: 50% if the 
holding period has been between 1 and 4 years, 65% if from 4 to 8 years and 85% 
for holdings over 8 years. This relief only applies if the SME had not existed for 
more than 10 years at the time of acquisition, is subject to CIT and situated in an 
EEA country. Retiring owners of SMEs do not have to fulfill these conditions.  
 18% of amounts invested in qualifying SMEs can be deducted from the personal 
income tax base up to an amount of € 50,000 (for small companies) or € 20,000 
(for medium-sized companies). 
 50% of investments in qualifying SMEs are deductible for wealth tax purposes up 
to an amount of € 45,000. 
 Capital contributions to innovative SMEs can be depreciated over 5 years under 
certain conditions. 
 Venture capital firms benefit from an exemption of their income from securities 
and shareholdings. Certain criteria with regard to the legal form and the assets of 
venture capital firms apply. 
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For purposes of the VAT, enterprises are exempt if their turnover does not exceed € 80,000 
(supply of goods/accommodation/food) or € 32,000 (supply of other services). A simplified 
regime with quarterly provisional payments and a year-end final settlement is available for 
enterprises with less than € 763,000 (supply of goods/accommodation/food) or € 230,000 
(supply of other services) of turnover. 
 
Germany 
Germany has two tax incentives in place that target specifically small companies. For both 
reliefs, the following criteria must be met in order to be eligible: 
 Net assets must be smaller than € 235,000 if the company applies the net worth 
method to determine the taxable income and smaller than € 100,000 if the compa-
ny applies the net income method. (The thresholds were reduced from € 335,000 
and € 200,000 respectively in 2011.)  
 The relevant assets must remain in a domestic permanent establishment of the 
company for at least one year. 
The benefits connected to fulfilling these criteria are twofold: First, an additional depreciation 
of 20% of the acquisition or manufacturing costs of new movable assets can be incurred in the 
year of acquisition or manufacturing and the following four years (20% at most in all five 
years together). The additional depreciation reduces subsequent depreciations accordingly. 
Second, an investment reserve of up to 40% of future acquisition or production costs of de-
preciable assets can be recognized. Income entering the reserve is tax-free upon recognition 
but is taxed as the respective assets start to be depreciated. The investment reserve is limited 
to € 200,000. The acquisition or the manufacturing of the asset for which the deduction is 
claimed must be made within three years and it must be used in a domestic permanent estab-
lishment (almost) exclusively for business purposes.  
For non-corporate entities, business income up to € 24,500 is exempt from the trade tax.  
If the annual turnover does not exceed € 500,000 and the profit stays below € 50,000, simpli-
fied tax accounting in the form of modified cash accounting may also be used by non-
corporate entities. 
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If turnover did not exceed € 17,500 in the previous fiscal year and does not exceed € 50,000 
in the current year, enterprises are exempt from the VAT. If the annual value-added tax paya-
ble does not exceed € 7,500, quarterly payments can be made (instead of monthly). 
 
Greece 
Greece does not provide any tax incentives specifically designed for SMEs. There is, howev-
er, a scheme that allows establishing tax-free reserves. The reserve amounts to 15–45% of the 
amount invested in qualifying undertakings (which includes investments that contribute to 
improving business, technological development, business competitiveness and regional cohe-
sion). The eligible amount depends on the location of the investment and the size of the com-
pany (smaller enterprises receive higher reliefs of 25–45% instead of 15–40%). SMEs should 
therefore receive larger exemptions. The tax-free income must neither be distributed nor capi-
talized. Up to one third of the exemption is due in the first year of operations of the invest-
ment and up to two thirds in the following year. The balance is settled within a maximum of 
eight years.  
For small firms with a turnover of up to € 1.5 million the use of single-entry accounts is al-
lowed; however, this entails an increased tax rate of 33% instead of the usual 26% on all in-
come over € 50,000 for partnerships. Corporate entities are usually not eligible for this special 
scheme.  
A disadvantage for SMEs occurs with respect to Greece’s treatment of so-called strategic in-
vestments. These are investments of at least € 15 million or investments creating at least 150 
new jobs. SMEs naturally will not (or only hardly) reach such investment levels.  
Enterprises only need to register for VAT if their turnover exceeds € 5,000 (provision of ser-
vices) or € 10,000 (sale of goods), respectively. If enterprises use single-entry books, they 
may also opt for quarterly VAT returns (instead of monthly). 
 
Hungary 
Hungary offers substantial tax incentives that primarily benefit SMEs. SMEs are generally 
defined according to the definition by the European Commission. 
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Most importantly, a special tax rate of 10% applies to the first HUF 500 million 
(≈ € 1.6 million). Beyond the threshold, income is taxed at 19%. Moreover, small businesses 
are exempt from the innovation tax (0.3% of the tax base of the local business tax) and may 
be exempt from the local business tax (depending on municipalities). 
With regard to input-based tax incentives, there are several tax allowances for SMEs. First, 
100% of investment expenses for certain assets can be deducted from the tax base if the SME 
is solely owned by individuals. The maximum deduction is HUF 30 million (≈ € 100,000). 
SMEs with less than 20 employees can also benefit from an additional allowance of 200% of 
wage costs that are incurred for employees who are at least 50% disabled. The deductible 
wage costs per employee cannot exceed the statutory minimum wage. Lastly, micro enterpris-
es with less than five employees and without an outstanding tax liability at the end of the year 
are subject to an allowance based on the increase in personnel. They are entitled to a deduc-
tion equal to the product of the increase in the average annual number of employees compared 
to the previous year and 12 times the statutory minimum wage. 
There is also a tax credit for new investment projects that is available for businesses of all size 
classes but requires lower minimum investments to be eligible for SMEs: 
 Large enterprises: minimum investment is HUF 3 billion (≈ € 10 million), 150 
new jobs must be created and wage costs need to be increased by at least 600 
times the statutory minimum wage. 
 Medium-sized enterprises: minimum investment is HUF 500 million (≈ € 1.6 mil-
lion), 50 new jobs must be created and wage costs need to be increased by at least 
100 times the statutory minimum wage. 
 Small enterprises: minimum investment is HUF 500 million (≈ € 1.6 million), 20 
new jobs must be created and wage costs need to be increased by at least 50 times 
the statutory minimum wage. 
The tax credit equals 100% of the investment value but must not exceed 80% of the tax liabil-
ities. It is granted in 10 equal instalments.  
Another tax credit is offered for SMEs that invest at least HUF 500 million (≈ € 1.6 million) 
and take out a loan from a financial institution to acquire or produce required tangible assets. 
The credit equals 60% of the interest paid on the loan with a maximum eligible interest of 
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HUF 6 million (≈ € 20,000). Enterprises from the transport or the agricultural sectors are not 
eligible.  
For SMEs in disadvantaged regions, immediate depreciation of acquisition costs of machin-
ery, equipment and vehicles (excluding cars) is also available. 
In addition to these incentives, small businesses in Hungary may also opt for three alternative 
regimes. The so-called simplified entrepreneurial tax is available for small businesses that are 
no public companies and whose turnover does not exceed HUF 30 million (≈ € 100,000). Un-
der this regime, taxpayers are taxed at 37% on turnover increased by VAT. If turnover unex-
pectedly exceeds HUF 30 million during the fiscal year, an increased tax rate of 50% applies 
for the excess. The simplified entrepreneurial tax replaces corporate and personal income tax-
es, the value-added tax and the company car tax. The regime must not be applied if the tax-
payer sells waste products falling under the reverse charge regime for VAT purposes or if 
certain holding requirements are not met. 
Another regime that may be opted for instead of the ordinary corporate income tax is the 
small company tax. In order to be eligible companies need to fulfill the following criteria: 
 average number of employees ≤ 25; 
 expected annual turnover ≤ HUF 500 million (≈ € 1.6 million); 
 expected balance sheet total ≤ HUF 500 million (≈ € 1.6 million); 
 balance of enforceable tax debt ≤ HUF 1 million (≈ € 3,000) 
The small company tax replaces the corporate income tax, the social security tax and training 
contributions for the taxpayer. The tax is levied at 16% on accrual profits but it must not be 
smaller than the personnel costs incurred.  
Lastly, the itemized tax of small businesses can be chosen by businesses with a turnover of 
less than HUF 6 million. Under this regime, businesses pay HUF 50,000 (≈ € 160) per full-
time employee and HUF 25,000 (≈ € 80) for each employee not being classified as full-time. 
These tax payments replace the corporate income tax, the social security tax, the health care 
charge and the vocational training contribution. If the threshold of HUF 6 million (≈ € 20,000) 
is exceeded, a tax of 40% on the excess turnover is charged.  
With regard to administrative obligations, small enterprises are subject to less restrictive regu-
lations on transfer pricing and related documentation. Businesses with a turnover of less than 
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HUF 6 million are exempt from the VAT. If the net VAT payable is below HUF 1 million 
(≈ € 33 million), only quarterly returns need to be filed instead of monthly. If net turnover 
does not exceed HUF 250,000, (≈ € 800) only annual returns are required. Cash accounting 
for VAT purposes is allowed up to HUF 125 million (≈ € 400,000). 
 
Ireland 
With regard to the corporate income tax, Ireland does not provide tax incentives specifically 
for SMEs. However, they may benefit from an exemption of taxable income up to € 40,000 
that phases out between € 40,000 and € 60,000. The exemption is restricted to newly founded 
companies in the first three years of operation, though, and must not exceed the PRSI contri-
butions made (max. € 5,000 per employee). 
SMEs also benefit from less restrictive transfer pricing regulations and – if their tax liability 
does not exceed € 200,000 – less restrictive provisions for preliminary tax payments. No pre-
payments are required from new businesses that do not expect a tax liability of more than 
€ 200,000 in their first year of operations. 
For personal income tax purposes, individuals can deduct up to € 150,000 of the acquisition 
costs of shares in qualifying unquoted trading SMEs from their taxable income (excess in-
vestments can be carried forward). The share in the company must not be higher than 30% 
unless the capital of the company does not exceed € 500,000. Holding restrictions and other 
anti-avoidance rules are in place. The company must either be incorporated and resident in 
Ireland or be incorporated in an EEA country and resident (a) in Ireland or (b) in another EEA 
country and carry on business through a branch or agency in Ireland. In addition, the company 
must carry on qualifying trade. The maximum capital the company may raise amounts to € 15 
million and € 5 million within any 12-month period. An even more generous deduction is 
granted to formerly employed people who invest in a start-up. They can claim a tax refund on 
income from the last six years (the maximum tax refund is € 100,000). 
For VAT purposes, businesses are exempt if their turnover does not exceed € 37,500. Moreo-
ver, small businesses do only have to file returns and make VAT payments every 6 months 
(instead of every 2 months) if their VAT payments do not exceed € 3,000 and only every 4 
months if payments are below € 14,400. 
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Italy 
Italy does not provide generally applicable incentives for SMEs with regard to the corporate 
income tax. SMEs, however, can use simplified rules for determining the tax base of the busi-
ness tax (IRAP). The simplified rules include standardized lump-sum deductions for expenses 
incurred.  
Moreover, there is a tax credit for R&D expenses in place that is likely to benefit SMEs more 
than large companies as it is capped at € 5 million. Eligible enterprises need to incur at least 
€ 30,000. In 2014, two different R&D tax credits were in place. The first one only applied to 
enterprises with less than € 500 million of turnover. It granted a relief equal to 50% of R&D 
expenses as far as the expenses surpassed the average of the previous three years. The other 
credit amounted to 35% of the wage costs that were attributable to newly hired employees in 
R&D who were given permanent contracts. The cap for this credit was € 200,000. 
Companies in the fields of energy production and supply were not subject to the increased 
corporate tax rate of 34% (instead of 27.5%) if they had a turnover below € 3 million and tax-
able income below € 300,000. The surtax for companies in the areas of energy production and 
supply (6.5%) has been abolished in 2015, though. 
Innovative start-up companies are exempt from stamp duties and registration fees, if the fol-
lowing criteria are fulfilled:  
 business not older than 48 months; 
 not a result of a merger/acquisition;  
 turnover ≤ € 5 million; 
 no profit distributions;  
 sole purpose of innovative high-technology products and services. 
Additionally, at least one out of the following conditions are met: 
 R&D expenses amount to at least 15% of revenues or costs; 
 one third of all employees are highly qualified; 
 the respective company is holder or licensee of patent right connected to its activi-
ty. 
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Newly founded companies – in contrast to established ones – may also fully deduct expenses 
incurred for studies, research, advertising and entertainment as well as the costs of formation 
in the first year, in which they incur gross receipts. 
Shareholders of innovative SMEs and start-ups can deduct 20% of their respective invest-
ments from taxable income. The maximum deduction amounts to € 1.8 million. Furthermore, 
the shareholding has to satisfy, i.a., the following criteria: 
 equity share not larger than € 2.5 million; 
 shares must be held for at least 2 consecutive years; 
 SME must not be older than 7 years, not have gross production of more than € 5 
million and it must be active in the field of highly technological and innovative 
products. 
Investors of venture capital funds are also exempt with regard to their proceeds from the fund 
if the fund only invests in non-listed, Italian small companies (turnover ≤ € 50 million) that 
are not exempt from corporate income tax, have not been incorporated for more than 36 
months and are controlled by individual shareholders. 
For purposes of the value-added tax, enterprises that do not have more than € 50,000 of turn-
over can file quarterly returns (instead of monthly). There is no registration threshold. Each 
business needs to register for the value-added tax. 
 
Latvia 
Latvia provides micro enterprises with the option to tax turnover instead of the ordinary cor-
porate income tax. Companies are eligible if their turnover does not exceed € 100,000 and if 
they do not employ more than 5 employees who must not earn more than € 720 per month. 
Shareholders have to be exclusively individuals. Under the regime the following tax rates 
apply: 
 9% on turnover from € 0 to € 7,000; 
 12% on turnover from € 7,001 to € 100,000; 
 20% on turnover beyond € 100,000. 
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In the three first years the regime is applied, the lowest rate of 9% is granted for all revenues 
up to € 100,000. The turnover tax replaces the corporate income tax (15%) and the social se-
curity contributions that need to be paid by the employer. Penalty taxes apply if either the 
wage threshold is exceeded (20% on excess wages) or more than five employees are hired 
(2% tax rate increase per employee).  
In Latvia’s special economic zones, a tax credit is available for new investments. For small 
and micro companies, the credit equals 55% of the investment value, whereas it is limited to 
45% for medium-sized enterprises and to 35% for large ones. For each size class, the credit 
must not exceed 80% of the tax liability. The definition of the size classes corresponds to the 
definition by the European Commission. With regard to the standard tax credit, however, 
SMEs are by trend disadvantaged because only investments of at least € 10 million are eligi-
ble. The credit grants a relief of 25% of the investment value up to € 50 million and 15% on 
expenditure beyond the threshold. 
For VAT purposes, enterprises are exempt if their turnover does not exceed € 50,000. Busi-
nesses beyond the threshold have to file monthly returns. If supplies are below € 14,228.72, 
six-monthly returns are sufficient. Cash accounting for the value-added tax is allowed up to 
€ 100,000. For the corporate income tax, annual tax returns need to be filed sooner by SMEs 
(4 months after the end of the fiscal year) than by large enterprises (7 months). 
 
Lithuania 
Lithuania has extensive tax incentives for micro companies. Foremost, enterprises enjoy a 
reduced corporate income tax rate of 5% (instead of 15%) if they meet the following criteria: 
 number of employees ≤ 10; 
 taxable income ≤ LTL 1 million (≈ € 300,000); 
 corporation must not be owned by more than 50% by an owner/a family/a group 
of persons who also own(s) a sole proprietorship or other companies by more than 
50%.  
Companies meeting these criteria whose income does not exceed € 150,000 are also entitled 
to free depreciation of fixed assets (excluding buildings). When benefitting from the reduced 
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tax rate, no maximum for the use of loss carry-forwards applies (70% of the current year’s 
income for large entities).  
Additionally, newly founded businesses and companies with taxable income of less than 
€ 30,000 in the last three years of operation are allowed to determine their income based on 
cash accounting. Large enterprises, on the other hand, tend to be favored in special economic 
zones, where several tax advantages only apply to investments of at least € 1 million. 
With regard to the value-added tax, enterprises are exempt if their turnover does not exceed 
€ 45,000. Registration is also mandatory, if goods from other EU countries are acquired for at 
least € 14,000. 
 
Luxembourg 
Luxembourg does not provide any tax incentives that refer specifically to SMEs as defined by 
the European Commission. However, small companies in particular should benefit from the 
reduced corporate income tax rate of 20% (instead of 21%) that applies to companies with an 
income below € 15,000 as well as from the progressive schedule of the minimum tax. (The 
amount of minimum tax payable depends on the balance sheet total.) Moreover, income up to 
€ 17,500 is not subject to the municipal business tax. The generally applicable tax credit (7% 
or 8% on qualifying tangible and depreciable assets) may also favor SMEs as it is capped at 
€ 150,000. Beyond the threshold, only 2% of the qualifying expenditure is creditable. Further 
advantages for SMEs include higher non-tax grants for R&D projects. 
25% of the income by certain new businesses fostering the growth of the economy may be 
exempt from corporate income taxation. 
There are also incentives for venture capital investments. Special venture capital vehicles 
(SICAR) are exempt from corporate income tax and qualifying investments up to € 5 million 
or 30% of taxable income, respectively, can be deducted from the tax base by investors. The 
latter relief only applies if the capital finances enterprises that introduce new technologies or 
fabrications.    
For VAT purposes, enterprises do only have to register if their turnover does exceed € 25,000 
or intra-community acquisitions exceed € 10,000. Returns need to be filed annually if the 
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turnover is below € 112,000 and quarterly if it is below € 620,000 (instead of monthly). VAT 
can be paid on a cash basis (receipts method) if the turnover of the taxpayer is below 
€ 500,000.  
 
Malta 
Malta provides SMEs with increased tax credits for new investments or major extensions of 
existing operations in a multitude of manufacturing and service industries. Eligible activities 
include: 
 production, manufacturing and processing of goods, materials, commodities, 
equipment, plant and machinery; 
 activities related to information technology,  
 call centers 
 R&D and innovation of products and processes as well as activities related eco-
innovation, water treatment, environmental solutions and biotechnology; 
 tertiary education, filming and cultural restoration as well as the provision of 
large-scale cultural, creative and trade facilities 
 private healthcare services. 
Creditable costs include expenditures in tangible or intangible assets incurred by such under-
takings in the preceding year or wage costs for jobs directly created by the initial investment. 
Taxpayers may deduct 35% (micro and small undertakings) or 25% of eligible costs from 
their tax liabilities (instead of 15% for large enterprises). Cash grants are available instead of 
the tax credit if the makes a substantial contribution to the economic development of Malta. 
SMEs are defined according to the definition of the European Commission. 
An extra credit is available for research projects. The size of the credit is measured as a per-
centage of eligible personnel costs, current costs, overhead, costs for contract research (not 
more than 25% of total eligible costs), costs for registering intellectual property (IP), depreci-
ation of land and buildings and capital expenditures for fixed assets other than land and build-
ings. Eligible percentages are as follows: 
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 small and micro enterprises: 70% for industrial research projects (80% for collab-
orative projects with research and knowledge-dissemination organizations); 45% 
for experimental research projects (60% for collaborative projects); 
 medium-sized enterprises: 60% for industrial research projects (75% for collabo-
rative projects); 35% for experimental research projects (50% for collaborative 
projects); 
 large enterprises: 50% for industrial research projects (65% for collaborative pro-
jects); 25% for experimental research projects (40% for collaborative projects). 
Projects must be finished within three years in order to be eligible. Unused credits can be car-
ried forward indefinitely. 
Another tax credit exists for small enterprises. The credit amounts to 45% (65% in the region 
of Gozo) of wage costs for new employees, refurbishing costs and costs incurred for machin-
ery, equipment and technology. The maximum credit amounts to € 30,000 (€ 50,000 for start-
ups). Eligible businesses must have at least one and less than 30 full-time employees, a turno-
ver of less than € 10 million and be registered for the value-added tax and not be part of a 
group. 
Enterprises are exempt from VAT if their turnover does not exceed € 35,000 (supply of 
goods), € 24,000 (supply of service with low value added) or € 14,000 (other activities), re-
spectively. Professional service providers and retailers with less than € 2 million of turnover 
may account for VAT on a cash basis. 
 
Netherlands 
The Netherlands do not provide any incentives that are exclusively restricted to small and 
medium-sized enterprises. Some provisions, however, particularly benefit SMEs due to max-
imum absolute thresholds limiting eligible income or expenses. First, there is a progressive 
corporate income tax schedule in place that taxes income up to € 200,000 at 20% and the ex-
cess at 25%.  
Second, the general investment deduction for small-scale investments in certain assets is only 
applicable if the total annual qualifying costs are between € 2,300 and € 309,693. Moreover, 
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the deductible percentage decreases as eligible costs increase. The following sliding scale 
applies:  
 28% if the total of qualifying investments is between € 2,300 and € 55,745; 
 € 15,609 if the total of qualifying investments is between € 55,745 and € 103,231;  
 € 15,609 less 7.56% of the invested amount exceeding € 103,231 if the total of 
qualifying investments is between € 103,231 and € 309,693; 
 0% if the total of qualifying investments exceeds € 309,693. 
The thresholds and deductible amounts are adjusted for inflation annually. 
A regime of free depreciation was introduced in 2015. It applies to certain assets that are in 
the interest of the furtherance of economic development with a maximum investment value of 
€ 25 million. Beyond the threshold EU admission is necessary. For R&D activities, a wage 
tax reduction of 35% for involved employees is available up to € 250,000 per employee (50% 
for start-ups). Beyond the threshold, only 14% of eligible wage costs can be deducted. The 
maximum deduction amounts to € 14 million. Another deduction applies to individual entre-
preneurs conducting R&D. They are entitled to a lump-sum allowance of € 12,310 or 
€ 18,467 for the first five years of his entrepreneurial activity. Net losses arising from this 
deduction can be carried back for three years or carried forward for nine years. 
For VAT purposes, businesses may make quarterly payments if the amount payable per quar-
ter does not exceed € 7,000 (instead of monthly). Yearly payments are allowed if quarterly 
amounts are below € 2,000. Natural persons whose VAT liability does not exceed € 1,883 are 
fully exempt from VAT. 
 
Poland 
Poland provides several tax incentives for SMEs. First, small and medium-sized enterprises 
may receive a tax credit of up to 75% of investment costs for investing in new technologies. 
The credit must not exceed 70% of the sales value of the products produced with the new 
technology. Lower percentages may apply depending on the size of the company and the pro-
ject location. The technology needs to be new and sufficiently innovative (must not have been 
used for more than five years globally). The maximum credit is PLN 4 million (≈ € 950,000) 
302 
 
and the project must not involve investments of more than € 50 million. SMEs are defined 
according to the definition by the European Commission. 
Second, SMEs receive tax benefits if they invest in so-called special economic zones. For 
investments of at least € 100,000, enterprises benefit from investment allowances on either 
the investment costs (costs for land and buildings only enter the calculation base with 5% and 
40%, respectively) or the personnel costs of newly hired employees over two years. While 
large enterprises can only apply an allowance of 30% to 50% (depending on the zone), medi-
um-sized enterprises are entitled to an additional 10% and small enterprises to an additional 
20%. In order to be eligible for the allowance, activities must be carried on for at least 3 years 
without changing ownership and new jobs must be created and kept for this period. 
A special regime of depreciation is also in place in Poland. Under the regime, enterprises with 
a turnover (incl. VAT) of less than € 1.2 million are allowed to immediately depreciate the 
costs of certain fixed assets up to an amount of € 50,000. The same exception applies to start-
ups. The latter may also get a waiver for the income tax due in the first or second year of op-
erations (depending on the exact date of initiation) if they are small or micro companies. The 
tax, however, must be repaid in the subsequent five years in equal instalments.  
For the VAT purposes, small taxpayers with less than € 1.2 million of turnover (incl. VAT) 
can opt for quarterly tax payments instead of monthly payments. Moreover, cash-basis ac-
counting is available for these enterprises. Eligible taxpayers can also opt for quarterly ad-
vance income tax payments instead of monthly.  
 
Portugal 
Portugal offers various kinds of tax incentives targeted at SMEs. Starting with the corporate 
income tax rate, the first € 15,000 of income of SMEs (according to the definition of the Eu-
ropean Commission) are taxed at a reduced rate of 17% (instead of 23%). Moreover, SMEs 
benefit from the progressive structure of the state surtax that is levied at the following rates 
(for all enterprises irrespective of their size): 
 0% on income up to € 1.5 million; 
 3% on income between € 1.5 million and € 7.5 million; 
 5% on income between € 7.5 million and € 35 million; 
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 7% on income beyond € 35 million. 
Tax credits are also available for SMEs in Portugal. First, there is a credit of 10% on retained 
earnings. The credited amount needs to be reinvested in eligible assets within two years. An-
other credit is granted for R&D expenditures (capital expenditure excluding land and build-
ings, costs for personnel and contract research and other operating costs). While the creditable 
amount is generally calculated as 32.5% of eligible costs, new SMEs can claim 47.5%.
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 In 
addition, they may include 100% of personnel costs instead of only 90% as is usual. Unused 
credits can be carried forward for six years.  
The third credit refers to investments that are designed to internationalize the Portuguese 
economy. The credit is available to all enterprises for non-EU member states but is restricted 
to SMEs for investments within the EU. The minimum investment is € 250,000 and the credit 
amounts to 10-20% of the investment. It must neither exceed 25% of the tax liability nor 
€ 997,595.79. There is also an exemption of dividends from non-resident subsidiaries that is 
restricted to non-EU countries for large companies whereas SMEs can benefit in both the EU 
and non-member states. In order to be eligible, the holding must be at least 10% one year pri-
or to the dividend, the investment must have led to a newly created non-resident company or 
an acquisition of such and the investment must have amounted to at least € 250.000. 
Another investment tax credit applies to all enterprises but is especially beneficial to SMEs as 
smaller investment amounts are promoted more generously in relative terms. The credit re-
duces the income tax payable by 25% of investments in fixed assets up to € 5 million. Beyond 
this threshold only 10% are deductible and the credit must not exceed 50% of the tax liability. 
For start-ups, the credit may amount to 100% of the tax liability in the first three years of op-
erations. The incentive only applies in certain sectors such as tourism and mining and requires 
an investment period of at least five years. The credit can be carried forward for 4 years. The 
incentive also includes exemptions from the property tax, the property transfer tax and stamp 
duties on acquired land. On the other hand, SMEs may be disadvantaged with regard to con-
tractual tax incentives for so-called strategic investment that are only granted if certain mini-
mum investments are made (€ 3 million). The related tax credit of 10% to 25% is also accom-
panied by exemptions from property tax, the property transfer tax and stamp duties. 
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 In addition, an incremental tax credit (50%) is available for all businesses on all eligible R&D expenditures as 
far as they exceed the average spending of the previous two fiscal years. 
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A deduction of 5% from taxable income applies to SMEs on all capital contributions in cash 
by shareholders upon incorporation or subsequent capital increases. Eligible SMEs must be 
owned by individuals or qualifying venture capital investors. Shareholders on the other hand 
are exempt from taxation with 50% of their capital gains from the sale of participations in 
unlisted small and micro companies. 
For micro companies – either incorporated or not incorporated – Portugal also offers a very 
simplified accounting regime to determine taxable income. It applied to micro enterprises that 
fulfill the following criteria: 
 no. of employees ≤ 5; 
 turnover ≤ € 500,000; 
 balance sheet total ≤ € 500,000; 
 income ≤ € 200,000. 
If these criteria are met, small businesses may determine taxable income as follows: 
 4% of sales and services rendered for hotel, food and beverage activities; 
 75% of income derived from the official schedule of activities approved by order 
of the Minister of Finance 
 10% of remaining income arising from services and business-related subsidies 
 95% of income from the sale or temporary use of rights of intellectual or industri-
al property and other investment income 
 100% of acquisition value of charge increases in wealth 
Another simplified accounting system is in place for enterprises that fulfill the following cri-
teria: 
 no. of employees ≤ 50 
 turnover ≤ € 3 million 
 balance sheet total ≤ € 1,5 million 
Further administrative reliefs for micro enterprises exist with regard to the value-added tax. 
While individual entrepreneurs with a turnover of less than € 9,976 are completely exempt, 
enterprises with less than € 650,000 do only need to file quarterly returns (instead of month-
ly). Micro enterprises are also subject to reduced periods of safekeeping for supporting docu-
ments. 
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Romania 
Romania provides a mandatory special tax regime for micro companies under which corpo-
rate income tax has to be paid at 3% on turnover. The regime applies to fully privately owned 
enterprises with income below € 65,000 except for enterprises deriving income in the bank-
ing, gambling, consultancy or management sector. Before being repealed in 2010 and re-
introduced in 2011, the regime used to be applied on a voluntary basis.  
If businesses do not have more than € 65,000 of turnover, they are also exempt from the val-
ue-added tax.  
 
Slovak Republic 
The Slovak Republic does not have any specific tax provisions for small and medium-sized 
enterprises except for size-adjusted eligibility criteria for R&D investment incentives. Small 
enterprises may even be disadvantaged with regard to some investment incentives as these 
require minimum investments of up to € 3 million. 
For new companies, start-up expenses are deductible when incurred. 
For VAT purposes, small businesses are exempt if their turnover is below € 49,790.   
 
Slovenia 
Slovenia does not provide tax incentives specifically designed for SMEs. They are, however, 
subject to less restrictive holding requirements (3 instead of 5 years) for assets that qualify for 
the investment deduction in the region of Pomurje. The deduction amounts to 70% of incurred 
costs of eligible equipment and intangibles with a maximum allowance of € 30,000. There is 
also a general investment allowance of 40% of expenditures on intangibles and equipment in 
place, the maximum threshold of € 30,000 for this allowance has been abolished, though. 
Consequently, there is no advantage for SMEs compared to large enterprises. 
Venture capital companies are generally tax exempt with their investments. 
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Administratively, there are some minor reliefs for SMEs reduced penalties in case of insuffi-
cient or delayed tax payments or shortened audit periods. Moreover, businesses are exempt 
from the value-added tax if their turnover does not exceed € 50,000. 
 
Spain 
Spain is a country with multiple kinds of tax incentives for SMEs. Accelerated depreciation is 
offered as well as allowances, tax credits and special tax rates. In order to be considered an 
SME, firms generally need to have a turnover below € 10 million (€ 8 million until 2010).  
There are two schemes of accelerated depreciation. The first one allows depreciation at 200% 
of the normal rates. The regime includes all newly acquired tangible fixed and intangible as-
sets. Alternatively, free depreciation is available for SMEs if they increase the annual average 
of personnel in the 24 months following the first use of the asset. The maximum amount to be 
freely depreciated equals the product of € 120,000 and the percentage increase in personnel. 
Assets with acquisition costs below € 601.01 maybe freely depreciated up to a threshold of 
€ 12,020.24 in any case. In 2013 and 2014, there were further schemes that allowed SMEs to 
depreciate all tangible fixed assets if they were purchased with proceeds stemming from capi-
tal gains. Moreover, ordinary depreciation rates for tangible fixed assets, intangibles and im-
movable property were not temporarily reduced by 30% as was the case for large enterprises.  
SMEs with less than 50 employees also qualify for two tax credits that are granted for the 
hiring of new employees with indefinite full-time employment contracts. The first one 
amounts to € 3,000 for each new employee under the age of 30. The other tax credit is provid-
ed for the hiring of employees who have received unemployment payments for at least three 
months at the time of hiring. The latter one yields 50% of the outstanding unemployment 
payments for one year for the enterprise as well as 25% of the outstanding payments for the 
employee. The R&D and innovation tax credits may also favor SMEs as they are capped at 
€ 3 million and € 1 million, respectively. 
Besides tax credits and accelerated depreciation schemes, special corporate income tax rates 
apply for SMEs which meet the following criteria: 
 net revenue ≤ € 5 million; 
 no. of employees ≤ 25; 
 level of employment needs to be retained or increased relative to 2009. 
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If the criteria are met, a special corporate income tax rate of 20% applies for the first 
€ 300,000 of income. All income beyond the threshold is taxed at 25%. SMEs that do not 
meet the above criteria incur a reduced tax rate of 25% on the first € 300,000 of income in-
stead of being subject to the standard CIT rate of 28%. The normal rate, however, will be fur-
ther decreased to 25% in 2016 (coming from 30% in 2014) thus making the special rate irrel-
evant. Another rate exists for newly founded companies (not only SMEs) that are not part of a 
group. In their first two years with positive income, they are subject to a CIT rate of only 15% 
on their first € 300,000 of income and 20% on income beyond the threshold. The newly 
founded company must not be held by shareholders having performed similar activities before 
in order to be eligible. 
Further SME tax rates apply in several regions of Spain. In Alava, Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa, a 
special rate of 24% applies to SMEs (instead of the usual 28% in Basque Country). In Na-
varre, a rate of 23% (19%) instead of 25% applies for SMEs that employ at least one person 
and have an annual turnover below € 9 million (€ 1 million). A slight disadvantage for SMEs 
is the regressive structure of the surcharge for members of the Chamber of Commerce. While 
0.75% is charged on income up to € 60,101, the rate decreases gradually to only 0.01% on 
income beyond € 24 million. The surcharge is tax deductible though. 
Besides the abovementioned provisions, Spain offers the following tax incentives for SMEs: 
 exemption from the local business tax (IAE) if turnover is below € 1 million; 
 special deduction of up to 10% of taxable income; deduction must enter a special 
reserve that is used in the following 5 years to balance out tax losses (otherwise 
taxation at the end of the 5-year period); 
 option to establish a special provision for bad debt not qualifying for the general 
provision. The maximum provision amounts to 1% of the existing balance of debt 
at the end of the tax period;  
 exemption of 99% of gains from venture capital investments in non-financial 
SMEs operating in the field of technological innovation by qualifying venture 
capital companies and funds; exemption includes gains from the sale of shares and 
other participations that have been held for at least one and not more than 15 
years. (An extension to 20 years may be granted.) 
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With regard to administrative facilitations, Spain offers relaxed transfer pricing requirements 
for all SMEs with intercompany transactions below € 100,000. For VAT purposes, a special 
regime of cash accounting can be applied if an enterprise’s turnover does not exceed 
€ 2 million. If turnover is below € 35,000, only annual VAT returns need to be filed. 
 
Sweden 
Sweden does not provide any tax incentives directly targeted at SMEs. Individual investors, 
however, can claim a deduction of 50% of the acquisition costs they incur when acquiring 
shares of small companies at the formation or subsequent share issuances. The shares must be 
held for at least five years. The deduction can be made from capital income. The maximum 
deduction amounts to SEK 650,000 (≈ € 100.000). The maximum total investment per com-
pany is SEK 20 million (≈ € 3 million) per year. Furthermore the company must fulfill the 
following criteria (on a group level): 
 payment of annual salaries of at least SEK 300,000 (≈ € 45,000); 
 fewer than 50 employees or active partners;  
 net turnover ≤ SEK 80 million (≈ € 12 million); 
 balance sheet total ≤ SEK 80 million (≈ € 12 million).  
For VAT purposes, businesses can use cash-based accounting if their turnover does not ex-
ceed SEK 3 million (≈ € 450,000). Returns have to be file monthly unless the turnover does 
not exceed SEK 40 million (≈ € 6 million). Then quarterly returns are sufficient. Enterprises 
with a turnover of less than SEK 1 million (≈ € 150,000) can opt for yearly returns. No regis-
tration threshold exists. 
 
 
United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom provides an investment allowance for R&D activities that is especially 
beneficial for SMEs. Under the regime, all enterprises are allowed to deduct an additional 
30% of their R&D expenses from taxable income (only revenue expenditure, no capital ex-
penditure). SMEs, however, are entitled to an additional 100%, resulting in a total allowance 
of 130%. In order to be eligible, the following criteria need to be met: 
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 number of employees ≤ 500; 
 turnover ≤ € 100 million; 
 balance sheet total ≤ € 86 million. 
Loss-making SMEs may surrender their R&D losses in return for a tax credit equal 14.5% of 
the underlying loss. The credit is refunded immediately. The relief from the SME-specific 
regime must not exceed £ 7.5 million (≈ € 9 million). If an SME incurs eligible expenditures 
beyond the threshold, however, the scheme for large enterprises applies. 
Further provisions that may benefit SMEs include the following: 
 There is an annual investment allowance of 100% on the first £ 500,000 
(≈ € 650,000) of expenditure on plant and machinery in place. Alternatively, a 
first-year allowance for certain assets can be claimed. Both incentives are general-
ly applicable and not restricted to SMEs. 
 There is no cap on deductible external finance expenses if an SME is part of a 
taxable group.  
 Special corporate income tax rates apply for companies engaged in the production 
of oil and gas: income up to £ 300,000 (≈ € 400,000) is taxed at a rate of 19% in-
stead of 30%; marginal relief is available for income up to £ 1.5 million 
(≈ € 2 million). 
 SMEs are subject to simplified provisions for the valuation of intellectual proper-
ty. 
With regard to the value-added tax, enterprises are exempt if their annual turnover does not 
exceed £ 81,000 (≈ € 100,000). A simplified VAT scheme applies for enterprises with a turn-
over below £ 150,000 (≈ € 200,000) and cash-based accounting for VAT is allowed up to 
£ 1.35 million (≈ € 1.8 million). 
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Annex 2: Empirical Studies on the Relation of Firm Size and Job Creation 
Table A1: Empirical studies on the relationship of firm size, firm growth and job creation 
Author(s) Year Publication Data Estimation design Main findings 
Amirkhalkhali/Mukhopadhyay 1993 Eastern Economic Journal  large U.S. firms  
 all sectors 
 1965–1987 
 regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
Armington/Odle 1982 The Brookings Review  U.S. establishments 
(private sector) 
 all sectors 
 1978-1980 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 negative relationship between estab-
lishment size and rate of net job 
creation 
Audretsch/Elston 2006 Entrepreneurship, 
Growth, and Innovation 
(textbook) 
 all publicly traded 
German firms 
 all sectors 
 1970–1984 
 regression  positive relationship between firm 
size and  firm growth (employment) 
Audretsch/Klomp/Santarelli/Thurik 2004 Review of Industrial Or-
ganization 
 Dutch firms  
 hospitality sector 
 1987–1991 
 regression  
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 no clear relationship between firm 
size and  firm growth (employment) 
Audretsch/Santarelli/Vivarelli 1999 International Journal of 
Industrial Economics 
 Italian start-ups  
 manufacturing 
 1987–1993 
 regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and  firm growth (employment) 
among surviving start-ups 
Baldwin/Picot 1995 Small Business Econom-
ics 
 Canadian firms 
 manufacturing 
 1970–1990 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 negative relationship between plant 
size and rate of net job creation  
 negative net job creation among 
large plants 
Barnes/Haskel 2002 Working paper  UK firms 
 manufacturing 
 1980–1991 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 negative relationship between estab-
lishment size and rate of net/ job 
creation  
 negative net job creation among 
establishments with 20+ employees 
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Author(s) Year Publication Data Estimation design Main findings 
Becchetti/Trovato 2002 Small Business Econom-
ics 
 Italian firms (10+ 
employees) 
 manufacturing 
 1989–1997 
 regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
among firms with less than 100 em-
ployees 
 no clear relationship between firm 
size and  firm growth (employment) 
among firms with 100+ employees 
Birch 1981 The Public Interest  U.S. establishments  
 all sectors 
 1969–1976 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 negative relationship between firm 
size and rate of net job creation  
 new businesses account for majority 
of job creation 
Birch 1987 Job Creation in America 
(textbook) 
 U.S. establishments  
 all sectors 
 1969–1985 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes / age 
classes 
 negative relationship between estab-
lishment size and rate of net job 
creation (except for very large es-
tablishments) 
 negative net job creation among 
establishments with 100+ employ-
ees 
Bottazzi/Dosi/Lippi/Pammolli/Riccaboni 2001 International Journal of 
Industrial Organization 
 large international 
firms  
 pharmaceutical sector 
 1987–1997 
 comparison of 
size distribution 
functions  
 no clear relationship between firm 
size and  firm growth (employment) 
Broersma/Gautier 1997 Small Business Econom-
ics 
 all Dutch firms (10+ 
employees) 
 manufacturing 
 1978–1991 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 negative relationship between firm 
size and rate of net/gross job crea-
tion 
 negative net job creation among 
firms with 50+ employees 
 only new businesses account for 
positive net job creation 
Buckley/Dunning 1984 Kyklos  large international 
firms  
 industrial firms 
 1972–1977 
 
 regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (sales) 
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Author(s) Year Publication Data Estimation design Main findings 
Cefis/Ciccarelli/Orsenigo 2007 Structural Change and 
Economic Dynamics 
 
 Italian firms 
 pharmaceutical indus-
try 
 1987–1998 
 Bayesian hierar-
chical model es-
timation 
 no clear relationship between firm 
size and  firm growth (employment) 
Chen/Lu  2003 Applied Economics Let-
ters 
 publicly traded Tai-
wanese firms 
 all sectors 
 1988–1999 
 regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (fixed assets) 
only in some sectors 
Davidsson/Lindmark/Olofsson 1998 Small Business Econom-
ics 
 all Swedish plants  
 all sectors 
 1989-1994 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
 negative relationship between firm 
age and firm growth (employment) 
Davis/Haltiwanger/Schuh 1996 Small Business Econom-
ics 
 U.S. plants 
 manufacturing 
 1972–1988 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 no clear relationship between plant 
size and net job creation (contrary 
results driven by methodological 
problems) 
Davis/Haltiwanger/ Schuh 1996 Job Creation and Destruc-
tion (textbook) 
 U.S. plants 
 manufacturing 
 1972–1988 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 no clear relationship between plant 
size and net job creation 
 only new plants (5 years) account 
for net job creation 
 positive net job creation by large 
plants  
de Wit/de Kok 2014 Small Business Econom-
ics 
 population of EU-27 
businesses 
 all sectors 
 2002–2012 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 negative relationship between firm 
size and rate of net job creation (de-
creases in firm size at diminishing 
rate) 
de Kok/Vroonhof/Verhoeven/ Tim-
mermans/Kwaak/Snijders/ Westhof 
2011 Project report  all EU firms 
 all sectors 
 2002–2010 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 negative relationship between firm 
size and rate of net job creation 
Del Monte/Papagni 2003 Research Policy  Italian firms  
 manufacturing 
 1989–1997 
 regression  no clear relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (sales)  
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Author(s) Year Publication Data Estimation design Main findings 
Droucopoulos  1982 Journal of Economic 
Studies 
 
 large international 
firms 
 all sectors 
 1957–1977 
 regression  
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 no clear relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (sales) 
Dunne/Hughes 1994 Journal of Industrial Eco-
nomics 
 large UK firms  
 all sectors 
 1975–1985 
 regression  
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 negative relationship between firm 
size and rate of net job creation (de-
creases in firm size at diminishing 
rate) 
 negative relationship between firm 
age and  firm growth (employment) 
Dunne/Roberts/Samuelson 1989 Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 
 all U.S. start-ups 
 1967–1977 
 manufacturing 
 regression  
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size and age clas-
ses 
 negative relationship between plant 
size and plant growth (employment) 
 negative relationship between plant 
age and plant growth (employment) 
European Commission 2015 Annual Report on Euro-
pean SMEs 
 all firms in EU 
 2008–2012 
 all sectors 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 no clear relationship between firm 
size and  firm growth (employment) 
Evans 1987 Journal of Industrial Eco-
nomics 
 U.S. firms 
 manufacturing 
 1976–1982 
 regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (rate of em-
ployment growth decreases in firm 
size at diminishing rate ) 
Evans 1987 Journal of Political Econ-
omy 
 U.S. firms  
 manufacturing 
 1976–1982 
 regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (rate of em-
ployment growth decreases in firm 
size at diminishing rate) 
 negative relationship between firm 
age and firm growth  
Fariñas/Moreno 2000 Review of Industrial Or-
ganization 
 Spanish firms 
 manufacturing 
 1990–1995 
 regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
 negative relationship between firm 
age and  firm growth (employment) 
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Author(s) Year Publication Data Estimation design Main findings 
Gallagher/Daly/Thomason 1991 Small Business Econom-
ics 
 UK firms 
 all sectors 
 1985–1987 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes  
 negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
 negative net job creation by large 
firms (1000+ employees) 
Haltiwanger/Jarmin/Miranda 2013 The Review of Economics 
and Statistics 
 all U.S. establishments 
 all sectors 
 1992–2005 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes / age 
classes 
 no clear relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
if controlled for firm age 
 only new businesses with  positive 
net job creation  
Hall, B. H.  
 
1987 Journal of Industrial Eco-
nomics 
 publicy traded U.S. 
firms 
 manufacturing 
 1972–1983 
 regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
Harhoff/Stahl/Woywode 1998 Journal of Industrial Eco-
nomics 
 German firms 
 all sectors 
 1989–1994 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size / age classes 
 regression 
 negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
 negative relationship between firm 
age and  firm growth (employment) 
Hart 1962 Economica  U.S. and UK firms 
 manufacturing 
 1931–1960 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 no clear relationship between firm 
size and  firm growth (employment) 
Headd 2010 Working paper  U.S. establishments 
 all sectors 
 1998–2006 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
Headd/Kirchhoff 2009 Journal of Small Business 
Management 
 all single-
establishment firms 
(1+ employees) 
 all sectors 
 1992–2002 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes / age 
classes 
 negative relationship between firm 
age and firm growth (employment) 
 most firms do not grow much after 
start up  
Heshmati 2001 Small Business Econom-
ics 
 all small firms (Gäv-
leborg)  
 all sectors 
 1993–1998 
 regression  no clear relationship between firm 
size and firm growth: negative for 
employment, positive for sales 
growth negatively related to size 
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Author(s) Year Publication Data Estimation design Main findings 
Hohti 2000 Small Business Econom-
ics 
 all Finnish establish-
ments (5+ employees) 
 manufacturing 
 1980–1994 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 no clear relationships between es-
tablishment size and establishment 
growth (employment) 
Hymer/Pashigan 1962 Journal of Political Econ-
omy 
 largest U.S. firms 
 manufacturing 
 1946–1955 
 regression  no clear relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
Kirchhoff/Phillips 1988 Journal of Business Ven-
turing 
 U.S. firms 
 manufacturing 
 1976–1984 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 negative relationship between firm 
size and rate of net job creation 
 new firms account for majority of 
net job creation 
Kumar 1985 Journal of Industrial Eco-
nomics 
 quoted UK firms 
 all sectors 
 1960–1976 
 regression  slightly negative relationship be-
tween firm size and rate of net job 
creation 
Liu/Tsou/Hammitt 
 
1999 Economics Letters  Taiwanese firms  
 manufacturing  
 1990–1994 
 regression  negative relationship between plant 
size and plant growth (employment) 
 negative relationship between plant 
age and plant growth (employment) 
Lotti 2007 Industrial and Corporate 
Change 
 Italian firms  
 manufacturing and 
service 
 1993–1998 
 regression 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes / age 
classes 
 negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (rate of em-
ployment growth decreases in firm 
size at diminishing rate) 
 negative relationship between firm 
age and firm growth  (employment) 
Lotti/Santarelli/Vivarello 2003 Journal of Evolutionary 
Economics 
 all new firms (1+ em-
ployees) 
 manufacturing 
 1987–1993 
 regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
only for new and small firms 
Mansfield 1962 The American Economic 
Review 
 large U.S. firms 
 manufacturing sector 
 1916–1959 
 regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
among  surviving firms 
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Author(s) Year Publication Data Estimation design Main findings 
Mata/Portugal 1994 Journal of Industrial Eco-
nomics 
 all Portuguese start-ups 
(5+ employees) 
 manufacturing 
 1981–1988 
 comparison of 
numbers of firms 
in size classes 
 negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
Mata/Portugal/Guimaraes 1995 International Journal of 
Industrial Organization 
 all Portuguese plants 
 manufacturing 
 1981–1990 
 regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
Mohnen/Nasev 2008 Betriebswirtschaftliche 
Forschung und Praxis 
 German SMEs  
 all sectors 
 2001–2003 
 regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
 negative relationship between firm 
age and firm growth (employment) 
only among new firms 
Neumark/Wall/Zhang 2011 The Review of Economics 
and Statistics 
 all U.S. establishments 
 all sectors 
 1992–2004 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
 only small firms (max. 20 employ-
ees) with positive net job creation 
Samuels 1965 Review of Economic 
Studies 
 U.S. firms 
 all sectors 
 1950–1960 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 positive relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
among  surviving firms 
Santarelli/Vivarelli 2002 Industrial and Corporate 
Change 
 Italian start-ups 
 electrical/electronic 
engineering 
 1987–1993 
 regression 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes   
 negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment); 
less pronounced among established 
firms 
 negative relationship between firm 
age and firm growth (employment) 
Singh/Whittington 
 
1975 Review of Economic 
Studies 
 all quoted UK firms 
 all sectors 
 1948–1960 
 regression 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes 
 positive relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
among  surviving firms 
Tang 2015 Empirical Economics  all Swedish companies 
 energy sector 
 1997–2011 
 regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
but only for young firms 
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Author(s) Year Publication Data Estimation design Main findings 
Variyam/Kraybill 
 
1992 Economics Letters  SMEs in Georgia 
 all sectors 
 1986–1991 
 regression  negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
 negative relationship between firm 
age and firm growth (employment)  
Voulgaris/Papadogonas/Agiomirigianakis 2005 Review of Development 
Economics 
 all Greek firms 
 manufacturing 
 1995–1999 
 regression 
 comparison of 
growth rates by 
size classes / age 
classes 
 negative relationship between firm 
size and firm growth (employment) 
 negative relationship between firm 
age and firm growth (employment)  
 only young firms (5 years) with 
positive net job creation  
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Annex 3: Loss Compensation Rules for Business Income 
Table A2: Loss compensation rules for business losses in the EU (2015) 
Country CIT Loss Offset PIT Loss Offset 
Carry Back Carry Forward Carry Back Carry Forward 
Austria -  unlimited carry forward 
 max. annual offset: 75% of taxable 
income 
   unlimited carry forward of busi-
ness losses (limited to 1 year for 
other losses) 
 capital losses can only be offset 
against capital gains 
Belgium  -  unlimited 
 loss trafficking rules apply if 
change of ownership not justified 
by financial and economic needs 
   unlimited for business losses 
 capital losses can only be offset 
against capital gains 
Bulgaria    limited to 5 years 
 loss-trafficking rules apply for 
restructurings other than mere 
change of legal form 
   limited to 5 years 
Croatia -  limited to 5 years    limited to 5 years  
 capital losses can only be offset 
against capital gains 
Cyprus -  limited to 5 years 
 unlimited offset for losses from 
disposal of immovable property in 
Cyprus against taxable capital 
gains in future years 
 loss-trafficking rules apply for 
change of ownership and a sub-
stantial change in the business of 
the company within 3 years 
   limited to 5 years (if income > 
€ 70,000) 
 business losses can be offset 
against income from any other 
source 
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Country CIT Loss Offset PIT Loss Offset 
Carry Back Carry Forward Carry Back Carry Forward 
Czech Republic -  limited to 5 years 
 loss trafficking rules apply if sub-
stantial change (> 25%) in owner-
ship unless at least 80% of com-
pany's income is generated by 
same activities as the losses 
   limited to 5 years 
 business losses can be offset 
against rental income 
Denmark -  unlimited 
 max. annual offset: 60% of taxable 
income if a company earns more 
than DKK 7,75 million 
capital losses on investments (oth-
er than investments in subsidiar-
ies) and capital losses on immova-
ble property can only be offset 
against gains from similar assets 
-  unlimited  
 capital losses can only be offset 
against capital gains 
Estonia  - -  -  carry forward of business losses 
limited to 7 years 
Finland -  limited to 10 years 
 separate carry forward for "other 
income"  
 loss trafficking rules apply if ma-
jority of ownership transferred 
(> 50%) unless it is necessary for 
continuation of activities 
 -  limited to 10 years 
 no offset of losses classified as 
earned income against income 
from capital 
 capital losses can be offset 
against capital income and earned 
income (as a tax credit equal to 
30% of the loss) 
France  limited to 1 year (with re-
strictions)  
 max. annual offset: € 1 million 
 tax credit available for following 
5 years 
 refund available after 6 years 
 unlimited 
 max- annual offset: € 1 million 
plus 50% of profit beyond € 1 mil-
lion 
 loss trafficking rules apply if busi-
ness activities terminated, opera-
tions sold, company reorganized 
or company liquidated under court 
 -  limited to 5 years 
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Country CIT Loss Offset PIT Loss Offset 
Carry Back Carry Forward Carry Back Carry Forward 
Germany   limited to 1 year 
 max. annual offset: € 1 million  
 unlimited 
 max. annual offset: € 1 million 
plus 60% of net income beyond 
€ 1 million 
 loss trafficking rules apply if own-
ership changes by 25% within 5 
years (proportionate  loss of carry 
forward) or 50% (complete loss of 
carry forward) 
 limited to 1 year 
 max. annual offset: € 1 million  
 unlimited  
 max. annual offset: € 1 million 
plus 60% of net income beyond 
€ 1 million 
 capital losses (participation < 
1%) can only be offset against 
capital gains 
Greece -  limited to 5 years  -  limited to 5 years 
 unlimited for capital losses (but 
offset only against capital gains) 
Hungary  -  limited to 5 years 
 max. annual offset: 50% of taxable 
income  
 -  unlimited  
 max. annual offset: 50% of taxa-
ble income 
Ireland   limited to 1 year for continuing 
businesses 
 limited to 3 years for discontinu-
ing businesses 
 unlimited  
 net capital losses cannot be offset 
against other profits 
 loss trafficking apply if ownership 
or nature of company change sub-
stantially 
 carry back only for losses from 
discontinuing business ventures 
(limited to 3 years) 
 unlimited  
 capital losses (no active involve-
ment in trade) can only be offset 
against capital gains 
Italy -  unlimited carry forward 
 max. annual offset: 80% of taxable 
income (limitation does not apply 
to losses accrued in the first 3 
years of business) 
 loss trafficking rules apply if ma-
jority of ownership transferred or 
activity changes 
-  no carry forward of losses from a 
small business (turnover < 
€ 400.000 for services / € 
700.000 for other sectors) but 
offset against other aggregate in-
come of the tax year  
 limited to 5 years for losses from 
other businesses but offset only 
against other large business in-
come 
 unlimited carry forward of busi-
ness losses from first 3 years of 
operations 
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Country CIT Loss Offset PIT Loss Offset 
Carry Back Carry Forward Carry Back Carry Forward 
Latvia -  unlimited 
 loss trafficking rules apply if con-
trol of company changes unless 
basic nature of the business does 
not change for 5 years 
-  limited to 3 years 
Lithuania -  unlimited 
 max. annual offset: 70% of taxable 
income (limitation does not apply 
to taxpayers eligible for small 
company relief) 
 capital losses cannot be offset 
against ordinary losses 
-  unlimited if registered for VAT 
or applying accrual accounting 
Luxembourg -  unlimited 
 loss trafficking rules apply for 
successor companies (e.g., after 
mergers) and "Mantelkäufe" 
-  unlimited carry forward of busi-
ness losses but offset only against 
business income 
Malta -  unlimited 
 losses from depreciation can only 
be offset against the profits of the 
same and continuing trade 
 capital losses can only be offset 
against capital gains 
-  unlimited  
 offset of business losses against 
other income categories 
 capital losses can only be off set 
against capital gains 
Netherlands  limited to 1 year  limited to 9 years 
 loss trafficking rules apply if own-
ership changes (unless qualified 
shareholding under the participa-
tion exemption is disposed) 
 limited to 3 years (business loss-
es) or 1 year (capital losses) 
 limited to 9 years  
 offset of business losses only 
against income from box 1 (= all 
income not from shareholdings, 
investments and savings) 
 capital losses from qualified 
shareholdings (participation > 
5%) are deductible from income 
from other sources in the same 
box and 25% of any excess is 
creditable against the tax due on 
income from box 1 
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Country CIT Loss Offset PIT Loss Offset 
Carry Back Carry Forward Carry Back Carry Forward 
Poland -  limited to 5 years 
 max. annual offset: 50% of loss 
 loss trafficking rules apply for 
reorganizations (exceptions apply)  
-  limited to 5 years  
 offset only against business in-
come 
 max. annual offset: 50% of loss 
Portugal    carry forward limited to 12 years 
 max. annual offset: 70% of taxable 
income 
 loss trafficking rules apply if ma-
jority of voting rights change 
owner (exceptions apply)  
-  limited to 12 years 
 offset only against business in-
come  
 carry forward of capital losses 
limited to 5 years and offset only 
against capital gains 
Romania    limited to 7 years  -  limited to 5 years 
 offset only against business in-
come 
 carry forward of losses from 
disposal of shares in listed com-
panies limited to 7 years and off-
set only against income from 
same source (no carry forward or 
offset of losses from disposal of 
securities in unlisted companies) 
Slovakia    limited to 4 years  -  limited to 4 years  
 offset only against business in-
come 
Slovenia -  unlimited  
 max. annual offset: 50% of taxable 
income in any tax year 
 only 50% of capital losses deduct-
ible from positive income (except 
venture capital investments) 
 loss trafficking rules apply if own-
ership and essential business activ-
ities change (exceptions for suc-
cessor companies) 
 -  unlimited 
 offset only against business in-
come 
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Country CIT Loss Offset PIT Loss Offset 
Carry Back Carry Forward Carry Back Carry Forward 
Spain -  unlimited  
 max. annual offset (2015):  
- 50% of taxable income if € 20 
million < turnover < 60 million  
- 25% of taxable base if turnover 
> EUR 60 million 
 
   limited to 4 years 
 offset against income from other 
categories except for capital and 
savings income  
 capital losses can be offset 
against other capital income and 
other savings income 
Sweden  losses can be carried back through 
dissolution of tax allocation re-
serve 
 unlimited  
 capital losses on business-related 
holdings not deductible 
 loss trafficking rules apply if own-
ership changes 
 losses can be carried back through 
dissolution of tax allocation re-
serve 
 unlimited  
 offset only against business in-
come from the same source (in-
come from businesses abroad/ 
from partnerships/other business 
income) 
 business losses from the first 5 
years of operation can be offset 
against business income from 
other sources and employment 
income up to SEK 100,000 annu-
ally 
 capital losses from quoted shares 
can only be offset against gains 
on quoted shares 
 capital losses from non-quoted 
shares can only be offset against 
gains on quoted and non-quoted 
shares 
 70% of capital losses not offset 
against capital gains can be offset 
against other capital income 
 30% of negative net capital in-
come up to SEK 100,000 and 
21% of the loss exceeding SEK 
100,000 can be credited against 
the income tax due on earned in-
come  
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Country CIT Loss Offset PIT Loss Offset 
Carry Back Carry Forward Carry Back Carry Forward 
UK  limited to 1 year  unlimited 
 max. annual offset for banks: 50% 
of taxable income 
 loss trafficking rules apply for 3 
years if ownership and nature of 
the trade change 
 limited to 1 year 
 carry back of business losses from 
the last 12 months of discontinu-
ing trade limited to 3 years  
 carry back of early year´s losses 
(4 years) 
 carry back of discontinuing trades 
 unlimited  
 unlimited offset against business 
income and limited offset against 
other income (including capital 
gains) up to the higher of GBP 
50,000 and 25% of total adjusted 
individual income 
         
Note: Data was retrieved from ibfd.org. 
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Annex 4: Taxpayer Bunching around Eligibility Thresholds for SME Tax Incentives (Supplemental Tables) 
Table A3: Summary statistics of enterprises covered in AMADEUS (2014) 
Country Obs. 
Number of 
enterprises 
Turnover Number of employees Total assets 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Belgium 380,941 322,845 25,615.39 3,300.50 15.17 3.00 5,315.10 278.69 
Hungary 413,671 313,603 216,668.91 11,044.00 9.55 2.00 247,670.29 7,024.00 
Latvia 106,346 101,572 426.48 22.93 5.95 2.00 441.81 14.78 
Lithuania 9,021 8,384 6,083.02 1,080.91 58.32 16.00 8,283.01 547.14 
Romania 642,409 637,328 408.26 12.28 6.15 1.00 91.07 2.74 
Spain 648,765 645,020 2,276.52 201.59 12.99 3.00 3,900.60 321.23 
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Table A4: Probit estimation of propensity score 
 
BUNCH_5EMP 
PROFIT_TURN 0.052*** 
 
(0.012) 
EMPL_TURN  –0.127*** 
 
(0.036) 
WRCP_TURN 0.123*** 
 (0.015) 
LN_TURNOVER 0.103*** 
 (0.005) 
LN_TOTALASSETS –0.123*** 
 (0.003) 
GROWTH_TOt-1 –0.080*** 
 (0.007) 
GROWTH_TOt-2 
0.059*** 
 (0.018) 
GROWTH_TAt-1 
0.044*** 
 (0.007) 
GROWTH_TAt-2 
–0.018*** 
 (0.004) 
GROWTH_EMt-1 
0.228*** 
 (0.011) 
GROWTH_EMt-2 
0.029*** 
 (0.004) 
Constant –1.258*** 
 (0.040) 
Pseudo R
2
 0.031 
Notes: PROFIT_TURN, EMPL_TURN and WRCP_TURN are financial ratios (profit before taxes over turnover, 
employment over turnover and working capital over turnover). LN_TURNOVER and LN_TOTALASSETS are 
the natural logarithms of turnover and total assets. GROWTH_TOt-1, GROWTH_TOt-2, GROWTH_TAt-1, 
GROWTH_TAt-2, GROWTH_EMt-1 and GROWTH_EMt-2 are the growth rates with regard to turnover, total assets 
and employment in the previous (two) year(s). 
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Annex 5: Distortion of Legal Form Choice (Supplemental Tables) 
Table A5: Variable definitions and data sources 
Variable Definition Source 
COMPLEX Dummy variable based on World Bank’s measure of how long it takes a model corporation to file 
its tax returns and pay the due taxes. The dummy takes the value 1 if the required time exceeds the 
median time in the sample and 0 otherwise. 
World Bank 
NONCORP Share of sole proprietorships in the population of enterprises. Variable is determined for each 
country and industry for each year. 
Eurostat Business Demography (European 
Commission) 
GNIC Natural logarithm of the gross national income per capita in current U.S. dollar. The World Bank 
LN_THRESHOLD Natural logarithm of the turnover threshold up to which non-corporate enterprises are eligible for 
simplified tax accounting in million euro. For all observations where no simplified accounting 
exists the threshold is set to one euro before taking the log.  
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 
and national tax codes 
MINCAP Minimum capital of a corporation required by law in million euro. International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 
POST Dummy variable that takes the value 0 for years preceding the treatment in the respective differ-
ence-in-differences estimation and the value 1 for years following the treatment. 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 
and national tax codes 
POST_INCREASE Dummy variable that takes the value 0 if the eligibility threshold for simplified tax accounting in 
the respective country-industry cell has not been increased by at least 20% compared to the base 
year (2004) and the value 1 otherwise. 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 
and national tax codes 
TAX Tax rate differential (in decimals) of the personal income and the corporate income tax rate. For 
the personal income tax rate, the top marginal rate on business income is taken if progressive 
schedules apply. For the corporate income tax rate, applicable small business rates are taken if 
applicable. Dividend taxation is included. Social security contributions are neglected. 
OECD, International Bureau of Fiscal Docu-
mentation 
THRESHOLD Turnover threshold up to which non-corporate enterprises are eligible for simplified tax account-
ing in million euro. 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 
and national tax codes 
THRESHOLD_INFL Turnover threshold up to which non-corporate enterprises are eligible for simplified tax account-
ing in million euro. Increased thresholds are adjusted by accumulated inflation rates since 2004. 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 
and national tax codes, World Bank 
TREAT Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a country experiences a treatment (= an increase in the 
eligibility threshold for simplified tax accounting of at least 20%) during the sample period from 
2004 to 2010 and 0 otherwise. 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 
and national tax codes 
 
UNEMP Unemployment rate in decimals. The World Bank 
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Table A6: Refined measurement of the treatment effect (complete results) 
 Eligibility  
threshold 
Inflation-adj. 
threshold 
Log threshold Tax complexity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
THRESHOLD 0.047***    
 
(0.016)    
THRESHOLD_INFL  
 
0.046**  
 
  
(0.018)  
 
LN_THRESHOLD    0.013** 0.005 
   (0.005) (0.006) 
LN_THRESHOLD#COMPLEX 
 
  0.005*** 
  
  (0.001) 
COMPLEX 
 
  0.022* 
  
  (0.013) 
TAX -0.061*** -0.062*** -0.071*** -0.081*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) 
MINCAP -0.024 -0.126 -0.225 -0.245 
 (0.745) (0.756) (0.760) (0.749) 
UNEMP 0.052 0.051 -0.000 0.183* 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.100) 
GNI -0.224*** -0.222*** -0.233*** -0.181*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.032) 
Constant 2.756*** 2.740*** 2.946*** 2.345*** 
 (0.305) (0.306) (0.317) (0.346) 
Year FE     
Country-Industry FE     
Observations 7,030 7,030 7,030 5,807 
R
2
adj 0.127 0.126 0.126 0.099 
Notes: Dependent variable is the non-corporate firm share is the number of sole proprietorships divided by the 
number of all firms (excluding partnerships).  All regressions control for country-industry fixed effects and a full 
set of year dummies. Additional controls include TAX, GNIC, MINCAP and UNEMP. Explanatory variables are 
defined as given in Table A5. Standard errors clustered at the country-industry level are given in parentheses; *, 
**, *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
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Table A7: Marginal effects (GLM) 
 
GLM 
LN_THRESHOLD 0.007** 
 
(0.003) 
TAX  –0.086*** 
 
(0.027) 
MINCAP 0.386 
 (0.829) 
UNEMP 0.052 
 (0.096) 
GNIC –0.250*** 
 (0.036) 
Notes: Average marginal effects are given for the GLM regression presented in column (2) of Table 7. Variables 
are defined and scaled as given in Table A5. Standard errors are clustered at the country-industry level and given 
in parentheses; *, **, *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table A8: Industry classification 
ID NACE 1.1 NACE 2.0  Description 
1 DA C10-12 Manufacture of food products, beverages, and tobacco 
2 DB C13-14 Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel, and other textile products 
3 DC C15 Manufacture of leather and leather products 
4 DD C16 Manufacture of wood, wood and cork products (except furniture), arti-
cles of straw, and plating materials 
5 DE C17-18, J58 Manufacture of pulp, paper, paper products; publishing and printing 
6 DF C19 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products, and nuclear fuel 
7 DG C20-21 Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products, man-made fibres, basic 
pharmaceutical products, and pharmaceutical preparations 
8 DH C22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
9 DI C23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
10 DJ C24-25 Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products except ma-
chinery and equipment 
11 DK C28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
12 DL C26-27 Manufacture of electrical equipment, computer products, electronic 
products, and optical products 
13 DM C29-30 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers, and other 
transport equipment 
14 DN C31-32 Manufacture of furniture and other manufacturing 
15 - C33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 
16 E40 D Electricity, gas steam, air conditioning, and hot water supply 
17 E41, O90 E Water supply, sewerage, waste management, and remediation activities 
18 F F Construction 
19 G50 G45 Wholesale trade, retail trade, and repair of motor vehicles and motor-
cycles 
20 G51 G46 Wholesale trade and commission trade except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
21 G52 G47, S95 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of per-
sonal and household goods 
22 H55.1-2 I55 Hotels, camping sites, and other provisions of short-stay accommoda-
tion 
23 H55.3-5 I56 Food and beverage service activities 
24 I60 H49 Land transport and transport via pipelines 
25 I61 H50 Water transport 
26 I62 H51 Air transport 
27 I63 H52, N79 Warehousing and support activities for transportation; travel agency, 
tour operator, and other reservation service and related activities 
28 I64 H53, J61 Postal and courier activities; telecommunications 
29 K70 L Real estate activities 
30 K71 N77 Rental and leasing activities 
31 K72 J62 Computer programming, consultancy, and related activities 
32 K73 M72 Scientific research and development 
33 K7411-2 M69 Legal, accounting, book-keeping, auditing activities; tax consultancy 
34 K7414 M70 Activities of head offices and management consultancy activities 
35 K742-3 M71 Architectural activities, engineering activities, related technical consul-
tancy, technical testing, and technical analysis 
36 K7413, K744 M73 Advertising, market research, and public opinion polling 
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ID NACE 1.1 NACE 2.0 Description 
37 K745 N78 Employment activities 
38 K746 N80 Security and investigation service 
39 K747 N81 Services to buildings and landscape activities 
40 K748 M74, N82 Other professional, scientific, and technical activities; office adminis-
trative, office support, and other business support activities 
41 M P Education 
42 N M75, Q Human health, social work activities, and veterinary activities 
43 O91 S94 Activities of membership organizations 
44 O92 J59, J60, J63, 
R90-93 
Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 
45 O93 S96 Other personal service activities 
Notes: ID is the identifier of the converged industries. NACE 1.1 is the industry codification used by the Euro-
stat Business Demography until 2007. NACE 2.0 is the industry codification used by the Eurostat Business De-
mography from 2008 onwards. The column description reports the activities covered by the converged classes. 
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Annex 6: Cost of Capital and EATRs for the EU Member States 
Table A9: Development of the cost of capital of a domestic investment on the corporate level in the EU Member States (1999–2014) 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
AUT 6.3 6.3 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 
BEL 6.5 6.5 6.4 6.5 6.2 6.2 6.2 5.1 5.0 4.8 4.8 4.9 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 
BUL 6.2 6.1 5.9 5.7 5.8 5.6 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 
CRO 4.2 4.2 5.8 5.8 5.7 5.8 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 
CYP 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.6 5.8 5.8 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.8 5.8 
CZR 6.2 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.9 5.8 5.8 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 
DEN 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.1 6.1 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.9 5.9 6.0 
EST 5.8 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 
FIN 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.1 6.2 6.4 6.3 6.0 5.8 
FRA 7.8 7.7 7.7 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.0 7.0 7.1 7.4 7.8 
GER 7.7 7.7 7.1 7.1 7.2 7.1 7.1 7.0 7.0 6.5 6.4 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 
GRE 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.1 6.0 5.8 5.8 6.3 5.8 5.6 5.6 6.2 6.2 
HUN 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.1 5.8 5.8 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
IRE 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 
ITA 5.5 5.3 5.4 6.6 6.5 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.3 6.3 6.3 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.4 
LAT 6.1 6.1 6.1 5.9 5.8 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.7 
LIT 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.5 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.6 5.6 
LUX 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.9 5.9 6.0 6.0 
MAL 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 
NED 6.9 6.9 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.4 6.3 6.1 6.1 5.8 5.8 5.8 6.0 5.8 6.0 
POL 6.6 6.3 6.2 6.2 6.1 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 
POR 6.7 6.6 6.6 6.4 6.4 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.2 6.2 6.3 6.3 6.3 
ROM 6.9 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.0 6.0 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 
SVK 7.2 6.1 6.1 5.9 5.8 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.8 5.7 
SLV 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.9 5.9 6.0 5.9 5.9 5.8 5.8 5.7 5.7 5.7 
ESP 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.3 7.5 7.7 7.6 
SWE 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 5.8 5.8 
UK 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.9 6.9 6.9 7.0 6.9 6.9 6.9 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.9 6.8 6.7 
EU 28 6.3 6.2 6.2 6.3 6.2 6.2 6.1 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 6.0 
EU 15 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.6 6.5 6.5 6.4 6.3 6.3 6.2 6.3 6.2 6.1 6.2 6.2 6.2 
EU 13 6.1 5.9 6.0 5.9 5.9 5.8 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.7 
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Table A10: Development of the EATR of a domestic investment on the corporate level in the EU Member States (1999–2014) 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
AUT 29.7 29.7 31.2 31.0 31.0 31.2 23.0 23.0 23.0 23.0 23.0 23.0 23.0 23.0 23.0 23.0 
BEL 34.5 34.5 34.4 34.5 29.5 29.5 29.5 25.7 25.4 24.9 24.7 25.3 25.9 26.3 26.5 26.7 
BUL 29.7 28.1 24.2 20.4 20.5 17.1 13.2 13.2 8.8 8.9 8.8 8.8 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 
CRO 23.6 23.6 18.0 18.1 17.8 18.1 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 
CYP 27.5 27.5 26.5 26.9 14.8 14.8 10.6 10.6 10.6 10.6 10.6 11.6 11.6 11.9 15.2 15.2 
CZR 25.4 23.6 23.6 23.6 23.6 24.6 22.7 21.0 21.0 18.4 17.5 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 
DEN 28.3 28.3 26.8 26.8 26.8 26.8 25.1 25.1 22.5 22.6 22.6 22.6 22.6 22.0 22.0 22.2 
EST 22.4 20.4 20.4 20.4 20.4 20.4 18.8 18.1 17.3 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 
FIN 26.1 27.2 27.2 27.2 27.2 27.2 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 23.6 23.8 24.7 23.3 22.3 18.4 
FRA 38.4 36.6 35.8 34.9 35.0 35.0 34.8 34.4 34.6 34.6 34.7 32.8 32.8 34.3 35.4 39.4 
GER 40.4 40.4 35.8 35.8 37.0 35.8 35.8 35.5 35.5 28.2 28.0 28.0 28.2 28.2 28.2 28.2 
GRE 30.4 30.4 30.4 30.4 30.4 30.4 27.8 25.2 21.7 21.8 30.5 21.0 17.5 17.5 24.1 24.1 
HUN 19.3 19.7 19.7 19.7 19.7 17.8 16.6 16.3 19.5 19.5 19.5 19.1 19.3 19.3 19.3 19.3 
IRE 9.4 9.4 9.4 12.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 
ITA 32.0 31.3 30.7 34.3 32.6 31.8 31.8 31.8 31.8 27.3 27.5 27.5 24.9 25.1 25.1 24.0 
LAT 22.7 22.7 22.7 20.2 17.7 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 13.8 13.8 11.8 12.2 12.2 12.1 14.3 
LIT 23.0 19.1 19.1 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7 16.0 15.2 12.7 16.8 12.7 12.7 12.7 13.6 13.6 
LUX 32.6 32.6 32.6 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 25.9 25.9 25.9 25.0 25.0 24.9 24.9 25.5 25.5 
MAL 32.2 32.2 32.2 32.2 32.2 32.2 32.2 32.2 32.2 32.2 32.2 32.2 32.2 32.2 32.2 32.2 
NED 32.3 32.3 31.5 31.0 31.0 31.0 28.4 26.7 23.1 23.1 22.2 22.2 21.8 22.6 21.6 22.6 
POL 30.6 27.1 25.3 25.3 24.2 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.4 17.4 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 
POR 33.4 31.5 31.5 29.5 29.4 24.6 24.6 24.6 23.7 23.7 23.7 24.8 24.8 27.1 27.1 27.1 
ROM 34.4 22.7 22.7 22.9 22.7 22.4 14.7 14.7 14.8 14.8 14.8 14.8 14.8 14.8 14.8 14.8 
SVK 36.7 25.8 25.8 22.3 21.9 16.5 16.8 16.8 16.8 16.8 16.8 16.8 16.8 16.8 20.3 19.4 
SLV 20.9 20.9 20.9 20.9 21.5 21.5 22.1 22.3 20.9 20.0 19.1 18.2 18.2 16.4 15.5 15.5 
ESP 36.5 36.5 36.5 36.5 36.5 36.5 36.5 36.5 34.5 32.8 32.8 32.8 31.9 32.4 33.7 32.6 
SWE 23.8 23.8 23.1 23.1 23.1 23.1 24.6 24.6 24.6 24.6 23.2 23.2 23.2 23.2 19.4 19.4 
UK 28.9 28.7 28.7 29.3 29.3 29.3 29.3 29.2 29.3 28.0 28.3 28.4 26.9 25.2 24.3 22.4 
EU 28 28.3 26.9 26.3 25.7 24.9 24.0 22.6 22.2 21.6 21.1 21.4 20.7 20.5 20.5 20.9 20.8 
EU 15 29.7 29.5 29.3 29.1 28.8 28.4 27.2 26.5 25.6 25.1 25.4 24.8 24.2 24.4 24.6 24.4 
EU 13 26.8 24.1 23.2 22.0 20.7 19.2 17.6 17.6 17.3 16.8 17.0 16.4 16.5 16.3 16.9 17.0 
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Table A11: Development of the cost of capital of a domestic investment on the investor level in the EU Member States (1999–2014) 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
AUT 5.7 5.7 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 
BEL 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.1 6.1 6.1 4.5 4.4 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.5 4.3 5.7 4.8 
BUL 8.0 7.9 7.5 6.8 6.9 6.7 6.2 6.2 6.0 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.1 5.2 
CRO 4.2 4.2 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.5 
CYP 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.1 5.4 5.4 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.2 5.7 4.9 4.4 4.4 
CZR 5.6 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.1 5.1 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 
DEN 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.5 4.8 4.8 5.0 5.2 
EST 6.6 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 
FIN 5.0 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.9 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.5 5.5 5.7 5.5 5.3 5.2 
FRA 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.3 5.2 5.1 4.4 4.4 5.5 4.8 5.4 
GER 5.8 5.9 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.6 4.3 5.9 5.9 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
GRE 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.1 6.0 5.8 5.8 6.3 6.0 5.9 5.9 6.1 5.8 
HUN 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 4.6 4.7 5.8 5.8 5.8 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 
IRE 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.9 5.9 5.8 5.2 
ITA 5.8 5.6 5.7 6.9 6.8 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.2 6.5 6.5 5.8 5.9 5.4 4.7 
LAT 6.1 6.1 6.1 5.9 5.8 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.7 
LIT 6.1 6.0 5.7 5.7 5.9 5.9 5.9 6.0 6.0 5.9 6.1 5.9 5.9 5.9 6.2 6.1 
LUX 4.2 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.4 6.4 
MAL 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 5.7 5.7 5.7 
NED 3.6 3.6 6.7 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.4 6.3 6.1 6.1 5.9 5.9 5.8 6.0 5.8 6.1 
POL 7.0 6.7 6.5 6.5 6.4 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 
POR 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.4 5.3 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.2 5.7 5.8 5.7 5.7 
ROM 7.0 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.0 5.2 5.0 5.4 5.4 6.3 6.3 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 
SVK 9.0 6.9 6.9 6.5 6.4 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.4 5.4 
SLV 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.1 6.3 5.3 5.3 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.5 4.5 
ESP 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 4.3 7.1 7.1 7.0 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.2 
SWE 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 5.3 4.1 4.1 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.3 5.3 
UK 4.9 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.2 4.9 4.9 4.8 5.1 5.0 
EU 28 5.6 5.4 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.3 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.5 
EU 15 4.9 4.9 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.2 5.2 5.4 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.5 
EU 13 6.3 6.0 6.0 5.9 6.0 5.8 5.6 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.4 5.4 5.4 
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Table A12: Development of the EATR of a domestic investment on the investor level in the EU Member States (1999–2014) 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
AUT 39.4 39.4 40.4 40.3 40.3 40.4 34.3 34.3 34.3 34.3 34.1 34.1 34.3 34.3 34.3 34.3 
BEL 44.2 44.2 44.2 44.2 40.5 40.5 40.5 36.2 35.9 35.6 35.4 35.9 36.3 35.5 39.5 36.9 
BUL 42.1 40.9 37.4 32.7 32.9 30.0 21.1 21.1 17.2 13.7 13.6 13.6 13.8 13.8 11.2 11.7 
CRO 23.6 23.6 27.1 27.2 26.9 27.2 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.5 19.0 16.5 25.2 25.2 25.2 
CYP 30.2 30.6 29.5 29.8 22.0 22.0 18.4 18.4 18.4 18.4 18.4 19.3 21.6 21.9 21.4 19.3 
CZR 35.6 28.4 28.4 28.4 28.4 29.5 27.9 26.4 26.4 24.1 23.4 22.6 22.6 22.6 22.6 22.6 
DEN 41.5 41.5 42.5 42.5 42.5 42.5 41.5 41.5 39.9 41.4 41.4 40.6 41.5 41.5 41.9 42.3 
EST 26.0 23.6 23.6 23.6 23.6 23.6 21.8 20.9 20.0 19.1 19.1 19.1 19.1 19.1 19.1 19.1 
FIN 20.2 21.2 21.2 21.2 21.2 21.2 30.9 32.0 32.0 32.0 31.4 31.5 32.2 32.3 31.6 31.5 
FRA 49.1 48.0 46.9 46.0 43.8 42.5 42.4 40.1 42.2 39.5 40.0 38.7 39.2 44.4 47.0 50.2 
GER 49.4 48.3 38.9 38.9 39.8 38.6 38.4 38.2 38.5 32.5 38.9 38.9 39.1 39.1 39.1 39.1 
GRE 40.3 40.3 39.6 39.0 39.0 39.0 28.0 25.4 21.9 22.0 30.6 33.0 34.9 34.9 38.5 29.5 
HUN 26.7 27.0 27.0 27.0 27.0 25.7 26.6 26.8 32.8 32.8 32.8 34.0 28.8 28.8 28.8 28.8 
IRE 38.8 37.3 36.2 38.3 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 38.8 42.9 42.9 45.6 45.5 45.3 43.9 
ITA 39.2 39.1 38.2 41.9 41.6 39.8 39.4 39.4 39.4 35.7 38.5 38.5 37.1 37.3 35.9 33.7 
LAT 22.7 22.7 22.7 20.2 17.7 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 13.8 13.8 18.0 18.3 18.3 18.2 20.2 
LIT 40.3 37.6 36.3 31.8 24.3 24.3 24.3 27.1 26.4 24.3 30.7 27.5 27.5 27.5 28.2 25.1 
LUX 36.3 36.3 35.9 30.4 30.4 30.5 30.4 36.1 36.1 36.1 35.4 35.4 36.4 36.2 37.3 37.3 
MAL 33.5 33.5 33.5 33.5 33.5 33.5 33.5 33.5 33.5 33.5 33.5 33.5 33.5 28.0 28.0 28.0 
NED 33.6 33.6 42.4 42.1 42.1 42.1 40.1 38.8 36.1 36.1 35.4 35.5 35.1 35.7 35.0 35.7 
POL 40.7 37.9 33.9 33.9 33.0 26.7 26.7 26.7 26.9 26.9 26.9 27.0 26.9 27.0 27.0 27.0 
POR 40.9 39.4 39.4 35.3 35.2 31.2 31.2 31.2 30.5 30.5 30.5 31.4 33.9 37.1 38.4 38.4 
ROM 38.8 25.3 25.3 25.5 25.3 25.1 18.8 21.4 23.2 23.2 26.9 26.9 23.2 23.2 23.2 23.2 
SVK 47.5 35.9 35.9 32.2 31.9 14.2 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 18.8 17.9 
SLV 38.2 38.2 38.2 38.2 38.6 38.6 40.4 30.4 29.2 27.4 26.7 25.9 25.9 24.5 26.1 26.1 
ESP 33.2 33.2 33.2 33.2 31.3 31.3 31.3 31.3 32.8 39.2 39.2 40.3 40.0 42.8 43.8 43.0 
SWE 32.8 32.8 32.3 32.3 32.3 36.3 33.5 33.5 37.9 37.9 36.9 36.9 36.9 36.9 34.2 34.2 
UK 34.5 34.4 34.4 34.7 34.7 34.7 34.8 34.7 34.7 34.0 34.2 39.4 38.4 37.3 34.3 33.0 
EU 28 35.9 34.3 34.3 33.5 32.6 31.3 29.7 29.3 29.3 28.9 29.7 30.2 30.1 30.6 30.9 30.3 
EU 15 37.4 37.2 37.6 37.2 36.7 36.5 35.6 35.3 35.2 35.2 36.1 36.7 37.3 38.0 38.4 37.4 
EU 13 34.3 31.2 30.7 29.5 28.1 25.7 23.4 22.9 23.0 22.2 22.8 23.1 22.5 22.6 22.9 22.6 
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